The Quest for Unity

A Study in the Psychology of Primitive Man in relation to Religion.

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Chapter I

The Meaning of Primitive

The question of the value of a study such as this depends at the outset upon the definition of "primitive". Strictly speaking "primitive" is near to the beginnings, the origins of the things so designated. The "primitive" in man, therefore, should be that which characterises him near his origin as man, when he began to be human. Remote as that may seem to be from us, there are not wanting materials, as we shall see presently, for knowing something about it. The reconstruction of the skull & thence also of the brain of fossil man, from remains preserved from the ages when, along with human characters, his bodily structure was full of vestiges of his kinship to the anthropoid apes, throws unexpected light upon how he must have thought, & upon the differ-ence in that regard between him & civilised or cultured man. But we give the term a fuller extension, albeit with all necessary caution. We accept this statement by Prof. Hopkins of Yale as expressing our views "In using the word primitive of early undeveloped forms of religion it must be understood that primitive is not synonymous with primordial. The word is appli-ed exactly as it is commonly applied to primitive art, to conn-ote art found among peoples at a low stage to-day or in ancient times." [1] When we thus include under primitive the mind of the savage who, in the present day, is at a low stage of culture & in religion, as in other respects, is at the "levels" probably

1. The History of Religions. E.Washburn Hopkins.(Macmillan. 1918) p.14.

occupied by early man, the range of the study is very greatly increased.

"With some exceptions", says Prof. Hopkins, continuing the sentence just quoted, "the simpler form is the more primitive form of thought, whether in art or religion." And in pursuing man's thoughts on religion to their simpler & more primitive forms, the student of religion is merely following the most modern method of other sciences. The hyper-sensitive student of anatomy may view with disgust the snail or worm he is required to dissect, until he discovers that their digestive system is a kind of diagram or groundplan of the human & enables him to see how the more complex system has been built up. The zoologist finds in the nervous arrangements of the mollusc or the sea-anemone ana-logues to the simplest nervous reflexes of the human body which are the antecedents & rudimentary forms of thinking. So the investigator of religion sees a great & keenly discriminating light cast upon its highest forms from its simpler & ruder expres-sions in primitive & savage life. There is no modern science which does not assume the Law of Evolution as the backbone of its study; & the sciences of religion are no exception. The richest illumination of the growing thing is to see it grow - especially, & this is important, when keeping the highest stages, the perfect-ion of the thing, always in view. The end interprets the be-ginnings, as Aristotle taught us to say, rather than the begin-

-nings the end. The seed by itself has little meaning until the flower it is to become sheds backward its radiance upon it. Each of the great evolutionary Sciences, it is sometimes forgotten, has some rich & complex form or forms always in its mind as it investigates what is rudimentary & primitive. The zoologist never quite forgets that the splendid organism of man is "the roof & crown of things". The astronomer as he studies the nebul-ae has at the back of his mind that "daedal" earth on which he stands at his telescope. And the student of religion, let us say, the Christian philosopher, is but following the same legit-imate track when he views all the previous stages in the evol-ution of religion & morals in the light of the highest forms, the richest unifications, of these, known to him, such as an ideal humanity or an ideal of human society. With these final express-ions, which in some sense are also final causes, ~~xx xxxx~~ of man's progress in view, the rudimentary forms of his belief & conduct are illuminated with meaning, & the direction of his tendencies becomes significant. On the other hand, these prim-itive elements & tendencies throw light upon the highest embod-iments of ethics & religion from their simple, diagrammatic forms; & the value, which modern science keenly maintains in all its spheres, of seeing a process of evolution along the whole line of its development - stage melting into stage - may justly be claimed for the study of the Psychology of Primitive Relig-ion.

Professor Elliot Smith, in dealing with the word "primitive", declares that "it is necessary to protest against the common mis-use of this expression, of which", he says, "modern ethnologists in particular are guilty. For instance, it has become a pract-ice to refer to all the customs & traditions of such peoples as the aboriginal Australians & the Bushmen of South Africa as 'prim-itive', although it is patent that many of these elements of culture, & especially those which are most often used as illustr-ations of 'primitive' beliefs & practices, & labelled as such, have been borrowed in relatively recent times from more advanced & alien civilisations."[1] This statement we quote not because we are in agreement with it, but because it expresses a theory whose sub-stantiation would considerably reduce the value of any psychol-ogical analysis which might be attempted of primitive mind. The difference between this theory & what this new school would call the orthodox ethnology is concentrated in the contrasted inter-pretations given of a large fact with which all anthropologists are familiar. This fact is the striking similarity of human institutions in all ages of man's development & in widely separ-ated areas of the world. Identical or extremely similar ideas, myths, customs, magical & religious rites, forms of art, invent-ions or discoveries, & invented articles, are found among tribes the most remote from each other. There are, for instance, no known peoples who are ignorant of fire, just as the tribes have

1. The Evolution of Man. (Oxford)1924. pp. 49-50.

yet to be discovered which have no beliefs that can neither be called religious nor described as at least tending towards religion. Of invented things, the universality of wrought flints of Neolithic or Palaeolithic type which are found in all quarters of the globe & align the Australian native of to-day with the Mousterian man of perhaps a hundred thousand years ago, is a good example. Or again, of the "bull-roarer" that simple piece of sharpened stick, Mr. Andrew Lang wrote: "It is found, always as a sacred instrument, employed in religious mysteries, in New Mexico in Australia, in New Zealand, in ancient Greece & in Africa; while it is a peasant boy's plaything in England."[1] The Spaniards invading Mexico found a sacramental service among the Aztecs presenting astonishing resemblances to the Christian Eucharist.[2] The conquerors, indeed, regarded the native ceremonies as malignant caricatures invented by the devil in mockery of the true sacred rites of the Catholic Church. As a further example, baptismal washing or sprinkling of a child in connection with the giving of a name existed among the Cherokees, the Peruvians, the Negroes of the Guinea coast, & many other tribes in different parts of the world.

The two main explanations of these similarities in religious institutions & practices which, up to a few years ago, had occurred to anthropologists, are thus stated by Dr. L.R.Farnell. Referring to Anthropology, he says; "It has shown us that through

1. Custom & Myth.(Longmans) p.31.
2. Primitive Ritual & Belief. E.O.James. p.133.

all the present societies of savage men there prevails an extra-ordinary uniformity, in spite of much local variation, in ritual & mythology, a uniformity so striking as to suggest belief in an ultimately identical tradition, or, perhaps more reasonably, the psychologic theory that the human brain-cell in different races at the same stage of development responds with the same religious speech or the same religious act to the same stimuli supplied by the environment."[1] The former of the two explanations here given by Dr. Farnell refers really to the old theory of a dogmat-ic orthodoxy, that there was an original revelation of God to man, & consequently an original monotheism from which the count-less superstitions & varieties of religion grew by a process of degeneration. So considerable an authority as Prof. Jevons adhered to this theory in his earlier works, & he endeavoured to identify, without much success, the tribal god of totemism with such a monotheistic belief; but he has since altered his opinion. This idea is so clearly the product of a credal position & dogm-atic bias that we shall not stay to refute it.

More important is the theory to which the brilliant W. H. R. Rivers inclined in the last year or two before his death, to which G. Elliot Smith has attached his distinguished name, & which Prof. W.J. Perry devotes himself with equal industry & ingenuity to substantiating. Rivers pointed out with truth that the react-ion against the orthodox theological theory just mentioned went

1. The Evolution of Religion. p.9

too far in its neglect of the influence of degeneration on the history of human society.[1] The many cases in which degeneration had actually taken place thus came to be ignored. Where, for example, the means of navigation were rude, it was not realised that in such cases a higher art might have been lost through degeneration. Hence very early migrations across wide seas were ruled out as impossible. But once degeneration was restored as a factor in the argument, & such migrations were seen to be feasible without the hypothesis of land connections, the possibility of transmission of one culture over a wide area of the globe was recovered. From his study of the Melanesians & Polynesians Rivers was much impressed by the evidence of migrations over large areas of the South Seas, & of the transmission of the culture of a higher people to a lower, masked often, however, by the incapacity of the lower race to retain the transmitted belief or practice, or only in a mutilated form. The importance of this transmission hypothesis lies in the fact that it accounts for similarities in ideas & rites among far-separated peoples by the contact of one race with another by means of migration. In such a case what might seem to be "primitive",-a myth, a religious rite, a magical practice, & original to one people, may prove to have been derived from some superior & perhaps forgotten race.

A full statement & criticism of this theory here are not possible.

1. Medicine, Magic & Religion. pp.58-59.

We simply sketch it as a background to the psychological theory which we hold & which must be adjusted to the truth in it. We find it carried out with great thoroughness by Professor Elliot Smith. The essence of his view is that all man's beliefs were practically created at a certain, no doubt very extensive, period, & probably by one race, the Pre-dynastic Egyptians. In referring to myths & beliefs connected with agriculture & irrigation in Egypt, he says that they "came to include within their scope all the innermost beliefs of mankind at the time when the foundations of the thoughts & hopes of civilised man for all time were being established."[1] At this time,, he says,man was "framing the whole of his beliefs". The effects of this first system of thought "are seen not only in the ritual practices of every religion but also in the direction of the innermost thoughts of all peoples & their expression in every language."[2] These beliefs it is maintained by this school were carried into all quarters of the world by the diffusion & migrations of a people, called by Mr. Perry "the Children of the Sun", who mummified their dead, made megalithic tombs & monuments, & worshipped the sun. It would be contended, moreover, that the religious ideas & customs & the magical practices of savage man everywhere have not originated in the country in which they are found or in the crude reflections of the people who hold them, but have filtered through to them from direct or indirect contact with that wonderful origin-

1. The Evolutions of Man. G. Elliot Smith. (Milford. 1924.) p.128
2. Op. cit. p.130.

-ating race.

We shall mark our divergence from this theory by reference to two further sentences of Prof. Elliot Smith, which we quote, italic-ising the first for its bearing on our own position. In speak-ing of the elements of civilisation, he says: "There is no nat-ural impulse in Man to invent such customs or ability to do so independently in one generation. In other words, the possession of the arts of civilisation by any population is positive evid-ence of the most definite kind of contact, directly or indirect-ly, with the people who actually invented their particular arts."[1] It appears, then, that there is such a thing as invention & orig-inality. And there seems to be no good reason for supposing that the mind of man was nowhere inventive & original except among the Pre-dynastic Egyptians. Yet this is distinctly the impression conveyed by Prof. Perry in his book, "The Origin of Magic & Religion", where we must say the arguments appear to us often highly conjectural & ill-supported. Our position is quite the contrary to that of Dr. Elliot Smith in the statement we have italicised. There is in man just such a natural impulse as he denies. It is an impulse which it is the main purpose of this essay to investigate, an impulse which is in the nature of mind & is operative in all races. It is the impulse towards unific-ation, the tendency to unify both his thought & his practical life, what we shall name his Quest for Unity. In this endeavour,

1. The Evolution of Man. p.122.

the imperfection of his instrument, his mind, its slow growth itself in unification & in all its powers, its uncertain grasp upon phenomena, accounts alike for the crudeness & immense variety of his primitive beliefs on the one hand, & his long periods of stagnation at low levels of culture, on the other; while the developing power of unification, of mental integration, is the means by which he attains the loftiest achievments of his philosophy & his art, his ethics & his religion.

The dust of the controversy between the Transmission & the Psychological Theories of primitive mind is still in the air: & time must be allowed for the newer hypothesis to be tested by reference to the facts it sets out to explain. In adhering to the other, we would acknowledge the value of the transmission theory in directing attention to the great part played by the migration & contact of peoples, & the consequent diffusion of one culture over a wide area, & also to the important role of degeneration of races, so that the higher culture becomes a half-forgotten tale, a myth, a dim memory of a Golden Age. These must be given their place in the causation of similarities of human belief & custom in lands far distant from each other. We should also accept Prof. Elliot Smith's criticism of the idea involved in the phrase "psychic unity" employed by some of the older school of ethnologists to account for these similarities.[1] It involves, we imagine, an unnecessary dogmatic postulate. On the other hand, we

1. Op. cit. pp. 112 f.

should dissent from the idea of Rivers that the Psychological theory takes the view that "the human mind is the same everywhere"[1]. On the contrary, the human mind is different at different stages of its development, just as the human brain is; & both are different in various races. And these differences account for much in the variety of human belief & custom. But we shall maintain throughout this study that the resemblances in man's ideas & practices are chiefly traceable to the similarity in structure of the human brain everywhere & in the consequent nature of his mind. As the physical organ is at all known stages of man's history substantially the same in constitution & in nervous processes, so the mind has certain universal characteristics, powers & methods of action. The lowest savage has the tendency, however ineffectual it often is, to work up his percepts into concepts, to form general ideas from observed facts; & he succeeds even in arriving at what are for him general laws, vague & faulty as they are to us. Given data he makes inferences & leaps at conclusions: often the inference is an unexpected one, & he takes a very long & erratic leap which lands him in some odd places & queer notions; but he is learning to walk mentally, feebly essaying the road to science & philosophy. This similarity of the operation of the brain is seen in the nineteenth century intellects of Darwin & Russell Wallace, which working on the same data arrived simultaneously at the Theory of Evolut-

1. Medicine Magic & Religion. p.77.

-ion; & it accounts for numerous claims in the same age to prior-
-ity with respect to the same invention or discovery, of which
wireless telegraphy & the "tanks" are familiar examples. The
similar operations of the common mind of the race - more fragment
-ary in their data, more rudimentary in their powers, & vaguer
in their results - explain the appearance of such institutions as
Exogamy, Totemism, & the many purificatory rituals, in most
widely-separated peoples & portions of the globe.
Moreover, the data for the thoughts & inferences of primitive man
are very limited, & they ~~very~~ are much the same everywhere. ~~the same.~~
The nearer we come to the primitive man, the more the means to
his ends tend to coincide over the whole race, as is shown by
flint tools & weapons scattered all over the world & in many
strata of time. Hence, as might be expected, the similarity in
the means he takes in various peoples & ages to express his early
religious & social ideas & to attain his crude moral & spiritual
ends. As Mr. Stanley A. Cook well says: "if we look back upon
the history of thought, it is obvious that there was once a time
when the amount of divergence must have been exceedingly small.
The factors that made for variation of ideas were wanting, &, as
we repeatedly see in primitive or rudimentary societies, a cert-
-ain oneness of all thought is characteristic of the lower levels.
Starting as we must with groups, & not with isolated individuals,
we must conceive a stage of development when the contents of
minds were quantitatively very small & closely related."[1.]

1. The Study of Religions. p.84.

There is, therefore, a primitive type of brain, such, for instance, as that of Palaeolithic Neanderthal man or that of the existing native Australian: there is a primitive type of mind, such as are those in which imagination is active, the brain centres for it being well-developed, while, owing to lack of pre-frontal dev--elopment of the cortex, there is a deficiency in reason, co--ordination & control. Those beliefs & customs of savage man are primitive which are the product of that primitive type of mind, or of non-primitive mind which for some reason or other keeps the co-ordinative, reasoning, controlling power in abeyance. That man is "primitive", whether he is a Vedda of Ceylon or a European peasant, whose ideas & practices are of that character.

Chapter II

Materials for a Psychology of Primitive Man

1. Naturally the first source of data for a psychology of the prim-
-ive mind is Palaeontology. The fossil remains of early man &
the relics of his life & work discovered & investigated by that
science are surprisingly fruitful in knowledge of him considering
the fragmentary nature of the material. The reason is, of
course, that we can bring to bear upon each small relic of his
anatomy or his work our general knowledge of the bodily & mental
structure of man, both savage & civilised, as he is, & thus form
a fair idea of what he was like & even of what he thought. But
besides this, the remains of primitive man in fossil & other forms
are themselves so numerous & so well-authenticated that there may
be said to be a sufficiently continuous anatomical chain of inter-
-mediate forms between modern man & a generalised ancestor both
of him & of the existing anthropoid apes. For example, the
Neanderthal type of man, so-called from Neanderthal near Düssel-
-dorf where one of the earliest specimens was found, is represen-
-ted by a great many remains, portions of & even complete skelet-
-ons. It is not necessary for our particular purpose in this
study that we should trace the anatomical history of man from the
beginning down to modern times. There are numerous works in
which this is done. The data we are seeking may best be found by
glancing at a number of the types of early man & stages of his

development, & observing the relation between them & the type of mind by which they may have been accompanied, the psychological characters of his mind, indeed, which can with some accuracy be inferred from his anatomical structure & above all, naturally, from the structure of his skull & of his brain as inferred from his skull.

(a). In turning, then, first to Homo neanderthalensis, it is to be noted at the outset that this race is generally regarded by anthropologists as not an ancestor of modern man but as constit-uting a distinct species which became extinct. None the less what can be gathered concerning his mind is of much interest to us. Elliot Smith gives a vivid picture of him, which we may quote as displaying many of the sub-human characters which must have belonged to man's true ancestors. "His short, thick-set, & coarsely built body was carried in a half-stooping slouch upon short, powerful, & half-flexed legs of peculiarly ungraceful form. His thick neck sloped forward from the broad shoulders to support the massive flattened head, which protruded forward, so as to form an unbroken curve of neck & back, in place of the alternat-ion of curves which is one of the graces of the truly erect Homo sapiens. The heavy overhanging eyebrow-ridges & retreating forehead, the great coarse face with its large eye-sockets, broad nose, & receding chin, combined to complete the picture of un-attractiveness, which it is more probable than not was still

further emphasised by a shaggy covering of hair over most of the body. The arms were relatively short, & the exceptionally large hands lacked the delicacy & the nicely-balanced co-operation of thumb & fingers which is regarded as one of the most distinctive of human characteristics."[1] To this strange being, so ape-like in many respects, we cannot deny the name of human; for he knew the use of fire, made rude flint weapons, hunted the mammoth & the woolly rhinoceros in Europe during more than one ice-age, & ~~stranger to think of still~~ it is probable, buried his dead with some faith in a future life.

There is special significance in the character of the brain of Neanderthal Man. His skull & presumably his brain were actually larger than those of modern Europeans. But Elliot Smith points out that "the development of the brain of Neanderthal Man was partial & unequal. That part of the organ which plays the outstanding part in determining mental superiority was not only relatively, but actually, much smaller than it is in Homo sapiens. The large size of the Neanderthal brain was due to a great development of that region which was probably concerned primarily with the mere recording of the fruits of experience rather than with the acquisition of great skill in the use of the hand & the attainment of the sort of knowledge that comes with manual experiment."[2] The importance of this characteristic of Neanderthal man lies in the fact that the low development of

1. The Evolution of Man. pp.69-70.
2. Op. cit. p.70.

of the frontal region of the cranium is necessarily accompanied by a low development of the pre-frontal region of the brain. It is striking to discover that this deficiency in the frontal part of the cortex is shared by the human infant, & by such a primitive existing type as the Australian aborigine, with Neanderthal Man. The cerebral area referred to is that in which the power of co-ordination or of unification resides. In its lowest development this co-ordination is at first simply of muscular movement, particularly of the hands & eyes; but with the increase in size & refinement of this prefrontal region of the neo-pallium, the power of co-ordination also grows until the mind is capable of making complex wholes of its experience, & of integrating its thought into the higher unifications of religion, science & philosophy. On the other hand, it is part of our task to show in later pages how the absence or defect of this capacity of co-ordinative thought accounts for the forms taken by the beliefs & customs of primitive & savage man.

(b). At an immense distance in earlier time from the appearance of Neanderthal Man in the world, there existed a creature of a nature & characteristics so ambiguous that there was for a time after its discovery in a few fossil fragments, a vigorous controversy as to whether it was ape or man. Pithecanthropus erectus, reconstructed from a skull, a femur, two molars & one pre-molar tooth unearthed by Dr. Dubois in Java in 1894, is now, however,

generally accepted as belonging to the human family, & as the most primitive known member of it. It is at least as early as the Lower Pleistocene. There are two characters observable in this most ancient skeleton which are extremely interesting to us as pointing forward to the line of human progress & hinting at the development of early man's psychology.

The first point is that the skull of Pithecanthropus shows that the speech centres in the brain were highly developed, the corres-ponding lobe being twice the size of that of the ape, though still only half that of the normal human. "The endocranial cast of Pithecanthropus", says Elliot Smith, "reveals a localised & precocious expansion of those areas of the brain which we assoc-iate with the power of articulate speech, that is, ability to appreciate, in a far greater degree than other animals are cap-able of, the auditory symbolism of sounds, & to reproduce them as a means of communication with its fellows, not merely as sig-nals expressive of emotional states, such as most animals can impress upon one another, but also as the means for transmitting information & ideas, & attaining the communion of knowledge & belief that is Man's exclusive prerogative."[1] This suggests the important question as to the relation between man's brain & his human characters on the one hand, & the modifications of his bodily structure in the process of its evolution. Here, for

on the other

1. Op. cit. p.84.

instance, we have highly-developed speech centres combined with the erect position of the body. The necessary connection is evident enough; for the hanging position of the head in quadru-peds makes the free passage of sound impossible & prevents the evolution of such vocal organs as are compatible with articulate speech.

The second point which emerges, a similar & related one to the first, from this glimpse of the Java Man, is raised by the fact that the femur of this skeleton is of a less apelike & more human character than the skull. Prof. Scott-Elliot has pointed out that this is " a curious confirmation of what ought to happen on theoretical grounds. Man theoretically ought to have begun to walk uprightly before his brain developed to the average scale required in mankind." [1] This statement is substantially true, if it is remembered that there is an erect position of the body apart from walking upright, which was attained by those more primitive forms, such as the Tree-Shrews of the type of the Spectral Tarsier, which were the probable ancestors of the Simiid-ae & thus of man. In any case, the relation of the erect posture of the body to the brain remains the same. The forward hanging pos-ition of the head in quadrupeds & to a less degree in arboreal apes, necessitates strong neck muscles & massive bony attachments on the skull. The erect position, with the skull resting as on the top of a column, dispenses with these muscles & their attach-

1. Primitive Man & his Story. Scott-Elliot. p.44.

-ments, & gives room & opportunity for backward enlargement of the brain. It is clear also that in the hanging position only a limited weight of brain is tolerable, while in the resting posit-ion there is much greater scope. Again, the massive projecting jaw in apelike forms demands powerful muscles, especially with the added weight of heavy teeth, & these muscles require strong bony ridges about the temples & eye-orbits for their attachment. As the jaw recedes & the teeth decline in size & weight - perhaps as a result of the invention of fire & the eating of cooked food - these muscles grow less massive, the bony ridges cease to be necessary, & a larger frontal development & a higher forehead become possible.

(c). The remark just made points to the fact that at a certain stage in his evolution man's fitness to survive in the struggle for e existence concentrated in his brain. We may connect this fact with a third early human type which occurs on the evolutionary ladder somewhere between Pithecanthropus & Neanderthal Man. It is the fossil type known as Eoanthropus or from the place of its discovery in Sussex, Piltdown Man. There has been a famous dispute concerning these fragments, the crucial point of which was the question whether the extremely apelike lower jaw found near them belonged to this undoubtedly human individual. In accepting Elliot Smith's view that the whole of the remains con-stitute a very early human type, we may quote the inference he

connects with it. "The outstanding interest of the Piltdown skull is the confirmation it affords of the view that in the evolution of Man the brain led the way. It is the veriest truism that Man has emerged from the simian state in virtue of the enrichment of the structure of his mind. It is singular that so much biological speculation has neglected to give adequate recognition to this cardinal fact. The brain attained what may be termed the human rank at a time when the jaws & face, & no doubt the body also, still retained much of the uncouthness of Man's simian ancestors. In other words, Man at first, so far as his general appearance & 'build' are concerned, was merely an Ape with an overgrown brain. The importance of the Piltdown skull lies in the fact that it affords tangible confirmation of these inferences."[1].

Up to a certain point then, the bodily organisation of the being who ultimately became Man was the main subject for development. He acquired, for instance, the kind of jaw & teeth necessary for the kind of food - nuts, fruits & the like - he lived upon. But he was neither strong nor swift enough to escape the great carnivora among which he lived - had it not been for the trees. He survived because, like his fellow-primates, he was not "probably arboreal" as Robert Louis Stevenson called his far-back ancestor, but actually so. When, therefore, he left the trees & walked on the ground, his chance of survival would have fallen to zero. But here, so to say, the brain stepped in. Mental power took charge of the business of life. The erect position into which

1. Op. cit. pp.67-68.

he was probably forced by the thinning of the trees & the vanish-ing of the forest, gave room for the growth of the brain. Man's organs of speech in their new position became capable of a new variety of sounds, & he acquired his unique possession of langu-age. Words became the instruments not merely of speech but of thought, & reflection as well as language began to be articulate. The great advantage of speech would be in making cooperation, social action, possible. A mere bleat or growl might call an-other to his assistance; but to be able to speak is to have the power to communicate a plan & to unite in common action. "The differentia of man", says Marett, "the quality that marks him off from the other animals kinds - is undoubtedly the power of articul-ate speech. Thereby his mind itself becomes articulate. If language is ultimately a creation of the intellect, yet hardly less fundamentally is the intellect a creation of language."[1].

(d). A very important element in the development of man's brain & consequently of his psychology is curiously connected with an interesting phase in his very distant animal ancestry. The striking part discovered by Prof. Elliot Smith, his pupil Mr. W Wood Jones, & others, to have been played by a family of ancient small insectivores, the Tree-Shrews, in the ancestry of man & the history of his brain, is one of the recent romances of discovery in this field. We can only briefly touch upon the two salient points in the story. The first is the substitution of reliance

1. Anthropology. R.R.Marett. (Williams & Norgate.1923) p.130.

upon the sense of sight, upon vision, in one of these Shrew-like creatures for reliance upon smell & the olfactory functions. This occurred when it became arboreal. The result of this as shown in Tarsius, or the Spectral Tarsius, that curious living representative of extinct types, is "a noteworthy reduction in the size of the olfactory parts of the brain" & "an enormous "development of the visual cortex in the neo-pallium."[1] The evolution which brought the eyes to the front in Tarsius was a step in the direction of the conjugation of the eyes so as to co-ordinate two images into one, which is the function of stereo-scopic vision.[2] This is not yet in the power of the little Tree-Shrew, but it is on the way towards it. Out of this simple tendency to stereoscopic vision, to co-ordinate the two separate images of the eyes into a distinct whole, & the unifying, concen-trating effort of attention involved in it, there has probably grown the general visualising & imaginative operations of thought. We may have here the germ of the co-ordinative power of imagination which will play some part in our future discussions. We remark at the moment that imagination appears to reside in the visual (& auditory) area of the brain ; its co-ordinations are generally in visual form, images seen in the mind; & in the order of brain & mind development both imagination & its organ are well-develope-ed when the pre-frontal area of the cortex & its function are comparatively rudimentary. The importance of these facts may

Elliot Smith

1. Op. cit. p.31.
2. ibid. pp.141-142.

appear in later chapters.

The second point to which we referred concerns the evolution of that pre-frontal region of the brain just mentioned. It is in connection with the development of muscular control & co-ordination, especially in the use & guidance of the hands in this early ancestor of the apes & of man, the climbing Tree-Shrew, in conjunction also with its development of eye-mindedness as Prof. J.Arthur Thomson calls it, that according to Elliot Smith this area & function began their remarkable course. We may be permitted to quote his account of the process. "The high specialisation of the sense of sight awakened the curiosity to examine the objects around it with closer minuteness & supplied guidance to the hands in executing more precise & more skilled movements than any that the Tree-Shrew attempts. Such habits not only tended to develop the motor cortex itself, trained the tactile & kinaesthetic senses, & linked up their cortical areas in bonds of more intimate associations with the visual cortex, but they stimulated the process of specialisation within or alongside the motor cortex of a mechanism for regulating the action of that cortex itself. Thus arose an organ of attention which co-ordinated with the activities of the whole neopallium so as the more efficiently to regulate the various centres dontrolling the muscles of the whole body. In this way not only is the guidance of all the senses secured, but the way opened for

for all the muscles of the body to act harmoniously so as to permit the concentration of their action for the performance of delicate & finely adjusted movements.

In some such way as this there was evolved from the motor area itself, in the form of an outgrowth placed at first immediately in front of it, a formation that attains much larger dimensions & a greater specialisation of structure in the primates than in any other Order. It is the germ of the great prefrontal area of the human brain, which is said to be "concerned with attention & the general orderly co-ordination of psychic processes. This area, in far greater measure than any other part of the brain, deserves of being regarded as the seat of the higher mental faculties & the crowning glory & distinction of the human fabric."[1] Deficiency in this prefrontal development with the accompanying sloping forehead is a marked point of difference in primitive man from modern cultured man; & the absence of the power to make orderly, coherent unifications of experience in the mentality of primitive types of men accounts for many things in their beliefs & practices which later we are to investigate.

(e). It is the possession of this area of the brain well-developed, with the consequent higher forehead, which distinguishes the men of the Upper Palaeolithic age from earlier types, such as Piltdown & Neanderthal Man. These men of the Caves of France & Spain & elsewhere in Europe, with their truly remarkable art & their great variety in weapons & their burial customs showing

1. Op. cit. 32-33.

some idea of a future existence for their dead, are true members of the species Homo sapiens. Still they are of primitive type in some respects; & the fact that their often realistic & accur-ate work in painting & carving animals on the walls of their caves had evidently a magical purpose & was probably the occupat-ion of an artist-magician caste, indicates the distance between them & the modern mentality.

Enough has perhaps been said upon these types to show the consid-erable amount of material which Palaeontology supplies for our study & the ways in which that material becomes available in illuminating the nature & processes of the mind of early man. Even so general a survey provides us with an impression of the mighty struggle upwards of those primitive ancestors of ours & their kin, which moves us to a certain sympathy & reverence towards them for the heritage they have conquered for us & for the dim, unrecorded heroisms by which it was won. "We stand," says Sir James Frazer, "upon the foundations reared by the generations that have gone before, & we can but dimly realise the painful & prolonged efforts which it has cost humanity to struggle up to the point, no very exalted one after all, which we have reached. Our gratitude is due to the nameless & forgotten toilers, whose patient thought & active exertions have largely made us what we are."[1.]

1. Taboo & Perils of the Soul. p.421.

2. The sources in modern life of material for a psychology of prim-itive man are largely those which are the subject of Psychology in general. We shall touch lightly some of these sources in order to dispose of a few preliminary questions which arise in connection with the study in which we are engaged. From what has been already said of man's animal ancestry & the influence of that far distant heredity upon him, it will be clear that we recognise no unbridgeable gap between the animal & man or between instinct & intelligence. The latter distinction will occupy us considerably in later chapters. With regard to the other quest-ion, it seems to us unnecessary to postulate a special creation to account for man, since the creation takes place much more beautiful-ly & interestingly by the growth which goes on all the time, like the arraying of the lilies as described in the Sermon on the Mount, or the growth of the corn in the little parable. We like the stout words of the late Prof. Sanday, in one of the latest lectures he wrote: "It requires an effort to realise, truism as it is, that to write the history of Religion, we have to begin with a tabula rasa. We have to go back to the cave-men. When man first appeared up on the earth, everything existed in posse but absolutely nothing in esse. The creature newly stranded upon the earth's surface, from the first moment that he acquired a substantative existence, was left - or seemed to be left - to his own resources. Whatever divine help might be awaiting him, was as yet invisible & potential." "Religion", he says again, "be-

-gins with a blank. But everything begins with a blank. It seems almost too much to say that Man began as a conscious being. He began as a sentient being, with the potentiality of consciousness"[1] We shall look, as we have already done, therefore, to the psychology of animals to illustrate that of man, because the mental life of man flows in a current continuous with the instincts & rudimentary ideas of his animal ancestry, & thus what we know of the "mind stuff" of animals leads us nearer to the springs & simpler streams of that human mentality.

3. A further source of light upon the mind of the "primitive" is found in the mind of the savage of our own day. We have already maintained in our first chapter that in some respects, & in certain races & regions especially, the savage is the primitive. The Australian is physically an early type of man; his skull & brain are of an early type; therefore, making all allowance for possible impacts of other & perhaps superior races very far back in his history - whence, it may be, his myths of the Altcheringa, his Golden Age in the past, - it is safe to treat his thinking as of a primitive character. We devote a part of this essay to a criticism of the mistaken theory of a French school of ethnologists or rather sociologists, as they would prefer to be called, who hold that the thought of primitive man - & this includes the present-day savage - is fundamentally or at least radically different from the thought of civilised man.

4. For the same reason this French school of Durkheim & Levy-Bruhl

1. Divine Overruling. (Oxford) pp.32-33.

declare that there is nothing infantile or analogous to the Mind of the Child in the thinking of the "primitive"; & so they reject all light from that small human lamp. But, on the contr-ary, the child not only before birth but after it, is the embry-onic human; & there are striking primitive traits in the child mind. We have noted the important point that in the infant as in the race the prefrontal area of the brain is the last to be developed. The deficiency in the co-ordinative, & - which is but the obverse side of the same thing - in the discriminative power of the mind, which is chiefly localised in that prefrontal region, may be seen in the ease, for example, with which a child can be led to treat a dead thing, such as a table or a chair which has hurt him, as living & culpable. The same lack of clear distinctions in his concepts, as between "living" &"dead", is, as is pointed out later, characteristic of truly primitive man. Another analogy of value is found in the fact that imagin-ation, with its functional area in the brain, develops earlier than the prefrontal area & the co-ordinative reason. Hence the early imaginative constructions of the child, its simple accept-ance of the reality of the unseen, its invisible playmates, its mythopoeic faculty, are reflections as in a clear mirror of a primitive trait.

5. Lastly, the Modern Mind itself is not so far removed from the primitive & the savage that the study of it may not be necessary

in order that we may understand that distant cousin or ancestor of ours. "Reversion" is a very real phenomenon in civilisation. Primitive physical types reappear, primitive passions break volcanically to the surface, & primitive superstitions are found like fossils even in the upper strata of the modern mind, in the world as we know it. These are material fitted to help us to understand primitive & savage man, just as his mind - & that is one of the encouragements of such a study as this - helps us to understand our own. It is probably an exaggeration, as Dr. Marett points out, to say as some anthropologists are inclined to do, that "the typical savage & the typical peasant of Europe stand exactly on a par in respect to their power of general intelligence."[1] But speaking of the endeavour to project ourselves into the life of the peasant, he says it "is no easy task. Yet we are near enough in sympathy to our own folk to make it well worth the trying. Then, using the peasant as our bridge, let us proceed as best we can to do the same for the remoter savage. From folk-lore to the anthropology of savages,- that, I am sure, is the only sound method in social psychology."[2] There is finally, one common feature in all human thought from its lowest to its sublimest. It is that it always seeks a whole, strives for unity within itself, & rests most gladly in some unification whether of the inward or the outward life. The philosopher, the man of science, the reformer, the mystic, the man of faith - all "declare that they seek a city", some finely

1. Anthropology. p.151.

2. Psychology & Folk-Lore.p.19

unified whole in theory or in life. So also we have sight of that low-browed, shaggy ancestor of ours, with his bleak look, regarding his world, seeking, it is true, first the unity of his own body, but not long after seeking the unification of his soul in the unseen. We may find thus a string, to hold the beads of *our* studies of the primitive together, in the Quest for Unity.

Chapter III

MAN'S QUEST FOR UNITY

An avenue of approach to the psychology of Primitive Man may be found in the principle of the Quest for Unity which it appears to us is fundamental in human nature. It is a tendency which can be traced & which is profoundly influential through all man's thinking & practical life as soon as, & wherever, he is recognisably human. Its presence in the mental life of civilised man needs no demonstration. The late Mr. Bosanquet defined Reason as "the spirit of totality" & again as "the nisus towards the whole". Certainly, the characteristic activity of the mind, from the formation of a general idea to the great systems of Philosophy, from the humblest perception to the laws of Science & the Uniformity of Nature itself, from the vaguest conception of spirit to the monistic unity or the Supreme Personality of Religion, is the endeavour to create "wholes" in thought, to organise experience into some form or other of coherent totality. As is well-known, it was one of the works of Herbert Spencer's genius for generalisation to show that this tendency in man's mind is but a particular instance of the general course of the evolutionary process. This is evident from his famous definition of that process as a passage of matter from "an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity" through a continuous series of "integrations" & "differentiations". We

shall find these latter terms useful in the exposition of the principle of the Quest for Unity; for we conceive that man's progress towards & in civilisation proceeds by a series of Integr-ations, by the formation of more & more comprehensive & yet more definite wholes, which are linked together by successive Differen-tiations. What happens is that man with his unifying tendency forms a primitive integration whether in his mental or practical life: this integration, on the emergence of some new power or idea in man, is found inadequate & is broken through by a differ-entiation which applies the new idea or power to wider areas of experience. Out of the more differentiated phenomena & relations thus arrived at, the mind with its determined search for Unity creates a new integration, larger, richer & more organised than the former. This again is followed by a differentiation, & so the process goes on, man becoming ever more capable of more com-prehensive, higher & finer integrations both of his own inner life & of his outward social relations.

Innumerable examples of this process could be given; but we shall simply mention a few, which are of special interest to our enqui-ry, & will come up for fuller treatment later on. The most obvious illustration is probably in the development of man's social life. "Community" in human life passes through the successive integrations of the Family, or more properly the orig-

-inal social unit of mother & child, the Herd or Clan, the Tribe, the Nation, & so on to the dream or hope of social optimists, the World-Community, what the late Professor Royce called "the Great Society." Between these successive unifications of man's life there are the appropriate differentiations as his interests & new powers expand. Another important instance is to be found in the inner life of man, in the growth of his mind. As his mental life rises up out of the animal stage, carrying with it into its highest moments some of its most primitive elements, the integr-ations of his thought can be observed merging into one another, from lower to higher, from simpler to more complex, by imperceptible gradations, through the stages of Instinctive Reflex, Perception, Apperception, Concept, & thus onward to the greater unifications of human Reasoning, not stopping short of the great claim of Pascal: "By space the universe encompasses & swallows me as an atom; by thought I encompass it." The transition between the integrations, inseparable from each as the trough of the wave from the succeeding crests, is made by a differentiation, result-ing from the pressure of some new necessity, or the acquisition of a new power, or whatever change of man's inner life or outward circumstances compels his mind to grasp & organise, by its native hunger for Unity, a wider range & content of experience. It will fall to us to trace in later pages a similar series of integ-

-rations in the development of Religion from its most primitive & "generalised" form, whether it be something analogous to "Mana" as most British anthropologists tend to believe, or the "Sacred" as contrasted with the "Profane", as Hubert & Mauss say, or some other "indefinite, incoherent homogeneity"- on to the higher integration of Animism & belief in spirits, & so to more or less anthropomorphic & personalised gods, & beyond by a tendency observable in most higher religions to the richest unity of all in Monotheism. Let these be sufficient illustrations in the meantime of the character of man's march upon the long road of his Quest for Unity.

The Integrations, however, might with some truth be called rest-ing places on that nomadic march—Encampments. For in the evolution of man as in that of every other living thing there is action & reaction between Inertia & Variability. Throughout all the range of life resting is easier than movement; there is econ-omy of energy, which, other things being equal, makes for sur-vival. Hence the tendency of organisms to remain in an integration which works well, that is, in which there is more or less perfect equilibrium between the living creature & the con-ditions of its survival. So long as the adaptation of the organism to its surroundings is maintained, it may continue to exist unchanged for whole geological periods. This accounts for

the persistence down to the present age of archaic forms of life, like Peripatus, almost an intermediate form between insect & worm, Amphioxus a very primitive vertebrate, & the Marsupials. In like manner man may remain within a certain integration of his life for immense ages, provided the adaptation of his needs & powers to the environment continues substantially unchanged, & no differentiation in his own life, in that of his fellows, or in the external conditions of existence, calls for a new effort to secure survival or for an advance to a further stage in his development. Thus he remains for an enormous period at the Palaeolithic stage of culture as regards his tools & weapons, no doubt because these unpolished flints are sufficient to ensure his survival against the natural conditions which threaten his existence, against the competing animals, & the members of his own species who are no better armed or equipped than he. The discovery or invention of Fire was an integration of his life of incalculable importance, supplying perhaps the one condition which brought the species at least in the northern hemisphere through the Ice Ages; but its use alone for cooking & for protection continued for vast ages of prehistoric time & remains its sole function in many primitive tribes at the present hour, while its employment for the smelting of metals belongs to comparatively very recent & much briefer periods. Nevertheless each Integrat-

-ion, however long-lived, is mortal, & whatever new departure or variation deals the death-blow leads man out into the wider areas & larger experience of a more differentiated life. The process, moreover, accelerates with human progress. The simple Palaeo--lithic culture in Europe may have lasted one or several hundred thousand years; the Neolithic thirty thousand; & the later ages may be compressed into less than twenty thousand; while in the civilisation of to-day the unifications & variations of life are innumerable, & a differentiation -an invention or discovery, for example- which would have initiated a new age for early man, occurs within every decade. The characteristic of the process however, which is of special interest to us is the tendency trace--able from beginning to end of it, the tendency in man towards unification of his life, which is part of his inner constitution, shared indeed by all other living things, but in him becomes a more & more conscious quest. We study it in primitive man , as the anatomist investigates simple organisms, in the hope of find--ing there in simple diagrammatic forms some essential qualities of man's nature in general.

In considering the stage of Differentiation for a moment, it may be noted that its characteristic feature is that an earlier Integ--ration has been broken up & a new one has not yet been formed. It is like the Children of Israel released from Egyptian bondage

in which a certain unification of order & appointed task was imposed upon them from above by their masters, bursting into the larger & freer life of the wilderness, but finding it a life of wandering, more vague, more diffused, less organised than the more unified life on the lower plane of slavery, & more than inclined to lapse back upon it at times were it not that a higher integration beckons them onward to settlement in The "Promised Land", to Nationhood & the function of Prophet to the world. Any differentiation in this sense means that a larger range of phenomena & of activity is opened up to man than before; & for a time they elude the grasp of his mind & of his practical endeavours to reduce them to some unity of mental comprehension or some form of unified life. He wanders about in the wide new field, trying many wrong paths & cul-de-sacs, making many false integrations, before his unifying power is sufficiently developed to form the new & higher integration. An illustration may be drawn from man's primitive mental development. His animal ancestor at the Instinctive stage moves within the small circle of an integration marked by certainties & regularities of connection between sensations & the appropriate reflexes. His later reliance on Perception opens to him a vastly wider world; but the new power has to grow in range & refinement immensely before its results even approach the sureness of instinct. The Conceptual stage

supplies still better examples. The Concept, though the higher animals have it in sketchy outline, is chiefly a human achievment, & its integration is attained by a process of mastering differentiations which is difficult for the early type of mind. The concept, for instance, of "the dangereus" is diffused for primitive man over innumerable things which to civilised man are not dangereus at all. The oddly-shaped stone, the bird on the left hand, the newborn child, the corpse & a host of other harmless things are charged with peril for the savage, in the same way as the high explosive, the gun at full cock & an infected article are perilous to civilised man. The allied concept of "power", usually for the savage power to harm & therefore "dangerous", has the like vague & wide application to many classes of phenomena -they have in fact "Mana"- to which nothing of the kind is ascribed by the cultivated mind. Here one has a glimpse of what may prove to be the primitive mental character which gives rise to Fetichism. In like manner the vague & fluid nature of the concept "living" in the primitive mind, to which, therefore, the distinction between animate & inanimate things is difficult to make, may be found on fuller examination to be the root of what Dr. Marett has named Animatism, the antecedent & more rudimentary form of that Animism which is one of the most widely spread & well defined types of primitive religion. These are questions which will

occupy our attention very considerably at a later stage of this study. At the moment they illustrate the characteristic of primitive mentality we have been describing, namely, that its concepts, which gather together a number of particulars into a totality usable as a whole by thought, are of this indefinite, vague & changeful nature, because the primitive mind has not yet acquired the capacity for unification, the power of integration, which is at its best in the trained civilised mind. The history of man's mind, from the shattering of the earthen vessel of the Integration of Instinct which he shared with the animals, to the highest forms of the Integration of Intelligence which emerged out of it, is the story of its growth in the "grasp" which unif--ies the particulars of experience into more or less integrated wholes for thought, such as the concept, the general idea, the employable category, the inference, the scientific law, the world-view of Philosophy or Religion.

Pari passu with his power to integrate his inner world of mind, so as to form various coherent wholes & unifications of thought, there grows for man the co-ordinate power to integrate his outer world, to create varied forms of Unity in the relations between himself & his environment & between himself & his fellows. We have already instanced the different embodiments of the principle of "Community" as an example of this process, where integrations

can be traced from the family or ~~herd~~ clan life up through the various-
-ly organised Tribe, with differentiations intervening such as
matriarchal & patriarchal forms of the community & the nomadic &
settled or the pastoral & agricultural stages of culture, onward
to the higher unifications of civilised society. We shall con-
-cern ourselves presently with a further example which must be
dealt with in greater fulness since it is very important for our
specific subject, an example in which unifications of the inner
& outward life of primitive man border upon each other & indeed
intermingle. It is that in which the early human is seen pro-
-ceeding out of the animal stage, in which he is mainly within
the Integration of Instinct, upward through the differentiations
of Intelligence which are the product of Reflection upon Instinct
(in our view an extremely important factor), to the very wide &
far-reaching, & yet in many respects very definite & coherent
Integration of Custom. In this the tribal consciousness & its
habitual ideas, the "representations collectives" of Levy-Bruhl
& the school of Durkheim, are the inner side of that Integration of
which the various practices of tribal conduct, Magic, & Religion,
are the outward manifestation in practical life. The Integration
of Custom recovers ~~(under the influence of the Herd Instinct)~~
much of the static nature & stability of the Instinctive stage, &
resists differentiation in virtue of its adaptation to immense

variations of the environment, that is to say, in virtue of its power of survival without the necessity of new departures, to such a degree that it maintains a great portion of uncivilised mankind at the stage of Tribal Custom through countless generations, & but for the irruption of civilised influences & conditions would & does keep them in a state of arrested development resembling these primitive forms of animal & plant life which survive down to the present age. The Integration of Custom is, however, broken through at last by inevitable differentiations, such as, for instance, the mere growth to unwieldy proportions of the Tribe itself, by unifications under single leadership & submission to the authority of great individuals, & the greater leisure given by safety to reflect upon Custom with growing intelligence, & thus to introduce variations & new departures in its theories & practices. We shall presently endeavour to trace the process by which the Integration of Custom is formed through differentiation from the Integration of Instinct by the operation upon it of increasingly intelligent Reflection, in the course of which there emerge such customs & institutions as Totemism, Exogamy & Taboo, & the further progress beyond whereby Custom itself is differentiated into the structures of civilised thought & more highly organised social relations.

Chapter IV

THE ORGANIC BASIS OF THE QUEST FOR UNITY

Before proceeding to deal with those great Integrations in the life & thought of man which are of significance for the early forms of his religion, it may advance the subject to glance at the roots of this tendency to unification which is so inveterate in him. The impulse in man to integrate his thought, to form coherent, definite wholes out of his experience, is undoubtedly connected with the fact that biologically he is a unity, that as an organism he is an integration bound together by the close & sensitive bonds of life. In this sense, as already suggested, man is a wave in the ocean-tide of the evolutionary process as a whole. That process, from the gaseous mass of the Nebular Hypo-thesis, integrating itself into stars & planets, onward to the mind of the man of Science, integrating that hypothesis within itself, is, as Spencer showed, one of continuous progress from integration to integration. Life, on its first appearance in an inorganic world, introduces into the process a new & powerful in-tegrating force; & Mind continues the advance with its more & more conscious quest for unity, organising man's inner experience into orderly & employable totalities, & unifying into the forms of society his relations to the world of things & men outside of him.

The growth of Individuality is but another way of describing the

the same process. There is a certain uniqueness in the lowliest form of organised life in that it keeps the whole world at bay except that which serves the ends of its own existence. Never-theless, those animals are recognised to be lowly-organised, not closely integrated, which can be divided into two or more parts, each of which reconstitutes itself into a new animal of the same kind, like the Hydra, a primitive type of animal which has been divid-ed & grafted in as wonderful ways as any plant. The higher animals cannot be so treated; they are more literally individual; & the main reason is the integrative action of a more complex & differentiated nervous system. It is the network of nerves, even before the brain is in any degree developed, which, const-ituting in all parts of the organism the circuit of afferent, central or transmittent, & efferent neurones, makes of it a unity which manifests itself in coherent & comprehensible ways of re-sponse to the environment & at least instinctive action upon it. Professor Lloyd Morgan, in analysing the primary experiences of a moorhen, which he observed making its first dive as an instinct-ive response to the impulse of fear, describes well in the follo-wing passage the integrative action of the nervous system at the instinctive stage, & at the same time points forward to the higher integration which depends upon cortical processes & becomes possible with the development of the cortex or upper portion of

the brain. "Just as," he says, "there is one moorhen with inter-related parts & organs, one united nervous system correlating the incoming data of presentation & co-ordinating the outgoing nerve-impulse in responsive behaviour, so there grows up in correlation with the cortical processes, one experience for which the presentative data acquire meaning & become precepts for the guidance of future behaviour. Thus is it, I conceive, in the case of the moorhen: thus is it in the case of the human infant. Such in all cases is the starting point of the natural history of experience, the unification of which finds expression in behaviour & conduct."(Instinct & Experience p.20.).

The unity of experience may thus be said to originate in the unity of the "experiencer", to use Lloyd Morgan's word. Behind every experience of the moorhen there is the integration of the living creature itself, "one moorhen", with its finely unified nervous system -so finely that an alarm sets in operation all the varied & complex actions involved in diving & swimming away from danger. When it dives, the living creature is obeying the instinct which bids it maintain & defend the integration which may be called its self. When, newly out of the egg, it pecks at food, it is seeking instinctively to enrich that integration. So when man, taken at the instinctive stage, seeks food, it is the maintenance or enrichment of the integration of his bodily life

at which he aims; & when he leaps aside at a sudden danger, it is the integration of his animal body which he instinctively protects. In the passage quoted, however, there are two stages of integration evident in the life of the young moorhen. There is the integrat-ion which is constituted by the nervous system acting through purely instinctive reflexes, through the circuit, namely, of afferent nerve, spinal cord, & efferent nerve; but there is also the integration of incipient experience which Lloyd Morgan holds, we think rightly, is specially the work or creation of the grow-ing brain. When the chick of a few days old pecks once or twice at an unsuitable insect & then refuses it altogether, there has been an elementary putting two & two together, a rudimentary judgment, which is different from the swift response of the in-stinctive reflex -as different as the slipping of a small stream into a shallow pool where it pauses & flows round in an eddy be-fore it emerges again, from the unbroken flow of the same brook down a smooth slide of rock. It is the brain which gives pause to the swift passage of a reflex, perhaps, as the older psychol-ogists such as Romanes suggested, by the very interposition of its substance, which retains sensory impressions in memory so that they modify both perceptions & actions thereafter, & opens even to the animal mind a variety of means for the satisfactions of its instincts & the attainment of its ends.

The Integration of Mind or Intelligence, which in man largely though not completely supersedes the Integration of Instinct, has for its organic basis the Brain. We have already suggested how the earlier & simpler integration of the instinctive stage in animal development is broken through by differentiations introduced by intelligence, so that, for example, the sensory impression inducing an instinctive reflex passes into the successively higher unifications of Perception, the Concept, & all the various forms & products of human reason. This we described as being largely a growth in "grasp", in the power of the mind to grasp the phenomena of experience in such a way as to unify them, to organise them into coherent totalities for thought. The organ by which these unifications are accomplished is the Brain. As the unity of the bodily life in the animal, what one might call its unique selfhood, is behind all the integrations of its behaviour & achievments at the instinctive level - a unity constituted above all by its nervous system - so the unity of the brain with its cellular interconnections (synapses) within itself & its continuity with the rest of the nervous system, is behind all the integrations of intelligent experience. The unifications of the mental life depend upon the degree of unification in the brain as a physical organ to an extent which is extremely important for our discussion. For the brain, the organ of mental

integrations, passes, like every other element in the evolution-
-ary system, through an ascending series of integrations with the
appropriate differentiations in between. It thus evolves from
very "generalised" & indefinite types common to a wide range of
early vertebrate life to more & more definite & specific forms.
The advance can be traced step by step both in the human embryo
& in the ascending scale of the brains of vertebrates through the
anthropoid apes & (inferentially, of course, from the skull) foss-
-il man to the highest modern types. Beginning (at least per-
-ceptibly) in a slight bulbous expansion at the anterior end of
the spinal cord, the brain is at first chiefly an olfactory organ.
The immediately succeeding course of its evolution may be given
in the words of Professor J. Arthur Thomson. "The most impor-
-tant fact is the relative reduction of the smell-receiving area
& the preponderant growth of the part of the cerebral hemispheres
that has to do with vision, hearing, speech, & memory. Man is
the climax of a change towards eye-mindedness, which began in the
Lemurs. Prof. Elliot Smith has made much of this. He points
out what a gain there was in looking forward, in a stereoscopic
vision, in attent-

-tively focussing the eyes & concentrating the gaze. It reacted, he thinks, as a stimulus on the cerebral cortex. It promoted more precise discrimination, more delicate manipulation. It was, as we should say, a sieve that would foster germinal variations in these directions. Then there was a great increase in the area concerned with receiving sound-tidings. These steps of progress are represented by stages in Primates; they are corroborated by the early Hominid skulls." Specially interesting here is the point that with the increasing importance of the eyes the optical region of the brain becomes dominant, & the ancestor of man ac-quires what Prof. Thomson elsewhere calls "eye-mentality". It seems probable that from this point & for a consider-able period onward the pre-human being thought (so to call it) largely in pictures. The experience of this eye-minded subhuman creature would take the form in the mind of a series of snap-shots of things & events, to use Bergson's metaphor; but the cinematographic picture would be like one taken too slowly, & the images would be ill-connected, unco-ordinated, & issuing there-fore in impulsive action resembling the reactions of Instinct. However, this may well have been an imaginative period in the pre-history of man, in which he saw things & events pictorially, & even visualized himself doing things -a period which is perhaps recapitulated in that well-marked age in little children (say

between the ages of three & six) when imaginative powers are often singularly active, in the evident visualizing of invisible playmates & the like, only to vanish usually with the acquisition of facts & the development of reasoning powers. This type of mentality we shall consider at a later stage of our enquiry, with reference to its influence upon the primitive forms of man's Religion, such as the visualizing of spirits & ghosts in Animism. Meanwhile, continuing the summary description of the evolution of the Brain, we observe that the cortex has been developing towards the frontal region in the form of the "Neo-Pallium"; & at the same time as this new mass of brain cells gradually in the upward pro-gress of the race spreads over & covers the visual & olfactory region, the specific co-ordinative power of the mind of which this is the organ develops with it. The characterictic activity of Reason, that according to Bosanquet of forming totalities in thought, thenceforward comes increasingly into play; & the spec-ial organ of this new integrating quality of Mind -new, not absolutely, for it is present very early in rudimentary forms of co-ordination, but in its predominance & command of man's future-is, as just said, the Cortex.

The importance of this gradual integration of the Brain itself, as an organ of the body, & the consequent slow growth of its integr-ating power, for the present stage of the discussion, lies in

this, that at the transition period when man is becoming human & passing from the Integration of Instinct to the Integration of Intelligence, his brain is not yet fully integrated, & his power of Co-ordination is, therefore, far below that of civilised man. The difference between & the skull & also the brain of Pal-aeolithic man & those of the modern higher races is not in comparative size. The averagge cubic capacity of, say, the Nean-derthal or the Cro-Magnon skulls may even be greater than that of the ayerage European. It is probable, since, according to Elliott Smith, there was at one stage of animal evolution a gener-al rise in size & weight of brain in proportion to the body in all the leading mammalia, that Nature experimented with brains of large size as a means of Integration, in the hope, to speak very anthropomorphically, that the greater mass of brain cells would be the better able to grasp & unify the phenomena of exper-ience. A better method, however, was found in the expedient of convolutions, which enables the brain to be more closely packed, & secures a more economical & effective form of unification. A further improvement in integration was the development of the frontal region of the brain, with its specific function of Co-ordination & the formation of wholes in the mind. Accordingly, it does not sur prise us to find that the chief difference be-tween the primitive & the modern skull in in the frontal or

"pre-frontal" area; & the most striking deficiency in the early type of brain was apparently in the low development of the cortex, the physical organ of the co-ordinating & integrating functions of the mind, whereby it is capable of reflection, forming general ideas, reasoning from cause to effect, & other activities of the the highest types of thought. This is also the difference be-tween the skulls & brains of existing primitive types of savage, such as the Australian aborigines, & those of cultured man. The former are smaller on the average in proportion to the body, gen-erally less convoluted, & certainly less developed in the front-al region of the cortex, upon which the higher powers of intell-igence & reflection appear to depend. Dr. Bernard Hollander, who in his learned book, "In Search of the Soul" maintains strong-ly the thesis of the close organic relation of the frontal lobes to the intellect, says,(Vol.II. p.90), "It has been shown that the frontal lobes vary in size & weight in different races accord-ing to their intellectual capacity. Anthropologists have demon-strated from examination of European skulls that the progress of civilisation has resulted in raising the anterior & flattening the posterior part of the head." Interesting further in view of the influence of pause or delay in the brain as leading to the differentiation of reflective mind from the instinctive, is the following statement, p.92: "The larger the frontal lobes, the greater the power of inhibition, suspending & postponing the

immediate & direct pursuit of an end, a step which lies at the root of all progress, civilisation & morality. The larger & more perfect the frontal lobes, the more reasoned adaptation enters into the action of instinctive tendencies, & the greater the self-control." Hollander quotes Bianchi as expressing the same facts in the following words: "That the frontal lobes are the seat of co-ordination & fusion of the incoming & outgoing products of the several sensory & motor areas of the cortex. The frontal lobes sum up into series the products of the sensory-motor regions, as well as the emotive states which accompany all the perceptions, the fusion whereof constitutes what has been termed the psychical tone of the individual. Removal of the frontal lobes does not so much interfere with the perceptions taken singly as it does disaggregate the personality, & incapacitate for synthetising grpups of representations."

When, in view of these facts, we consider the mind of primitive man at the stage in his development at which he is emerging out of the Integration of Instinct, where his life is, like that of the higher animals, dominated by the habitual connections of instinct but showing intelligence in the selection of means to the ends of instinct, & moving towards the higher Integration of Intelligence in which he reflects upon the phenomena of his life, including his instincts, & forms theories & modes of action based

upon these reflections, we must see him approaching this new task armed with a very imperfect instrument, his imperfectly integrat-ed Brain. That physical basis of the intelligent co-ordination of experience is far from complete. Like the hand of his early subhuman ancestor, wth the imperfectly "opposable" thumb, capable of hanging on to things by the fingers, prehensile-fashion, but not of grasping them all round as a whole, comprehensively, so the Brain of primitive man is deficient in grasp, in the power to take in things in the forms of wholes, in a word, in comprehens-ion. Accordingly, when man of the primitive type proceeds to integrate his experience by means of his Intelligence, the true integrations inevitably escape him in a multitude of ways. He jumps at conclusions unreflectively, in the swift impulsive way of Instinct but without its innate accuracy, & arrives at false conclusions. In place, for example, of the instinctive associat-ion of danger with flight he forms the concept "dangerous", but his concepts are loose, fluid, incompletely grasped; & "dang-erous" includes innumerable things not really dangerous, while it excludes many things, to his cost, which are actually perilous. So, where Instinct for his animal ancestor connected unreflect-ively effect & cause, as moving reeds with lurking foe, in such a way as to induce caution or flight, the savage, attempting with his crude intelligence to make causal connections, appears almost

to exhaust the possibilities of error. He connects things as cause & effect which are not causally connected, as whistling or top-spinning with stormy winds, & establishes that almost universal law of his crude Science, that like is the cause of like, which is the foundation of his Imitative Magic. At the same time he misses the true causal relations in the most astonishing way, as for example, among the Australian tribes, the connection between death & its natural causes, decease being invariably ascribed to the sorcery of an enemy, or among many savages the connection between sexual intercourse & the birth of children, of which they are ignorant.

These are instances of the point we are making, that the primitive mind, in attempting the higher unifications of intelligent reflection in place of obeying unreflective instinct, has in the "generalised" brain of early man an imperfect instrument. It is one which by reason of the undeveloped condition of the frontal co-ordinative centres of the Brain makes such integrations of thought difficult, & accounts, therefore, for the many strange & childish forms of customary thought & practice which appear as inferior to the steady instinctive accuracy & marvellous adaptation of means to ends in such "lower" creatures as ants & bees, on the one hand, as they are to the sanest & loftiest judgments & conduct of civilised men, on the other. The intermediate stage between the

of Instinct
Integration & the Integration of Thought is the Integration of Custom, the custom of the Clan or the Tribe. Here something of the stability of Instinct is recovered. As Walter Bagehot said, ("Physics & Politics".p.27.) "A cake of custom was necessary for making the mould of civilisation, & hardening the soft fibre of early man". The aberrations of the individual mind, which using crude imagination & incipient intelligence & following endless strange fancies, might be infinite, & turn the tribal world -if indeed it survived, which is not likely- into an assemblage of the insane, are checked by the necessities of the common interest of the many. The Social Instinct working through intelligence becomes the Tribal Mind, with common ideas, "collective representations", customary ways of thinking & acting which command the individual with al-most the unquestioned authority of the instinctive. There is in this Integration of Custom so complete an adaptation to many kinds of environment, providing safety & other means of survival which maintain an equilibrium with the conditions of existence, that a great part of savage mankind remains for ages at this stage. Fortunately for human progress, pressure from within or without the Tribe, the mere increase in numbers, epoch-making invention or discovery such as domestication of animals or smelting of ores, or some striking change in the environment, breaks up the crust of custom; & man moves out from that Egyptian bondage in search of his new Land of Promise, achieved by the strivings & conquests of Reflective Thought.

Chapter IV

INSTINCT & INTELLIGENCE

In the course of tracing man's Quest for Unity in himself & in the world, or in other terms, his tendency towards Integration, we have come to perceive the existence of two great unifications in his life: the Integration of Instinct & the Integration of Intelligence. These are not strictly separable for the reason that they are successive stages in the life of a growing thing; & they are not easy to distinguish because the difference between Instinct & Intelligence is so variously defined by authoritative writers, chiefly on account of the ambiguity in the meanings given to the word instinct. As Lloyd Morgan says, "No two writers use the term in quite the same sense." The statement of Dr. Myers is also significant. "We ought", he says, "to speak, not of inst-inct & intelligence, but of instinct-intelligence, treating the two as one indivisible mental function." Bergson, in "Creative Evolution", illuminates both the difficulty of defining the terms, & at the same time the distinction between them. He declares, "Neither intelligence nor instinct lends itself to rigid definit-ion: they are tendencies, & not things"; & he has just said, " all concrete instinct is mingled with intelligence, as all real intelligence is penetrated by instinct." A picturesque express-ion of the distinction Bergson makes, which helps us onward, is found in the statement: "instinct ~~is~~ perfected is a faculty of us-ing & even of constructing organised instruments: intelligence perfected is the faculty of making & using unorganised instruments."

On this principle an organised instrument is a part of the creature's body; an unorganised instrument is a tool which may be used for the making of other tools. Thus the hand itself is the organised instrument using which instinctively man does not advance much beyond the chimpanzee; but the hand using, under the the direction of intelligence, unorganised instruments, like the stick & the flint stone, is on the way to all the triumphs of fire & the power-engine. Instinct no more than enables the animal to adapt itself to the environment; intelligence empowers man to master the environment & make of the world a more or less organised unity under his dominion.

In moving forward to a fuller understanding of this distinction, without attempting rigid definitions, we may mention another element which is of interest to us. It is that at the instinctive stage man's life-energy is devoted to the integration of his Body: at the Reflective stage he is much occupied with the integration of his Mind, seeking to make rational wholes of his experience. At the period in his evolution when he is still an animal, pre-human, his whole concern is to maintain his body as a living integration, to preserve it, in fact, from the disintegration of privation, hurt, or death. And since the final disintegration of death cannot for ever, & rarely for long, be pushed from the door, Nature "careful of the type", or the urge of the evolutionary

process expressing itself in a bodily appetite, the sex-impulse, which satisfies the man himself & yet goes beyond himself, drives him to seek a new Integration in his offspring. We have here touched what is commonly known as the supreme animal "instinct of self-preservation" & it is evident how this integrating tendency may be the parent of a whole family of what are familiarly called "instincts", for example, the Food Instinct, the Flight Instinct, & the Sex & Herd Instincts. McDougall says that the "instincts are differentiations of the will to live"; & J. Varendonck regards the instincts as various forms of the tendency in the animal to "adaptation", namely, to the environment, adding however that consciousness or intelligence is simply a more developed form of the same tendency: thus; "consciousness..... is that part of intelligence which is organised for the reaction against the outer world, for adaptation to the non-ego."; & again, "wish & will should be defined as aspects in different degrees of the vital impulse tending towards adaptation." These are statements in other words of our position, which is that the process of Integration which is the universal method of Evolution as a whole, takes the form in man of the integration of his bodily life by means of his instincts at the animal or instinctive stage, which merges, however, by gradual & at first imperceptible differentiations into the integration of his mental life, with its more & more numerous subordinate integrations, constituting the Integration of Mind or Intelligence.

The nature of Instinct & its relation to Intelligence may be further illustrated by the following definition of "instinctive behaviour" by Prof. Lloyd Morgan, with which we are in agreement. It is "a definition of instinctive behaviour as that which is, on its first occurence, independent of prior experience; which tends to the well-being of the individual & the preservation of the race; which is similarly performed by all the members of the same more or less restricted group of animals; & which may be subject to subsequent modification under the guidance of experience." Such behaviour, he goes on, "is, I conceive, a more or less com-plex organic or biological response to a more or less complex group of stimuli of external & internal origin, & it is, as such, wholly dependent on how the organism, & especially the nervous system & brain-centres have been built through heredity, under that mode of racial preparation which we call biological evolut-ion." We add to this another statement, which is one of the main theses of Lloyd Morgan's book, & which unfolds the physical processes underlying these relations with which we are concerned. He sets out, as he says, "to defend the hypotheses that intelligent guidance is the function of the cerebral cortex with its distinguishing property of consciousness; that the co-ordination involved in instinctive behaviour, & in the distribution of physiological impulses to the viscera & vascular system, is the

primary function of the lower brain-centres; that, in instinctive behaviour as such, consciousness correlated with processes in the cerebral cortex is, so to speak, a mere spectator of organic & biological occurrences at present beyond its control; but that, as spectator, it receives information of these occurences through the nerve-channels of connexion between the lower & higher parts of the brain."

The archetype of Instinct, then, is the reflex action of the most primitive forms of animal life. There are simpler & more com-plex reflexes; but the characteristic features are, first, the three-linked chain of receptor, conductor & effector, (to use the terms of Prof. Sherrington), the afferent nerve, the spinal cord, & the efferent nerve; secondly, the speed or practical immediacy with which the nerve impulse is sent through the chain; &, third, their independence of the influence of the cortex of the brain. Experiments with decerebrate or "spinal" animals show that in very many of their normal activities, which they continue to perform when the cerebrum has been removed, the cerebral cortex normally sustains the role of passive "spectator"; which means that, these manifold movements, which are instinctive in Dr. Morgan's sense, that is, which are the work of the spinal cord & the sub-cortical centres without the intervention of the cortex, are yet within the cognisance of the cortex through the connections of the nervous system as a whole. A great part of the instinctive

life of civilised man, a much larger portion of his life as a whole than used to be imagined, comes under this category. Start-ing at a loud noise or a sudden appearance, blinking the eyes at a threatened blow, coughing sneezing, & so forth, are accomplished without the intervention of the cortex, although they immediately become part of the experience of the cortex & material for memory & reflection. These are survivals of the Integration of Instinct within the Integration of Intelligence. But the course of Evol-ution in general is along the line of integration; & the nervous system of man is no exception. The higher uni fication of cortic-al control, in virtue of its better adaptation to the animal's more differentiated life, supersedes progressively Integration through the spinal system & the subcortical centres. The higher animals, such as the large carnivora for instance, in hunting their prey, act doubtless upon many reflexes, both simple & com-plex, & upon racial, inherited connections between scent & move-ment, hunger & seeking, sight of the game & stealthy approach, & the like; but, should exceptional circumstances, especially if they present an obstacle, intervene, say, a suspicion of danger, a new kind of prey, & so on, there comes a Pause: & then a new method is taken of dealing with the new situation. This is most probably the work of the cortex, the elementarily reflective brain, forming a mental integration which thereupon influences & governs action.

In turning now to our pre-human ancestor at that stage of his evolution at which he must be classed as a higher animal, though also at the point where he is breaking out of the Integration of Instinct through various differentiations which elude that integr-ation & are driving him forward to the Integration of Intellig-ence, the stage, perhaps, at which the Java Man, Pithecanthropus erectus, had arrived, we find him to an overwhelming degree a creature of instinct. In seeking his food or hunting his prey, in escaping his enemies, in mating & so forth, he acts on swift reflexes, living an impulsive life, obeying impulses that flash from the sensory receptor to the motor effector like electricity along a wire. But he has also a fairly developed cortex, super-ior as such to that of any other animal. This Brain is at first mainly a "spectator" of man's instinctive life, but the integrat-ing tendency which is inherent in the living organism & is the main current of the evolutionary stream itself, naturally shifts the centre of gravity in the nervous chain between sensation & behaviour from the spinal cord & the subcortical centres to the more powerfully integrating mass of the cortex. We have already accepted the suggestion of the older psychologists that the mere material substance of the cortex with its millions of cells must set up a certain mechanical resistance & so produce delay, that Pause which, however infinitesimal, is the first condition of

true Reflection. The process becomes clearer as we recall that the tendency towards Integration -the essential urge of Evolution itself- which is present even in inorganic nature, which is power -ful as the very energy of its life in the humblest speck of living matter, is most varied & intense in Mind, & mightiest above all in the mind of man. We may therefore conceive of the organ of mind, the cortical area of the brain, as thrilling in every cell which is awake & under the stimulus of some necessity or excitement, & through all their synaptic interconnections, with the impulse to integrate, to make a harmony which preserves & enriches life out of the elements in the situation, to "find peace", as it were, in some great unification of life within itself, or with the outer world, or both of these. It is thus that the swift passage of the instinctive impulse is arrested, & there is substituted the Pause of deliberation which allows of storing in memory, & that co-ordination of a sensory impression with a memory by which a mere reflex is transmuted into Perception, Apperception, & other beginnings of reflective thought.
The resistance which induces delay in the response to sensory impress- -ions in place of the immediate flashing on to the motor nerves of the instinctive reflex, may come not only from within, from the the obstacle of the brain-substance itself & from the integrating action of the mind ; it may come also from without, from the environ- -ment. An example may be taken from the constructive instinct in bees. The reflexes of instinct whereby the bees build up the

combs may go on for many generations without cessation till one day the bees find themselves confronted with a peculiar shape in the roof of the hive. There is a pause of consciousness of the obstacle, & out of that delay there issues, like Athene from the head of Zeus, a complete adaptation of means to end, a new method of working which, in virtue of its employment of experience in the creation of a new integration, has the quality of intelligence. It is in this resistance of the external world to the smooth machine-like workings of instinct, the interposition of obstacles to its reflexes from without, that Bergson finds the origin of consciousness. He says, "where consciousness appears, it does not so much light up the instinct itself as the thwartings to which instinct is subject; it is the deficit of instinct, the distance between the act & the idea, that becomes consciousness." He has already made the suggestion that intelligence issues from "the very insufficiency of the natural means at man's disposal for defence against his enemies, against cold & hunger. This insufficiency, when we strive to fathom its significance, acquires the value of a prehistoric document; it is the final leave-taking between intelligence & instinct." This is probably true to the prehistoric facts. It is legitimate to imagine the prehuman ancestor at the stage at which some immense "insufficiency" of his instinctive reflexes presents itself to

him, say, at the stage when he made his (probably enforced) descent from the trees, & assumed more or less the erect position. He is faced with new situations then for which the earlier integrations of his instinctive life are inadequate. New reflexes are indeed being formed, such as those for speed in running instead of climbing; but by themselves they would be insufficient. On the other hand, this subhuman being has acquired a new integrating organ in the brain, especially the cortex. The necessities of countless desperate situations set the brain working with the primeval effort of integration; the cells of the cortex are awake & as it were throbbing with the sense of need & at the same time with the innate tendency to integrate some whole response of action which shall ensure safety & survival; & thus the "will to live" which according to McDougall differentiates into all the instincts at the instinctive stage, using now the new instrument of the brain, makes a novel response to the situation by means of an integration in which there is consciousness of the obstacle to the smooth working of instinctive life & of insufficiency to cope with the difficulty, but also consciousness of the novel means of meeting the peril or the need, & which therefore is definitely an integration of intelligence. It is in this way that the first discoveries or inventions of primitive man probably arrived. The danger, whether of want or capture & death, impelled the developing brain to the new integration of seeking refuge

in a cave, or of using a stick or stone in defence, as a weapon, or of calling the kin or the horde, by a call with something of meaning in it, to the aid of the individual. In these, enregistered in memory, which itself is a further power of the integrating brain, one may find not improbably the origin of cave-dwelling, of the use of tools & weapons, & of human speech, & thus of the foundations of intelligent & civilised life.

An interesting sidelight on this element of Pause or delay, which breaks through the Integration of Instinct with the differentiat- of consciousness, & is the preliminary condition of reflection, is given by the analysis of Attention in Miss Washburn's book, "The Animal Mind". This author says; "In attention, the details of the object attended to become clear & distinct. That is, attention is a state where discrimination is improved. Further, attention involves varying degrees of effort, & these are marked by varying intensity of certain bodily processes. Attention under difficulties is accompanied by a rigid position of the body, by holding the breath, & by various muscular effects, aside from the processes which, like frowning, are concerned with the adaptation of the sense organ to receive an impression. These general bodily effects of attention are all such as to suggest that the body is to be kept as quiet as possible during the attentive state In other words, no reaction is to be made to the object attended

to, except such as may be necessary to allow its being carefully discriminated from other objects. Attention, in its intenser degrees, at least, seems to involve a state of suspended reaction. We have here again the Pause which interrupts the smooth flow of instinct & involves consciousness of an object. To trace, however briefly, the development of attention is to pursue the growth of thought from that first dim awareness up towards the rich integrations of intelligence & reflection, & even if desired to the richer unifications of man's moral idealism. At the lowest end of the scale there is stillness, motionlessness, of the primitive animal assimilating itself to its environment in order to escape danger, in response to sensations of scent or sound. An immense advance is then made by the development of eye-mentality. As Dr. Washburn says; "The rabbit or wild bird crouching motionless close to the ground, watching each movement of a possible enemy, suggests strongly to our minds a condition of breathless attention." The focussing of the eyes to produce a single & then an ever clearer image doubtless immensely stimulated the integrating activity of the early brain. The eye-minded brain thinks in images. The crouching motionless rabbit or wild bird has an image or series of images in its mind of what its enemy is doing, & possibly an image of what he is about to do, an ideal image therefore, which moves the creature to run or take some other alternative

mode of instinctive action besides that of simulated immobility. The ancestor of man for long periods had this eye-mentality. He must have thought in images, inner representations of the world & of himself. But with the growth of his brain its integrating quality took the form of incipient imagination. That is, in place of a flickering cinematograph of images in the mind, there was a grasp upon these to integrate them into new totalities, ideal images, visions of things that might happen, of things he might do, of himself doing things in the future, of what might be made of or done with things. And then came Speech. The word made the image into an idea. A thousand images are gathered into one general idea, represented by a word, & then forgotten as images. As Miss Washburn says again; "The highest grade of attention, the final triumph of vital importance over mere intensity of stimulation, is to be found where the focus of attention is occupied by an idea or train of ideas." Attention thus devoted to what is within the mind is essentially Reflection; & man, his life dominated no longer by his instinctive reflexes but by the integrations of Intelligence is now Homo Sapiens.

Interested as we are in this study in the implications of primitive man's Psychology for his moral & religious development, a glance back upon the process just outlined may not be out of place. It is one of continuous Integration in the line of Evolution as a whole. In the case of the plant, where there is the Integration

of Life without instinct, there is in growth from the seed an un-seeing pursuit of the integration of the perfect plant. It may be remarked, in parenthesis, that the metaphors of Finalism appear to us inevitable: the urge of the whole process, viewed as a whole, is as manifestly directed towards the completion of the organism, as is the movement of an animal hunting with its prey in full view or the running of an athlete on a track towards the goal. In animals the integration which is mainly that of Instinct, is accomplished by means of a more & more connected & sensitive nervous system, working, however, through unconscious reflexes. With the appearance & development of the Brain there comes at first a vague awareness of these reflex operations, which, with the interposition of obstacles & difficulties in the way of the smooth flow of instinct, becomes a more & more definite & discriminating consciousness. The ends of the life-integration in the higher animals are to a certain extent visualized, & the method of pursuit is varied with variations in the outer circumstances & in the behaviour of the object. In Man the unification of his life is gradually taken over by the increasingly co-ordinated & co-ordinating Brain , which aided by speech & the growing power of abstraction, turns the images or visualizations of the ends of life into ideas. With these the mind works integratingly, pursuing them within itself, combining them into tentative or final

totalities, projecting their realisation into the future, making them ideals yet to be realised. The Quest for Unity thus becomes the Quest for the Ideal.

Chapter VI

REFLECTION upon INSTINCT

Reflection, having in it the metaphor of a mirror, suggests a stillness in the mind, such that images are seen in it, quiet & contemplation. Consciousness, as we have seen, awakens at a Pause in the mental life of the higher animal, delay in the flow of the instinctive reflexes created by some obstacle or difficul-ty which hereditary adjustments cannot meet. This pressure of difficulty in the environment of early man would act as a stimul-us to his new & peculiarly rich endowment of the co-ordinating Brain, now taking over life's integrations. Such an event as the descent of arboreal man from the trees, involving many new adaptations, probably called into play the new activity, consci-ous adjustments which become more & more intelligent in their imaged connection of means to end, supplementing the reflexes of instinct. There is much to be said for the view of some author-ities that the Ice Age, making life for primitive man much more difficult & demanding from all existing forms of life new condit-ions of survival on pain of extinction, impelled the primitive mind, relying on its sole resource, the co-ordinating Brain, to create certain new integrations which should make that survival possible. Raphael Pumpelly, for example, says:[1] "What I wish particularly to emphasise is the conception that in the interven-tion of the glacial period & its reaction on the inter-continental conditions, we must see the initial- the motiving- factors in the

[1] ~~Explorations in Turkestan. p.66~~

~~the~~ evolution of the intellectual & social life of man," [8] A-
-mongst the integrations achieved in this age-long emergency by the primitive mind & brain may have been fire or cave-dwelling, or the use of stone weapons & tools, or all of these. It will be noted that these integrations are not adjustments within the body itself such as the animals use to meet a changing situation, organ-
-ised instruments in Bergson's sense, but unorganised instruments, integrations of the environment, of things outside his body, & therefore entitled to be called inventions & discoveries of Intel-
-ligence, the firstfruits of man's intellectual mastery of the world.

A further step in man's mental development was doubtless made from the vantage ground of the comparative safety which these new integrations of Mind & the accession of power they brought to him, provided. Within his cave, or beside his fire, or armed with his coup-de-poing, man has that security from the restless search for food & incessant watchfulness against & flight from enemies, to which impulsive & reflexive movement is the natural answer-back. He has in a small but real degree leisure to think, to contempl-
-ate, to reflect. Palaeolithic man in the recesses of his cav-
-ern & Pheidias in the peace of the Greek city-state may both devote long hours to the creations of their art; but they are different mainly in the fact that outside his cave the primeval

[8] Explorations in Turkestan. p.66.

artist is the hunting & hunted animal, depending largely on his instinctive reflexes to escape a hundred perils, while the Greek may go & philosophise in the Agora. It is true of man's life as it is of a river, that the proportion of stillness is the measure of reflection. The security of a late stage in his history, like the pastoral stage , gives him leisure to "consider the heavens" & evolve a solar mythology; while the safety & quiet times of the agricultural level enable him to add to the earlier myths those of fertility spirits & deities. But we are concern-ed with an earlier period, the earliest of man's history as human. In emerging from the Integration of Instinct & presented by these inventions & discoveries of Intelligence with a certain deliver-ance from the rest less & impulsive life of an animal to which the environment is dangerous, man has opportunity to look on at things & even at himself, & to advance to purely mental integrat-ions, such as general ideas & classifications of things, & ex-planations how & reasons why of events. Being however on the verge of the instinctive life, it is aspects of that life which naturally are the subjects & pre-occupations of his thought. The problems over which early man wrinkled his low forehead in the first efforts of concentrated thought were simply the problems of his bodily life- to get food, to keep safe, & to reproduce his kind. These problems, solved earlier at the animal stage by

instinctive connections between sensory impressions & motor im-
-pulses, in the main, are now increasingly to be solved by integr-
-ations of intelligence, by generalisations, rudely classified
results of observation, inferences, plans, & even theories. In
place of the swift nervous circuit between hunger, sight or scent
of food, & movement towards it, there is pause for consideration
as to how the supply of food may be increased; instead of the
animal reactions to fear of either flight, or lying low, or turn-
-ing in rage upon the enemy, there is classification of things as
dangerous or not; & around the various impulses of the sex-inst-
-inct there play innumerable crude theories as to its mystery,
power, pleasure & peril.

The theories are crude, the generalisations are faulty, to an
almost incredible degree, because the mind's instrument in form-
-ing them is imperfect. The co-ordinating brain, the organ with
which the mind accomplishes these unifications, is, as already
described, in the early stages of its evolution, defective in
"grasp", in this very power of creating unities of idea, judgment
or a train of reasoning. It is the strangeness to us of so much
of the reasoning of primitive man which has led a school of French
anthropologists, such as Levy Bruhl, to postulate for him a radic-
ally different mentality from that of civilised man. That, as
we shall argue later, is not necessary. The thought of the

savage is not "prelogical"; but his logic is hurried & impulsive like his instinctive actions, though without their accuracy. He "puts two & two together"; but his "two" is often our three or five. He reasons of cause & effect, but he makes innumerable false causal connections. As Sir James Frazer says, the errors of savage men are "not wilful extravagances or the ravings of insanity but simply hypotheses." The hypotheses are extravagant & to us apparently insane for two reasons. The one is that they are formed by intelligence after the ancestral fashion of Instinct in sudden impulsive, unreflective ways; & the influence of the instincts, still very strong, such as the Herd Instinct & more than all the instinctive emotion of Fear, makes him jump to con-clusions which are wildly erroneous. The other reason is that the unifying power of the mind, through the co-ordinating brain, is crude & undeveloped, & those unifications which by their grasp & coherence imply accurate discrimination, as truth of generaliz-ation, judgment & inference, are naturally at that stage imposs-ible. Modern theories of the "Subconscious" make much of the influence of primitive instincts, lying "perdu" in that hypothet-ical region & breaking up occasionally to the surface of consc-ousness in order to influence profoundly even highly intelligent thought; & Mr. John Galsworthy has crystallised in a penetrating essay the well-known fact of the extraordinary power of unreason-

-ing, instinctive Fear to drive kindly civilised people into acts of savage cruelyy, & to account for the inhumanities of "Reigns of Terror", "Reprisals," & modern warfare. The point is that man theorises at the stage of intelligence; but while his intelligenc is still primitive in character or when ancestral instinct lays its spell upon his thought, his theories are infinitely more stupid & often much more cruel than the impulses of animal instinct. In escaping from the Egyptian bondage of Instinct he has many strange wanderings in the wilderness of error before him, until by the growing integrations of Intelligence he arrives at & begins to conquer the Promised Land of Intellect, Morality & Religion.

These limitations & aberrations are naturally most evident at the most primitive stages of man's intelligent life, when he is nearest to the realm of Instinct; & we have now to observe in certain salient examples of his chief instincts the formation of those crude conceptions & theories concerning the subject-matter of his instinctive life, which, under the influence mainly of his tribal associations & what is called the Group-Consciousness, become later his deeply-rooted & wide-spread customs, & go to form the Integration of Custom. The psychology of these processes will be dealt with at a later stage in more detail: they are brought forward now in a general way as examples of the working of savage intelligence upon the concerns of its own instincts.

1. The FOOD INSTINCT & TOTEMISM.

Totemism has all the appearance of an extremely primitive human custom; for, while there are traces of it in very many peoples & in all quarters of the world, it seems to have broken up in most cases under the disintegrating influence of later conditions & ideas, leaving fossil remains in animal names of tribes, rites of communion, & so forth. A.W. Howitt says; "It has always seemed to me that the origin of totems & totemism must have been in so early a stage of man's social development that traces of its orig--inal structure cannot be expected in tribes which have long pass--ed out of the early conditions of matriarchal times." Totemism, then, in our view, is the outcome of primitive reflection upon the Food-Instinct, or rather on its subject-matter, combined, however, with other elements such as the feeling of kin or if one may so call it, the Instinct of Kinship. Instead of the simple reflexes between the perception of, say, the food-animal, or the the image of it awakened by the feeling of hunger, on the one hand, & on the other, the impulse to go on the hunt for it, which man shares with the higher animals, there is reflection upon the pleasantness of the food, the value & beneficence of the food--creature, the usefulness of increasing its numbers, & the prob--lem, on which he concentrates his primitive brain, as to how to make it more abundant, & especially in times of desperate scaro--ity to bring it when absent. Dr. Howitt rightly states the

view of Messrs. Spencer & Gillen & also of Sir J.G. Frazer when he says:"that in Australian tribes the primary function of a tote-mistic group is to ensure by magic a supply of the object which gives its name to the totemistic group."(1) Here come in the rude efforts of the savage's Sympathetic Magic, based on crude infer-ences such as that like is the cause of like, his potent spells, his rudimentary prayers, all designed to solve that food problem by making the food-animal come in greater numbers. The Instinct of Kin or Blood-relationship adds its suggestion to the struggling intelligence. The beneficent creature when eaten becomes "one-f-flesh" with the savage, how natural then to think of it as all-one-flesh with the tribe it nourishes. Dr, Frazer says, for example:"As a clan consists of those in whose veins the same blood runs, & who are therefore one flesh, the totem animal is spoken of by the Mount Gambier tribe, for instance, as being their tumamang i.e. their flesh, & is treated in all respects as a clansman." It is no great step further to think of it as the ancestor. The ceremonies of blood-brotherhood by which strangers or youths are admitted to the tribe are used to symbolise unity with the totem. The forms of address in conciliatory & supplicatory prayer slip easily into the terms of kinship & of ancestry, as the Red Indian of the buffalo totem addresses the totem as "Grandfather". Add the element of mystery or mysterious power to the savage's refl-ection on the food-animal & you have the rudiments of awe &

(1) The Native Tribes of South-East Australia. p.152.

reverence, which require but the later evolution of ideas of spirit to raise the totem to the status of the tribal god. Tot-emism is thus a striking example of the process whereby man, seeking at first the simplest kind of Unity in himself, the unif-ication of his body through his food, passes through intelligence into a more & more differentiated & ever higher unity with his environment, & into that close & intense unity which is the Tribe. It is also an instance of how the differentiation of intelligence works upon the earlier integration of instinct, & how reflection, forming new integrations, brooding upon an inst-inct, creates out of it a Tribal Custom.

The Sex Instinct & Exogamy.

The Instinct of Sex reflected upon by primitive man leads to his innumerable varieties of custom & theory as applied especially to Adolescence & Marriage, & gives rise to many strange cults & barbarous practices. The wildness of these theories often, & the strangeness of the customs & their luxuriant variety, point to a strong primitive impulse. It is, in fact, the urge of the evolutionary process itself characteristically seeking new integ-rations by means of differentiation. It is an impulse become a powerful passion, thus escaping from the regulation of Instinct & its restrictions, such as, for example, seasonal pairing, effects of climate & other limitations, into direction

& control by Intelligence, which for long, owing to its undevelop-ed powers, is in this respect like Phaethon in charge of the chariot & steeds of Apollo. We shall leave aside other products of savage man's consideration of this instinct, & use as our example of the process the theory & practice of Exogamy. Exogamy or Outbreeding, marriage outside the kin, however kinship be conceived, is not by any means universal in primitive life; it shares the field with Endogamy, marriage within the kin. "There are", says Prof. J.Arthur Thomson, "many races in which mating with other races is disapproved or prohibited...Marriage may be prohibited outside the clan, or outside the community, or outside the caste, or outside the class. In many cases the kind of, marriage most approved of is a so-called "cross-cousin marriage"; that is to say, a man should marry his father's sister's daughter or his mother's brother's daughter. There is no doubt that man has given much thought to enforcing some degree of endogamy." It is easy to see how when he began to reflect on the sex-relation, man would find reasons, such as race-pride, dislike of strangers, etc., for marrying within his own folk. But Endogamy has a certain biological value, as breeders of pedigreed stock well know. And as L.T.Hobhouse says, "What has survival-value becomes organised into a hereditary structure in the mind, in other words, an instinct." It is difficult, however, to discover an

instinct or instinctive tendency corresponding to the practice of Endogamy. The most that can be said in that regard is that behind it is the general urge in Nature to Integration, which moves in the direction of consolidation of the tribe & the transmission of qualities which have survival value. Endogamy has rather the appearance of being the product of reflection upon the sex relation in general, which has evoked such an amazing variety of custom & tribal practice in many other directions. The highly sophisticated idea of royal blood is an example, where marriage beneath the sacred caste was impossible in Europe even to recent times, & the Egyptian Pharaohs were still more logical in marrying their sisters. Marrying within the kin, therefore, in so far as it may be regarded as an unconscious tendency without the right to be called an instinct, is probably best described as an expression of the tendency in inorganic & organic Nature to Inertia, to the preservation of integrations existing & achieved, which the primitive & even the civilised mind, reflecting on it, translates into a customary & often highly-elaborated practice.

Exogamy, on the other hand, is connected with the profound urge in Nature towards Variability, which is another name for differentiation; & differentiation is the movement of Nature not toward the preservation of existing integrations, but toward the production of new & richer integrations. Here the impulse, the objection to the

marriage of near kin, is so strong that it is commonly regarded as an "instinct". Dr. Freud, in applying his characteristic theories to the subject of "Totem & Taboo", speaks in general of "the savage's dread of incest". Certainly the repugnance is almost as universal as that which induces respect for pregnancy throughout the animal kingdom, & which has so obvious a survival value. It is, as just said, widely held to be an "instinctive" repugnance; & this idea is supported by what are supposed to be the disastrous effects of human endogamy. But closer & more scientific investigation has shown that the evil results of inbreeding are not so self-evident as has been imagined. The evils observed may not be the effect of inbreeding at all; & endogamy has frequently the advantage of improving the stock, by transmitting desirable qualities. Prof. J.Arthur Thomson says;"There is no hint that close inbreeding in Wild Nature has any deteriorative effects." He quotes also the authorities, East & Jones, ~~to them~~ thus; "in-breeding is not in itself harmful; whatever effect it may have is due wholly to the inheritance received."
Exogamy, therefore, out-breeding, cannot safely be accounted for by an instinct against in-breeding. But, on the other hand, there is evidence that it represents a very strong tendency in life, which becoming conscious in man gives rise to many repugnances & inhibitory customs. Cross-fertilisation, which is out-breeding in plant life plays an immense part in the vegetable kingdom. And it is found that crossing of strains both in

animal & plant life carries with it a biological advantage, has distinct survival value. As Darwin said, "both with plants & animals, there is abundant evidence that a cross between very distinct individuals of the same species- that is, between members of different strains or sub-breeds- gives vigour & fertility to the offspring." Prof. Thomson says, "There is often an increase in 'vigour,' resisting power, size, & other good qualities." "And he adds, "there is another thing that out-breeding does. It promotes variability. The hybrid offspring may be a new thing & its offspring may be new. Sometimes the crossing seems to start "an epidemic of variations"? It is striking to find that this tendency to Variability (that is, to Differentiation) is traceable, like the upper waters of the evolutionary stream, as far back as the origin of sex itself. Thus, the writers of "Taboo & Genetics" say: "Having once originated, the sexual type of reproduction possessed a definite survival value which assured its continuation. Sex makes possible a crossing of strains, which evidently possesses some great advantage, since the few simple forms which have no such division of reproductive functions have undergone no great development & all the higher, more complicated animals are sexual. This crossing of strains may make possible greater variety; it may help in crossing out or weakening variations which are too far from the average, or both. Schäfer thinks that an exchange of nuclear substance probably gives a sort of chemical

rejuvenation & very likely stimulates division. At any rate, the groups in which the reproductive process became thus partitioned between two kinds of individuals, male & female, not only survived, but they underwent an amazing development compared with those which remained sexless."

Anthropologists have still to formulate a distinct theory of Exogamy. We venture not so much to present a theory as to arrange the facts inductively in that direction, as an illustration both of our principle of Man's Quest for Unity & of the subordinate question of the influence of primitive man's reflection upon his tendencies & instincts, in creating his crude theories & customs.

We have, then, to begin with, the universal tendency in Evolution to advance from integration to integration, from simpler to more complex, by means of differentiations. The first great differentiation in the realm of life is that of Sex, whose value for thme process- value for survival & progress- evidently lies in the immense range of Variability to which it gives access. This crossing of individuals in Sex is succeeded by Cross-fertilisation in plants, which, though not by any means universal, continues the same biological advantage of promoting variability & carrying on the primal urge of differentiation in the direction of new integrations, while there is an additional advantage to integration beaause new individuals produced by the crossing of

strains probably possess a certain access of 'vigour.' This advan-
-tage of Outbreeding is continued in animals & man. The urge of
differentiation, (with "higher" integrations in view), universal
in Nature, is there; & the advantage of Variability, together
with the probably greater vigour of crossed or exogamous strains,
is organised into a tendency which is almost an instinctive pref-
-erence for Outbreeding.

In Man all instincts, fulfilled in the lower animals by unconsc-
-ious reflexes, tend to become objects of intelligence; their aims
are more & more consciously pursued. With him, therefore, into
the sex relation we are considering psychological factors enter.
Of these the most important in this connection is the attract-
-ion of the unfamiliar & strange. This is manifestly a form of
differentiation in the direction of new integrations. It must
be observed that with the advent of consciousness in animals &
man, Nature attaches a certain pleasure or satisfaction to nerv-
-ous & mental integrations. Assimilation of food, capture of
the prey, expression of sex, are examples of this in bodily integ-
-rations, while unifications of the mind, the formation of wholes
in thought, such as the assimilation of new & interesting facts,
an imaginative picture , the emergence of a new idea or discovery,
the satisfaction of curiosity, is accompanied by a definite pleas-
-ure, which is obviously of advantage for the acquisition of
knowledge, an important new condition of human survival. It is
the impulse of Curiosity with which we are specially concerned at

the moment. Both in animals & in man it drives the mind towards the mental acquisition of the unfamiliar & strange, thus forming in experience new & more differentiated integrations to which is attached a certain mental pleasure. Now, this attraction of the unfamiliar is clearly operative in sexual selection. The bio-logical advantage in certain variations, such as striking plum-age, peculiar crests, the Australian Bower Bird's elaborately decorated structure, the Secretary Bird's mating dances, & so on, must have lain initially in attracting the attention of the other sex, appealing to its curiosity & interest in the unfamiliar, which is reinforced by the pleasure which accompanies a new in-tegration in the mind. In the case of human beings Westermarck has pointed out that one of the roots of Exogamy is probably the lack of interest in the females who are near & familiar, & conversely the greater interest & attraction of the distant & unfamiliar. He quotes his Berber teacher, asked if marriages of cousins were common among his people, saying, "How could you love a girl whom you had always seen?" We have suggested wherein the attraction consists, the psychological appeal of the strange & unfamiliar in circumstances in which fear could have little or no influence, but in which the tendency towards variation, the primal impulse in Nature of differentiation & integration, takes the form of that appeal to attention & curiosity, the satisfaction of which carries with it an accompaniment of pleasure. These various elements, which yet are but expressions of the supreme tendency

in Evolution, taking the form, on the one hand, of the preference for a crossing of strains, & on the other hand, of the attraction of the distant & unfamiliar, both of these embodying the urge towards Variability, go some way towards accounting for the wide-spread objection in primitive man to marriage of near kin, which is almost an "instinctive" repugnance & expresses itself in the numerous & varied customs of Exogamy.

We are employing Exogamy as an example of the growth of an integration of Custom from an integration of Instinct by the operation of crude intelligence reflecting upon it. We are not prepared to call it an instinct, but it is sufficient for our purpose to describe it as an almost instinctive repugnance, which both for primitive & for civilised man is embodied in most stringent customs & laws against what the latter calls "incest". The repugnance is there in savage man; the tendency becomes conscious. Instead of obeying an impulse blindly, reflection makes him wonder why. Especially his child & his youth are curious about reasons, as the old Hebrew legislators wisely anticipated. The first answer on this point is that which Fear, that all-pervading influence in primitive life & thought, prescribes, namely that it is "dangerous". Calamity of one sort or another will follow to the individual, & what is more important to the tribe. Savages somewhat above the most primitive in intelligence make the same deduction from observation that civilised & scientific men do,

namely that inbreeding is undesirable because the offspring tend to be sterile & otherwise defective. Mr. J.H. Hutton, for example, says of the Sema Nagas, an Assamese tribe; "That the Sema recognises the evils of consanguineous marriage is clear enough, & he describes it as sterile or resulting in idiocy or deformity of itw offspring, & it is also clear that he considers exogamy a sufficiently effective bar," The observation on which this theory is founded, is, as we have seen, of doubtful accuracy, since there is no satisfactory proof that inbreeding produces idiocy or deformity if these undesirable characters are not already in the heredity. This, however, is an inference which men of Science have been satisfied with, & it may be pardoned in the intelligent savage. Nevertheless, it is not only doubtful in itself, but it is probably too logical, the observation too intellectual, for the more primitive types such as the Australian natives to be able to make it. It is too elaborate to be taken, as Westermarck does, as the origin of exogamous practices in such tribes. The most that can be said perhaps is that primitive man is conscious of a preference for marrying outside of his own family & near relations-the preference whose roots we have endeavoured to trace. He asks himself & his neighbour or is asked, in those interchanges of tentative thought which build up the tribal consciousness & its "collective representations," the why of this preference. The first & most natural answer is that

not to do this thing would be disastrous to the man & the tribe. It would involve the usual penalties of the breach of a Taboo. To avert the danger the utmost ingenuity of the tribe, particularly that of their specialists, the Medicine Men, is concentrated upon the adjustment of these relations. And when, as in the case of the Australian aborigines, Exogamy is one of their chief interests in a life in which interests are few, the concentration of thought upon it results in a maze of exogamous rules, which has all the simple complexity, so to say, which children often introduce into their games, easily comprehensible to the initiate but mysterious to the outside spectator.

The main problem for these primitive minds in considering marriage relations is that of the meaning of "Kinship". The crude intellect interprets this in ways strange to the civilised mind, & its inferences frequently make connections which are not in the facts & miss others which are real; but it works upon basal instinctive tendencies, & its logic is a rudimentary form of our own. Thus Dr. Howitt[1] found that the division of a tribe into two exogamous moieties was intended to prevent the marriage of blood brothers & sisters; & he accepted the suggestion of Dr. Frazer that the further subdivision into four exogamous sections was to prevent the marriage of parents & children. These are naturally the first & strongest forms of the inherited tendency we have already described, which is instinctive in the animals

[1] Native Tribes of South-East Australia: A.W. Howitt. p.284.

becomes conscious in man & the subject of his simple reflection. A further complication is introduced by Totemism. The totem being "all-one-flesh" with all the members of the clan creates a new & more sacred idea of kinship. And as the "sacred" or holy is at first that which is invested with dangerous power, marriage within that kin is the subject of deeper aversion than incestuous relations in the ordinary sense & becomes the subject of more stringent laws. These are the more carefully elaborated & more strictly enforced in that the whole tribe, through its mystic unity with the totem-god, is involved in the peril & disaster of breaking them. It is not difficult to see in these tendencies & regulations the rudimentary forms of the religious sanctions of marriage in civilised life, & also the process by which there grew up the laws of society & the imperatives of morality. It is probably unnecessary to add that to trace the most sacred rites of Religion & the highest ideals of Morality back to these rudimentary beginnings is not to derogate from their meaning or to depreciate their value, any more than to see in the Magic of the savage the primitive pattern of Science & in the art of Palaeolithic man the ancestor of modern Art is to diminish their worth. One does so only to remark the impressiveness of the continuous process whereby man in his Quest for Unity, in that endeavour after Unification which is the urge in him of evolving Nature as a whole, expressed in the integrations of the inorganic world, in

the instinctive unifications of organic life, & finally in the structures of man's conscious intelligence, moves on through that primitive order -so tentative & fumbling as hardly to deserve the name- the order of such crude theories, beliefs & customary laws as those of Totemism, Exogamy, & Taboo, which Reflection substit-utes for the less fallible but narrower co-ordinations of Inst-inct, towards the higher unifications of Knowledge, Morality & Religion. What we have been particularly observing at this point is that part of the long process in which man breaks out from the Integration of Instinct by means of the differentiations of Intelligence on his way to a new Integration. This view shows man as like some of Rodin's sculptures of Creation, half-emerging from but still half-held by the primal clay. Intelligence is still near to Instinct & partakes of its sudden impulsive character. The subjects, too, of its reflection are naturally the instincts themselves, the impulses he now for the first time must reason about & explain; & out of the theories he forms, as primitive man, his surmises, inferences, & practical endeavours to avert the dangers of the unseen power & later Powers he dimly fears & guesses to be all around him, the new Integration of Custom is created.

Chapter VII

THE GENERALISED MIND

(a) [illegible] Ideas & Mental Grasp.

The integration of Custom is that stage of primitive culture at which most savage peoples are found at the present day. It is associated everywhere with tribal organisation. The Custom, which is law, science & religion for the members, is the custom of the tribe. This unification of man's life has great stability, restoring upon the higher plane of intelligence & crude reflection the adaptation to the environment which made for survival at the instinctive stage. The customs are so implicitly & almost mechanically obeyed that they might be called the instincts of the tribe. It is man at this point of his development who is the subject of our enquiry; & we are seeking the psychological roots & early forms of that thought of his which assumes a certain definiteness & complexity in tribal custom. We return, then, to examine in this & following chapters the mind of man of which we have taken a somewhat general view in order to trace its tendency to unification, which seems to us so fundamental. We make the investigation in more detail of that mind emerging from the integrations of animal instinct & moving towards those new unifications of customary belief & practice which are characteristic of tribal life. The mind thus observed has that character of "indefinite, incoherent homogeneity" at first which is the earliest observable stage of every developing thing, including the universe itself. To put it in terms of Zoology, it is

"generalised"mind. A generalised animal is one usually of primitive form which possesses qualities common to various allied genera, but lacks those specific characters which have been acquired in the course of evolution by the species & varieties descended from it; as, for example, the earliest known ancestor of the horse shares the toed foot of innumerable kinds of quadruped, while it lacks the specific hoof of the horse of history & the multitude of special characters which belong to the many varieties evolved or bred in recent times, from the Clydesdale horse to the Shetland pony. The Lemur, which in its primitive types is the ancestor of the monkeys, is such a generalised animal. In certain general characters it covers, or sprawls loosely over, a wide area of life. It belongs to the quadrupeds, & yet its feet tend towards the hands of the monkeys; & its facial characteristics show it moving away from the long-muzzled mammals toward the apes, & acquiring a more & more humanlike face. Some species of lemur have developed a single long finger, very useful for digging grubs & insects from the bark of trees, as though this creature, instead of taking the straight road of evolution toward the human hand, had diverged into this by-path of evolutionary variation & acquired something like a human finger. Thus the generalised ancestor of the present lemurs, of the apes & of man, had certain simple characters common to all three; but it lacked the specialised features which

distinguish the anthropoid apes from the lemurs, & man, on his side, from the apes. It had not, for instance, the human hand or weight of brain or erect position in walking.

Pithecanthropus erectus, the ape-man whose type is that of the remains found by Dr. Dubois in Java, might be called a generalised man. By means of common qualities this type of creature covers in great part both the simian & human tribes. Its three teeth as discovered are definitely human, & so also is the femur, denoting the erect position in walking; but the skull is simian in shape & subhuman in size. It may be conjectured with probability that it had the projecting upper jaw & strong eyebrow ridges of the apes & of low & primitive human races; it would have the erect human posture, but it would be without the smooth skin & the much larger & more convoluted brain of recent man.

In like manner, to apply the figure, primitive man possesses a generalised mind. He stands somewhere between the animals & civilised man. In certain general characters the primitive mind covers both. It has the instincts which belong to both; & it has the intelligence, more rudimentary in the animal, more highly developed in civilised man, than its own, which they have in common. But the brain, the organ of the mind of primitive man, is itself of a generalised type, as we have seen, undeveloped, for instance, in the frontal & temporal region; & so his mind is not furnished with those co-ordinative centres & functions which play

so great a rôle in highly developed thought. An illustrative parallel, touched upon earlier, may be drawn between the evolution of the human hand & the growth of the co-ordinating power of the mind - between physical & mental grasp. The hand of the monkey without the opposable thumb is very much a purely prehensile organ - a little more varied & effective than the prehensile tail - an organ for hanging on to things, just as the hand of the very young infant is. The hand of early man with the thumb in the human position is comprehensive; it has real grasp. It takes hold of the stick all round & can use it as a weapon. It grips the stone & can throw it at an enemy or use it to chip another stone into a sharp-edged tool. Thus arrives man the employer of tools & the fire-maker. And after the hand has reached this point, the innumerable kinds & qualities of grasp, from the hand on the rein or the plough to the hand of Raphael or the fingers of Paganini, are already on the way;.

The function of the mind which corresponds to the hand in this metaphor of "grasp" is the apprehending & later the comprehending activity of thought. In percepts & perception thought is almost purely prehensile; it hangs on to things, or, with the finger-grip of the ape on its branch, it hangs on to one thing just long enough to swing it on to another; & that is characteristic, as we shall note more fully later, of the animal mind & more or less of the mind of primitive man. In concepts & in conception, on the

other hand, the mind grasps a thing all round, comprehends it, separates it from other things, individualises it by its peculiar qualities or classifies it with other things of the same kind. The mind thus acquires two forms of concept, first, the distinctly individualised thing with all its distinctive qualities comprehended in the idea of it, &, second, the general idea under which is grouped a whole class of things.

This power of forming concepts is the hand (with the opposable thumb) of the mind. It is present but very rudimentary in the animals: it is still rudimentary in primitive & savage man; but the power to individualise objects, to get a comprehensive grasp of them, on the one hand, & the power to form general ideas, grasping many things under one class-name, on the other, make man the mental-tool-using animal, That is, they provide him in concepts with those mental tools & the increasing ability to employ them which lead him on from the medicine-man to Socrates & St. Paul & Charles Darwin. On the other hand - & this is very important for our later consideration of primitive religion - it is the limitation in savage man of this power of forming concepts, the vagueness & wavering character of them, the difficulty of forming them distinctly at all, which accounts in great measure for the crude & strange shapes of man's early & savage religions.

In a subsequent chapter we shall discuss in more detail the formation of concepts, with reference to certain special theories of the nature of primitive mind. At the moment we are considering in various aspects the character of that mind as generalised; & we may be permitted to illustrate the growth of a concept or general idea in such a mind from Rudyard Kipling's Jungle Book & Mowgli's idea of fire. To the animals (in the book but also in reality) fire is in the great dim class of things-to-be-feared. It is a percept, a thing seen, felt perhaps, fled-from, but not a concept, in no real or definite sense grasped by the mind. They call it, indeed, the Red Flower, which is a rudimentary attempt to classify it under the general idea of "flower", but it eludes that concept as an incomprehensible flower which hurts when touched & moves like a living thing. Mowgli, however, goes down to the village to get some to fight Shere Khan the tiger with. He finds out some things about fire by experience, that it can be carried in a clay pot, that it eats dry branches, that he can use such a branch, burning, to terrify the tiger & the recreant wolves. Thus it can be observed how increasingly definite the concept fire becomes to the human brain of the animal-reared Mowgli, & how as the concept fire does so become definite, both the thing & the idea grow more & more serviceable tools in the thought & practice of the young savage. Here Mr. Kipling's imagination - as is the way with poetic genius - serves the same purpose as the patient

induction of the scientific observer; for it is very likely that this is not far-off from the ~~k~~ true history of primitive man's relation to fire, from the percept of it in his brute stage as a thing of terror to the concept of it as something that could be grasped & kindled & mastered; & that crude power over it which made the savage Master of the Jungle is the lineal ancestor of the mastery of modern man over the jungle of industry with its stranger monsters of the blast-furnace & the factory.

The concept of spirit - extremely important for the present enquiry &, naturally, the subject of fuller consideration at a later stage - has a very similar history. ~~N~~ In the generalised mind of early man, or of the precursor of man, it is not there as a concept at all. It is hardly even a percept at first. The formless protoplasmic germ, so to say, of spirit floats about on the great sea of things-to-be-feared. The first distinction is between things-to-be-feared which are seen, known & familiar, such as the animal or human enemy, on the one hand, & on the other, things-to-be-feared which are unseen, indefinite, unfamiliar, such as the things vaguely behind the strange, unidentifiable shape or sound or unexpected occurence. Then, probably with man's dim but growing sense of himself as <u>doing</u> things when he began to use tools, came the rudiments of the idea of power, of unseen entities which <u>did</u> things, & to which he dimly referred the inexplicable things-to-be-feared. Anthropologists employ the

Polynesian word Mana for savage man's idea of power or mysterious agency simply because power as understood by civilised minds is a definite concept of which the generalised mind of the savage is incapable. A little more definiteness comes when Mana or force is regarded as resident in definite things, as in a curious stick or unusual stone; & with this definiteness ~~xxxxxxx~~ in mental grasp arrives the idea of physical mastery over the thing in which the power is, so that he can use it to attain desirable ends - which, it is evident, is the beginning of Fetichism & Magic. It is not necessary at this point to trace further the gradual emerg-ence, under the influence of dreams, visions of ancestors, & man's growing conception of himself as a spparate being, of the idea of soul or spirit. As M. Levy-Bruhl says; "Between the exact con-ception of spirits which take the form of actual demons or gods, of which each has his name, his attributes, & often his worship, & the idea, at once general & concrete, of a power immanent in objects & beings, such as Mana, although that power is not indiv-idualised, there is room for an infinite number of intermediate forms, some more definite, others more elusive, vaguer, less defin-ite in outline, though not less real for a mentality which is but little conceptual in character (peu conceptuelle), in which the law of participation is still dominant."[1] As to the "law of participation" in M. Levy-Bruhl's psychology of primitive man we shall have more to say; but we may accept his description of the

[1] La Mentalite Primitive. Levy-Bruhl. p.55.

hardly conceptual character of savage man's idea of spirit as illustrative of the aspect of the generalised primitive mind, with which we are concerned, namely, its difficulty in forming concepts.

THE GENERALISED MIND

(b). Fatigue or Weariness of Effort.

A further characteristic of the generalised primitive mind which leads to important consequences for religion, may be called fatigue or the difficulty of sustained mental effort. As the early mind of man is deficient in mental grasp, in the power to grip various similar or related objects into the coherent whole of a general idea, so it is deficient in the capacity for continuous effort along a particular line, to hold to & pursue one thread of thought, to join up the memories or ideas of the past with the facts of the present & the possibilities or expectations of the future. The poet Coleridge in one of his prose works has noted this quality of the uncultivated mind from the testimony of missionaries in India: "How often, & how feebingly, do they describe the difficulty of rendering the simplest chain of thought intelligible to the ordinary natives, the rapid exhaustion of their whole power of attention, & with what distressful effort it is exerted while it lasts."[1] M. Levy-Bruhl remarks that "primitives" "dispense with thought as often as they possibly can" & that "the simplest reflection is insufferable fatigue."[2] De La Saussaye says of savages, "They follow impulses & impressions which change every moment."[3] This impulsiveness or changeableness in thought is in one aspect a consequence of the difficulty of continuous mental effort. If one may go to the Jungle Book again for illustration, one finds that this is the character the other

[1] Aids to Reflection. p.10.
[2] La Mentalité Primitive. p49.
[3] Manual of the Science of Religion. p.35

animals give to the Bandar-Log or Monkey People. "They never go far" said Rann the Kite, using his own bird language, "They never do what they set out to do. Always pecking at new things are the Bandar-Log." This restlessness of the mind which in Kipling's fancy provoked the contempt of other animals was in one sense the pledge of the greater inheritance of these primates to which man belongs. The other creatures moved placidly in the grooves, smoothly along the rails, of instinct; but the animal which be-came human was thrown by its new power of intelligence into a forest of ideas among which it had to make its own paths. To repeat a figure already employed, the primitive mind, escaped from the Egyptian bondage of animal instinct & dimly seeking the Prom-ised Land of rich & ordered civilised thought which was yet far in the future, wandered, less guided than the children of Israel, in an aimless & spasmodic way, in circles & interlacing paths, in a wilderness of barren, vague & transitory notions. Intelligence was driven by its fundamental restlessness - that divine discon-tent really which we have named the Quest for Unity, whose only & final rest in Augustine's famous saying is in God - from one idea to another, seeking always the path of its progress; but all the time intelligence was hampered by its own defect. This defect, which is that under discussion, was its undeveloped powers & therefore its inability, to make a sustained mental effort, to pursue, for example, one line of thought long enough to arrive at some large & comprehensive, broad & yet deep conception. The

The Jungle Book. p.57.

primitive intelligence is thus easily tired, like a child learning to walk, & falls back upon various ways of escaping the fatigue, various forms of rest for the mind. One of these is just this tendency to change of thought, to variety of idea, to pass easily from one notion to another. Another is to put an act in place of a thought, to cut the Gordian knot instead of solving the riddle of it, to do something - ritual, magical or the like - instead of thinking. A third form of rest, which is very much a development of the preceding, is to do the same thing over & over again, in other words, Custom, which is always tending backwards, to throw the mind back from the more difficult operations of intelligence to the easier working of instinct. With such inclinations to rest arising from the early mind's incapacity for a long strain of thought, the deep urge of the nobler restlessness, essentially the urge of towards unification of life, within & without, contin-ually strives, breaking out from them in the forms & along the paths of progress.

This tendency to relax from the effort of thought to some resting-place for the mind nearer to the level of instinct may be illust-rated by reference to a stage in man's physical development. The erect position of the body which means so much for the growth of the human mind by permitting the development of the brain, is only attained in evolution slowly &, so to say, with difficulty. The stages from the lemurlike quadruped to the Pithecanthropus erectus & the European Apollo or athlete might easily be traced. The

gorilla, for example, supports the erect position by resting on the knuckles of the hand against the ground . The orang-utan may grasp a branch overhead as he stands, or walk with his arms balancing above his head. When the upright posture was new to the precursor of man the necessity of frequent rests from it would be greatly felt. And it is the familiar fact that when civilised man is weak from childhood, from age, from illness, it is the erect position of the body which fails; when he is tired the muscles which keep him upright are the first to complain; & when he rests it is sitting or lying down.

The capacity for continued mental effort resembles in these respects the erect posture of the body which is its physical basis in the evolutionary process. We are accustomed to speak on our own part of an effort of memory, an effort of imagination, an effort to pursue a thought, all of which imply a certain straining of the mind, from which not to think or to think little is a relaxation & a rest. The late W.H.Hudson, that poetic observer of nature & of himself, describes in one of his books the strange peace & elation which he found in riding out into the vast plain of Patagonia day after day & simply gazing on its desolate expanse. He says; "during those solitary days it was a rare thing for any thought to cross my mind; animal forms did not cross my vision or bird-voices assail my hearing more rarely. In that novel state of mind I was in, thought had become impossible.... my mind had suddenly transformed itself from a thinking machine into a machine

for some other unknown purpose. To think was like setting in motion a noisy engine in my brain; & there was something there which bade me be still, & I was forced to obey. My state was one of suspense & watchfulness: yet I had no expectation of meeting with an adventure, & felt as free from apprehension as I feel now when sitting in a room in London. The change in me was just as great & wonderful as if I had changed my identity for that of another man or animal;....the state" (he continues) "seemed familiar rather than strange" & was "accompanied by a strong feeling of elation." Hudson's explanation is that "such changes in us.. can only be attributed to an instantaneous reversion to the primitive & wholly savage mental conditions."[1] He appears to us to be right in his explanation; & what one notes particularly is that in this primitive mental state part of the satisfaction lay in the cessation of thought involving mental effort, & the return to the suspense & watchfulness of the animal or the savage in the jungle. That condition of suspense & watchfulness is quite different from the strain of thinking: it is simply the keen awareness of the animal senses to the external world at the instinctive stage of development, which on the emergence of any new sight or sound would touch the spring or release the trigger of some instinctive movement or other response. The elation, in part, & certainly the restfulness of this mental state as felt by Mr. Hudson are due to the relaxation of the effort of thought,

1. Idle Days in Patagonia. pp.211-212.

Which is often felt as a strain even by civilised men. In the primitive mind the effort is far more difficult, the strain is more pronounced, & thence the inclination to rest, to relax from thought altogether or to seek some kind of support for it, is much more influential. In order, however, to make progress in thinking it is necessary to be able to recall the course of past thought, to visualise at least a little way ahead its course in the future, & by a certain concentration to "hold the line" in between. This is hard for the uncultured mentality which does not easily hold ideas in memory nor see whither they tend or lead, & finds it difficult to concentrate upon & pursue a train of thought. In such efforts the brain of primitive man is soon tired: it sinks down from mental erectness, & seeks & finds various ways of resting. We shall examine a few of these.

1). The first we note is, as already suggested, the swift response, (resembling the reflexes of instinct) of primitive man to impulse & sense impression, & hence the quick passage from one object of interest to another. In the jungle, it has been said, the law is, "Strike first & ask questions afterwards"; it might be put as, "Leap aside first or run like the wind from the strange sight or sound & then stop & think about it - if you have time, that is, & some other danger does not send you flying again." Everything around early man, depending as he did, not upon strength or speed but on his brain for survival, seemed dangerous, especially to

his awakened imagination, his new human power of visualising phenomena within his mind. Hidden power to hurt was in everything he did not understand; & the impulse of flight was for the most part stronger than the inclination to dwell on things, to reflect upon them. Hence that disconnectedness in thought, which for want of a better word, we shall call atomism. We have already seen it in the inability of the savage to form distinct concepts or general ideas; & it reappears in the tendency to leap impulsively from one object of fear or interest to another without dwelling long enough upon one in particular to understand it thoroughly, or to form any definite conception or habit of thought about it. Thus, for example the savage may see "mana," his vague notion of power, in an object, say an odd stick or stone, owing to its curious shape or some lucky or unlucky experience connected with it in his mind; but, either through the entrance of some other of his innumerable fears or through the lack of capacity to reflect long enough upon the object or the occurence, he fails to penetrate any further into its meaning or to form any idea of it which lasts & thus may be applied to other objects of similar kind. A common mistake of observers of savage tribes in our time has been to regard "mana" as a sort of pantheistic term representing universal spirit or as representing spirit (in the form of soul or demon or god) in individual objects, whereas the savage, who thinks in concrete terms, simply ascribes "mana," something vaguer

than what we mean by "power", to one thing & then another & to innumerable things.

The following quotation given by M. Levy-Bruhl provides an excell-ent illustration of the sudden & impulsive manner in which the imaginative fears of the primitive mind translate the simplest natural phenomena in the environment, if not immediately explic-able, into manifestations of unseen, dangerous power. It prob-ably represents a stage in human development very near to the instinctive, the atomism or disconnectedness of the thought & the impulsiveness & immediacy of the leap of the mind, dictated by fear but taking its form from imagination, reproducing with a human difference the character of ~~xxxx~~ the reflexes of instinct. The quotation is from a paper in Anthropos by Fr. J.Jette "On the superstitions of the Ten'a Indians". VI(1911), p.p. 721-722. "One may say that the Ten'a maintain an almost constant intercourse with the "undesirable"inhabitants of the spirit world. They think they are liable to see or hear them at any moment. Every sort of unusual noise, every fancy whatever of their imagination takes the form of the manifestation of a devil. If the black trunk of a tree, soaked with water, appears, disappears, & reappears in the river under the action of the current, they have seen a nekod-zaltara. If they (have) heard in the woods a faint sound which is not clearly the cry of birds with which they are familiar, it is a nekodzaltara which is calling them. Not a day passes in a camp

of Indians without someone relating that he has seen or heard something of that nature...These manifestations of the presence of the "devil" are as familiar to the Ten'a as the noise of the wind or the song of the birds."[1] As M. Levy-Bruhl is careful to point out, the idea of "devil" or evil spirit is probably too definite to represent accurately the vague imaginings of these savages. It should be conceived rather as mysterious & danger-power in these unexplained phenomena, tending with the advance of intelligence & of the savage's sense of his own individuality to become personalised in the form of spirits at the stage of the animistic religions. The earlier & more rudimentary stage is admirably expressed in the following report on the intellectually low tribes, the Junglemen, of Chota-Nagpur. It is quoted by Prof Hopkins from Risley in Census for India 1901, PartI, 352f. "The indefinite something which they fear & attempt to propitiate is not a person. The idea which lies at the root of their religion is that of power or rather of many powers, the shifting & shadowy company of unknown powers or influences making for evil rather than for good, which resides in the primeval forest, in the crumbling hills, in the rushing river, in the spreading tree; which gives its spring to the tiger, its venom to the snake, which generates jungle fever, & walks abroad in the terrible guise of cholera, small-pox, or murrain. Closer than this he does not define the object to which he offers his victim, or whose symbol

1. Levy-Bruhl; La Mentalité Primitive. P.56.

he daubs with red at the appointed season. Some sort of power is there & that is enough for him."[1]

This describes what we regard as the most generalised & elementary form from which man's religion has developped. It illustrates also what we mean by the atomism, the atomic, disconnected or impulsive character of the thought of primitive man, leaping from one object to another without dwelling of reflecting upon any. The opportunity, & with it the power, so to dwell & reflect upon things must have come with some deliverance from fear -some safety which enabled the primitive human, having taken to the ground & the erect posture, with all their perils, to pause & consider his world or at least some things in it. Such safety & oppertunity might come with cave-dwelling, or with the invention of comparat-ively effective flint weapons, or with the use of fire, or with a combination of these. It is tempting because of its picturesque-ness, though we are here in the realm of conjecture, to suggest that fire enabled man to sit down protected by its red & smoky veil from his brute enemies, & like the psalmist "consider the heavens", or in that dim ancestral träumerei or reverie see in the embers more & more distinct shapes of ideas & less fleeting impressions of his world. In his daydreams or night reveries by his campfire would grow especially that more & more distinct vision of himself which does so much to unify both his inward & outward life. The history, indeed, of progress in early human

1. The History of Religions. p.18.

thought is in some degree the history of the safety of his life & consequent leisure & opportunity for reflective thought, which developed in power with the opportunity. But the point with which we are concerned now is that for a long time in the evolut-ion of the race sustained mental effort would be fatiguing, as it is with existing backward peoples & even with backward sections among the highly civilised; the pursuit of an elusive general idea or of a linked chain of cause & effect would quickly tire the primitive brain, & rest would be found in relapse into the earlier & easier atomism of thought, flitting lightly like a winged insect from one object to another. These opposite tendencies may be seen both at work in Fetichism. There, on the one hand, a cert-ain association of ideas or at least vague mental connection between an object which can be grasped & to a certain extent used, & mysterious power in that object, acquires a degree of permanence & makes the object into a fetich; but, on the other hand, the permanence of the association is limited & tends to break down in the savage's impulsive & disconnected mentality, when the object, having ceased to bring luck or seriously disappointed its worship-per in some other way, is thrown aside, ceases to be a fetich, & is supplanted by some other object of reverence.

1). Another form of rest from mental effort in the savage mind is Custom. This is the opposite of that form of relief from mental strain which we have just discussed. Instead of moving lightly from one object of interest or fear to another - the creature of impulse - primitive man contents himself with doing the same thing & therefore thinking the same thing, over & over again, becoming thus the creature of custom. Indeed, action for man is fundam-entally easier than thought, because genetically & in the course of evolution action was prior to thought. "Animal thought" says Varendonck, "seems inseparable from movement"[1]; & this is perhaps the meaning of Ribot when he says that "every idea is a movement which is just commencing". At any rate at the instinctive stage of animal development before thought could be said to exist, man's animal ancestor would live by & for action & movement under the impulse of his instinctive reflexes. It is easier to slip down-ward than to strive upward on the slope of evolution, & man finds rest from the fatigue of mental effort in muscular movements of his animal body or in doing things which require the minimum of thought. It is in this sense that games are relaxations. Here also is the attraction of ritual & magic. Man solves his prob-lems, which primitively are mainly practical, by doing things & saying things instead of thinking them out. This preference for action over thought, in other words of the outward for the inward,

[1] Evolution of the Conscious Faculties. Varendonck. p.155.

is reinforced when it is action not of the isolated individual but of a mass of people, of the clan or tribe. The feeling of community, which has its roots far off in the herd instinct & in what is not quite the same, the sense of kin, gives a deepened feeling of safety & well-being, a heightened sense of power & a warmer exhilaration to the great communal actions of tribal magic & religion. In the corroboree there is expression in outward forms of kinship-feeling, sex-feeling, & also of artistic impul-ses; for in Australia musical tunes are sometimes exchanged at these gatherings & thus spread over the continent.[1] In the ordeal there is a simple & to the savage mind extraordinarily effective action which obviates that weighing of evidence which would be an impossible task.[2] The imitative magic which increases the supply of grubs or kangaroos provides the pleasure of drama & play[3] without the hard & desperate thinking which invents better weapons & methods of hunting. The various ceremonies by which man seeks unification with his world & with himself through unity with his god, as in the totemistic & sacrificial rituals, secure that unification upon their lower plane so successfully that not only for savage man, for most tribes, & in all ages, but even for many civilised & modern people, the higher unification through search-ing of heart, thoughtfulness of mind & spirituality of character is largely unsought & unattained. The strength of Custom, the

1. Tom Petrie's Reminiscences of Early Queensland. p.19.
2. Cf. Levy-Bruhl. La Mentalite Primitive. p.347
3. Spencer & Gillen; Native Tribes of Central Australia. p.195.

custom of the tribe, - so great that it keeps a very large portion of mankind under its "tyranny" - lies very much in its adaptation to a stage of mental development in which the effort of action is preferred to the more difficult effort of thought, especially of co-ordinative & prolonged. Its attraction consists in its evas-ion, by practical ways of solving life's problems, of the strain which reflection imposes upon the inferior & less developed co-ordinative powers of the savage brain. It is, as we shall see more fully later, the acquisition of these co-ordinative powers, relieving the mind from the effort of thought which is difficult & even painful to the savage, & substituting the pleas-ure & delight of unification which these higher faculties such as imagination & reason bring with them, which makes all the differ-ence between the savage mind & the civilised, between the tribe with its immemorial customs & the sciences & arts of highly civil-ised nations.

Custom, then, is a form of rest from the fatigue of the primitive mind. Mutatis mutandis, the lines of Wordsworth in the Ode to Duty might be spoken of primitive man;

> Me this uncharted freedom tires;
> I feel the weight of chance desires;
> My hopes no more must change their name,
> I long for a repose that ever is the same.

The escape from the mechanism of instinct into the comparative freedom of intelligence finds man not yet controlled by any inner

law or comprehensive principle such as duty, & not yet capable of "the quietness of thought"; he is oppressed by chance-desires & ever-changing hopes, his soul driven, by fear especially, like Io by the gadfly, from one impulse to another, until he comes to the resting-place of custom. This system of rules & methods for life stamped with tribal authority & almost instinctively obeyed, has ~~h~~ this advantage for primitive man that it provides islands of certainty & even great tracts of assured & tried security of belief & conduct for the mind to rest upon from its voyage on that ocean of danger-ous possibilities & countless things-to-be-feared which filled the subhuman & very early human experience. As fire & flints were man's earliest effective weapons against his physical enemies & gave him leisure from a restless & impulsive, ape-like life to reflect & so to make progress; so the comforting & protecting fire of his belief in practices which his ancestors had tested & found effective for generations, & these practices hardened by habit & the authority of the tribe, provided him with spiritual weapons ~~ag~~ against the "perils of the soul", & gave him leisure from the terr-ors of immaterial enemies - the evil spirits whom he could avert or master by Magic or propitiate by sacrifice- for the thought, reflection & originality which would break through custom itself & open a way to material, moral & spiritual advancement.

For there, on the other hand, was the disadvantage of custom. The mental effort required to break through tribal traditions & age-

-long practices is as difficult as for the individual to conquer ingrained personal habits, & indeed more so, as the collective consciousness in the primitive state, with the herd instinct in the heart of it like the iron in reinforced concrete, is extremely resistant to alteration. The tendency to rest in what has appar-ently proved safe is stronger for the most part than the advent-urous impulse to launch out upon the new & the unknown; & this accounts for the innumerable cul-de-sacs in racial history, the stagnation in which so many tribes remain for long periods. Self-preservation seems all on the side of inertia. The contrary urge in nature, however, that of variability, is not to be defeated; the inveterate tendency to differentiation for the purpose, so to speak, of higher unifications, breaks up this integration of custom at last, & the tribal habit of resting in custom is overcome by the restlessness of the human spirit which is the impulse & impet-us of progress. How these revolutions are accomplished by which certain tribes of men move out from the savage stage of custom towards nationhood & civilisation is to be touched upon later. At the moment this integration of custom, man's next & prolonged rest-ingplace after the integration of instinct, is an illustration of the difficulty of maintaining the erect posture of the mind & of the tendency to relapse to various forms of rest from mental strain or fatigue which are characteristic of primitive man.

(3). One more example of the tendency of the primitive mind to fall back from mental strain upon some form of rest or support, is to be found in the place of authority in early religion, & indeed in some of the latest & highest types of religion. Custom, as may be gathered from what we have just been saying, is the supreme authority for savage man, embodying the authority of tradition & of the tribe. Primitive man is a Pragmatist. Life is too difficult & dangerous for him not to trust to what has "worked", what has been safe for his ancestors. There are two elements in the religious conservatism of primitive man, in which one may see oddly & yet with some faithfulness reflected, as in an ancient mirror, the same conservatism of modern times. The one is the fear which is the essence of all taboo & moves him to let well alone, the fear which sees in all religion & religious objects a perilous force resembling a powerful modern explosive, which the average man dare not handle & which only highly trained & specialised hands may touch, & these with the most extraordinary precautions. The other element is this factor of fatigue, the difficulty in the generalised mind first of grasping & then of holding new ideas or variants, in a more inward & more spiritual direction, of thought or practice, which call for mental effort. The existing ideas or rather customs are those of the tribe; the fear is also that of the tribe as a whole which is exposed to the dangerous power which a careless or contumacious hand may let loose upon it; & it is into

the tribal mind that any new departure must penetrate, as a "repr-
-esentation collective", in Levy-Bruhl's phrase, a collective idea.
Hence it is that originality or genius in individuals, such as no
doubt appears from time to time, probably has almost no effect
upon the tribal life; & the tribal integration, the integration of
custom, is broken up, not as a rule by the power of great individ-
-uals, lawgivers, prophets & kings such as emerge at a later stage,
but by movements & developments of the tribe itself, by its own
growth under favourable conditions to great proportions, by migr-
-ations, impact of higher civilisations, & the like. The tribal
integration resists the onset of originality or individual genius
within itself almost as the iron cliff flings back the exceptional
wave; & that is why savage or primitive races remain for so many ages
& in so many parts of the world at the same stage within the
integration of custom. It is in tribes which from other causes
are incipient nations, at the pastoral or agricultural or even
town-dwelling stage of culture, that great dim figures, half-
-legendary but representing the power of original genius at last
to influence the lives of masses of men, appear in the mists of
early history, men like Abraham, Moses, Solon, Lycurgus, founders
of religions, lawgivers & makers of nations. At earlier stages
in human development the tribal solidarity & inertia of custom are
so strong that the savage mind, to which mental concentration is
already difficult & the formulation of a new idea or even any

general idea whatever involves an intolerable strain, falls back all but invariably upon the authority of custom & the tribe. Mr. Chas. W. Abel records the following conversation with a Christian native of Papua regarding a burial which was taking place.

"Why have they painted & decorated the corpse?"

"It is our custom," replied the chief.

"Yes, I know that, but what does it mean?" I inquired.

"Ibai," he said.

I grew hopeless. Ibai is a very comprehensive expression. It may be literally translated, "query", or "who knows?" Sometimes it also covers the wider meaning, "I don't want you to know."

"Thou art not willing to enlighten me," I said.

"Nay, Master," he replied respectfully, "it is not that. Thy question is a hard one for me to answer. We do these things because it is our custom. It is what our forefathers did with their dead, & we do it. I know no more than that."[1]

There is nothing unfamiliar to our age in this attitude of mind on the part of the New Guinea chief. Many things in modern life are maintained for no other reason than that of unreasoned custom. The duel, that survival of the ordeal, has been maintained till very recent times in Germany & France for reasons which could only be convincing to a savage; & Maeterlinck's essay on the duel written in war time is a singular & under the circumstances pardonable example of that primitive mentality into which most of us

1. Savage Life in New Guinea. p.95.

were brought through the stirring up of the ancestral depths & the inhibition of more recently acquired powers by the Great War. In the "religions of authority" as contrasted by Auguste Sabatier with the "religion of the spirit" there are the most striking examples in civilised society of what we have named fatigue & of the falling back upon a more primitive state of mind, that of submission to authority, from the exercise of the higher & more recently acquired capacities of the mind & from the mental effort & strain of feeling which were demanded by that exercise. The attraction of Roman Catholicism for minds under the influence of the fear of change & fatigued by the problems presented by Science & Biblical Criticism, is the primitive one of providing in the authority of the Church the rest from thought which is the normal condition of the savage mind. It is not surprising that the methods & means of the maintenance & transmission of that author-ity should remind the anthropologist in many respects of the magical notions & practices of primitive man, & that, in Roman Catholic countries especially, the peasant - who, according to R.R. Marett, is by his folk-lore midway between the cave-man & the cultured modern - retains many superstitions in common with the savage.

In Protestantism the extreme emphasis upon the authority of Script-ure has incurred a similar nemesis. Dr, Martineau has describ-ed vividly this attitude: "The blind idolater of "Holy Writ" will

have it all infallible, that it may spare him the cares of thought & conscience, & serve him as sortes fatidicae for the solution of every question, & the relief of every scruple." The result of this return upon the primitive, arising from the ancient fear of & for the sacred & from the enticement of relief from mental strain, is evident in the adherents of verbal inspiration who make texts into magic spells, prophets & apostles into medicine-men or mechanical oracles, & in their reverence for numbers & expectation of sudden apocalyptic events recover the mental attitude of the childhood of the race. In both these reversions to authority - that of an infallible church or an infallible book - a certain integration of the mind, a unification which it is the inveterate tendency of the human mind to endeavour to reach, & in which it normally finds rest & satisfaction, is attained. But it is unification upon a low level, a level indeed not far above that integration of custom & tribal authority in which so many peoples have remained & from which the human spirit has escaped with such enormous difficulty. To revert to it is to turn against the whole trend & urge of the process of evolution in the universe itself which proceeds from integration to higher integration by ever richer differentiations, & which has committed its highest unifications to the mind & spirit of man.

Besides the authority of the tribe & tribal custom in primitive life, there is the authority of the individual. The authoritat-

Seat of Authority in Religion. p.287

-ive man in matters of religion & custom, the medicine-man, the sorcerer, the priest, the priest-king, is a familiar figure in the comparative study of religions. His power depends upon that credulity which is a mark of the primitive mental type not only in ancient or savage but in modern & civilised times; & credulity is a form of rest from mental effort. The medicine-man, the wizard, the priest, & even the Pope himself, derives his authority from the mind of man tired with the effort to cope with perils of the soul or of the body, wearied with the perplexities it cannot break through, & glad to rest on the strong assertions & the con-fident premises of another. It is the experience not merely of primitive man but of modern man that the promise of deliver-ance from danger or relief from pain or sorrow creates an immen-se prejudice in favour of belief so that the weighing of evidence or close scrutiny of the facts is done, if at all, under grave dis-advantages. There are phenomena in modern life, especially in relation to the occult, which make it not difficult to comprehend the simple acceptance by savage man of the most inpossible state-ments by his authoritative sorcerer or priest. In his case there are psychological defects with which we have yet to deal more specifically in later chapters. At the moment this inclin-ation to fall back upon authority, whether of custom, tradition or the strong personality, illustrates the tendency to rest from that erect posture of the mind, that steady & independent mental

effort, which is so hard for the generalised mind of early man, but which is as essential to human progress as the erect position of the body & means so much for the development of individuality.

Chapter IX

The Theory of M. Levy-Bruhl

A "Different" Mentality.

A. Representations Collectives.

In treating of "The Generalised Mind" we have made an assumption or taken up a position which some anthropologists & sociologists would not readily concede. The position is that the mind of man at all stages of his development is generically the same. It maintains that the primitive mind & the civilised mind are earlier & later types of the same developing thing. They are genetically connected; & cultured thought is a specific, & at once more highly differentiated & more deeply integrated, descendant of a generalised & primitive type of thought. It has seemed to us that the mind of man is the subject of evolution as well as his body, & that, as the brain, the organ of mind,, can be traced through well-defined steps of development from that of the animal up to the brain of civilised man, so the evolution of mind, could it be traced, would be found to be substantially continuous, from the animal & ape-like mind of the generalised subhuman ancestral type through truly primitive human forms onward to the highest modern mentality. Within the integration of intelligence, as we have called it in contrast with the integration of instinct, the phenomena & laws of thought which characterise the finest of cultured minds are found in rudimentary forms in the brain of the savage, & even, sketchily, in the mental processes of the higher animals. Hence, however different they may seem from each other,

as the golden-fruited corn is from the raw green blade, these earlier mental phenomena & operations are regarded as elementary forms of the later, into which they have developed by a process of continuous evolution.

This is a position to which a certain school of thought is more or less definitely opposed. It is the French school of sociologists, of which the most representative names are these of M. Emile Durkheim & the contributers to "L'Annee Sociologique" of which he was editer, including as the most distinguished the collaborators MM. Hubert & Mauss. We shall devote some attention in the following pages to the theories of M. Lucien Levy-Bruhl, professor of the Sorbonne, because, occupying with some slight differences the position of this school, his two brilliant works[1] present us with the most illuminating points of contrast, if one may so say, with the theory here put forward.

The salient point in the theory of this sociologist which has impressed his critics is the contention that primitive mentality is so different from that of civilised man as to constitute it at the very least a different species & to make the ordinary laws of psychology & logic inapplicable to it. The following quotation from the earlier work gives as good a statement of his position as any other: "there are characters common to all human societies by which they are distinguished from other animal societies: a language is spoken, traditions are transmitted, institutions are

(1) Les Functions Mentales dans Les Societés Inferieures. 6th. Edition (Alcan. Paris. 1922)
La Mentalité Primitive. (Alcan. Paris. 1922)

maintained. In consequence, the superior mental functions have everywhere a groundwork which cannot fail to be the same. But, granting this, human societies, like the (other) organisms, may present structures profoundly different from each other, & consequently corresponding differences in the superior mental functions. One must, accordingly, abandon the attempt to refer mental operations a priori to a single type, whatever may be the societies considered, & to explain all the collective representations by a psychological & logical mechanism which is always the same. If it is true that human societies exist which differ from each other as animals without vertebrae differ from vertebrates, the comparative study of the diverse types of collective mentality is no less indispensable to the science of man than comparative anatomy & physiology are to biology."(1) In later passages M. Levy-Bruhl maintains that the difference between primitive mentality & what he frequently, & somewhat ambiguously, designates as "ours", necessitates a new psychological terminology or at least that a drastically new meaning be given to the current terms. The following passage from the conclusion of the same volume indicates further his divergence from existing theories & contains in its final paragraph almost all the terms peculiar to his system of thought & to that of the French school. "The philosophers, the psychologists & logicians, instead of proceeding by the comparative method, have all assumed a common postul-

(1) Les Functions Mentales. p.20

-ate. They have granted to themselves, as the starting point of their investigations, a human mind (ésprit) always & everywhere similar to itself, that is to say, a single type of thinking subject, obeying in its mental operations laws, psychological & logical, which are everywhere identical. The differences amongst institutions & beliefs must from this point of view be explained by the more or less puerile & incorrect use which is made of principles common to the different societies. Reflective analysis practised on himself by an individual subject ought thus to be sufficient in order to discover the laws of mental activity, since all subjects are supposed identical in their inner constitution. Now, this postulate is incompatible with the facts revealed by the comparative study of the mentality of the diverse human societies. That study informs us that the mentality of the inferior societies is of a character essentially prelogical & mystic, that it has a different orientation from ours, that its collective representations are governed by the law of participation, & indifferent, consequently, to contradiction, & united with each other by connections & pre-connections which are disconcerting for our logic." [1]

In speaking of the "philosophers, psychologists & logicians", Prof. Levy-Bruhl has particularly in mind what he designates "the English school" of anthropologists under the leadership of Sir E. B. Tylor & Sir James Frazer, to whose theories his own & those of his school are definitely opposed. That school makes a good

1. Les Functions Mentales. p.454.

foil for the display of his own weapon, & his criticism of ~~kix~~ its main position, that of Animism regarded as universal, is up to a point as just as it is able. In neither of his volumes, however, is there evidence that he is abreast of the younger school of English & American anthropologists, who, while giving to the early generalisations of Tylor, Spencer, & Frazer only a limited application, have persisted in combining psychology with sociology in their studies of primitive man, not without positive & valuable results. Such men as Marett, Macdougall, Rivers, Crooke, & Lloyd-Morgan & L.T. Hobhouse rightly treat the mind of man as the subject, like everything else in the universe, of evolution, & in looking into the mind of savage man for what is truly "primitive," they are not surprised to find that the mentality which psychology analyses in civilised man exists there in what are apparently rudimentary & primitive forms. In pursuing this method, we have maintained the theory that the earliest human mind had a generalised character, & that the cultivated mentality of modern man has been evolved from it by a continuous series of progressive integrations & differentiations, in the course of which it has acquired its more & more specific characters. We hold that man has in his pre-history passed through an instinctive stage, which he has shared with the other animals, & which having its own laws & operations we have called the Integration of

Instinct. In passing from this instinctive stage by way of the differentiations of his more & more human life, primitive man carries up with him into the Integration of Intelligence not only all his instincts but their method of operation in the mental life, & it is an important part of our task to show how immensely influential in the creation of his customs, & upon his ways, theo-retical & practical, of approaching his world, are his instinctive fears, desires, & semi-instinctive mental operations. We have found also, as a guiding thread for our investigation of the evol-ution of the mentality of primitive man, that the universal tend-ency in nature towards integration through differentiation takes the form in man of an inveterate Quest for Unity, an endeavour, traceable in all his activities, after unification of his own inner life, of the world outside of him, & of himself with that world. The application of this principle of Unification, it may be remarked, renders it unnecessary, as we hope to show, to postulate, as M. Levy-Bruhl does, the existence of a law peculiar to primitive mentality such as the "Law of Participation".

It is on this point that the theories of M. Levy-Bruhl, & indeed, the whole school of Durkheim & "L'Année Sociologique," are most open to criticism. They do not attempt, or rather definitely refuse to give a genetic account of primitive mentality as they understand it. While all other sciences find the idea of devel-opment not merely intensely fruitful but indispensable in their

studies of life, these writers almost entirely ignore it in their account of the mind of savage man. Preoccupied with a relatively high stage of human development, the stage of tribal ideas & customs, they have left it somewhat like Melchisedek, "without father, without mother, without pedigree". M. Durkheim for example, says that "it is a vain enterprise to seek to infer the mental constitution of primitive man from that of the higher animals".[1] He refuses also to seek light upon man's early mental life from the psychology of the child. "Let us", he says, leave these doubtful analogies aside. To find out if men were primitively inclined to the confusions attributed to them, we should not study animals or children of to-day, but the primitive beliefs themselves."[1] But this is certainly contrary to the whole trend of modern psychology which is so strongly directed to the study of the mind of the child & of the instincts & tendencies of the higher animals. M. Levy-Bruhl himself in repudiating the theories of the evolutionist school of Tyler, seems to speak with almost equal scepticism of their application to them of the idea of development. Writing of Herbert Spencer's generalisations upon the hypothesis of Darwin he says: "Mr. Tyler & his disciples thought they found in them a guarantee for the continuity which they established in the development of the mental functions of man. This doctrine permitted them to present this development as an uninterrupted evolution, of which also one could mark the steps, from the animistic beliefs of the lowest societies right up to

[1] The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Durkheim. pp.66, 67.

the conception of the system of the universe in the mind of a Newton." In "La Mentalité Primitive" his position is well-defin-ed in the following statements "Provided one grants that their mind is orientated as ours is, that it reacts like ours to the impressions it receives, one grants also by implication that it must reflect & reason like ours upon the phenomena & the beings of the world presented to it. But we discover that as a matter of fact it neither reflects nor reasons in that way. In order to explain this apparent anomaly one resorts then to a certain number of hypotheses: indolence & weakness of mind in the primitives, con-fusion, infantile ignorance, stupidity, etc., which do not suf-ficiently account for the facts. Let us abandon this assumpt-ion & devote ourselves without any preconceived idea to the objective study of primitive mentality as it is manifested in the institutions of the lower societies or in the representations from which these institutions are derived. In that case the mental activity of the primitives will not any longer be inter-preted in advance as a rudimentary form of our own, as infantile & almost pathological." In explaining his description of the primitive mind as pre-logical (prelogique), the term by which, along with its complementary term, mystical (mystique) he chiefly characterises the difference between primitive mentality & ours, he is careful to observe that "Prelogical must not be taken to mean that this mentality constitutes a sort of anterior stage, in

1. Les Functions Mentales. p.18.
2. La Mentalité Primitive. p.15-16.

time, to the appearance of logical thought."[1] He defines "pre-logique" a little later thus: "In calling it" (primitive mentality) "prelogical, I simply mean that it does not feel constrained like our thought above everything to avoid contradictions."[1] In defining, then, the difference between primitive & modern mentality, M. Levy-Bruhl, & his school in general, do not make & even repudiate the attempt to place the former in the line of a direct evolution towards the latter. It is true that this author may claim only to be describing the mental functions of man in his inferior societies, that is to say, in clans & tribes; but for him that is primitive mentality as investigated in his two volumes. It is also true that, as one might expect from such a fresh & able mind, he does not fail to apply fruitfully the comparative & evolutionary method to the data of anthropology, where his special theory is not in question, as when he says, for example, that between the "représentation", at once general & concrete, of a force immanent in objects & persons, such as mana, & the idea of demons & gods, there is room for an infinite number of intermediate forms.[2] But in general, so determined is he to isolate the mentality of man at the tribal stage, & to make it essentially different from "ours", that he throws over altogether comparative psychology, & gives no account whatever, probably considering it impossible, of how that admittedly complex & mysterious mentality came to be. It is significant also that he gives no satisfactory

[1] Les Functions Mentales. p.79.

[2] La Mentalité Primitive. p.55.

description of the manner in which the mentality he is concerned with develops into modern ways of thinking- he has made the severance so complete that the bridges he throws across the gulf are of the slenderest -& indeed he seems to despair of the possibility of such an account. Thus in the recent volume he declares: "The difference between the primitive mentality, mystical & prelogical, & the white man's mode of thinking, is so profound that the abrupt passage from the one to the other is inconceivable. The slow transition which would transform the first into the second, would be of incomparable interest for the science of man, could it be observed. Unfortunately, circumstances have not yet permitted this anywhere, & it is to be feared that they may not be more favourable in the future."[1] The comparative study of the primitive mind, however, will not accept this "non possumus"; & it will seek for a solution of its problems where other comparative sciences of life seek them, in principles which regard man as a developing being, whose mind as well as body passes from more generalised & rudimentary forms to higher, & more specific & complex, by a continuous development whose stages & more or less gradual transformations are recognisable to a considerable extent. Among these principles we have found man's Quest for Unity, the tendency towards Unification, both of his inner & outer world, which holds together all the stages of his history from the age in which he first became human up to the highest forms of his

1. La Mentalité Primitive. p.476.

civilised life, as the string holds the beads of a necklace, or better, as the life of the growing thing is the permanent under & in & through all its changes. This "urge" in man which yet is consistent with, & indeed necessary to, the noblest expressions of his freedom, sets man, as we have seen, within the general move-ment of the universe by way of differentiations towards more & more subtly integrated & as we should say spiritual unities, like one of the "seven seas" within the tidal movement of ocean as a whole. The Integration of the Tribe, which is the supreme inter-est of the school of thought under notice, is in our view a smaller unity within the larger Integration of Intelligence. Pri-or to the unification of his life under the laws & customs of the tribe, man passed through the Integration of Instinct, in which all animals but himself remained. The laws & customs of the tribe were initially the result of his rude, impulsive, semi-instinctive reflection upon his instincts, as already suggested; & the very rigidity & all-pervasiveness of tribal custom & trad-ition which have given savage man, for some, the appearance of a singular mentality, are themselves manifestations of a return, under the influence of the herd instinct in its new form of tribal authority, & of the still powerful fear of the unknown, towards the integration of instinct, as the curve of a spiral mountain railway turns almost to the same point on an imperceptibly higher plane. Subsequent to the Integration of the Tribe, for the peoples

whose life broke from its iron channel, there open the many & varied paths to the unifications of civilised & cultured, moral & spiritual life. The integrations of the modern mind, however, can only be understood, in their aberrations as in their high achievments, in their stagnations & cul-de-sacs as well as in their impulse towards progress & refinement, by seeing them pass through the instinctive & later the tribal stage of human devel--opment - like a river which after a wide, shallow, brawling reach has plunged into an immense, narrow, rock-walled & often gloomy canyon- & emerge bearing with them elements, influences, & even prehistoric relics & fossils from them both.

In refusing to regard the primitive mentality as different from civilised mentality in the sense that it is an earlier & rudiment--ary stage of the latter, M. Levy-Bruhl does not succeed in establishing the very great difference, (it is almost if not quite an essential difference) he claims. This may appear when we con--sider briefly the terms he employs. Of these the first is collective representations, <u>représentations collectives</u>.

These mental phenomena may be recognised, he says, by the follow--ing signs:"they are common to the members of a given social group they are transmitted from generation to generation; they impose themselves upon individuals & awaken in them according to circum--stances sentiments of respect, fear, adoration, etc., for their objects. They do not depend on the individual for existence."[1]

These collective representations "have their own laws, which can-

[1] Les Functions Mentales. p.1.

-not be discovered - above all if it is a question of primitives- by the study of the individual white, adult & civilised ".[1] So far as we have been able to gather from M. Levy-Bruhl's use & exposition of this term, we see no reason to give to this trait of the savage mind any other meaning than that of tribal ideas or the traditional conceptions held by the clan or group & transmitted to its members. It is granted that the ideas of savage man even in somewhat advanced tribal groups are at once less definite & more concrete than those habitual to civilised minds, & that his conceptions are nearer to images upon which he impulsively feels & acts than to the concepts which are the common tools of civilised thought. It is also to be admitted that the salient characteristic of what we call the tribal integration is the crushing authority of the group over its members, which makes obedience to tribal laws or taboos almost a second nature to the savage. But neither of these characteristics is peculiar to the "collective representations" of the primitive mind; for concepts, as we may see more fully later, are of all grades of definiteness or abstraction, from the "image-concept" which M. Levy-Bruhl himself rightly regards as the most primitive type, up to the most rigidly scientific term; & submission to authority is, as we have tried to show, a characteristic of "generalised" mind which continues to reappear in civilised society. In his own book there is an interesting example under the head of "tradition et adaptation", of the transition made by converted savages from the

1. Les Functions Mentales. p.2

authority of the tribe with its ancestors & spirits, as represented by the chief, to the authority of God in the Church. "The native", he says, "finds means even to preserve inviolate his respect for custom at the very moment when he has just changed it: he conducts himself with regard to the new as he did to the old." He continues with the quotation from "Missions Evangeliques": "Our Christian natives are very conservative: the custom which is (a law) accepted by all in the civil domain has become in the church the law of God. To change anything is to go contrary to the will of God."[1]

An interesting point is raised when our author maintains as one ~~mark~~ element of the unique mentality of primitive man that in speaking of "représentations collectives", a different shade of meaning must be given to "representations" from that which it has in the common usage of psychology. (The discussion leads us a certain degree further in the development of our own theory.) Having stated that representation is par excellence an intellectual & cognitive phenomenon, M. Levy-Bruhl proceeds: "It is not in this way that the collective representations of the primitives are to be understood. Their mental activity is too little differentiated for it to be possible to consider ideas ~~or objects~~ or images of objects in isolation, independently of the sentiments, emotions, passions which evoke these ideas & these images, or which are evoked by them. Precisely because our mental activity

1. La Mentalite Primitive. p.p.475-476.

is more differentiated, & also because analysis of its functions is familiar to us, it is very difficult for us to realise by an effort of imagination states more complex, in which the emotional & motor elements are integral parts of the representations. And in effect, in order to retain the term it is necessary to modify the sense./ It is necessary to understand by this form of mental activity among the primitives, not a pure, or almost pure, intell-ectual or cognitive phenomenon, but a more complex phenomenon, in which what is for us properly "representation" is found blended with other elements of an emotional or motor character, coloured, permeated by them, & implying as a consequence an other attitude with respect to the objects represented." It is an important point in this theory that these collective representations are chiefly acquired on occasions in the tribal life & in the life of the individual of intense emotional excitement, particularly at the time of education for, & initiation into manhood & into the secrets of the society, & at the similarly emotional periodical mass celebrations of tribal ritual & religious actions. The result of these impressive comminglings of tribal ideas with profound emotions & thrilling ritual actions is that "when", as he says, "in the interval between these ceremonies the object of one of these representations shall rise into the consciousness of the "primitive", even if at that moment he is solitary & calm, that object will never appear to him in the form of a colourless

1. Les Functions Mentales. p.p.28-29.

& indifferent image. A wave of emotion will rise in him immediat-
-ely, not so violent doubtless as during the ceremonies, but
strong enough to make the cognitive phenomenan almost dissappear
beneath the feelings which envelop it."[1.]

The criticism of M. Levy-Bruhl's conception of "collective repres-
-ations" & his application of it may be summed up in two points.
(a). He has with perfect justice laid stress upon the emotional &
motor elements accompanying the cognitive in all man's primitive
thought. He lays hold here upon a genuinely primitive character
of savage mentality. But he gives the impression that the power-
-ful emotional element is derived almost wholly from the religi-
-ous & magical ceremonies & exciting collective ritual actions of
the tribe; & he has not noted that they do so only by return to,
(as is the way with mass feeling & action), & revival of more
primitive states of mind, which in the last resort may be largely
individual. At the instinctive stage of the life of man or ani-
-mal the cognitive element in the mental content is enveloped in
feelings & impulses to action. The perception of anything that
arouses its interest is for the primitive type of mind to feel emotions
like fear or desire & tendencies to action in the way of flight or
defence or approach. In the "generalised" mind as we have descr-
-ibed it, the perils of life make reflection hasty & impulsive;
the effort of thought to co-ordinate phenomena is difficult & the
suggestible mind turns easily to the rest of authority or to re-

1. Les Functions Mentales. p.p. 29-30.

-lief in ritual action, while differentiations of the herd instinct, such as the feeling of safety in being with others, the sense of kinship, & the exhilaration of excited mass emotion, combine to form those customary beliefs & traditional ways of meeting life's problems which we are unable to distinguish from "collective representations". These "représentations collectives", therefore are not "different" from the more elementary modes of thought which precede them & from the concepts & reasonings of cultured thought, except as stages in the history of the same developing phenomenon differ from each other.

(b). A second point of criticism with respect to "collective representations" is that by this author & his school they are given too wide a range of application to primitive mentality. M. Levy-Bruhl conveys the impression that practically all the thought of primitive man is of this character, that all his conceptions & even his perceptions are collective representations or tinged & permeated by them. It must be remarked that he gives few actual concrete examples of these "representations"; but let it be granted that the sight of a "bull-roarer" or the appearance of his totem animal or that of a neighbouring tribe, will undoubtedly awaken in the savage the modes of thought, the emotions, the tendencies to ritual action, which were associated with them in those striking experiences in which the sacred & perilous, powerful & mysterious traditions & privileges of the tribe became his own.

One cannot ignore, indeed, the resemblance of such a state of mind to the attitude, say, of a devout Roman Catholic to the crucifix or the high altar as compared with that of a Protestant, & the difficulty this puts in the way of supposing a "different" mentality for the savage. Setting that aside, however, M. Levy-Bruhl provides some interesting examples under the head of connections among representations, (liaisons des représentations), which are clearly lacking in that "collective" character which he demands for all these representations. He quotes instances of Central African natives who connected a period of drought with a type of hat or with the long robes worn by missionaries; others in New Guinea who ascribed an epidemic of pleurisy to a sheep in the missionary's possession, then to his goats, & finally to a portrait of Queen Victoria; & Sagard's Hurons who were convinced that some shadow pictures he made for them of rabbits produced an unusually heavy catch of fish. These are savage representations; but it is impossible to see what can be their "collective" character in the peculiar meaning which this school gives to the term. The hat, the cassock, the sheep, the portrait could not arouse memories & the associated emotions connected with the great tribal occasions, when the secrets of the tribe concerning the totem, the gods, & the sacred objects & so on, were ceremonially communicated; they could not be "collective" in that sense. They would certainly be collective ideas in the familiar sense in which

1. Les Functions Mentales. pp.70-72.

the ideas of a group of people savage or civilised, are the ideas of the individuals composing the group. The common element in all these representations, the priests' dress, the portrait, etc., is one which man has brought up with him out of the animal & instinctive stage of his evolution, & which enters into the timidities & conservatisms of the most civilised minds, the fear of the new, the strange, the unknown, & the tendency to ascribe to such things power, which by the remotest of possibilities may be beneficial, but in any event is dangerous & hurtful if not dealt with in the right way. There is nothing essentially collective in this state of mind. As the lone wolf may have his doubts about the man with a gun as well as when running with the pack, so the individual "primitive" may fear & take precautions against many things in his experience ; he may make a fetish for himself out of the peculiar stone or stick which has brought luck to him alone, without "tapping", as this theory supposes he must, the tribal consciousness. It is therefore an over-emphasis on the part of this school to regard the undoubtedly very great influence of tribal customs upon the individual, at that stage of his development which we have called the Integration of the Tribe or of Custom, as constituting a type of mentality which cuts him off from every other stage by its peculiarly "collective" character.

Chapter X

THE THEORY OF M. LEVY-BRUHL.

A Different Mentality.

B. Mystique & La Loi de Participation.

The term "mystique" is one of those which this author most frequently uses to describe the difference between primitive mentality & that of modern man. In only one place does he define it, & the definition helps us to understand his position, without however convincing us of a "different" mentality. In explaining the nature of collective representations, he says there is in them, "an influence, a virtue, ~~x~~ an occult power, variable according to the objects & the circumstances, but always real for the primitive, & forming ~~x~~ an integral part of his representations. In order to designate by one word this general property of the collective representations which hold so great a place in the mental activity of inferior societies, I shall say that this activity is mystical. I shall employ this term, for want of a better, not with reference to the religious mysticism of our societies, which is something rather different, but in the strictly definite sense in which "mystical" means belief in forces, influences, activities (actions) imperceptible by the senses but nevertheless real." It cannot escape notice how near this definition of "mystique" comes to defining religion in general. It reminds one, indeed, of De La Saussaye's formula that religion is "belief in superhuman powers & worship of them". This is significant because it

Les Functions Mentales. p.30

suggests the probability that "mystical" thus defined is not a quality in any real sense peculiar to primitive mentality, but such as may be predicated of all religion from its most rudimentary to its most refined forms. M. Levy-Bruhl himself sees the "mystical" character in its simplest form in mana,[1] the unseen "force", "influence", or "activity", which the savage attributes to things strange & mysterious & therefore dangerous to him. The same definition, as our author would probably admit, would apply to the animistic "representations" of primitive man, his belief in spirits; & it is in the same "mystique" sense that in becoming more civilised, he conceives of his gods or his God. It is not surprising therefore to find that in the conclusion of his earlier work M. Levy-Bruhl declares that the "mystical & prelogical mentality" not only co-exists in civilised society & in the civilised mind, but must always co-exist, with what he calls by contrast the "logical" mentality.[2] It can, therefore, only be in degree & not in kind, that in virtue of this "mystical" characteristic the thought of primitive man can be said to be different from that of cultured minds.

An interesting example of M. Levy-Bruhl's endeavour, & what seems to us his failure, to establish this qualitative, if not essential, difference is to be found in his treatment of savage Perception. He states the difference in this way: "primitive men do not perceive anything as we do. Inasmuch as the social environment in

1. Les Functions Mentales. pp.147-148. cf. La Ment. Prim. pp.403-404.
2. Les Functions Mentales. p.455.

which they live is different from ours, & precisely because it is different, the external world which they perceive differs also from that which we perceive. Of course, they have the same senses as we have -rather less refined in general than ours, contrary to the usual assumption - & the same structure of the cerebral apparatus. But it is necessary to take into account what collective representations introduce into every one of their perceptions. Whatever may be the object presented to them, it involves some mystical properties which are inseparable from it; & the primitive mind, in fact, does not separate them when it perceives it[1]. "The primitives see with the same eyes as we do; they do not perceive with the same mind."[2] "All reality is mystical, like all action, & consequently all perception."[3]

Our criticism of these statements is in general that they are too extreme; & that they introduce unnecessary mystery by refusing to apply the psychology which is valid for the rudimentary forms of our own thought. In particular we note the following points.

a). The difference between us & M. Levy-Bruhl is considerably a question of the extent to which "collective representations" enter into & influence the ordinary perceptions & usual thought of the savage. We have seen reason earlier to doubt whether that extent is so great as he supposes. Many of the examples he gives concern the attitude to things new & strange to the savage mind; & it is in our view the most striking primitive trait of that mind

1. Les Functions Mentales. p.37.
2. ibid. p.38
3. ibid.p.67.

that it generally invests the unfamiliar with mysterious & danger-
-ous power. This is the first & perhaps universal stage of the
activity of intelligence which succeeds the integration of instin-
-ct. It is the result of that imaginative activity of the mind,
vaguely constructive, emotionally motived & always trembling on
the brink of action, which is so near to the mental state of the
creatures of instinct, within sight or sound of the unfamiliar,
but is so different in power & promise, & which the savage shares
with an early period of the mental life of the civilised child.
There is nothing essentially collective about it; it may be very
much an individual experience; & compared with it, "collective
representations" or tribal customary ideas are extremely elaborate
& advanced constructions. Apart from the new & strange, which
always touches the spring of this tendency, & apart from the per-
-ceptions of objects or situations which recall to him sacred or
impressive associations derived from the tribal religion & its
ceremonies, or from traditional notions of magic & its practices,
a great part of the objective world must be to the perception of
savage man little different from what it is to us.
This is admitted by M. Levy-Bruhl himself, even when reserving
his own view. Thus he says: " doubtless, in certain cases in
which an immediate practical interest is involved, we find them
(the primitives) very attentive & often very capable in disting-
-uishing between impressions only slightly different from each

other, & in recognising the external signs of a particular object or phenomenon, on which their subsistence or perhaps their life depends (the sagacity of the Australians, for example, in knowing where to gather the dew deposited in the night, & other facts of the same kind)." [1] And again, speaking of "prelogical" mentality: "These characteristics only apply, as has been said, to the collective representations & their connections. Considered as an individual, in so far as he thinks & acts independently, if that is possible, of these collective representations, a primitive will feel, judge, & conduct himself most often in the way we should expect. The inferences he will make will be exactly those which appear to us reasonable in the circumstances. If he has shot a brace of game, for instance, & can only find one to pick up, he will ask himself what has become of the other & look for it." [2] In a large part, then, of his ordinary thought & action the perception of savage man is indistinguishable from our own in our least mystical moments. It is putting it too strongly to say that for him "toute perception...est mystique." [3]

(b). In the interests of his theory of the supreme influence of collective representations M. Levy-Bruhl unduly depreciates some facts of psychology. In quoting examples in which savages exhibit the same fear of an image, a picture or a moulded form, of an object as of the object itself, as the Bororo people of Brazil attached the mystic properties of a picture of a "bull-roarer" in

1. Les Functions Mentales. p.40.
2. Ibid.p. 79. 3. ibid. p.68.

a book the mystic properties of the "bull-roarer" itself, & the lion-shaped feet of a pot excited the terror of Mississippi Indi--ans as though they were the lion, an unknown animal to them, it--self, he adds: "Must these facts be explained, as they often are, from a point of view which is purely psychological, by association of ideas? Must one say, with M. de Groot, that we have here an inability to discriminate between a simple ressemblance & an iden--tity, & suppose that the primitives are subject to the illusion of the little child who believes his doll to be living?"[1.] He disposes of the parallel to the child in a rather perfunctory way by contrasting its mental attitude, as that of play, & only half-serious, with the profound seriousness of these beliefs of primit--ive man. In our opinion the analogy is extremely close; & it seems at least possible that the child, at that imaginative stage, roughly between the ages of three & six, when play is at once most serious & absorbing as well as satisfying, recapitulates the mental character of truly primitive man in this particular. The essential tendency of all thought is towards unification, as we have maintained. In the case alike of the child & the "primit--ive" the unification is imaginative rather than reasoned. In both, the particulars within its mental unifications are not clear--ly discriminated. Their concepts, as we shall see later, are vague, indefinite, & fluid. The Bororo do not distinguish as we do between a pictured bull-roarer & a real one; & a little girl

1. Les Funct. Ment. p.43-44.

of three known to the present writer, after seeing a vivid pict-ure of a tiger, asked at night whether it could come into her room. There is certainly not there an "association of ideas", if by ideas are understood definite clear-cut conceptions, such as that of "soul" or "spirit" as employed in the earlier theories of Animism; but there is an association of image-concepts, ideas in the making, not themselves distinctly integrated & therefore not clearly discriminated, thrown loosely together by the emotion of fear of unknown dangerous power.

The child's mentality, then is "not" logical" in the sense in which M.Levy-Bruhl says the same of primitive man. It does not work with clearly defined ideas or concepts. It is "prelogical" also in his sense, for it is not impatient of contradictions; the doll may be living at one moment & a mere bundle of rags the next, as the fetich of the savage is at one time "sacred" & at another "pro-fane". It is even "mystique" in that it manifests "belief in forces, influences, activities, imperceptible by the senses but nevertheless real". It has, in fact all the characteristics of the primitive mentality -without the "représentations collectives" (c). In pursuing his theory of a different mentality & therefore a different perception, M. Levy-Bruhl sees himself compelled to make a breach not only with Psychology but with Folk-Lore. R. R. Marrett would not agree with him here, for he says; "From folk-lore to the anthropology of savages, -that, I am sure, is the

only sound method in social psychology."[1] Our author endeavours to maintain that the superstitions of the modern peasant are something very different from the creations of savage mentality. Belief in ghosts & the like might, he says, "almost tempt one to think that the difference is only one of degree. Doubtless, these beliefs can be regarded in our societies as a survival which bears witness to a more ancient mental state, & in other times more general." This is precisely our view. "But", he proceeds, "let us guard against seeing in it a faithful image, though somewhat weakened, of the mentality of the primitives."[2] The argument to which he goes on, to the effect that the least cultivated members of our society make a clear distinction between the natural & the supernatural world, while the savage does not, is completely unconvincing. There are, to give one concrete example, many cairns to be observed in the West Highlands of Scotland. These are erected by the mourners, carrying a corpse in its coffin to burial in a distant churchyard, at any spot on the way at which they may have paused to rest. The primitive, generalised, & now forgotten idea behind the practice is the almost universal one that the ghost or spirit is liable on the slightest opportunity to leave the dead body &, uncomfortably for the community, wander at large. The cairn, one imagines, is a substitutionary tomb, which it is hoped the spirit, if it has escaped from the body, will accept as its restingplace. It is certain, at any rate, that

1. Psychology & Folk-Lore. p.19.
2. Les Funct. Ment. p.66-67.

the cairn is regarded as in some sense the abode of the ghost. A Highlander of one of these districts has informed us that men say on a dark night: "Let us go cautiously; there are some cairns about here"; & a friend has remarked to him in broad daylight: "I must put a stone on my father's cairn". There is no sharp distinction here such as M. Lévy-Bruhl suggests between two worlds, the natural & the supernatural: the seen & the unseen, for the rustic mentality as for the primitive, of which it is the lineal descendant, inhabit the same world.

With regard, then, to this "mystical" character of primitive mentality, we see no reason to consider it unique or peculiar to that mentality. The "mystique" quality, as defined by this author, namely, belief in invisible, intangible, occult powers, or as we might put it, the tendency to attribute to objects & phenomena which are of deep interest a vaguely composite quality of power-life-will, is the primitive "generalised" form, the creation of a "generalised" mentality, from which have developed not only man's highest religion & mysticism, but also his philosophy & even his science. It is his first attempt at the unification of his life by means of intelligence, at comprehension instead of apprehension of phenomena, to grasp with his mind instead of merely making an instinctive response, (& that too, only individual, concrete things, percepts just tending to become concepts); but it is the ancestor of all other unifications whatsoever. The mentality is the same, in the sense that a living & growing thing is

the same at all stages of its growth: the difference is in the degree of development & use of the mental powers, especially of the co-ordinative, unifying powers of the mind, & in the social environment with its greater or less culture & its common stock of ideas, traditions & customs, its collective representations in fact, though M. Levy-Bruhl would not accept the connotation.

III. The Law of Participation, according to M. Levy-Bruhl, is a generalisation from the facts of the mentality of primitive man, which cannot be resolved into any law of the normal psychology of the modern mind. He regards it as a new & important discovery from that point of view. It seems to us, however, that this law merely embraces some of the phenomena & operations of the wider & indeed universal law of Unification, working under the conditions & limitations, both individual & social, of primitive mentality. The facts adduced by him can be accounted for without recourse to his hypothesis.

In speaking of the mystical connections which the savage sees so frequently among living beings & natural objects, M. Levy-Bruhl says: "Under diverse forms & in different degrees, they all imply a "participation" between the beings or objects connected in a collective representation"[1]. This participation he defines, only however, approximately, in view of its difficulty for our thought, thus: " I would say that in the collective representations of

1. Les Funct. Ment. p.76.

primitive mentality, objects, living beings & phenomena can, in a fashion incomprehensible to us, be at one & the same time them-selves & something other than themselves. In a way not less incomprehensible, they emit & receive forces, virtues, qualities, & mystic actions, which make themselves felt beyond them without ceasing to be where they are."[1] In the former of these statements are described "participations" which imply an identity; in the latter, the phenomena of "action at a distance" or magical action. The latter will come into view in our later discussion of Causality & Magic. In respect of the former, he speaks in this context of a "mystic community of essence between living beings, which, for our thought, cannot be thus confounded without absurdity. For example" (quot-ing von den Steinen) "the Trumai (a tribe of northern Brazil) say they are aquatic animals. -The Bororo (a neighbouring tribe) boast of being red araras (paroquets)". "This does not mean" he continues, "that after their death they become araras, nor that the araras are metamorphosed Bororos, & must be treated as such. It means something quite different....It is not a name that they assume, nor is it a relationship that they are asserting. What they wish to convey is an essential identity. M. von den Steinen considers it inconceivable that they can be at one & the same time human beings & birds with red plumage. But, for a mental-ity governed by the law of participation, that is no difficulty at all. All societies of a totemic form employ collective repr-

1. Les Funct. Ment. p.76.

-esentations of the same kind, implying an apparent identity be-
-tween the individuals of a totemic group & their totem."[1.]

There is no doubt about the facts which M. Levy-Bruhl adduces. But it is not necessary to invent a new law, the "law of participat-ion," to account for them, nor to regard that law as marking off the mentality of primitive man as sui generis. The mental activ-ity in question is simply a mode of the characteristic operat-ion of the human mind, that of integration or Unification. In the mind of primitive man it takes the form of imaginative identification. His mentality is still largely visual, an "eye-mentality". His first unifications of his experience are a throwing together of images, instead of classifications & distinct conceptions. He paints his thoughts like a scene-painter, & the colours often "run". He desires, for example, (in pursuit, as always, of that inward unification of himself, through safety or satisfaction, which is peace of mind) unification with his totem animal, to be in harmony with it, as we should say, to be at one with it, to feel it upon his side. The simplest way of doing this is, having the image of the totem in his mind, to see him-self imaginatively within that image, the image of himself dimly coalescing with the image of the totem, himself as it were vague-ly surrounded, as by a halo or an "aura", with the meaning, qual-ities & powers he ascribes to the totem. This imaginative identification with the totem is obviously the essence of those

1. Les Funct. Ment. p.77-78.

rites, designed to secure the multiplication of the totem animal, in which the tribe imitates or dramatises the life & production of it.

We are familiar with the same trait in the psychology of the child. The child who says; "I am an engine" or "I am a tiger", making appropriate sounds & movements the while, is enjoying an imaginative identification of a genuinely primitive character. It is not a justifiable distinction to say that the child is playing, while the savage is intensely serious at his rites. As a matter of fact, there are elements both of enjoyment & of seriousness in the simple dramatisations of both. The child of about three astride of a walking-stick which has to him the mystic value of a horse, is as "solemn as a judge"; but the undoubted interest & enjoyment of the play are forms of the pleasure which, as we shall see more fully in a later chapter, Nature, so to say, attaches to every form of unification, from the mere assimilation of food to the discovery of a new idea, & from the dramatic representations of the child or the savage to the satisfaction of a Salvini & a Siddons in their art. Thus also the "primitive" dancing his fertility-dance with the tribe, does it with all the seriousness appropriate to a rite upon which his very life depends & to the mysterious & dangerous powers he invokes; but, doubtless, there is in his heart also that same joy which is in the play of

the child, the joy subtly inwoven with Unification by Nature seek-ing determinedly, as from the beginning, integration. It is the joy of an achieved unity, a "drama" or "thing done", enhanced by the fact that it is done by the tribe in unison. Miss Jane Harrison has admirably traced the emergence of the majestic Greek Drama from the primitive ritual & especially the ritual dances of the savage ancestors of the Greeks. The progressive encroach-ment of the theatron or place for the spectators upon the orches-tra or dancing-place marks, as she shows, the transition. Orig-inally the Dionysia, the festival of Dionysos in the springtime, was a ritual dance for the bringing back of life & fertility to the earth, in which the whole people danced, as savages do in Australia & Africa to-day. It was thus a "dromenon", a thing being done by everyone. With growth of the people in culture & organisation there was a gradual surrender of the action to a specialised class, the priests & then the actors, the rest of the people withdrawing to look on, to be spectators of what was now becoming the Drama. 1.

There are thus in the process of development Miss Harrison descr-ibes three stages or types of "participation", not in M. Levy-Bruhl's special sense, but in the sense of the word with which we are familiar. The whole of the people participate in the magico-religious action, in which feeling & movement pre-dominate over thought, & in which there is a vaguely imagined unification with the unseen forces which are invoked, ~~together with an exhilarated sense of power conveyed by the united action of the tribe~~.

1. Ancient Art & Ritual. (J.E.Harrison) Ch.V

together with an exhilarated sense of power arising from the united action of the tribe. This is the first stage, manifesting the truly primitive mentality. At the second stage the intermediaries, the medicine-man, witch-doctor & priest, imaginatively identify themselves, & are identified by the tribe, with the powers & beings they seek to influence, & so acquire something of their nature, which makes them personally charged with mystic & probably dangerous power, & thus the subjects of many taboos. That is the character of <u>their</u> participation. At the third stage, where the drama is no longer ritual but Art, the actor "participates" in the person, at first divine & then human, he represents, imaginatively identifies himself with him , so that the Greek actor <u>is</u> Agamemnon, Salvini <u>is</u> Othello, Mrs. Siddons <u>is</u> Queen Katharine, with a certain passionate reality; while the spectators, looking on at an action in which they have no part, participate in it only in the refined & abstract sense that they imaginatively identify themselves with the characters, &, if there is tragedy, are "purified" by "pity" & "terror" through that sympathetic participation. The pleasure, one may add, which accompanies the seeing even of tragic drama, is that which constantly accompanies a unification, whether in outward action or within the mind or both. This is an example, accordingly, of the <u>same</u> mentality persisting but undergoing natural changes from the primitive ancestors of the Greek people whose

mentality by M. Levy-Bruhl's standard was prelogical & mystical & guided by the law of participation, up to the cultured Greek whose mentality created Logic. There is no question, therefore, of a "different" mentality as between the primitive mind & the civilised, except in degree of integration & differentiation; & "the law of participation" is included in the wider law of Unification under which in the hands of this author it calls attention to striking features of the rudimentary forms of the human mind.

In concluding this study of M. Levy-Bruhl's position, we may add a more general remark which is of some importance to our own. Towards the end of "Les Functions Mentales" he affirms that the "prelogical & mystical mentality shall continue to coexist indefinitely in the modern mind side by side with the logical mentality. One might suppose, he admits, that in the natural order of things the logical mentality, impatient of the "contradictions" involved in the prelogical representations, would encroach upon the other mentality & ultimately banish it. This, however, he maintains, would be a "hasty & illegitimate conclusion". The prelogical mentality shall continue to exist, because it is its very nature to ignore the demands of logic & to be patient of contradictions. On the other hand, he contrasts the satisfaction which mere knowledge, always incomplete, attains even at its highest, as compar-

1. Les Funct. Ment. pp. & 451f.

-ed with the far richer satisfaction which the prelogical mental-
-ity finds in its "participations". The illustration he uses is instructive. It is that of the idea of God. As an object of thought, "God" he says, "may be at one & the same time in our society investigated by logical thought & given in the collect-
-ive representations of another order. The rational effort to know God seems at once to unite the thinking subject to God & at the same time to set him at a distance from Him. The necessity of conforming to logical demands is opposed to the participations between man & God which are not capable of being represented with-
-out contradiction. Knowledge is thus reduced to a very small matter. But what need of this rational knowledge for the believ-
-er who feels himself united to his God? The consciousness he has of the participation of his being in the divine essence does not that procure for him an assurance for faith in comparison with which logical certitude shall always be a pale, cold & almost indifferent thing?"[1].

There is something oddly familiar to the student of the philosophy of religion about these statements. One seems to recognise the old antithesis between rationalism & "intuition", between reason & faith, between "religious experience" & logic, between the mystic & the man of science. The familiar answer must be given that it is a false antithesis. The necessity for Unification,

1. Les Funct. Ment. pp. 453-454.

which the mind of man shares, as we have maintained, with the whole of the rest of the universe, could not tolerate permanently the existence of two such opposed mentalities either in the same mind or in the same society. The determined resistance of the "prelogical" mind to logic, its "imperviousness to experience" as M. Levy-Bruhl describes it, is simply the resistance of invincible & ignorant prejudice. One sees how it is that he has taken for his model of the "prelogical" mentality, the savage mind within the tribal integration; for the essential character of that integration, especially some distance from the earliest primitive state & in the more advanced forms of tribal life, is just this solidification of custom, tradition, law & authority of the tribe round the individual, until he is almost embalmed in it like bees in amber. But in that tribal mentality, as Lady Macbeth said of Banque's life, "nature's copy's not eterne",; & its characteristics have no title to permanence in civilised mentality. The tribal mind, which this whole school regards, with exaggerated emphasis, as typically primitive, continues to exist in the more highly differentiated & more finely integrated civilised mind only, & in a corresponding degree, as the tribal organisation is present & may be traced in the complex organisation & varied culture of civilised society.

The strength, finally, of the antithesis for M. Levy-Bruhl between

the pre-logical & mystical mentality & the logical lies in his conception of "logical". One perceives, in fact, that the word has two different meanings in his use of it. On the one hand, he refers frequently to our mentality, namely that of civilised man in general, in contrast with the primitive mind, as "logical". This, however, as Macdougall clearly shews in his book, "The Group Mind", is a pure abstraction, having no existence in fact.[1] As this author says, referring to Cornford & Levy-Bruhl, "they commit the great error of assuming that the mental life of civilised man is conducted by each individual in a purely rational & logical manner; they overlook the fact that we also are largely dominated by collective representations; for these collective representations are nothing but ideas of objects to which traditional sentiments, sentiments of awe, of fear, of respect, of love, of reverence, are attached."

But, on the other hand, "logical" has the narrower meaning for M. Levy-Bruhl which it has for pure physical science, & for the Positivistic philosophy of Comte. The "logical" reasoning of the Positivist excludes everything which implies the existence of unseen, immaterial, spiritual powers & beings; these are the creation of a "mystic" mentality. It regards as involving contradictions intolerable to a pure logic such an idea as that of spirit or of God, which implies the possibility of transcending

1. The Group Mind. p.74.

space & time, of a being who is present "here" & "there" at the same moment, & of power exerted without some material medium. These are permitted only to the "prelogical" mentality which is not troubled by contradictions. The attitude of a sort of superior despair with which this school grants that the prelogical & mystical mentality, which means really that of religion & of the religious theory of the universe, shall permanently resist the advance of a materialistic & positivistic logic, is precisely that of Brahmins permitting the lower castes to retain their crude superstitions on the ground that their mentality is capable of nothing better.

Behind M.Levy-Bruhl's theories of the mind of primitive man, there is, then, a philosophic theory, & even a dogmatic position which is that of materialistic Positivism. It is hardly necessary to say that there is an opposite theory, which we maintain, whose dogmas, no doubt, have a certain influence on our conclusions, but which we regard as equally logical with that of this school. They & we alike pursue the ancestral tendency of primitive man to seek a Unification of the whole of life & experience. In our view, the inveterate endeavour of the "primitive" to unify his world by adding the mystical & the unseen to his physical powers & resources, even when it seems to proceed from the imperfection & limitations of his mind & leads him to bizarre conclusions, is

on the true road to a comprehension of reality. A logical con-
-ception of the universe, a philosophy which can in any sense
satisfy all thinking mindsm, must include in its interpretation
of existence not only those moral & spiritual values which are at
its summit, but these unseen realities, beings & powers, which
are the subject of Religion.

Chapter XI

THE FORMATION OF PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS

(a) Imagination & Image-Concepts.

In criticism of the French school of sociologists, including M. Levy-Bruhl, we had pointed out in general that they do not give a genetic account of primitive mentality, & even disclaim the attempt. It has been contended here, however, that their conclusions are vitiated by the fact that they regard as primitive the mind of the savage at the tribal stage of human development, & present no psychological explanation of how that mentality has come to be. The adherents of the various Group-Theories of the primitive mind, such as MM. Hubert & Mauss for whom the very categories of thought, time, space, causality & the rest, are the creations of the group, & M. Durkheim who thinks the categories are the product of religion, which itself is simply a form of the group-consciousness, have been too deeply impressed by what is indeed the salient characteristic of the tribal integration, namely, the subordination of the individual to the tradition, custom & law of the tribe. They may certainly contend, as both Durkheim & Levy-Bruhl do, that they have not gone for their data only to highly organised groups such as the Amerindians, but have drawn them from the Australian aborigines, who are in brain, mind, &, it might be said, in social organisation, of a primitive type. Here, however, we are compelled to differ; & we may be allowed to use an analogy, without claiming that it is an argu-

-ment. The Marsupials in Australia are an extremely primitive form of animal life. An equilibrium upon that island continent between the environment & that early animal type has maintained it in existence, while it has almost disappeared from the rest of the world. Nevertheless, within that primitive type there has been specialisation, so that besides the familiar rodentlike forms there have been elaborated, so to say, insectivora & even carnivora, which are still, however, Marsupials. In like manner, the human natives of Australia are an extremely primitive type of humanity. Their skulls are favoured by anatomists for comparison with those of the great apes & of Palaeolithic man: & their brains, deficient in the prefrontal area of the cortex, leave their minds also deficient in that co-ordinating power or power of Unification, which is resident in that prefrontal area, & which is the creator of the highest forms of thought. It is true that certain aspects of their tribal life are highly elaborated, notably their ceremonies for the initiation of their youth, & their totemic groups & classes in connection with exogamy; but these are specialisations upon which all the interest & the inventive energy, such as it has been, of the race, have been concentrated for immemorial generations, until they are like a complicated arabesque based on some simple form. The really primitive characters of the Australian native's mind are such as, first, an animallike accuracy of perception & knowledge in what concerns his

prey for food; second, a tendency to see in everything around him, especially in anything new or strange, a vague, undiscriminated quality, which might be described by a composite word, "power--life-will", whether it be in his own knife to which he prays to go kill his enemy, or in his throwing stick, which is sacred, (being a little mysterious), though his spear which it throws is not, or in Baiame or Daramulun, the dim supreme power or spirit; & third, an extreme suggestibility to the traditional beliefs of his tribe or to the pronouncements of authoritative men among his people, like the witch-doctor or medicine-man. In treating primitive man thus genetically, as emerging out of the instinct--ive animal stage into that of intelligence & human grasp upon life, it becomes, for us at least, impossible & an anachronism to derive the categories of his thought, time, space & causality, from the integrations of his tribal custom & practice; & we begin with the savage at the point where, like his animal kindred, he has had, for his very life's sake, to make important though un--conscious calculations of time, & had to take account of space in the matter of distance, & habitually acted on the supposition that other things & beings, & himself, were causes.

William James thus defines Conception & the Concept: "The funct--ion by which we...identify a numerically distinct & permanent subject of discourse is called Conception, & the thoughts which are its vehicles are called Concepts."[1] He says further, refer-

1. Principles of Psychology. Vol.I.p.461.

-ring to the comparative changelessness of concepts, that concept-ions "form an essentially discontinuous system, & translate the process of our perceptual experience, which is naturally a flux, into a set of stagnant & petrified terms."[1] There are two elements in this character of the Concept to which we call attention. They are those of Unification & Discrimination. The concept unifies a number of particular things into a whole for thought; as "death","life","whiteness", "blackness", each includes under its general character many things which are dead, or living or white or black. At the same time, in being thus unified, each concept is made to stand out as a more or less distinct whole apart from other concepts; they are discriminated from each other in proportion as they are unified within themselves. Thus "death" or "dead", in so far as the concept grasps "dead" things into a coherent whole of meaning, clearly discriminates those things from other particulars which, having the common character-istic of being alive, are unified into the concept "living" or "life". These correlative qualities of the concept, unity or integration & distinctness or differentiation, are important for our discussion, because it is in the lack of firmly unified & therefore definite & distinct concepts, & the possession only of diffuse, vaguely co-ordinated, & consequently undiscriminated concepts, that the primitive type of mind differs from the highly

1. Principles of Psychology.Vol.I.p.463.

developed & cultured. These characteristics of the primitive mind are consequences of the nature of that mind itself, especially its deficiency in co-ordinative power, which, as we have already suggested, is itself the result of the unco-ordinated character of the primitive type of brain. This is defective in that pre-frontal area of the cortex, in which the power of co-ordination, or unification, with the correlative power of discrimination, is located. The growth of this tendency to unification, with its reverse side of discrimination, which are once more embodiments of the universal "urge" towards integration through differentiation, may be observed in tracing the genetic relation between conception & the earlier & simpler operations of the mind, Sensation & Perception.

Sensation, the feeling in the mind of an impression from the external world upon one or other of the senses, "differs" according to James, "from Perception only in the extreme simplicity of its object or content...Its function is that of mere acquaintance with a fact. Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge <u>about</u> a fact; & this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication."[1] The relation between the two is excellently defined by Sully, when he says that perception "supplements a sense-impression by an accompaniment or escort of revived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual & revived sensations being solidified or 'integrated' into the form of a percept, that is,

1. Principles of Psychology. Vol.II.pp.1-2.

an apparently immediate apprehension or cognition of an object now present in a particular locality or region of space."[1] The basis, then, of Perception is in Sensation. It is a familiar fact also that there is a hierarchy of the senses, & that they follow each other, roughly speaking, in order of evolution. In animal development the tactual, olfactory, auditory & visual sensations probably succeed each other in dominance in this order. Without our tracing the process minutely, it is obvious that the progress is from the less integrated & differentiated to the more. It is progress in unification & at the same time in discrimination. The crown of the process is the visual; & it is a great advance in co-ordinative power, when the animal forms & thinks in images. Prof. J.Y. Simpson quotes Prof, Elliot Smith to the effect that he "considers that the acquisition of stereoscopic vision,...was of superlative importance, as bringing the organism into new relations to the environment that further stimulated curiosity & inquiry, & so, advance. This added power involved the development in the brain of a complicated area where the conjugated movement of the eyes was more exactly regulated, & the range of such movements extended so as to bring about convergence & more perfect focussing of the eyes upon objects in the field of vision. The mere act of focussing the eyes on an object for such examination involved the beginnings of that power of attention &

1. Outlines of Psychology. (Revised Edition) p.122.

concentration that is necessary for the development of the mind itself. More than ever as the result of various structural modifications & developments, the eye became the principal avenue of sensory impression, & vision the guiding sense."[1] This area of the brain over the visual centres developed early in man; & it is not in this region, over the temporal lobes, that there is any great difference in the shape of the skull between the crania of the highest apes, primitive man, & the civilised modern. It is in the prefrontal area, where the organ of co-ordinating, compar-ing, logical thought is ultimately situated, that the difference which gives intellectual man his broad & high forehead, is most marked. It is striking to find that the child of civilisation in whom the same prefrontal region of the brain developes late in the same manner as in the race, passes about the age of three to six years through an imaginative period when play is the very warp for the woof of imagination, inanimate things have life, dolls are personalities, any odd piece of glass or earthenware may be a rich symbol, & imaginary beings, such as invisible play-mates, are gravely regarded as real. It seems probable, then, that there was & is an imaginative period in the childhood of the race, which the civilised child recapitulates.

A further point of importance is the part played by the imagination in our ordinary perceptions. In looking at a distant view

1. Man & the Attainment of Immortality. J.Y.Simpson. pp.70-71.

one sees some blurred white shapes on a green field. These grow more definite in outline; & we perceive quite clearly that they are sheep. This is the characteristic activity of imagination in perception. It makes a coherent, intelligible unity for thought by taking the rough sketch provided by the visual sensation, filling it in with the materials presented by former sensations & stored in memory, & thus lining in & colouring a picture of a known object. It is a familiar fact also that this process sometimes results in illusion. One has seen an object at the edge of a partially cut field of corn, & imagination has completed the outline until it is clearly a man mowing, & we can even see the sweep of his scythe; but it is only a stunted thorn tree to a nearer view after all. This is the method also in the perceptions of primitive man. There is a direct lineage between the imaginative unifications of the primitive mind & those of the genius of civilised life, whether the latter be the patient induction of scientific facts, crowned & illuminated by the swift imaginative vision of the whole completed theory of a Newton or a Darwin, or the flashing visions of the poet or prophet. The difference arises mainly from the under-development in the primitive type of mind of those powers of co-ordination, comparison & classification, which are located in the prefrontal areas of the brain. Free from the inhibitions & corrections of this later

developed power of logical thought, the imaginative constructions of primitive man in his perceptions would, it might be expected, be much more subject to hallucination & illusion than those of the cultivated mind; & this is confirmed by experience. With regard, indeed, to those perceptions which concern his everyday life, the natural objects of his region, the habits of his food animals & the like, the savage lives very much on the instinctive plane, & follows the tracks of his prey, adapts himself to its movements & so on, in the same semi-instinctive way as do the higher carnivora. But as soon as these semi-instinctive adjustments are met by some obstacle to their smooth working, as soon as something new or strange forces itself upon perception by interrupting the flow of habitual sensations & actions, the new power of the mind, to which Nature has definitely committed the future of man as an intelligent being, Imagination, steps in & takes control. It is, to repeat a metaphor, rather like Phaethon taking the reins of Apollo. The imaginative construction has much of the hasty, impulsive, reflexive character of the instinctive stage which precedes it. It is done, moreover, under the influence of the emotions of fear & desire, particularly the former. Its unifications, therefore, in supplementing the perceptions of the savage, are, when applied, be it remembered, wholly to the new & strange or to the mysterious in ordinary experience, often illusory & of the nature of hallucination. He sees a ghost which is not there, or he invests the new or mysterious phenomenon with a

power of which all that he can say at first is that it is dangerous, the more so that it is indefinable in terms of any power he knows. The following example is from the South Seas. A missionary went fishing along with a native. The place was the bank of a river near a bluff on which the natives piled up the bones of their dead after the flesh had been removed, supposed naturally to be haunted by ghosts. At a critical moment the native was found to have disappeared. Questioned on his return as to the reason for his disappearance, he replied, "Did not you see the ghost"?, & described how he followed it through the bush for a considerable distance until he lost it near the bluff.[1] The man was convinced that this was a real experience. As James says, "An hallucination is a strictly sensational form of consciousness, as good & true a sensation as if there were a real object there. The object happens not to be there, that is all."[2] Such hallucinations in the perceptions of uncritical minds are the source of many ghost stories in modern times; but such illusions of perception, created by the undisciplined imagination, must have played a great part in the evolution of the Animism of primitive man.

The transition from Perception to Conception & the Concept is made through this image-making activity of the mind. Unities in the mind are first of all imaginative & pictorial before they become logical & reasoned. This is reflected in primitive lang-

1. Told to the writer by Dr. J.A.Hadfield, author of "Psychology & *Morals* ", who was present as a boy on the occasion.

2. op. cit. Vol.II.p.115.

-usage. Levy-Bruhl quotes Gatschet on the Klamath language(North American) to the effect that "it obeys a very marked tendency, which M.Gatschet calls pictorial, that is to say, it obeys a nec-essity to speak to the eyes, to picture & to paint what it is desired to express."[1] This is the translation into language of the appeal of a constructive "eye-mentality"to the perception of the same "eye-minded" type of mentality. The most primitive kind of concepts are, as Levy-Bruhl truly says, ~~one~~ Image-Concepts. "The more the mentality of a social group approaches the prelog-ical form, the more image-concepts predominate. Language bears witness to this by the almost total absence of generic terms, corresponding to general ideas, properly so-called, & by the extr-aordinary abundance of specific terms, that is, terms designat-ing beings or objects of which a particular & precise image is pictured when they are named."[2] The quotation he gives from Brough Smyth concerning the extinct Tasmanians is singularly descriptive of this early type of mind, & may be paralleled in many other directions . "The Tasmanians had no words represent-ing abstract ideas: for each variety of gum-tree or brake, etc., they had a name, but no equivalent for tree. They could not express abstractly the qualities, hard, sweet, hot, cold, long, short, round etc., For hard they said "like a stone"; ...for round, "like a ball;" "like the moon", & so forth, usually adding a gesture to the word, & confirming by a sign addressed to the eyes

1. Les Funct. Ment. p.161.
2. ibid.p.190

what they wish to convey."[1.]

There are two characteristics manifest in the primitive mind as thus described. The first is its tendency to individualise perceived things because of inability to generalise. This is what the "new" Psychology calls Concretism. Jung, for instance, says "Primitive thinking & feeling are exclusively concretistic: they are always related to sensation. The thought of the primitive has no detached independence, but clings to the material phenomenon. His thought & feeling depend upon sensation, & are only faintly differentiated from it."[2.] We have thus here what we have already designated as the "atomism" of the generalised mind, its particularism, its tendency to flit from one object of thought to another, without resting long enough upon one to relate & compare it with others, which latter is really the process of conception. In this respect we found that it was near to the instinctive, reflexive stage of animal development. The second characteristic here suggested is the tendency of the mind in seeking to pass beyond unrelated sensations & perceptions to do so by means of an image. Thus the extremely primitive savage such as the Tasmanian, when he struggles towards the concept "round", makes an imaginative unification of two concrete things, on the ground of their similarity for perception, the round thing to which he is referring & the moon, & saying "like the moon" advances to an Ima[referring]t.

1. Les Funct. Ment. p.190.
2. Psychological Types. Jung.p.533.

Perception & Conception, therefore, it is clear, are not to be defined in rigid distinction from each other. Percept & Concept fade into each other like the orange & red in the spectrum. For example, in speaking of "the sense of sameness" which " is the very keel & backbone of our thinking", Prof. James says in his vivid & colloquial way: "In this sense creatures extremely low in the intellectual scale may have conception. All that is required is that they should recognise the same experience again. A polyp would be a conceptual thinker if a feeling of 'Hollo! Thingumbob again!' ever flitted through its mind."[1] To regard this as a rudimentary concept, which we hold to be just, is to give to the Concept a meaning poles asunder from that which it has in the theory of Levy-Bruhl, for whom the thought of savage man even is scarcely conceptual at all. It is also to differentiate our theory of the concept & its origin from the view of Durkheim & his school, in the larger role it gives to the individual mind in its formation than to the group-mind. It is, however, nearer the truth. In retracing thus their rudimentary forms, at any rate, one finds that Perception & Conception are difficult to distinguish from each other because they are [illegible] "moments" in the life of a growing thing, the developing power of man's thought. The character which they have in common is that [illegible] each is a mental unification. The differ-

1. Principles of Psychology. p.463.

-ence between them is in the greater or less completeness of that unification. The completeness, however, is not merely in the integration, for an instinctive reflex has a "finish" & definite-ness denied to higher integrations of the mind, but in that the Concept is more richly differentiated within its unity than the product of mere perception. The percept "tree" for the savage is an integration of visual sensations in association with former sensations of mass, height, shade & the like, with, near at hand, the impulse to movement in relation to it, i.e., to pass round it, climb it or stand in its shade. The concept "tree" for the man of science is a rich integration of trees of all kinds, finely differentiated from each other, seen, it may be, only within the mind & without any impulse to action at all. There are innumer-able grades of ascent from the one to the other.

Chapter XII

THE FORMATION OF PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS

(b). Varendonck & the Group-Theories.

In pursuing the relation of Perception to Conception further we may refer to some of the discussions in J. Varendonck's "Evolut-ion of the Conscious Faculties".[1] We have seen that perception differs from sensation in that it unifies the immediate sense-impression with sensations already in memory. Varendonck makes a useful distinction between what he terms Reduplicative & Syn-thetical Memory. He says: "memory registers experience as in the sequence of actual happenings & reproduces it faithfully; that is what I call reduplicative memory."[2] Syhthetical Memory

1. Evolution of the Conscious Faculties, J. Varendonck D.Litt. D.Sc (Allen & Unwin.1923.)

(The English in which Dr. Varendonck writes is not unexceptionable & reads often like a not too satisfactory translation from the French.)

2. Op. cit. p.10.

he defines as "a function through which like is spontaneously associated in the mind with like,"[1] or again as "the function which registers a selected classification of experience".[2] Reduplicative Memory Varendonck claims to have rescued from the inattention of other psychologists. It has not, of course, been wholly ignored: it is, for example, what Sully calls "reproductive imagination". Varendonck's is the better term, for it is, as Bergson whom he quotes calls it, "true" memory; though Sully's description rightly emphasises the image-form, the visual cinematographic character which recollection for the most part takes.[3] Reduplicative Memory is thus that operation of the mind in which all sense experience, even when it is unconscious, is recorded in the brain in the chronological & connected order in which it occurs. It remains there in a fashion strikingly resembling a cinematographic film for visual experience, & a phonographic record for auditory experience, in such fashion that the experience can, on some stimulus either from within or without the mind, be unrolled or reproduced for the use of the mind in its more complex syntheses or unifications, such as Perception or Conception.

There are some points in Varendonck's account of this form of memory of considerable interest for our discussion. One is that it is a distinctly primitive activity of the mind. It can be traced very far down in the scale of conscious life, & plays a larger

1. Evolution of the Conscious Faculties. p.10.
2. op.cit. p.55.
3. Outlines of Psychology. p.223.

part in the mind of the child & the savage than in the mental life of adult & cultured man. As he says:"The lower down the zoological scale, the less an animal seems to be able to recog-nise or to show any interest in the objects of the outer world. Moreover, the number of its reactions are strictly limited & are practically always the same. We infer from this that...its power of synthesis is weak & that reduplicative memory is the chief factor of its mind. Reduplicative memory should thus appear a primitive function in the individual & the race."[1] It has, therefore, the comparatively undifferentiated character of all primitive integrations. The same primitive character can be detected in abnormally defective minds. The study of such minds shows "that whenever man's intellectual powers are impaired reduplicative memory is the last mental function to disappear, & it is generally admitted that the higher faculties, constituting the latest acquisitions in the phylogeny, are the first to fall into disorder in case of disease; the fundamental reactions com-mon to all organisms seem to be the most firmly established."[2] It is in virtue of this fact that intoxication which narcotises first the higher, finer & most recently acquired mental powers of civilised man, may leave him able to find his way home by a fam-iliar road, making use of reduplicative memory, unrolling almost

1. Op.cit. pp.46-47.
2. op.cit. p.45.

mechanically the chain of habitual associations. This type of memory also explains the extraordinary feats of recollection recorded of mental defectives like the idiots[1] mentioned by Ribot "who cannot make the most elementary calculations" but "repeat without hesitation the complete multiplication table." Lower down in the scale of life, this is the faculty upon which the training of animals depends. Maeterlinck has a delightful essay on a little dog which died when it was six months old, in which he remarks on the enormous number of things it comes to "know" in its short life. They were retained by this simple type of memory. Similarly very young children astonish sometimes by their power to retain & repeat long passages of poetry or, with more difficulty, of prose, exercising this same form of recollection. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the identical characteristic in the primitive mind. This has been noted by many observers; we quote two examples which Varendonck gives. Ribot remarks that "it has often been noticed that, amongst the inferior races of mankind, the children who are sent to school, or to whom one tries to give instruction, display at first an astonishing facility, which is suddenly arrested. Thus the aborigines of the Sandwich Isles display an excellent memory; they learn by heart with marvellous rapidity; but they cannot exercise their thinking faculties." Dugas observes that "missionaries have reported of certain savages that are able to repeat, without any alteration

1. Op.cit. p.47.

a sermon which they had just heard, a feat of which Chateaubriand is also said to have been capable."[1] Accordingly primitive man exercises & depends upon this earliest type of memory to a much greater degree than civilised man. The fact has certain important consequences for our theory.

(a) Reduplicative memory is singularly adapted to that characteristic of the primitive mind which we have called its "atomism", the particularistic & concrete nature of that mentality. The difficulty primitive man has in forming concepts & general ideas, his use of individual image-concepts, & the consequent presence in his language of a multiplicity of different names for things & situations which the civilised mind would express by a single abstract term, necessitate a remarkable development of memory.[2] It is, however, this simple type of memory which he possesses. Here also is provided a simple explanation of a phenomenon which has puzzled some observers. It seemed to the latter that the extreme complexity of his exogamic rules, for example, & the ease with which he discriminated among them, indicated a more subtle & developed mind in, say, the Australian native, than other circumstances of his life & conditions warranted. So also with the extraordinary elaboration of taboos among tribes like the Todas, bewildering to a civilised memory. The intricacies, which it must be noted are constituted by a multiplicity of details added loosely to each other, are easily recorded & retained

1. Op.citp.49
2. Cf. Levy-Bruhl: Les Functions Mentales.p.196.

& when necessary unrolled by reduplicative memory. It is in missing this point that Levy-Bruhl, in endeavouring to establi-sh a peculiar mentality for primitive man, makes an unnecessa-ry mystery concerning the mental attitude of the Australian youth in these initiations in which he acquired his knowledge of the numerous rules of exogamic & other customs. He says that these facts were "immédiatement sentis" by this peculiarly "myst-ique" mentality.[1] So far from their being thus immediately felt, & whatever that may mean, these numerous details are probab-ly taught during the weeks & even months of the instructionary process, & impressed upon the simply reduplicative memory. We may add further on this point something to what was said in an earlier chapter on the characteristic of primitive mentality which we named "Fatigue". The immense grasp of Custom upon the primitive type of mind, which is so almost universal among modern savages that we speak of it as a distinct stage in human development under the name of the Integration of Custom, is largely to be explained by the hold of its detailed concreteness upon reduplic-ative memory. This is, moreover, the attraction, in part, of ritual for some modern minds as against the effort of thought & the toil of moral endeavour. It is easier & a kind of rest to say & do a number of things, in a prescribed rhythm & routine, with the aid of reduplicative memory, than to pursue the higher

1. Les Funct. Ment. p.432.

integrations of thought & conduct.

(b). Reduplicative Memory as expounded by Varendonck provides a use-ful corrective to those Group-Theories of the primitive mind which are also Group-Theories of Religion. It is a good example of that over-emphasis of the tribal or clan consciousness in re-spect of its influence upon the formation of the mind of primit-ive man, which we have already remarked in the school of Durk-heim, that the very categories of thought are regarded as the creation of that consciousness of the tribe. We have here once more the error of taking the mentality of the stage in human de-velopment embodied in the tribe & its customs as truly primitive, & ignoring the animal & instinctive stages, & those of dawning sub-human intelligence, out of which it has grown up. Some slight admission of these earlier forms of mind is indeed made; but it is speedily passed over in eager pursuit of the theory. We may glance for a moment at the position of Durkheim. "At the roots," he says, "of all our judgments there are a certain number of essential ideas which dominate all our intellectual life; they are what philosophers since Aristotle have called the categories of the understanding: ideas of time, space, class, number, cause, substance, personality, etc." One must remark the surprising identification of the categories of time, etc. with the ideas of the same, with which we shall deal presently. These categories

he continues, "are born in religion & of religion; they are a product of religious thought." It is to be observed, however, that religion is "eminently social. Religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities the rites are a manner of acting which take rise in the midst of the assembled groups & which are destined to excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states in these groups. So if the categ-ories are of religious origin, they ought to participate in this nature common to all religious facts; they too should be social affairs & the product of collective thought." In employing the category of time as his first example, he makes a vague concess-ion to an earlier form of consciousness of time; but leaves it hurriedly without analysis. "We cannot conceive of time, except on condition of distinguishing its different moments. Now what is the origin of this differentiation? Undoubtedly, the states of consciousness which we have already experienced can be reprod-uced in us in the same order in which they passed in the first place; thus portions of our past become present again, though being clearly distinguished from the present. But howsoever important this distinction may be for our private experience, it is far from being enough to constitute the notion or category of time. This does not consist merely in a commemoration, either partial or integral, of our past life. It is an abstract & im-

-personal frame which surrounds, not our individual existence, but that of all humanity. It is like an endless chart, where all duration is spread out before the mind, & upon which all possible events can be located in relation to fixed & determined guide lines." These "guide lines" are "taken from social life. The divisions into days, weeks, months, years, etc., correspond to the periodical recurrence of rites, feasts, & public ceremon-ies. A calendar expresses the rhythm of the collective activ-ies, while at the same time its function is to secure their regularity."[1]

The same theory is elaborated, in greater detail & with much ingenuity by MM. Hubert & Mauss, joint-contributers to L'Annee Sociologique. Their theory of Time as a category in the primit-ive mind is republished in their Melanges d'Histoire des Relig-ions, under the title, "The Idea of Time in Religion."[2] In attempting a brief summary of their argument, one notes that the formative notion in their system is that of the Sacred. The divisions of time are defined qualitatively by their sacredness, rather than as with civilised minds quantitatively by their dur-ation or association with natural phenomena. Parts of time, such as days, weeks, & months, are distinguished by the obligat-ory rites or the equally obligatory "interdictions" which give them their sacred character. Sacred is equivalent to mana; it is the possession of mana which constitutes sacredness. "It is,

1. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. pp.10-11.
2. Melanges d'Histoire des Religions ; (Felix Alcan. 1909.)

"necessary
say these authors, that the associations which define the qual-
-ities of time should have a sacred character, as well as that
the terms which compose them, in other words that the dates &
their signs should have a magico-religious power & that the
things signified, events or acts, should participate in the nat-
-ure of that power. This thing, vague but very real" (here the
reference is to mana) "which is...neither substance, nor quality,
, nor act, but all of them at the same time, must appear here, at
least in gleams, under one or other of the forms which it is cap-
-able of taking.....Now this notion of the sacred, as we have
proved in part already, cannot be formed in the mind of the
individual as such: it results from ~~the~~ subjective experiences of
the group."

This last sentence gives the point at which we join issue with
the main position of this school. The point is the part played
by the group in creating the primitive mentality as contrasted
with the part taken by individual thought or rather by universal
tendencies in the minds of all primitives as incipiently thinking
beings. If the "sacred" for primitive man as distinguished from
the "profane" arises from his sense of mana, "magico-religious"
power in things, as these writers rightly hold, it appears to us
that this sense of mysterious power in things, this attribution
to things unfamiliar & therefore feared of a composite quality

1. Melanges d'Histoire des Religions. p.220.

like life-power-will, would naturally arise in the primitve mind as individual quite apart from the influence of the group. Even the modern savage at the fetichistic stage may make an individual fetich of any odd thing which may happen to impress him, through some purely personal association or experience or other, as possessing this power or mana. It is matter of general agreement that this vague ascription to things of magico-religious power is, through the rise & develppment of tribal life & thought, filled in like a rude sketch with the religious rites & ideas of the group, until it is the rich & colourful picture of tribal religion, magic & law; but the sketch is individual. This tendency to see in strange & unfamiliar things or events unseen & probably dangerous power might be called a category of the primitive mind; for it is universal & it gives its "form" to the matter of all experience of that character; but it is simply a development of a tendency which primitive man shares with the animals to see power either to hurt or to help in everything & to act upon the perception. The difference is made by the acquisition by the human animal of the new co-ordinating activity of imagination, which adds to the instinctively sensed or intelligently perceived power in things its visions & image-concepts & growing ideas of unseen & intangible power or powers in things, which may be either illusions or profound realities.

The most conspicuous joint in the harness of the Group Theory is

the confusion between "category" & "idea" with respect to time, space, class, etc. There is no difficulty in granting to Hubert & Mauss the truth of this statement: "To sum up, the work of abs-traction from which the notion of time, objective, quantitative & abstract, has proceeded, is perhaps the consequence of that which has detached from things time qualitative & semi-concrete." Or again that "In brief, the calendar is the order of the period-icity of rites. Its history teaches, on the other hand, that it is the code of the qualities of time." This means, what perhaps few have ever questioned, though it is stated by these writers in a vivid & learned way, that the content of the notion or idea of time for savage man at the tribal stage is provided by the most important periodical events of the tribal life, which are always religious in character. But to say that the category of time is of social, & therefore religious origin is quite a different statement. From the anthropological point of view, the categ-ory of time is the tendency of the mind to arrange events & to visualise them in the order in which they have occur-red in the past, & are expected to occur in the future. The organ of this tendency is what Varendonck calls Reduplicative Memory, which records & recalls events in their chronological order. It cannot be said to have a social or religious origin or to be the creation of the tribe or group, as Durkheim & his school maintain. The category, as a "form" for the matter of

of experience, is, like Reduplicative Memory, possessed in common by the higher animals & man, & was undoubtedly exercised before there were tribes with periodical religious rites & calendars; but it is also unquestionably true that the idea, the notion, the "representation", the concept of time has climbed up through the ages from poverty to wealth of meaning, from concreteness to abs-traction, from duration to eternity, by a stairway whose steps have been constituted mainly by the religious thought & practice of man in society.

It is probably unnecessary to show in detail that it is the same confusion which enables this school to maintain that the other categories besides that of time are of religious, that is, of social origin. One may simply say that there is something dis-tinctly grotesque in the impression Durkheim makes that he means that the category of class & the power of classification are derived from the actual existence of phratries & clans in the pri-mitive societies.[1] It seems so obvious that the category of class is the tendency which man shares with the animals to set things together in the mind on the ground of sameness, the tend-ency to unify experience which is present in perception & advan-ces to conception, the concept, & abstract ideas. But, natur-ally, the idea or concept of class would take for tribal man the meaning given to it by the only group phenomena he knows & their more or less sacred associations. Similarly, M.M. Hub-

-bert & Mauss may say that for primitive man "spaces are always veritable temples",[1] & Durkheim may justly affirm that "there are societies in Australia & North America where space is conceived in the form of an immense circle, because the camp has a circular form; & this spatial circle is divided up exactly like the tribal circle, & is in its image", & so forth; but as Durkheim himself says, "spatial representation consists essentially in a primary co-ordination of the data of sensuous experience",[2] & the category of space had already been for long operative in the animal mind as well as in the human, in co-ordinating sense-experience in terms of distance, nearness & relative position.

This position, that the categories, such as time, space & causal-ity, are not the creation of the tribal mind on the basis of its customs, but are as it were part of the equipment of the individ-ual mind, even in the animal & sub-human stage of man's develop-ment, is admirably confirmed by the nature of Reduplicative Mem-ory as described by Varendonck. There is given in its exact photographic record, & when need arises equally exact reproduction, of the phenomena of experience, a picture of things & events in that order of time, relations of space, & even causal connections of antecedent & consequent, in which they actually occurred. As Varendonck says, reduplicative memory "may be used as a basis for the knowledge of causal, temporal & spatial relations throughout the animal scale. This result is obtained by a regression, the

1. Melanges d'Histoire des Religions. Preface p.XXXI.
2. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. p.

mind reascending from the terminal image of the series to the initial one."[1] To point the same contrast, one notes that Levy-Bruhl devotes much of his attention in his later work, "La Mentalité Primitive", to the endeavour to show that the savage's idea of causality is totally different from ours, since effects for him are invariably referred to invisible & intangible powers as causes.[2] On the other hand, Varendonck says; "Reduplicative memory may therefore be regarded as being at the origin of the knowledge of causal relations. For the needs of the present study it will suffice to point out that such is also the case with temporal & spatial relations; but this is a question which lies beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that, according to circumstances, the mind may utilise the replica of the past which is at its disposal in order to establish a chronological sequence in the events under consideration, or else to make a comparison between things near & things remote."[3] It is thus proved by the nature of reduplicative memory as Varendonck has established it that the categories, in the sense we give them of tendencies of the mind to arrange the phenomena of experience in relations temporal, spatial, causal & the like, are present in the animal mind & in the mind of man just beyond the instinctive stage, in its earliest & simplest integrations such as its ordinary perceptions.

1. Op. Cit. p.51.
2. Op. cit. La Mentalité Primitive. p.86.
3. Op. cit. p.37.

Chapter XIII

THE FORMATION OF CONCEPTS

(c) Unification & Discrimination.

Progress in human thought from perception to conception, from the percept to the concept, is an advance both in unification & in discrimination of the phenomena of experience. Primitive thought is lacking in both, because it is only as things are comprehended, that is, grasped all round, that they are clearly distinguished from each other. The difference between the exact & definite concepts of civilised & especially of scientific man, & the fluid, indefinite, interpenetrating concepts of the primitive mind, is like that between a handful of finely-cut diamonds & the gleaming jewels of a wave crest breaking in the sun. In tracing this difference, which is important for this study, we may turn once more to Varendonck's distinction between Reduplicative & Synthetical memory. The function of the latter is to form syntheses on the ground of sameness between the newly presented facts of experience & those of the past which are recorded in the mind, & reproduced on stimulus, by Reduplicative memory. It may be doubted whether the name Memory is appropriate for this synthetical operation of thought; for it is rather the characteristic synthetising or integrating activity of the mind itself, employing for its unifications the material supplied by memory. Sully names the same function, Constructive Imagination. The point, however, with which we are concerned is that this synthetic

activity produces a percept, as we have seen, by the unification of a present sense-impression with sensations revived from memory, & creates concepts by unifications of a more complex character. We have already traced in a general way the evolution of sensat-ion into perception & towards conception as far as the Image-Concept. We may now particularise a little more. One import-ant point is that the process is evidently one of increasing internal control, grasp upon the phenomena by the co-ordinating mind itself; & the progress is towards mental unities which are ever more highly integrated & deeply differentiated. The unific-ation corresponding to the pure sensation is the instinctive reflex, in which there may be no mental control whatever. In perception the stimulus comes from the external world still, but there is a pause in which the material from without is co-ordin-ated with sensations of the past, held in reduplicative memory & recalled from it. There is selective action according to same-ness, & the resulting unity is a perceived thing. With the growth of the brain & the development of "eye-mindedness", per-ception becomes more & more visual, & revived perceptions are also largely visual, that is, in image forms. The higher animal, in so far as he thinks, as, for example, when he is faced with an obstacle, with some new thing, or with alternative courses of action, probably thinks in images: he sees the thing as a composite picture, constructed out of the present image-percept

together with recalled image-percepts, & tending through the characteristic unifying activity of the mind to become a definite & coherent image. Or, when it is a question of action, he sees himself in a kind of cinematographic film pursuing one or other course of action: which visualisation of the self is of some importance in the evolution of individuality, self-consciousness, & the idea of the soul.

An illustration of the development we are outlining may be taken from lower animal life. The opinion of farmers that rooks dis-tinguish between a man with a gun & a man without one, seems fairly well established. They disregard the one, but take flight at the appearance of the other. In the one case, the image-percept composed of present & past perceptions takes the form of the (naturally) wordless picture, "man in field, harmless", & the crow continues his operations. In the other, the image-percept takes the more complex & differentiated form of the picture, "man in field with gun, dangerous", & this pulls the trigger for flight. The combined process of unification & dis-crimination is evident here. In the latter case, moreover, one observes the image-percept merging gradually into the image-concept; & it becomes clear that the difference between the two is one of degree & of development, the image-concept being simply richer in content, more differentiated, & at the same time more widely comprehensive in the grasp of its integration.

The next stage is the Word-Concept; & here we are in the human sphere. The spoken word implies society; it is the means of communication. The earliest animal form of communication was no doubt gesture; & many primitives have a very complete gesture language to eke out the vocal. A very primitive form of word is found in what German ethnologists call the "Lautbilder", sound—pictures which Levy-Bruhl names vocal gestures. These are adverbial or interjectional forms, which are "a sort of pictures or reproduct-ions of what one wishes to express, obtained by means of the voice."[1] Words in general in early languages have this pictor-ial character, as already said, & are at first representative of image-concepts. Many of our abstract terms are hidden metaphors from which the image of a concrete thing has vanished. In the well-known example of the word "spirit" the concrete image embed-ded in spiritus, anima, psyche & ruach, is "breath-thing" or "wind-thing." The progress of words towards abstract meanings is achieved by the passing away of the application to a particular concrete thing, the fading out of the image which attaches it to a restricted class of things, & the reduction of the word to a sign which by its generality covers an immensely increased range of the phenomena of experience. We come thus at the summit to the general idea or abstract notion.

The advance thus outlined implies a growth of mind in the power of unification, with its parallel activity of discrimination. In

1. Les Funct. Ment. p.183.

the primitive mind with the co-ordinative centres & powers of the brain not well developed, the general idea, like the "portmanteau" word containing a great many things packed in orderly fashion, is, in the natural state of the savage, impossible. He thinks large-ly in images, by tracing likenesses to concrete things; & his concepts are mainly image-concepts. The unifying activity of his mind is above all imagination. For this reason, the attach-ment of his mind to the concrete does not mean that he cannot conceive of the invisible & intangible. On the contrary, he adds a whole imaginary, or better, imaginatively-conceived, that is, invisible & intangible world to the world of sensible experi-ence. That is the truth in Levy-Bruhl's view that the whole outlook of primitive man is "mystique", that is, determined by "belief in forces, influences & activities imperceptible to the senses but nevertheless real."[1] That this unseen & intangible world of primitive man is the creation of imagination, & is in great part imaginary & illusory, does not foreclose the possib-ility that it is a universal tendency in the primitive mind, which is part of the essential "stuff" of mind, which is making towards the truth of things & is a tentative grasp with an imper-fect instrument upon a world which is real though unseen. The imagination at its highest in civilised man is a sublime organ of truth for the poet, the philosopher, & even the man of science; & the values & powers which it grasps in its swift, flashing

1. Op. cit. p.30.

integrations, the subtler forces conceived by science, truth itself, goodness & the inward essence of beauty, belong more & more, it seems, to a world which is unseen & intangible & yet real if anything is. If one is to interpret the beginning by the end in the evolutionary order & not the end by the beginning, it would seem that this tendency in man in becoming human to add a world of unseen powers, beings & values, to the world of his sense experience, is the "spark" which "disturbs our clod", is the raw, green blade, otherwise unmeaning, which is making towards the full ripe corn of our wisest comprehension of reality.

In tracing the development of the concept out of more elementary forms, it may be useful to pursue the history of a particular conception, such as that of "power". This is at once for us an extremely comprehensive & yet definite general idea. To man as an animal at the instinctive stage "power" comes as a sense-impression in the mind of something external which affects a sense & may call forth the response of a reflexive movement. As a percept or as matter for perception, "power", let us say in a thing seen, is a perception of movement or action or a tendency to action; the object is doing or about to do something which is a concern of the perceiving subject. The image of a moving patch of jungle is co-ordinated with past similar perceptions, & the further image takes shape in the mind of the savage of a deer which has power to feed him or of a tiger which may reverse the process.

Though it is here still upon the plane of merely animal intelligence, the primitive mind discriminates; for example, the cause of the movement in the brake is not the wind, & it is a deer & not a tiger. There may be appropriate action under the impulse of desire or fear, namely pursuit or flight. The case is different when at the definitely human stage there is perception of "power" which escapes from the co-ordinations of instinct & animal intelligence, & refuses to coalesce with images of power already in memory from past experience. In other words it is unknown "power", unfamiliar, strange & therefore usually feared. But the unification must go on, & imagination takes up the task. Under the influence of the uneasiness at not being able to "place the phenomenon, & of the instinctive fear of the unknown, the "power" is imaged as dangerous. The next step is to co-ordinate the unknown "power" with known things by extending sameness to likeness. The unknown, mysterious "power" is, for example, like life: its action resembles that of living things. A Bushman who saw a cart for the first time regarded it as a living animal, & spoke of a hand-cart accompanying it as the child or the calf of the larger one. Similarly, in Australia, the sacred totemic stones, representing in their ceremonies for increasing the food supply a male & female kangeroo, have some smaller stones around them which are treated as their young to which they have given birth. The magical or sacred power attributed to these inanimate

objects is thus thought of under the image of life. Thus "power" becomes the image-concept "like life". This tendency to see life in unfamiliar, inanimate things is probably universal at an early stage of man's mental development. It is that pre-animistic state of the primitive view of the world which R.R. Marret, with general acceptance, has called Animatism.

Or again, "power" in things, especially in the strange, unfamiliar or sacred, may present itself to the primitive mind as like will, under the image of will. Not, of course, that the savage has the vaguest idea of "will" as a faculty of things or persons; but he may regard even inanimate things, which impress him as having power, strange or unfamiliar things, or familiar things to which for the nonce he ascribes unusual or heightened power, as able like a living & conscious being to wish to do or not to do something which he believes to be in its power. Thus when the Australian savage prays to his knife or to his spear to go & kill the man who has stolen his wife, he is ascribing to the weapon a power which is conscious -hears, for instance, what he asks- & which may wish to do or not to do what he desires, that is, is of the nature of will.

The savage mind, however, having not yet developed the capacity for exact discrimination even among its images, cannot keep these image-concepts of power, "like life" & "like will", separate &

distinct: they overlap & mingle with each other. Hence primit-
-ive man often forms a composite image-concept in which he re-
-presents the impressively powerful thing as both like life &
like will. It is then a composite mental representation in the
form of life-power-will. But this is what we have already sug-
-gested to be the essence of that mental attitude which anthrop-
-ologists now describe as belief in Mana. This word derived
(first by Prof. Codrington) from Melanesian magic has its counter-
-parts in very many & wide-spread languages all over the world; &
the idea it represents of a mysterious potency, which carries
with it almost invariably associations of life & volition, is
probably the generalised form from which both Magic & Religion
may be said to have evolved.

This conception of Mana has been analysed with great learning &
acuteness by the French collaborateurs, M.M. Hubert & Mauss. A
glance at their view may illuminate the idea for us. They say:
of the notion of mana, "it is at one & the same time that of a
power, that of a cause, of a force, that of a quality & of a sub-
-stance, that of an atmosphere (milieu). The word mana is at
once substantive, adjective & verb, & designates attributes, nat-
-ures, actions & things. It is applied to the rites, actors,
materials & spirits of magic as well as to those of religion."[1]
These authors find this idea under different names in America,
among the Amerindians like the Algonquins & the Sioux, in Mexico,

1. Melanges. Preface. p.XIX.

in India (under the Vedic conception of brahman) & among many tribes of Africa, where, indeed, they conclude that "it is necess-ary to replace for the whole of Africa the notion of fetich by that of mana."[1] The varied application of this prindiple is thus described: "In certain cases the general notion of mana pre-sents itself under its impersonal, integral form: in others, it is specialised, but there remains some element of generality - power of the will, danger of the evil eye, efficacy of the voice - in other cases, finally, in order to enter the practical, it assumes immediately concrete & individual forms: it becomes totem, stars, breath, plant, man, magician, thing, spirit. The basis remains identical, but the metamorphosis is none the less natural & inevitable. From the major premise which is mana there is deduced by a logical & psychological necessity the conclusion which is soul & myth."[2]

With this description of Mana we are in agreement; & it appears to us to be in harmony with the account which Hubert & Mauss do not give but which we have attempted, of the psychological pro-cess by which the primitive mind has arrived at this generalised notion of Mana. We may add, in advancing to show how this in-choate & shapeless germ of religion developed into its higher forms, that Mana may remain, for minds which are capable of little more, at the stage of the image-concept, as the ascription of a

1. Op. cit. p.xx.

2. id. p.xxxvi-xxxvii.

of a life-&-will potency to things & persons which give an impres-
-sion of power, especially of mysterious power. This is the essence of that truly primitive type of rudimentary religion known as Fetichism, of which the purest examples are to be found among the West African Negroes in their savage state, & which reappears as a curious reversion in civilised society in the form of a half-serious belief in luck, charms, amulets & mascots. On the other hand, let the primitive mind develop in mental power, in power, namely, of co-ordination & discrimination, & Mana shall pass out of the category of an image-concept. It shall acquire both deeper integration & richer differentiation, become more unified & more distinct, losing its vagueness & wavering & changing outline, & emerge into something which can be called a concept, such as the idea of spirit, soul or god, from which, by the way of Animism, all religions may be derived.

Chapter XIV

PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS & PRIMITIVE RELIGION

(a) Animism.

The whole effort of the human spirit we have defined as the Quest for Unity. The endeavour of man, both on the theoretical & the practical side of his life, appears to be directed towards making a whole of that life, achieving a harmony within himself & at the same time in relation to his environment including his fellows & "whatever gods there be." The growth of mind is thus a growth in the power of integration, of the capacity to co-ordinate the material of experience into more & more comprehensive & at the same time finely distinguished wholes for thought. The difference, as we have just seen, between the primitive & the cultured mind lies very much in the inability of savage man to attain somewhat complex & yet clear & definite unities in thought like the concept & the abstract idea, or the severe limitations in his power to do so. What R.R.Marrett says of the morality of primitive man is true of his thinking; it is impressionistic. His ideas are not distinct from each other; they melt into each another. The difference between the concepts of the savage & those of the cultivated man is like the difference between a wide, shallow, unbanked primitive river & a modern stream, confined, deep & regulated. Primitive concepts, when escaping from the stage of the image-concept, are thus vague, fluid & diffusive. This may be illustrated from animal life, it being premised that

1. Anthropology. p. 134

concept is here used in its widest sense. It may be asked, as a simple question of animal psychology, why it is that a kitten pursues & stalks a moving string, while the adult cat treats it with indifference. The reason is that the kitten's "concept" of living things & the possibly eatable is wide, diffused, & vague, & includes practically all moving things; but the cat's "concept" of what is living & possibly eatable is much more limited, definite & distinct, excluding innumerable moving things. In precisely the same way primitive man's concept of what is living is wide, diffused & vague; & indeed tends to include everything that moves. It is this fluidity of the concept we call "life", so that for savage man it sprawls over everything that moves, which enables Sir E.B.Tylor to speak of the primitive idea of a "general animation of nature" or of "a doctrine of universal vitality". These phrases are somewhat too definite to describe the earliest stages of man's thought on its way to religion. Tylor, as the greatest of the pioneers of this subject, made the splendid generalisation known by the name of Animism, & claimed that it covered all the essential facts of the origin of religion, from the point of view of anthropology. Later investigation, illuminated at many points by his theory, has naturally provided material for the criticism & the modification of Tylor's view. The main criticism is this, that the orthodox theory of Animism identifies savage man's ascription of life to moving things, &

especially to mysteriously moving things, with the ascription to them of "spirit". Primitive man, it is thought, ascribes to all animate beings the possession of soul like his own. But later observers, particularly of the phenomena of Fetichism, were able to establish that savage man does not necessarily regard his fetich as the abode of spirit, or as possessed by spirit: there may be nothing in the fetich for him but an indefinite idea of power or something even so vague as luck. The tendency to see life or something analogous to it in all things around him, is, as already indicated, more correctly designated by Marett's term, Animatism. This is certainly nearer to the primitive than Anim-ism, which belongs to a higher stage in human thought when man, having acquired greater mental powers of co-ordination & discrim-ation, has arrived at a certain distinction between matter & spirit, & has formed some idea of soul apart from body. This is admirably expressed by Dr. Hopkins of Yale thus: "There can be no clear understanding of the foundation of religion without the recognition of the fact that man has passed through a stage where he fails to discriminate between matter & spirit. Before a belief in freed spirits is possible, man must be able to abstract spirit from body. But, in the thought of the lowest savage, matter & spiritual power are so interrelated that there is no body without conscious power & no spirit without body. Even in

comparatively high religions, such as that of the Vedic poets, plough & drum are conscious volitive powers, as much as the sun & other phenomena expressing active life & will. Samoyeds & Finns worship objects without recognition of spirit detached from a natural basis. Some African tribes to-day are unable to dis-tinguish between matter & spirit." "In view of these various considerations, "he continues, in a passage which is interesting not merely for this point but for another reason, " we must start with the rejection of any theory that presupposes the priority of either religion or magic; that is, we must reject both the anim-ism of Spencer, Tylor, Réville, & Jevons, & the naturism of Pfleiderer & Menzies. The history of religion cannot be traced back to a more complex psychosis than that of to-day's savage. But that savage shows that he cannot imagine in other phenomena what he does not recognise in himself. What he recognises, the lowest savage, is a life-power or potency so diffused that all parts of the body possess their different 'souls'. His mind can-not distinguish between soul & body or between subjective & ob-jective. The object to which his vague mumblings of hope & fear are directed is neither god nor devil nor a power of any sort as a person; it is rather the potency called mana or orenda."[1].

Spirit, then, as distinguished from body or from an object which it inhabits, enters or leaves, is one of these concepts of which

1. The History of Religions.pp.17-18.

the earliest type of human mind was not capable, & which came later in the story of religion. There is a point at which it does come in, through the analogy of dreams, reflected images & the like, & with man's more & more distinct self-consciousness; & the theory of Animism has an all-important place as a descript- of a very great class of religious phenomena at that stage of human development. Before pursuing the course of that develop--ment further & the part played in it by animistic belief, we may introduce here a more general remark.

In the quotation just given Dr. E.Washburn Hopkins rejects the two theories of Animism & Naturism, as accounting for the rudim--entary forms of religion. One is thus reminded of the tendency there has been for anthropologists, in the development of their still young science, each to press his favourite theory of the origin of religion as the more primitive & comprehensive. Dr. Warde Fowler in his "The Religious Experience of the Roman People" remarks on the various theories which have been put forward to account for Roman religious practices. "Thus" he says, "Mannhardt had his theory of the Vegetation-spirit, Robertson-Smith that of the Sacramental Meal, Usener that of the Sondergötter, Dr. Frazer that of the Divine kingship."[1] These, he adds, are sound enough up to a point, but the tendency to explain everything by one or other of them must be carefully guarded against. This applies to the general question of religious origins. No theory of

1. "The Religious Experience of the Roman People. p,19.

of Animism, Fetichism, Ancestor-worship or the like completely covers the facts everywhere. There is truth in the observation of L.R.Farnell, when speaking of Anthropology; "We may owe to it the positive induction that the religious product at the different stages & in the different branches of mankind was a complex growth from many different germs."[1] The prevalence of particular forms of early religion, of one type rather than another, among particular racial types or in particular regions, such as Fetichism among the Negroes, Animism among the Amerindians & in the popular religion of India, Ancestor-worship among the Mongols, & Priest-Kingship among the Aryan races, no douht shows the influence of race & racial conditions upon the line taken by the religious tendency. Among these, however, there is unquestionably a sort of hierarchy, so that it is possible to say that Fetichism, + Animism are of a more primitive type than the others mentioned, & belong genetically to the lower & earlier stages of human development, through which these others, higher & later, have probably passed in one way or another. And behind Animism & even Fetichism there is something more general still, a generalised form of belief to which these can be tracked backward as more complex & later developments. There is, to return to the natural parallel, a generalised form of the human body, belonging to the prehuman period of man's evolution, sharing many ape characters & some human such as the erect position & the opposable thumb, &

1. The Evolution of Religion. p.9.

with the human future represented largely by tendencies in the generalised mind which went with that primitive bodily frame. The powers in that generalised primitive mind in their turn were largely those held in common with the animals, what we term instinctive as contrasted with those of intelligence, which latter was present also in rudimentary forms & in tendencies waiting, as it were, for the immense future which should unfold them to declare & illustrate their nature & meaning.

Religion, therefore, also goes back to a generalised form. On the analogy of the evolution of the body & the mind & of their early forms, one would expect primitive man to share the non-religious animal mind with certain tendencies towards religion which his vast religious future would unfold & interpret. This expectation is confirmed by the facts. The springs of the great river of Religion can be traced back to a point where they become invisible. Beyond all that Religion has written on the human consciousness there is, as Prof, Sanday said, a "tabula rasa", a blank, the tabula rasa, the blank of the animal mind which was shared by the ancestors of primitive man. Probably the first observable germinal form of religion is the dim sense of a "life" like his own, a "power" like his own, a "will" like his own, in things outside himself, image-concepts which we have already seen to be necessarily earlier than the animistic stage of thought in which the more definite & comparatively highly-developed concept

of soul or spirit comes into play. The inability of the primit-ive mind to form definite & distinct concepts keeps these ideas of "life", "power", "will", in things, dim, misty & changeful in character. The most that can be said of the objects of religi-ous exercises at this stage is that to the savage the thing it-self seems living, hears, for instance, when he speaks to it, can do things beyond what he himself can do, & has will, that is, can do things if it likes, when requested by prayer, compelled by magic or spell, or induced by gifts. Thus it has been said of the Australian native that he "imagines volition even in a member of the body or in dust, because he cannot do otherwise, not yet having reached the point where he can think of matter in any other way. Especially anything lively enough to move is alive, & what is alive is, like himself, a being with a will. But even without apparent sign of life, any instrument is to him a will-possessing thing. Thus to punish a man who has stolen his wife, the Austr-alian savage makes an instrument like a knife & 'kneeling before it', a religious not coercive attitude, sings to it a request to kill the injurer."[1.]

This is probably the most generalised & primitive form of religion we are ever likely to discover. It only deserves the name, as the shapeless seed is called by the name of the noble tree or the delicate flower into which it grows. All over the world, howev-er, among the most backward races may be found this crude &

1. The History of Religions. p.17.

shifting notion of mysterious agency, of a life-potency in things which is different from & greater than the man himself. With its three probably constant constituents of life, power, & will, it is what the Polynesians call "mana", the American Indians "orenda", the African tribes what we translate "medicine"; & in the lowest types of Fetichism it gives its power & value to the fetich. It may indeed be reasonably asserted that at the stage of man's religious development prior to the emergence of the idea of soul, before he acquired the capacity to distinguish somewhat clearly between animate & inaminate & between matter & spirit, this rudimentary conception of a life-potency or mysterious agency in the objects of his reverence was the universal form which the religious tendency took in the mind of primitive man.

The next stage was Animism, the belief in souls or spirits as distinguishable from material phenomena. This, according to Sir E.B. Tylor was the most primitive or original form of religion; & the theory, supported by his immense & accurate collection of anthropological data, obtained very general acceptance for a time. Even in 1908 F.B.Jevons speaks of it as "the earliest & lowest stage which Science recognises in the evolution of man."[1] The hypothesis was particularly attractive to modern religious people because it seemed to prove that man everywhere & always had been conscious of spirit in himself & in the world; & it was a pleasing reflection that so cardinal a quality of religion as belief

1. The Science of Religion. p.30.

in spirit, which indeed they would regard as the very essence of religion, had been present in its remotest origins. But, as De La Saussaye said, though "this question as to the origin of religion touches closely on that as to the essense of religion"... "the two questions are not identical; for primitive & essential are not synonymous, & though our opinion as to the essence of religion may strongly influence our views on its origins, yet it would be a petitio principii to maintain that the essence of religion must clearly show itself in the earliest forms under which it appears."[1] The essence of religion is difficult to define; but even if its essence were belief in the existence of souls or spirits, we have seen that such belief is not primitive. Dr. Tylor's theory manifestly breaks down when he is led to define Fetichism as "the doctrine of spirits embodied in, or attached to, or conveying influence through certain material objects"; for it is not necessarily a spirit in the fetich to which the savage prays but simply the thing itself, & what he regards as resident in the fetich is often not soul at all but a vaguely conceived "mana", life-potency, or living will-power. Progress from this point, however, is made by the slow growth of such concepts as life, power & will in definiteness & distinctness from their material embodiments. This implies probably increase in brain-power, especially in the co-ordinating centres,

1. Science of Religion. p.30.

through some favourable mutation in the race itself or crossing with some larger-brained race, & improvement, therefore, in the mental power of unification & discrimination. The gradual integ-ration of man's own self-consciousness, the growth of his indiv-iduality, his sense of being a person, all, however rudimentary, contributed to the personalising, so to say, of these living potencies into sentient beings. Dreams, with their visualising of dead persons whose bodies have vanished, help on the idea of existence of parents, friends, ancestors, as beings apart from body. Thence arrived the conception of spirits, usually evil & dangerous because mysterious, as more or less separate existences, inhabiting or associated with things, persons & places, more & more enjoying a superhuman freedom because like people in visions of the night they are independent of body, space & time.

This process of the evolution of Animism may be traced from low to higher stages through the beliefs of certain African tribes.[1] The lower types of West African negro are at the fetichistic level where the distinction between animate & inanimate or be-tween matter & spirit is vague & wavering, & where there is no definite idea of soul or spirit inhabiting the fetich or in any way conceived separately from it. The object is regarded is possessing in some dim sense life, potency & volition. The Bush-men, further south, are little beyond this stage. "They regard

1. We follow here the line taken & the information given by Prof. Hopkins in his "The History of Religions" pp.25ff.

sun & moon," says Prof. Hopkins, "as spirits & for the significant reason that 'they move, so they have life'." The Bantus who are more intelligent are "more advanced...Their belief in soul is real but vague. The soul may be left about anywhere. The shadow is a follow-soul. But ancestral souls are revered & even thanked for blessings & feared as illness-bringers. Souls may enter animals, & separate spirits of places exist." The Hottentot, who is partly Bantu in race, marks a slightly higher stage. "Owing to pastoral conditions there is here closer & longer family intercourse. Hence has come a higher development of moral qualities; & from this, the attribution of such qualities to spirits. Thus the conception of kind spirits, to whom man should be grateful, is much more pronounced among the Hottentots than among Bushmen & pure Bantus. They have real gods as well as spirits, such as Tsuni-goam, a benevolent god, unfortunately of uncertain origin." Already among the agricultural Wakamba Bantus there had arisen "a vague belief in a great spirit." The natives of Dahomey have a still more advanced development. Their neighbours, the Fanti, who live in segregated communities & villages, "have both vegetable & animal totems; their highest objects of devotion are the vegetable silk-cotton tree & the python. They have one real god. But the Dahomeyans, who have a royal house & a realm-idea, have developed further the idea of gods or spirits of a higher & more comprehensive order. In the Fanti villages

each community has its own separate power or spirit; in Dahomey these similar powers or spirits of the separate communities have coalesced into one, withal one having power & dignity commensurate with his physical expansion." This last observation leads Prof. Hopkins to make a remark of special interest. "One sees how intimate is the connection here between religion & the social group. The bigger the state, the bigger the god compounded of various gods: the bigger the god's province, the less local, confined, his activity. His comprehensiveness tends to make him more abstract."[1.]

The connection, such as Hopkins here indicates, between man's social state & his religious belief at the higher stages of his history, is a subject of much interest. There is, for example, action & reaction in the history of the Jewish people between their gradual achievment of national unity on the one hand, & their gradually acquired monotheism; on the other just as the conversion of the Anglo-Saxon tribes to Christianity was a strong force in welding them into one nation. We are concerned here, however, with the relationship as it is found in man's earlier organisations & his simpler beliefs & their psychology. Glancing back, therefore, over the account just given of these African tribes, one notes how at the restless hunting stage represented by the Bushmen, religion is of an impulsive, changeful & unreflective character. At this point religion is no more than a sense of

1. Op. cit. p.29.

superhuman, power in a thing which somehow, by strangeness, luck or curious association of some kind, has struck the savage's imagination. It has something akin to life, to potency, to volition; it does things he cannot do himself. This may be called Fetichism. At the pastoral stage, such as that of the Bantus to which the Zulus belong, there is more leisure for reflection, with at the same time greater brain development & consequent mental power. Hence there is growth in the man's own sense of individuality, in contrast probably with the animals he commands & uses; & therefore the more definite idea of souls or spirits separate from things, the basis of Animism, becomes possible. The agricultural life, with its further progress in intelligence & morals raises these spirits to gods with even beneficent qualities. Miss Jane Harrison traces in interesting & convincing fashion through the various rites of the ancient Greeks connected with the spring sacrifice of a bull, the emergence of the Bull-God Dionysos, who from being a mere fertility-power or fertility-spirit among a half-savage agricultural people, grew with the growing refinement & imaginative mind of the classical Greeks into the god Dionysos round whose ritual & great annual festival the wonderful dramas of Greece came to be written & performed.[1] In a state of national unity, to complete this sketch of religious & social development, as in a monarchical society like that of Dahomey, the gods are organised into a hierarchy; & a sovereign

1. Ancient Art & Ritual. (Jane Harrison). p.99.

god, a Zeus or Jupiter, a Marduk or indeed a Jahweh, becomes con-
-ceivable.

One must carefully guard against conveying the impression that we mean that these particular beliefs always correspond to these particular stages in social culture. That theory would instantly receive its quietus from the consideration that such primitive peoples as the Australian blacks, without flocks & herds & with-
-out agriculture, have spirits & gods in their worship of some definiteness, & certain of them possess a vague conception even of a supreme spirit. But the general outline of this position is true to fact. The hunting savage whose thought & social life are alike of a low organisation, to whom a concept or general idea of any distinctness, still more an abstract idea, is very difficult or altogether impossible, is found as a rule at the stage of belief in Mana, life-potency & volition in the objects of his veneration. Reflection such as comes in pastoral & still more in agricultural life, along with a deepening sense of man's own individuality, raises these dim powers to the status of spirits or souls separable from body, & these again, more defined & ethicised, become gods. The analogy of his own more highly organised society is naturally reflected in the hierarchy of the gods; & the paramount chief, the patriarch, & the priest-king assist the development of the idea of a supreme god, in some cases, such as the Biblical nations of Moab & Israel, ~~through~~

through Henotheism or the national god, up to Monotheism.

Chapter XV

PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS & PRIMITIVE RELIGION

(b) Belief in a Future Life.

The specific character of the primitive mind with which we are at present concerned is its difficulty in forming concepts, dis-tinct ideas & still more abstractions in thought. It has just been endeavoured to show how this operates in the creation of pre-animistic belief, from which proceeds, with greater definite-ness in thought & increasingly organised unity in the mind, the developing idea of spirit as distinguished from body, & hence the wide-spread cult of Animism or Spirit-Worship, which again refines & blossoms into the higher religions. The second example we take to illustrate these primitive psychological processes is the savage's conception of the life after death.

As to the primitiveness of this belief there is now little quest-ion among anthropologists. Among present-day savages it is in one shape or other all but universal; & evidence of it is contemporaneous with some very early vestiges of true human life. It is a re-markable circumstance that some burials at any rate of man of the Lower as well as of the Upper Palaeolithic age provide reasonable proof that many, perhaps hundreds of thousands of years ago, men buried their dead in a dim & groping faith that for them life went on in some fashion beyond the grave. There is a famous example in the youth of Neanderthal type found in one of the caves of Le Moustier in France. This case is the more striking that the race to which it belonged is generally regarded as a species

by itself of the genus Homo which became extinct & formed no part of the ancestry of modern man. The skeleton in this instance lay beneath gravel washed into the cave by some river or flood from the melting of the ice of the Glacial Period. The lad, perhaps about sixteen years of age, lay with his right arm supporting his head over a heap of wrought flints, & the left arm stretched out so as almost to touch with the hand a splendid coup-de-poing, a weapon of the period, while numerous bones of animals such as the urus or wild-ox were found split open for the marrow. There can never be absolute certainty of interpretation of such a phenomenon, & various explanations of this are given; but it appears to us reasonable to suppose that these accompaniments of burial were intended as weapons & food for the use of the man after the change we call death. This is supported by the similar beliefs & practices of savages of our own time. The example we shall quote is derived from the life of the Australian natives, of whom it is interesting to find Prof. Elliot Smith writing as follows: "The ancestors of the aboriginal Australians, while conforming in certain essential respects to the type of modern man & being unquestionably members of the species sapiens, also present a number of primitive structural features that suggest affinities with the species neanderthalensis. I venture to suggest that these facts can be explained only by the assumption of the early origin of the Australian."[1]

1. The Evolution of Man. G. Elliot Smith. (Humphrey Milford, 1924) p.98.

One of A.W.Howitt's most valued correspondents in compiling his great works on the Australian tribes was Mr. "Tom" Petrie.[1] This gentleman was the son of an early settler in the bush on a site which is now part of Brisbane. He grew up among the blacks belonging to tribes many of which are now extinct, knew their language, & was trusted by them to an extraordinary extent. His reminiscences written down & made into a book by his daughter, are full of first-hand information about the ideas & customs of these natives, & they provide a great deal of anthropological lore which has all the appearance of being authentic.[2] Describing a burial among the Brisbane aborigines, he says that in cases where the body was placed for a time on a platform stretched between a forked tree & some forked sticks, "after this, a space in the ground underneath the body about four feet square would be cleared bare of grass, & at one side of it a small fire would be built. This was that the spirit of the dead man might come down in the night & warm himself at the fire or cook his food. If the body was that of a man, a spear or waddy would be placed ready, so that the spirit might go hunting in the night: if a woman, then a yam-stick took the place of the other weapon, & her spirit could also hunt, or dig for roots."[3] It should be noted that an unscientific observer would naturally speak, as this author does, of the spirit doing these things as a disembodied being;

1. The Native Tribes of South-East Australia. p.323 etc.
2. Tom Petrie's Reminiscences of Early Queensland. Constance C. Petrie. (Brisbane. Watson, Ferguson & Co.)
3. id. p.31.

but the probability is that the Australian native was unable to make any thing like the clear distinction between soul & body to which we are accustomed, & thought of the pprson as he had known him, vaguely compounded of body & what we call soul, changed in-deed so that he does such things as hunting & eating in a differ-ent way, but not certainly acting as a disembodied spirit leaving its body on the platform while it went upon its affairs. That is too advanced an idea for minds at the stage of development of these tribes.

The common element in all such burials is the idea that life goes on after the change we call death, & that it is a life similar to that which has just closed. This is in accord with the nature of the primitive mind as we have already analysed it, particular-ly in the concrete character of its thinking & its incapacity for abstraction. The most primitive conception, therefore, of the life beyond death is revealed by the provision of food, weap-ons, fire & so forth, exactly as in the present existence. It is said of the Veddas of Ceylon, one of the most primitive of existing human races, that with them "the religious instinct ex-presses itself in an unquestioning belief that the father when dead still lives, guards, & guides his family in the hunt."[1] A stage ~~stage slightly more advanced is to be found~~ stage slightly more advanced is to be found where the man's weapons are broken before they are buried with him, the notion being to make them also "dead", so that they are certain to follow him into his new condition. The approach to Animism is seen

1. Hopkins. op. cit. p.57.

when weapons & food intended for the dead are burned, the idea then being of the essence or soul of the things joining the spir-it-essence of the dead in his new world. There is a highly developed Animism among the Red Indians in which this ethereal reflection of the seen world by the world beyond death is brought to great perfection, as in Tyler's saying : "if the soul of the Algonquin be equipped with the soul of his spear & of his snow-shoes, he will hunt hereafter the soul of the elk as it reams on the soul of the snow."[1.]

Retracing our steps a little to scrutinise more directly the psychological elements in the primitive conception of a future life, we may recall again that striking relic of Palaeolithic man, the youth of the cave of Le Moustier, so carefully provided with food & weapons for the long journey. Prof. Scott Elliot, in a passage which may seem to some unduly sentimental, still emphasis-es what perhaps was a real element in the minds of those who buried this extremely primitive man, namely, the feeling of affec-tion. "If one remembers the practice of many living savages, this youth's burial seems to show a real affection, as well as careful provision for his probable needs in a brighter & happier hunting-ground than his Neanderthaloid relatives ever knew; for the rich array of flint weapons means real self-sacrifice. Each was of real value, for it had involved a long toilsome & irritat-

1. Primitive Culture. Vol.II.p.75.

-ing labour. Yet they gave him all this precious wealth out of affection, & perhaps gratitude. It is, of course, purely a guess but it has been suggested that he had lost his life when hunting the Urus & possibly after some heroic deed of daring for which his tribe reverenced him."[1] Imaginative reconstructions, such as this, of primitive situations can, naturally, only be used with great caution. In all actions & ceremonies connected with death, there is, for instance, for savage man as we know him a very strong ingredient of fear. Thus the burial of weapons & other possessions with the dead is dictated, it would seem, sometimes merely by fear of the contagion of death or of the resentment of the spirit at the assumption by others of his property. Another factor of uncertainty in estimating his feelings & emotions is provided by the observation of competent observers that savage man often appears to be as shallow in his emotions as he is in his thought. Mr. Charles W. Abel says of the Papuan: "It would be misleading to estimate a Papuan's sorrow by the noise he makes in advertising it. All his emotions are shallow. His heart is limited in feeling, as his mind is restricted in thought. He can neither hate his enemy, nor love his friend, as civilised people can. He may torture & eat the one, & howl & lacerate his face with sharp stones till his blood mingles with his tears, for the loss of the other, but it is not deep feeling which prompts either action; it is custom that demands it."[2]

1. Primitive Man & His Story. Scott Elliot. p.152.
2. Savage Life in New Guinea. p.41.

It should not surprise us that the feelings & affections of prim-
-itive man may on close examination turnm out to be as general-
-ised, vague, wavering & lacking in depth or steadfastness, as
his thoughts. Amongst the evidence for this is the ease with
which even the parental instinct is set aside & children are sac-
-rificed in obedience to custom. In such examples, however, we
are probably faced by a phenomenon which is not strictly primitive,
but which, belonging to the Tribal Integration, is the product of
the tyranny of tribal custom. Within that iron integration feel-
-ings are suppressed, affections are outraged & cruelties are
perpetrated, under the influence of tribal fears & mob-psychology
crystallised into laws, in a way which is not to be observed at
more truly primitive stages of human development. This is sup-
-ported by the fact that with the break up of the authority of
tribal custom natural affections can be observed to reassert them-
-selves, like a spring released from pressure. The following is
an instance. In the neighbourhood of a Mission in Mbeshi in
Central Africa a little child began to cut a tooth in the upper
jaw before the lower. The truth leaked out & the village was
panic-stricken, expecting deaths from the witchcraft which possess-
-ed the child. Unfortunately the "long arm of coincidence" &
one or two deaths confirmed the villagers in their primitive reas-
-oning; & the parents were ordered to destroy the infant. Under
the influence, however, of percolating Christian or civilised

ideas, probably, though they were not Christian, the parents re-sisted the demand, gave rein to their natural affection, & the girl still lives.

It is possible, therefore, to be misled in estimating the emotion & feelings of truly primitive man by what occurs under the custom of the tribe which exercises such a despotic sway in so many, per-haps in most, of the savage societies known to us. It is the disterting & warping, by tribal ideas & terrors, of his more prim-itive tendencies which obscure the fact that man is still of the race of the animals, among which care for the young & helpless, affection, tenderness & even self-sacrifice have been observed as truly as the self-regarding impulses. We shall see further reason to think presently that these natural affections are not without influence upon the primitive attitude to death, & that the savage parts with his dead with a certain sorrow & sense of loss. It may even be said that the picture of G.F.Watts, "Love & Death," where the little child Love is seen desperately but vainly pushing back the mighty, inexorable, yet somehow kindly & tender Angel of Death crossing the threshold, has its dim & shad-owy prototypes, dimmer & less definite upon the whole the farth-er back one looks, through all man's history since he became human. Love thrusting back Death from the door has no doubt been a psychological factor in the creation of the belief in Immortality.

Returning to the factor of thought in the evolution of this idea of a future life, we find at the beginning the difficulty of the primitive mind in forming distinct concepts & particularly in conceiving abstract ideas. Herbert Spencer in his "Principles of Sociology" shows how elaborate are the distinctions & minute the observations involved in the idea of a species of trout; & adds, "perceiving this, we may understand why, lacking the needful representations, the mind of the savage is seen exhausted with any thought above the simplest. Excluding those referring to individual objects, our most familiar propositions, such even as 'Plants are green', or 'animals grow', are propositions never definitely framed in his consciousness; because he has no idea of a plant or animal apart from kind. And of course until he has become familiar with general ideas & abstract ideas of the lowest grades, these a grade higher in generality & abstractness are inconceivable by him."[1] He quotes in illustration this statement of a writer concerning the hill-tribes of India, "Light is a high abstraction which none of my informants can grasp, though they readily give equivalents for sunshine & candle or fire-flame," & gives the statement of Spix & Martius about the Brazilian Indians, that it would be in vain to seek in their language "words for the abstract ideas of plant, animal, & the still more abstract notions, colour, tone, sex, species, etc.; such a generalisation of ideas is found among them only in the frequently used infinite

1. Principles of Sociology. p.83

of the verbs, to walk, to eat, to drink, to dance, to sing, to hear, etc."[1]

Since this incapacity for abstraction is general in the primitive mind, it becomes clear that the ideas of "death" & "life", & even "dead" & "living", familiar & concrete enough as they are to us, are highly abstract for savage man, & at his earliest stages of development, above his mental capacity. When we speak of a person as "dead", the state is to us something very definite, defined by innumerable concrete facts & abstract conceptions which are wholly beyond the knowledge & grasp of the primitive brain. Thus, for example, the familiar words -"the dust returns to the earth as it was" -very many facts of observation & of physical science make it easy for us to call that body, in a condition so like life & so like sleep, "dust"; & again, "the spirit returns unto God who gave it"-a host of extremely abstract conceptions are involved in that to us simple thought, such as an invisible being, independent of space, independent of time, independent of body, an unseen world of such unseen beings in a totally new environment. By the savage the condition of death can hardly be expressed by one comprehensive word, but, as has been said of the Indians of Brazil, by the frequent use of verbal forms for common actions. That is to say, the state of being dead is described by saying that the man does many things he did before, or does not do some things he did before, or does other & new things

1. Op. cit. p.84.

or old things in a new way. Thus the primitive man declares that the "dead" man still eats, drinks, walks, speaks, hunts in his new state, & in practically the same way as before, & so he provides the departed with food, fire, weapons & so forth, in case he should lack them. At the same time there is a differ-ence. The man in his new state no longer eats & drinks with his friends, he does not hunt with the tribe, he is not seen except in dreams or in some strange, elusive manner as what we call a ghost. This difference is realised. In a true sense he is felt to have gone away, to have departed. There is doubtless a feeling of loss. In some tribes, as in the Fiji Islands, there is a simple & pathetic custom whereby a savage climbs a high tree & looking across a wide landscape, calls, mentioning the name of a dead friend, "Come back, Come back".[1] There is a long history between this expression of a primitive mentality & the Adonais & the In Memoriam, but there is a direct lineage between; & there are the same sense of loss & the same bestowal of immortality. The North Australian blacks had, according to Tom Petrie, the custom called "the cry for the dead". It was the invariable practice, when a number of the natives were assembled together, to herald the dawn with an outburst of crying & wailing, accom-panied by cursing of the murderer of the relative named, for here as so often for the Australian & other primitive minds there was no death from "natural causes". An incredible din was made

1. Hopkins. op. cit. p.66.

, especially if there were many tribes assembled for a great feast or corrobboree, for ten to twenty minutes, after which the usual occupations of the day began.[1.]

There is, then, at this early stage of thought about the future existence, a consciousness of difference & a feeling of bereave-ment associated with death; but there is no sharp distinction cutting off death from life. The dead man goes on existing, though in a different way. The subsequent history of the con-ception of death follows the lines which we have already traced in the previous chapter, of the gradual integration of the idea of spirit or soul, while the savage distinguishes more & more clearly between his sleeping & waking life, between matter & spirit, between body & soul, between visible & invisible. In the matter of the difficult concept of invisibility or intangib-ility as the quality of soul or spirit, we have noted the inter-mediary part played by the image-concept, "like breath" or "like wind", embalmed in language as in the cognate Aryan words, Sans-crit anila wind, Gaelic anam, soul, Latin animus, anima, Greek anemos.[2.] Another approach to the abstract idea of invisible spirit is made through the image-concept of smallness or minute-ness, perhaps because things become invisible by growing in the distance "small by degrees & beautifully less" until they vanish altogether. Thus a primitive idea of soul is that of the miniat-ure soul or the "mannikin", as Frazer styles it, a tiny replica of the body. "The Malays conceive the human soul as a little

1. Tom Petrie's Reminiscences. pp.12-13.
2. Survivals in Belief among the Celts. Henderson. p.48

man, mostly invisible & of the bigness of a thumb, who correspon-
-ds exactly in shape, proportion, & even in complexion to the man
in whose body he resides. This mannikin is of a thin unsubstan-
-tial nature, though not so impalpable but that it may cause
displacement on entering a physical object, & it can flit quickly
from place to place; it is temporarily absent from the body in
sleep, trance, & diseawe, & permanently absent after death."[1.]
The same tendency to arrive at abstract conceptions of spirit
through concrete image-forms appears in the idea of the animal-
-soul, usually pictured as a small animal able to creep out in
the form of a bee or lizard from the mouth during sleep or trance,
& to creep back again if life is to go on. One fashion of imag-
-ing the diffusiveness of spirit, its ultimate independence of
space, is the not infrequent idea of plurality of souls. "The
savage", says Sir James Frazer, "unshackled by dogma, is free to
explain the facts of life by the assumption of as many souls as
he thinks necessary. Hence, for example, the Caribs supposed
that there was one soul in the head, another in the heart, &
other souls at all the places where an artery is felt pulsating.
...The natives of Laos suppose that the body is the seat of thirty
spirits, which reside in the hands, the feet, the mouth, the eyes,
& so on."[2.] Another image-concept for diffusiveness or superior-
-ity to space is secured by endowing the soul-creature with wings.
The soul is then imagined to take the form of a butterfly, a moth,

1. The Golden Bough. Abridged Edition. p.179.
2. Id.p690.

a bee, & frequently of a bird. The picturing of personal spirit with wings in the higher religions such as Judaism & Christianity is an extension & exaltation of the image-concept of flight in order to represent the idea of spirits which as such are independ--ent of space & time. Once the idea of a separable soul, or an external soul, had been achieved under animal forms, these images began to fade into metaphors, & through man's growing power of abstraction & distinction, & through his increasingly definite sense of his own personality, aided by dreams, in which he saw ~~hi~~ himself & others as personal beings, the complex conception of spirit as like himself, ~~but~~ intangible, breathlike, & for the most part invisible, began to take shape in the mind of the prim--itive. It is unnecessary to trace the process further, since to believe in the existence of such invisible, intangible spirits to which space time & substance seem irrelevant, is to believe in a future life.

In concluding this chapter we may remark that it may seem at the first blush as if we had tracked man's belief in a future life back to a mere negative, to an inability, an incapacity of dis--tinguishing between ~~man's belief in a future life~~ the living & the dead or forming the concepts of death & life. We remind ourselves, however, of what has been said already, that the beginnings are not the same as the cause, nor are the rudi-

1. Survivals in Belief among the Celts. Ch. II. The Wanderings of Psyche

-mentary forms the originating force. In the background of this study we place frankly our theistic & Christian philosophy, which maintains that at the formless beginningx of the universe there is not merely the moving nebula but also God, & that God's way of creating the lilies is by growth & wonderful transformation from the hardly-shaped root down in the black earth. From this standpoint at least we perceive that even our apparent negative is but the reverse side of a positive, namely, that behind the inability to find the first distinct concepts, there is the iner-adicable impulse to form concepts. And indeed, there is behind it all that unconquerable effort on man's part, as sharing in the tide-flow of the universe towards integration & differentiation, to attain unity in himself & in his world, to make his life com-plete, to reach full self-realisation, which is the spark of the divine in the human & accounts for all man's progress. From this point of view it is also that the full impression is gained of the immense spectacle of men in all ages from primeval times, with most rare exceptions, clinging to belief in a world beyond this & following into the mists which hide it, their dead, not without love & hope.

Chapter XVI

THE REASONING OF PRIMITIVE MAN

A. Semi-instinctive Character.

(a) Taboo: a Freudian Theory.

The mind of primitive man is, as already ~~seen~~, "generalised" mind. Even as definitely human, it is greatly influenced by the instincts & instinctive feelings which it shares with the lower animals. At the same time it possesses intelligence, that higher correlating power which many of the animals also have, but which has in it the promise & potentiality of the finest achievments of cultivated thought. The advance of mind from the predominantly instinctive animal stage to the stage at which these achievments are possible is one of evolution from less to greater unification of the contents of mind, with correspondingly increasing differentiation. There is at the same time progressive development in these powers of the mind, powers of unification & of discrimination, by which more & more coherent & distinct wholes in thought are created. The simplest mental integration is the instinctive reflex, which is not absent from the experience of civilised man, but plays a much greater part in the life of the savage. We have seen this rudimentary integration increasingly superseded by the richer & more discriminated totalities of intelligent perception. Then followed the image-concept, more comprehensive, gathering a number of perceptions of similar character into a whole which is inwardly perceived. Finally, in the concept the difference between the primitive mind & the

civilised & cultivated is even more clearly illustrated. The concepts of the savage are few & rare in proportion to the prim-itive character of his mind: at the same time they are less comprehensive, less distinct, more fluid & uncertain in outline, than even the simpler concepts of civilised man, while more gen-eral & abstract ideas elude him altogether. We have just endeavoured to show how this difficulty in forming concepts, this incapacity for abstraction & dependence upon the concrete & per-ceptual, affect in some important particulars the character of the religion of primitive man.

As might be expected, similar phenomena & a parallel evolution are observable in relation to the still higher & more complex integrations of thought, namely, judgment & reasoning. Here once more, as seen in relation to perception & conception, the salient difference between the primitive & the civilised mind lies in the deficiency in the former of the power of integration, the power of grasping the elements of experience & uniting them by certain common strands of meaning into more or less coherent & discriminated wholes for thought. The mental deficiency is correlative, as already noted, with the fact that in the primitive type of brain the frontal region of the cortex, in which the co-ordinative power is chiefly located, is not well-developed. When, accordingly, it is a question not of the forming of a con-cept but of forming a judgment or making an assertion or coming to a reasoned conclusion about the phenomena of his sense percept-

-ions, there is the same lack of capacity to make the connections or to make them wisely & correctly. Thus, for example, in the extremely important relation of Causality, connections among phenomena are supposed which have no basis in fact, as between the moon & lunacy or child-birth, between whistling & storms of wind, sprinkling of water & the coming of rain; & innumerable ~~xxx~~ other relations are imagined & embodied in elaborate practices of Magic & Religion which the more integrative & discriminative, critical power of later-developed reason proves to be no relat-ions at all. In this as in other respects the mind of the savage is near to the instinctive stage of animal development, & carries with it into the new & tentative integrations of his growing intelligence, naturally & influentially, some of the char-acteristics of mind at that earlier stage. It may be useful, therefore, in our discussion of the inferences & reasoning of primitive man, & in the description of the savage theories, pract-ices & customs which are based on them, to follow the main lines of the analysis of the characteristics of the primitive mind already given, & arrange the subject-matter under the three heads:

(a) Primitive Reasoning: its Semi-instinctive character.
(b) Its Imperfect Co-ordinations.
(c) Fatigue or Weariness of Mental Effort.

(a) The semi-instinctive character of primitive reasoning.

At the stage of human development when man is emerging out of

the integration of instinct into that of intelligence, the part played in the cultured mind by reasoned thought is taken by feel-ing or emotion. The crude reasoning of primitive man is im-mensely influenced by his fears, on the one hand, & by his desires or hopes, on the other. "Mental evolution", says Spen-cer, "both intellectual & emotional, may be measured by the degree of remoteness from primitive reflex action. The formation of sudden, irreversible conclusions on the slenderest of evidence, is less distant from reflex action than is the formation of delib-erate & modifiable conclusions after much evidence has been coll-ected."[1] The progress of early man thus begins with the in-stinctive animal stage at which such impulses as fear or desire operate in the manner of a nervous reflex with almost no pause for thought, the creature leaping away from what it fears or towards what it desires without considering much where its leap is to end. The next stage is where the rudimentary intelligence exercising its incipient reasoning power, but still under the influence of crude fear or desire, leaps with almost the same suddenness & impulsiveness at conclusions, without seeing very clearly where the mental leap is to end, & so arriving at number-less erratic & mistaken inferences.

This operation of feeling in primitive inference may be illustr-ated by a glance at some examples of the same thing in civilised life, which are indeed survivals from the primitive & for that

1. Principles of Sociology. p.54.

reason have some interest in themselves. Take the case of fash-
-ion. A woman's reason may make the correct inference from the
cruelty in getting plumes of the osprey to the duty of not wear-
-ing them; but, on the other hand, Fashion may step in & convince
her that she must wear them. It is an instance of feeling pre-
-vailing over reason & producing an irrational conclusion. The
far-away origin of it is probably the herd instinct. The woman
is afraid, has the primitive fear of being unlike the others; &
conversely she desires to be like the rest of society, because it
is safe & delivers her from the dread of being looked down upon.
The same factors are present if the impulse is that of sex & dis-
-play. Or take the case of the mascot. Miss Cecil Leitch, the
distinguished lady golfer, in the course of some articles in a
newspaper on golfing topics, devoted her weekly column on one
occasion to mascots. The inference from the possession of a
mascot, such as a Teddy bear or a Gollywog, to success in a game
of skill is as wildly irregular & irrational as anything in sav-
-age reasoning. Of course, a modern person would laugh at the
mascot being taken seriously; but at the same time, among the
many real causes of failure in a particular game there would be
found the vague feeling that the absence of the mascot had some-
-thing to do with it; & some players would begin an important
game with genuine discomfort, if the irrational & absurd companion
were not to hand. There is ascribed to the mascot in quite the
manner of Fetichism a certain power to influence the game. It

It is an utterly wild & inconsequent inference; but its presence in civilised minds bridges the milleniums of time & helps us humbly to recognise in the primitive savage a man & a brother. It is feeling which here again distorts the logic to a caricature. There is the feeling aroused by some earlier association of the mascot with good fortune, & then there is the vague fear that its absence may be harmful & the dim irrational hope that its presence may help, with the consoling feeling added - a very potent one in the preservation of superstitions - that it can do no harm to be on the safe side.

Prejudice in the civilised mind, to take one more instance, is usually the result of the disturbing influence of feeling upon reasoning, producing aberrations from the normal course of inference which rival those of savage man. The feeling is sometimes defended as instinctive, left unexplained, that is, with the comforting supposition that it is somehow rooted in nature, & therefore natural & in a sense right. Such, for example, is the prejudice against "the foreigner", which is really irrational & goes back to the savage's fear of the stranger. Always in such prejudice & illogicality there is found lurking that element of fear or desire or of both combined, which plays so large a part in the aberrations of the primitive mind. A modern example from social life illustrates this. A recent writer described child-labour in the English weaving mills in the nineteenth century

as one of the most sophisticated forms of slavery the world has ever seen. Sophistication is reasoning under the prejudicial influence of feeling; & the worst cruelties in the world have been the work not of the most primitive tribes & men but of more or less civilised people using a more developed intelligence under the perverting power of terror or desire. Thus, in the example referred to, there seems to our age no reason at all for the employment of children of nine in mines or factories, but to the owners with their fear of competition or the loss of business, with their desire of gain & trade, it was justified as eminently reasonable. This, of course, is what is familiar in the Freud-ian psychology as the rationalising process under the influence of more or less suppressed desire. These examples, at any rate, in which the primitive is seen surviving in modern life may serve as the "large letters" in which we read the same mental & moral facts as we are spelling out in the small letters of savage thought & practice.

Returning, then, to view the primitive mind in the light of these survivals, we go to the opposite pole & think for a moment of the pre-human ancestor. Dominating his mind there are the same im-pulses of Fear & Desire actuating his movements of flight or approach. They operate mainly through instinctive reflexes, that is, the instantaneous or swift response of nerve & muscle to an impulse from the brain created by the perception of some

feared or desired thing - & this without the intervention of what can be called reflective thought. Thought soon enters in, however, even with the animals, & with the development of the apeman's brain there is more & more the pause for reflection, for discrimination among things, & for crude, perceived connections between causes & effects. Dependent as early man increasingly becomes on his brain for survival, & with a growing imagination to supplement perception, Fear & Desire, especially the former, make quietude & pause for reflection & discrimination at first very difficult; & so the suddenness of instinctive reflexes & movements is reproduced in the impulsiveness of his judgments & the rash leaps of his reasoning, but without the accuracy of racial habit & the practical inerrancy of instinct. Perhaps, his first considerable conquest in the new realm of intelligence came when in place of doing things instinctively he saw himself doing things & even making choice among things he might do. Thence arrived the rudimentary form of the idea of power. Things around him did things. Here his vast ignorance came in, & he saw mysterious power or potency in innumerable phenomena. But his life was dominated by the emotions of Fear & Desire, especially by fear, as, it may be, descended from the immunity of the trees in which his simian relatives have remained ever since all too safe & therefore unprogressive, he found himself in an extraordinarily hostile world with only his brain to help him. To

man in that situation mysterious power was generally dangerous, & he must be on his guard against it, avoid it, coerce it, conciliate it. On the other hand, some things were not dangerous but helpful to him; their "mana," their mysterious potency, as for instance in the food animals or medicinal plants, was of assistance to his desires. Thus he came to a two-fold classification of things having a strange, impressive power into those having power to hurt, mysteriously dangerous, answering to his fears, on the one hand, & those having power to help, on the other, corresponding to his desires or hopes. This distinction is highly important from the point of view of this study, for it brings us as it were to a junction or fork from which the lines of primitive man's psychology run, for the most part divergently, into the country of his moral & religious life. Along one line, that of mysterious power to hurt, we come to Taboo with its implications & developments, & also the nefarious side of Magic, as in Witchcraft & Sorcery: along the other, that of power to help, to Magic on its good side, to Spell & Prayer, & ultimately to the forms & ideas of the higher religions.

Taboo, as an idea, a practice or an institution, is the creation of fear, & in its most generalised forms might be defined as the varied means taken by primitive man to ward off mysterious, dangerous power from doing him harm. These means, & the manifold shapes assumed by Taboo are the result of the crude reasoning of

the savage mind under the influence of semi-instinctive fear. Before proceeding to give examples of Taboo as the product of primitive inference, we may glance at a theory which ascribes to a less general & more restricted origin. It is the theory of Dr Freud of psycho-analytic fame; & it is adopted by Miss Jane Harr-ison in her "Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion".[1] We shall refer to Freud's book, "Totem & Taboo";[2] but shall quote mainly from Miss Harrison's conveniently condensed account. On this view, accordingly, taboo originates in primitive sex-relat-ionships. It is essentially interwoven with totemism & exogamy. The theory is somewhat closely, one might almost say, absolutely, dependent on a particular hypothesis, based upon a hint of Dar-win's, concerning the earliest form of human society. The "primal family", says Miss Harrison, "consisted of an adult male, one or more females & their children. This same primal family is observable even among the higher quadrupeds. With gorillas one adult male only is observable in each band. So long as the chil-dren are young all is well, & if all the children were females no difficulty would arise. The father simply marries his daugh-ters as he married their mother. There is no "natural" instinct of repulsion against incest... It is when the young males off-spring grow up to maturity that trouble begins. The single oldest or strongest dominant male is confronted by his own sons as rivals...If he is to keep his wives to himself he must kill

1. Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. University Press Cambridge. 1921.

2. Totem & Taboo. (Routledge, London) 1919.

these rivals or expel them. His rule is - no other male to touch the females of his camp, the result - expulsion of adolescent sons, i.e. exogamy. It seems an impasse. Perpetual expulsion of all the young forces of the family. In time it is true the young males may & do conquer, the old father grows old & weak, the sons band together & slay him, but it is only themselves to retell the old hideous story of sexual jealousy. Advance in civilisation is forbidden for cooperation is impossible. But there were other forces at work. The mother counted for something, the young males were to her not merely as to their father, young males, they were sons. The higher quadrupeds have longer infancy & this would foster affection even in the father. The eldest son not very much younger than his father would have little chance, he would be surely killed or expelled, but the youngest born when his father's passions were ebbing might have batter lusk. Moreover man is a social animal & his brain is highly developed, he must have vaguely hungered after peace & consequent plenty, killing your sons would pall after a time. The next step, the crucial step, the beginning of all our morality was taken- man began to impose tabus, & thereby arrived at a sort of social contract.

"Tabu is never an artificial strengthening of an instinctive repulsion, it cuts clean across individual desire. It is easy to see what was the nature of the first tabu. It was made in

the interests of the Father. Weary at last of the expulsion & slaying of sons, conscious that the day would come when they would in turn slay or disable him, he made terms with them on the basis of a tabu. You may stay at home on condition that you do not touch my wives or at least certain of my wives, your mother & your sisters or some of them are to you tabu. And if tabu they must be marked as such, they must carry on their bodies a totem badge or mark of avoidance. This system of distinction once started branched out of course into endless complexities with which we are not concerned. The primal cardinal fact is that totemism consists in group distinction, that it functions through tabu, & that it takes its rise in perhaps the strongest[1] or at least the fiercest of human impulses in sex jealousy." The length of this quotation may be justified if it makes clear, as we cannot but think it does, the extreme artificiality of the theory as a whole & at many points. It is odd that so philo-sophic an observer as Miss Harrison should not have been warned off a social contract theory of taboo by the classical example of Rousseau. Things do not happen in that way in the process of evolution. One cannot escape the impression that she is thinking of just one primal family in which this supposed drama occurs. But can one visualise, as surely one must, a host of such families or hordes, scattered over a wide area of the earth, in which the father grown weary of killing his sons, or the sons

1. Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. pp.8-9.

of killing the father, proposed & accepted the arrangement sug-
-gested as the first form of taboo? We may remark in passing that the notion of totemism as originating in badges or marks of avoidance can hardly be accepted as adequate. Dr. Freud himself conveys the same impression of dealing with one single primal family & indeed with one single deed, the murder of the primal father, which, as the origin of the sense of guilt in the sons, plays a part in his system curiously resembling the dogma of the Fall of Man & Original Sin in orthodox theology. For example, he says, "One day the expelled brothers joined forces, slew & ate the father, & thus put an end to the father horde."[1] We confess to finding this quite unintelligible. Was the "father horde" one old male with his wives & daughters? In that case, why call it a "horde"? The alternative of an assemblage of old males plus their wives is too absurd to be entertained. Was there a "son horde", consisting of expelled bachelors over against the "father horde"? And what does "one day" mean? "Of course these cannibalistic savages ate their victim".[1] Anthropologists would say that there is no "of course" about it. Cannibalism is neither inevitable nor univer-
-sal amongst the lowest races known to us. It appears to be more common at higher levels of culture than the lowest, & is undoubtedly often the product of sophistication or crude reason-
-ing, the idea being to acquire the strength of the enemy or the

1. Totem & Taboo. p.234.

qualities of the parent. And if the old male gorilla with his family is taken as the prototype of the human family, as is done by both Miss Harrison & Dr. Freud, it is disconcerting that the gorilla feeds chiefly on vegetation & is probably as seldom cannibalistic as civilised man. Yet the factor of the sons devouring the father is very necessary for the Freudian theory of totemism, in which the totem which is ceremonially killed & eaten is the "surrogate" of the primal father.[1.]

The idea that the earliest form of human society was of the gorilla type is a postulate of the Freudian theory of totemism & taboo; it cannot be a foundation. The evidence for it is of the slenderest, if there is any at all. Since Darwin made the suggestion, which Freud calls a "Darwinian hypothesis"[2.], the discovery of extremely ancient types of men, who combine distinct anthropoid characters with very human brains, has so emphasised the gap between earliest man & the modern anthropoid apes, that deductions from their forms of society to those of primitive man are so precarious as to be valueless. Even on the assumption of this primal form of human society, the explanation of exogamy as the result of the driving away or killing of the young males by the father is not convincing. There is little evidence for such a situation having ever existed, as little as for the band-ing together of the sons to slay the father. It also ignores other alternatives, such as, for instance, the fact that the

1. Totem & Taboo. p.245.
2. ibid. p.234.

mating impulse is not all & only on one, the male, side. On the analogy of other animals, not to speak of woman in modern society, the young females could hardly have been prevented from escaping from the "old male" & seeking younger & more attractive companions. As we have already suggested in our earlier discussion of exogamy the powerful human impulse of Curiosity & interest in the new & strange would facilitate this tendency. It would reinforce the instinctive tendency to out-breeding, which we believe represents in man nature's preference for cross-fertilisation in the interests of greater Variability, & which becomes conscious in what Freud calls "the savage's dread of incest". In the process the jealousy of the old male would be one, but not by any means the only, factor.

A further point is raised by the following statement which Dr. Freud makes with that fairness & frankness of his which is so disarming: "The Darwinian conception of the primal horde does not, of course, allow for the beginning of totemism. There is only a violent, jealous father who keeps all the females for himself & drives away the growing sons. This primal state of society has nowhere been observed. The most primitive organisation we know, which to-day is still in force with certain tribes, is associations of men consisting of members with equal rights, subject to the restrictions of the totemic system, & founded on matriarchy, or descent through the mother."[1] This theory has

1. Op. cit. pp.234-235.

to meet the formidable objection that, as Freud here admits, the most primitive known societies are matriarchal in character, & that in these the rôle played by the father is far from being supreme. The motive of jealousy, also, which in the Freudian system is all-important, appears to be extremely weak in many of the most primitive tribes we know. Among the Australian tribes observed by Howitt exchange of wives is a rather common form of social courtesy;[1] & among other savage races resentment against wife-stealing or elopement seems to arise not from sexual jealousy but from the sense of an outrage upon private property. The compensation thus usually takes the form of some other kind of property.

The jealousy-motive, however, is supremely necessary for Dr. Freud's theory. The present writer is unable to avoid the impression that "Totem & Taboo" is a tractate in the interests of the familiar dogma of the Oedipus-complex, the supposedly universal desire of the son for the father's wife or wives & the "death-wish" to kill him in order to gain possession. It is no part of our duty or purpose in this study to discuss the Freudian system in general, in which there are elements of permanent value. We simply point out that the anthropology in the theory of Taboo, particularly in the crucial postulate of the primal family, is extremely doubtful, & that many of the genuine facts are allegorised ingeniously in order to fit into the hypothesis. Taboo

1. Howitt. op. cit. (Pirrauru wives) p.181. (Exchange) p.195.

has a much more generalised character in its earliest forms than is given to it in the Freudian theory; & its application to the phenomena & relationships of sex is only a specific case, though certainly an important one, of its more general meaning & application which we have now to describe.

Chapter XVII

PRIMITIVE REASONING

A. (a) Its Semi-instinctive Character.

(b) Taboo: a general theory.

"Taboo", says Prof. Hopkins, "(Samoan tapu, Hawaian kapu) is a tab or mark indicating that a thing is not noa or common, but set apart for private use".[1] This is its most restricted sense. The great specialists in Taboo are the Polynesian races, though in one form or other it occurs everywhere. The Polynesian may indicate that a particular fruit-tree is his private property by tying a piece of rag to it; or a chief may declare his claim to a piece of land by having strips of cloth attached to bushes on the land: the tree or ground is then taboo to everyone but its owner. Letourneau gives an example from the northern end of the globe. He points out that a stranded whale, walrus, & even a bear is to the Eskimo the property of the whole clan; but he has the right to consider his own as much driftwood as, unaided, he can drag up beyond the reach of the tide. "In this case," he adds, "a stone placed upon the piece of wood is enough to guarantee the right of private property."[2] The stone is here the sign of a taboo or reservation. But behind these signs - trifling in themselves - there must be some meaning, some power, some "sanction" which causes them to be respected; & the sanction, as might be surmised, is that of fear. The savage believes that something very terrible, generally death, will happen to him, if he disregards the taboo. The use of taboo, indeed, to

1. History of Religions. p.67.

2. Property, its Origin & Development. p.54.

indicate & to protect private property, is a special application of it; taboos are as numerous as primitive man's fears, & are to be found wherever he finds mysterious, that is to say, dangerous, power. In Tom Petrie's Reminiscences it is told that when he was a boy, marching along a path in the bush along with some Brisbane aborigines, he observed a half-fallen tree leaning across the track. They were walking in Indian file, & the leader stopped at the place, pulled up a bush from the wayside & laid it upon the path some way short of the leaning tree. He then walked round the tree instead of under it, & each man following did the same. The resemblance of this to the modern fear of ill-luck from walking under a ladder strikes one at once. The explan--ation of the fear may be the original, natural, instinctive or even animal fear that the unstable, half-falling thing in the jungle might fall & crush the man - an instinctive reflex which the crude reasoning of earliest intelligence turns into terror of mysterious power to hurt. On Petrie's enquiring why they went round the tree instead of under it, he was told that if a man went under it his body would swell up & he would die, & that that the bush was laid down as a warning.[1]

There are two points worth remarking in connection with this incident. The first is that the bush laid down as a taboo was a form of sign language or picture-writing, a sort of primitive bill saying, "Trespassers will be prosecuted", though with grim-

1. Op. cit. p.14f.

-mer penalties. These same Australian blacks sent messengers with a notched stick which was understood by another tribe to mean an invitation to bring their boys to a great "kippa" or joint ceremony of initiation into manhood.[1] It might seem to us no difficult step - though these Australians & many another savage tribe never made it - from such signs to primitive picture writing like that of the Red Indians, from which in more cultured nations hieroglyphs & modern writing developed. In such cases the apparently obvious step, simple & easy to the cultivated co-ordinative reason, is never taken through countless generat-ions, either because the co-ordinative power of the mind & the corresponding unifying capacity of the brain are not sufficiently developed to make the advance possible, or because the equilib-rium between existence & the environment has been well enough maintained for that people without it, &, which is the same thing, no pressing necessity in the folk itself or in the environment has arisen to force it on. The sign of the bush, at any rate, was for these Queensland savages a true taboo, warning of the danger of mysterious power.

A second point which is of interest for the light it throws on the psychology of the primitive mind emerges in the continuation of the narrative just quoted. Tom Petrie, "boylike, wished to show there was nothing in all this, & walked assuredly under the tree, drawing attention to the fact that he didn't die. 'Oh, but you are white', they said."[2] This explanation was doubtless

1. Op. cit. p.50.
2. Op. cit. p.14.

perfectly satisfying to these natives & enabled them to keep their superstition undisturbed. There is a modern example of the same type of reasoning in Mark Twain's "Tom Sawyer", in which book he purposely incorporates superstitions of children & slaves in the Western States of America at the time at which he wrote. A superstition of Tom's had failed. "If you buried a marble with certain necessary incantations, & left it alone a fortnight, & then opened the place with the incantation he had just used, you would find that all the marbles you had ever lost had gathered themselves together there, meantime, no matter how widely they had been separated. But now this thing had actually & unquestionably failed. Tom's whole structure of faith was shaken to its foundations. He had many a time heard of this thing succeeding, but never of its failing before. It did not occur to him that he had tried it several times before, himself, but could never find the hiding-place afterwards. He puzzled over the matter some time, & finally decided that some witch had interfered & broken the charm."[1] This solution of the problem was accepted as wholly satisfactory. Many examples of precisely this primitive type of reasoning are given by Levy-Bruhl, of which the following is a representative one; "When a native, writes Du Chaillu, has an iron collar on his neck, he is proof against bullets. Should the charm not succeed, his faith

1. The Adventures of Tom Sawyer. (Nelson). pp. 70-71.

is not shaken. He will conclude that a clever & malevolent sorcerer has produced a "counter-charm" of a powerful character of which the wounded man is the victim."[1]

This is what Levy-Bruhl calls "imperméabilité à l'expérience", imperviousness to experience, & is one of the traits which he adduces as proving that the mind of primitive man is different in kind from the modern, civilised mind, & that it is what he calls prelogical. We have seen exactly the same mode of reasoning in Mark Twain's modern boy; & imperviousness to experience is familiar enough wherever men of all periods encase themselves in the armour of prejudice, like the armadillo coiled up within his bony case. These rather are instances of the want of co-ordinating power in the primitive brain. Subtle connections among phenomena & grasp of general principles which envelop them are impossible to this stage of mind; & sudden, impulsive leaps of the mind are made with the speed of the instinctive reflex, but without the accuracy of instinct. Relations of cause & effect are supposed between phenomena which are not causally connected in reality, & a simple, uncritical, loosely integrated judgment is adopted, because reasoning of a more deeply integrated & finely discriminated character is impossible to this primitive type of thought.

Returning to the main line of our discussion we may remark that

1. Les Functions Mentales. p.62.

it is round the great mysteries of life that the largest number of taboos cluster. What primitive man does not understand, while yet it forces itself upon his notice, he fears: the mysterious thing has power to hurt, & if not properly managed will hurt. Taboo is his endeavour to manage the thing, in the form mainly of avoiding or warding off its dangers. From this point of view it has been justly called Negative Magic; for Magic is essentially the product of man's endeavour to manage for his own ends of safety or achievment, dangerous power. Taboos, therefore, are closely associated with the mysterious events in life, namely, birth, adolescence, marriage, death; &, when religion is sufficiently developed, with the events & figures of religion.

1. Birth gives the primitive mind the inpression of mysterious power which in the first instance man fears & regards as dangerous. Accordingly both mother & child are surrounded with taboos. The regulations in the Old Testament book of Leviticus concerning the seclusion of women after child-birth have behind them this primitive inference from mysterious power to peril. In general, wherever you have the word "unclean" in the old law you can trace a primitive taboo, the origin of which is sometimes clear & sometimes obscure. But it is to be remembered that the taboos are usually not in their crude original state. By the time of the Levitical & even the Deuteronomic Law they have been subjected to a somewhat civilised intelligence informed by a high type of

of religion; so that when we see them, though they retain something of their crudeness & unreason embalmed in custom, these primitive ideas of "uncleanness" or mysterious & contagious peril, are in process of "sublimation", of being exalted into consider-ations of health or moral purity or what we should call simple commonsense. It is important to observe in connection with all these matters that this process of sublimation is always going on wherever there is any progress in intelligence & culture, & is constantly tending to come into play, as the expression of the fundamental urge towards unification in nature & in life, even in the least progressive of races. This accounts for the permanence of customs, which, had their only meaning continued to be that of a taboo originating in primeval ignorance & fear, would have been discarded. For example, the 12th. chapter of Leviticus enjoins a sacrifice on the part of a mother for her cleansing & even as an atonement for her sin.[1] The need for such cleansing or atonement, as though child-birth involved uncleanness or even sin, or, in the more primitive idea, contag-ious or infectious peril to those around, naturally does not appeal to the modern mind. But one can see the custom undergo sublimation in the 2nd. Chapter of Luke, where the sacrifice on the part of Mary of a pair of doves is probably regarded as not for herself or in atonement but as an acknowledgment that her child belongs, as the first-born, to God;[2] & there gleams through the whole passage the loftier & yet homelier idea that

1. Lev. XII especially vv. 6-7.
2. Luke II 22. "present him to the Lord."

the child is a gift from God & that thanksgiving is due to Him. So in the modern service for the Churching of Women, a rubric for which still remains in the English Prayer-Book, no doubt the old prim-itive idea of impurity or peril to the community in child-birth is behind it; but it would not be tolerable to the modern mind, were it not sublimated into the more spiritual form of a thanks-giving on the woman's part for restoration to health & for the gift of a child - all the more spiritual if the service is not in any sense public at all but the simple feeling & prayer of a grateful heart. This, one may be permitted to add, is the sole sanct-ion for the continued use of any ritual practice, or indeed for the adoption of any new one, that it shall continue to express, or express anew, a genuine spiritual meaning which has a real spiritual influence upon the soul.

That the idea of mysterious & therefore dangerous power is the primitive root of Birth-Taboos is confirmed by the survival of it in relation to animals. In North Aberdeenshire, persons now living have seen a cow, the first time it left the byre after having calved, being compelled to step over a burning peat with salt on it. Probably the same idea of purification from uncleann-ess accounts also for the custom of driving the cattle at Midsummer through the Beltane fires.[1] In the former instance, at any rate, the double agency of fire & salt, two great purifiers in savage rite & practice all over the world, is invoked to

1. Hopkins. History of Religions. p.129.

ensure that the strange & perilous power of that mysterious thing Birth shall not injure people by its infection or contagion. In the case of the child the same inference from power to peril gives rise to many taboos. It is not uncommon in Scotland to find a decided dislike on the part of mothers of the less educated class to take an infant out of doors before it has been baptised. They cannot explain it; &, though they may imagine it to portend some harm to the child, it is more probable that originally the fear was of harm to the tribe from the mysterious power hanging about the new-born. There can be little doubt that the primitive origin of infant-baptism is the lustration or ceremonial cleansing of the child from that dangerous power before it is allowed free contact with society. The natives of Guinea significantly baptise both mother & child. Aztecs, Mayas, Peruvians, Cherokees & other Amerindian races have, or had, the same rite. To the horrified surprise of Roman Catholic priests who came among them as missionaries, these people spoke of child-baptism as a new-birth. Baptism passes through various stages of development from its pre-animistic form of cleansing from mysterious power or "mana" dangerous to the tribe, through the animistic theory of possession by evil spirits which must be driven away by symbolic cleansing or incantation or by holy water, to the theological dogma of original sin which, after the manner of the American Indians, must be washed away by a baptismal

regeneration. This latter dogma, still formally at least maintained over a great part of the Christian Church, has by this time certainly shed for the most part the cold ferocity of Augustinian logic with its hell for unbaptised infants & the "limbus infantum" of Arnobius; but it would no doubt have surprised the patristic, mediaeval & later theologians to be told that a good deal of the passion with which they defended Baptismal Regeneration, & of the irresistible force which they were sure was in their logic concerning it, was derived from a deep, almost instinctive prejudice which came to them from savage ancestors & out of primeval fear of the mystery of Birth; & yet this may very well have been true. To disconnect Christian baptism of any sort from primitive & still surviving superstitions, as also from harsh theological dogmas, & even to see its origin in primeval lustrations & fear of mysterious potencies, need not detract from its value as a Christian rite. The question to be answered is whether it is capable of sublimation, of losing its ancient & crude meanings in a lofty spiritual significance. We have no doubt that it *is*.

Adult Baptism is of interest as connecting itself with taboos concerning Adolescence. The change from childhood to manhood & womanhood means an acquisition of powers mysterious to the savage, sexual powers involving strange excitements & ecstasies, & equally strange & even terrifying lassitudes & feelings of weakness; hence they are dangerous powers. The various initiat-

-ion ceremonies which are found almost everywhere & are often most elaborate - the rites in Australia may last six months or more - are designed in the first instance to ward off from hurt-ing the tribe these terrible potencies, & in the second place to secure their beneficence to the tribe & to the individual himself. Purification is a natural & very frequent way of escaping the perilous infections, & an obvious & therefore common method of purification is by ceremonial washing with water - like being for the primitive mind a cause of like, the outward purity creating the inward. A natural advance of the same idea is to blood as the purifying agent, for blood is more mysterious & therefore more potent than water. Hence the wide prevalence of lustration of adolescents & adults, including the water-cleansings & the blood-bath or <u>taurobolium</u> of Greek & Roman mysteries. The strength in popular evangelism of the metaphor, adopted & spirit-ualised from these mysteries by the author of the Apocalypse, "washed in the blood of the Lamb", & the cognate expressions, is probably derived from this primitive notion of the cleansing efficacy of blood.

The mention of the author of the Apocalypse reminds one of that other striking metaphor which is of frequent occurence in the Johannine writings, that of the New-Birth. The influence of the mystery religions or of the ideas diffused by them through the early Christian age is perhaps to be found here also; & it is interesting to note that not only in the Greek & Roman

mysteries, but in the initiation rites of many savage tribes in different parts of the world, the change at puberty from childhood to manhood or womanhood is dealt with as a new or second birth. Frazer gives many examples of curious & grotesque ways of ritual expression of this idea. It is sufficient to quote one from Kikuyu in East Africa, where the boy having to be born again before he is circumcised, "the mother stands up with the boy crouching at her feet; she pretends to go through all the labour pains, & the boy on being reborn cries like a babe & is washed".[1] It is an easy transition in thought from a new-birth to a resurrection after a symbolised death in which the old life or the former state is cut off as drastically as possible. The combination of the idea of a new birth with those of death & resurrection is excellently illustrated by Frazer's account of the ceremonies of initiation into the Kakian association among the natives of Ceram. The Kakian house is a wooden shed built in a dark part of the forest & reserved for the rites of initiation. "As soon as each boy has disappeared within the precincts, a dull chopping sound is heard, a fearful cry rings out, & a sword or spear, dripping with blood, is thrust through the roof of the shed. This is a token that the boy's head has been cut off, & that the devil has carried him away to another world, there to regenerate & transform him." The boy's mother & the other women wail & mourn for him as dead. "But in a day or two the

1. The Golden Bough. III p.442.

the man who acted as sponsors or guardians to the novices return to the village with the glad tidings that the devil, at the intercession of the priests, has restored the lads to life.... When they (the youths) return to their homes they totter in their walk, & enter the house backward, as if they had forgotten how to walk properly; or they enter the house by the back door. If a plate of food is given them, they hold it upside down. They remain dumb, indicating their wants by signs only. All this is to show that they are still under the influence of the devil or the spirits. Their sponsors have to teach them all the common acts of life, as if they were new-born children."[1.]

Savage man acts out or dramatises his metaphors before he can use them, still less explain them, in speech. These rites of initiation of the adolescent under the dramatic form of a new birth or a dying ink order to live again are essentially elaborate forms of Taboo. They are designed to cope with the mysterious powers which come with sexual maturity, & which, being mysterious, though they are felt to be beneficent both to the individual & to the tribe, are still fraught with peril to both. The taboo is against the uninitiated, the young children & the women, who are protected from the dangerous "mana" of the youth by his being secluded, & these others warned off by solemn prohibitions & severe penalties, such as death to a woman who even only looks upon the sacred "bull-roarer" whose moaning or thunderous sound

1. The Golden Bough. (Abridged Edition) pp.696-697.

announces the proceeding of the mysteries. The taboo is also upon the youth who is protected from the danger to himself of these strange new powers, on the one hand, by gradual initiation into their use, & instruction, as their savage & childish minds conceive it, by his elders concerning their nature, & on the other hand, by rites performed upon himself, such as circumcision or tattooing, designed to control these powers for good & to increase them. The taboo is finally upon the tribe or community which institutes these ceremonies & carries them through with such solemnity & care, because it feels the need of protecting itself against any evil infection or contagion which might be associated with powers which it finds so impressive & mysterious, & against any misuse or misdirection of them.

2. Taboos connected with Marriage have at their source the same crude inference, under the influence of fear of what is not understood, from mystery & power to peril; & taboo is the manifold endeavour so to manage that mysterious potency that it shall not hurt. One of the writers of the able book on "Taboo & Genetics" puts forward the interesting view that the attitude of the savage to woman may be described in terms of the Freudian psychology as that of an ambivalence of desire & disgust.[1] She is the object of his most powerful desire, but also the cause of that satiation, lassitude & feeling of weakness to which the savage with his lack of restraint & absorption in matters of sex is specially exposed. This is an admirable explanation of the numberless taboos which

1. Taboo & Genetics. p.140.

forbid sexual intercourse before commencing any enterprise requiring strength, alertness & skill, such as a hunting, fishing or warlike expedition. The same debilitating influence is regarded as attaching to anything belonging to the person of the woman which might be associated with her sex-power. Thus among the Sema Nagas of Assam, whose word "genna" means taboo, we are told; "It is strictly genna for men to put on or in any way use a woman's petticoat that has once been worn. To do so would destroy all chance of success in war or hunting. It is equally genna to beat a house with a petticoat, which has the same result on its inmates."[1] It is the like fear of sex-power which makes it taboo for a woman among Australian tribes to step over the body of a man asleep on the ground; her husband may kill her for this offence.

The most remarkable of taboos connected with marriage is naturally that called Exogamy which we have already discussed. It is probably sufficient simply to mention it as the most striking example of semi-instinctive inference or reasoning under the influence of a repugnance, which may have its obscure root in an instinctive tendency, but in any case appears as a very distinct "dread of incest" as Freud expresses it, or fear of the marriage of close kin. Celibacy, especially of priests & other religious specialists, is demanded by the same idea that marriage is invested with dangerous power. The inferences do not always work in the same direction. Thus among the Todas, that strange fragment

1. The Sema Nagas. J.H.Hutton. (Macmillan)1921. p.18.

of a tribe in the Nilgiri Hills of India, the whole occupation is a primitive kind of dairy farming; & their religion consists of a dairy ritual. The Toda priest, who is the "dairyman in excelsis", is surrounded by innumerable taboos, one of which is that he must be celibate. The taboos mean that he is possessed of dangerous powers which by mere infection might destroy the tribe; & one of the possible perils is cut off when marriage is forbidden. On the other hand, in later forms, as in Christian Asceticism, the fear is not so much of the power to injure others which marriage might bring to the priest, as of the harm it might do himself. The original primitive fear of mysterious potency in sex has at this point been refined by highly sophisticated reasoning, through the antithesis of body & soul, matter & spirit, into the patristic & mediaeval idea of the body, the flesh, & indeed all matter as corrupt & corrupting. There is something quaint, & perhaps monitory to still later logicians, in this lurking, behind the triumphant logic of the scholastics, of the naked savage with his crude inferences from the idea of mysterious force touched & impassioned by fear.

3. The taboos which concern Death have the same origin. When the animistic stage of belief is reached or passed, the fear is of the ghost or spirit; & the taboos are intended to ward off the harm it may do. The countless funerary regulations which are designed to prevent the return of the spirit when the body is in

the grave are the product of the simple reasoning of primitive man on the problem of how to avert the peril which haunts the mysterious & terrible event of death. This accounts for the practically universal custom in Scotland of carrying the corpse out, feet-foremost, to burial, & for the building of cairns as substitutionary tombs, as well as the practice, of all periods & all quarters of the world, of presenting to the departed or burying with him such gifts as may make him contented & at home in the abode of shades. Here is a vivid little picture from New Guinea which illustrates the same point. Mr. Charles W. Abel saw some native women approaching him. "They had passed me by a few yards when one of them stopped, & turning partly towards me said,-

'There is a man hanging by the neck from the aiaru tree, on the hill yonder.'

She turned to follow her companions who had gone on, but I called to her, & asked for more particulars.

'Who is it?' I inquired.

'Naniwa,' she replied.

It was a thoughtless question for me to have asked. No Papuan will mention the name of the dead. A man's name always dies with him. 'Naniwa' is merely as we should say, 'What's-his-name'

'Do you know why 'What's-his-name' committed suicide?' I continued, anxious to understand this unpleasant occurrence.

'Because', answered my informant, 'his wife hanged herself yester-day, at Logea.'

'Why did What's-his-name's wife hang herself?' I went on.

'Because Naniwa & she had a quarrel.'"[1.]

This taboo upon the mention of the name of a dead person is very widespread, & the source of it is probably the fear that even to speak the name would be taken advantage of by the spirit as a call to return. Generally, though not universally, this is regarded as objectionable, & the feeling survives in the modern fear of haunted houses, churchyards at night, & ghosts in general. Before the animistic stage of belief, however, there is traceable the more primitive & simpler inference that like may cause like, & that death has a mysterious contagion, the power to bring forth death. An animal instinct, which makes the dead crow the best scarecrow, that is to say, which makes the animal flee from the corpse of one of its own kind, is what might be called an instinctive inference expressing itself in a reflex impulse of fear that what has killed it may kill you. The survival value of this instinctive fear & taboo of dead things, an unreflective inference, if one may so speak, from death to peril of death, is manifest enough. In later & more reflective times or minds, the semi-instinctive taboo took such forms as the ceremonial uncleanness of anyone, particularly a priest, according to the Jewish law, who had touched a corpse.[2.] It was this, perhaps, or the analogous fear of blood, which made the priest & the

1. Savage Life in New Guinea. p.89.
2. Num. 19:11-22.

Levite in the parable, (the story is no doubt true to the customs of the time), pass by on the other side. The wounded man might be dead for all they knew. It is a curious probability that the wearing of mourning - whether black, as with us, or white, as with the Romans, does not matter, if it is conspicuous - was thus primitively a danger-signal, a warning to society or the tribe that the relatives had upon them the perilous contagion of death. Dr. George Henderson, writing of the Highlands of Scotland, says: "It is forbidden for a young lad or a young woman to sweep out the room in which a corpse has been. This should be done by a woman who is past child-bearing. The idea is that the influence of death is about & may endanger the potency of the developing life."[1] Experience of contagious diseases, when the observation could not, at any rate by more developed minds, be escaped, that those who touched the dying or dead man, & those also in contact with them, died, would confirm the general conclusion of the contagious peril of the last enemy. All such taboos, like taboo in general, originate in the fear of mysterious power, taking the form of the inference that like is the cause of like, death therefore a cause of death.

1. Survivals in Belief among the Celts. (Maclehose. 1911) p.292.

REASONING OF PRIMITIVE MAN

A. (B) Its Semi-instinctive Character.

(C). The further Psychology of Taboo.

The fundamental nature of Taboo as essentially the effort to cope with mysterious & therefore dangerous power can best be illustr-ated by reference to its most important religious embodiment, namely, Sacrifice. There have been many theories of the origin & nature of Sacrifice. For Tylor the typical sacrifice was the offering of a gift; for Frazer it was the ritual murder of the chief, the priest-king; for Robertson Smith its original form & idea are to be found in the common meal between the god & his worshippers, with totemistic associations closely interwoven. In none of these, however, is there sufficient generality to reveal the common element in all sacrificial rites. The endeavour to penetrate to that essential element in all sacrifice has been made, with considerable success, by MM. Hubert & Mauss of the French school of Durkheim. These two authors declare that the process of sacrifice "consists in establishing a communication between the sacred world & the profane world by the intermediary of a victim, that is to say, by a consecrated thing destroyed in the course of the ceremony."[1] The nerve of this definition is in the distinction between the "sacred" & the "profane". It is a distinction upon which Durkheim & the contributors to L'Année Sociologique lay great stress. M. Durkheim has however pushed the con-trast to an unjustifiable extreme. He declares, for example, that "their heterogeneity is absolute", that they have "always

1. Melanges d'Histoire des Religions. (Hubert et Mauss) p.124.

& everywhere been conceived by the human mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between which there is nothing in common."[1] There is "an abyss between".[2] This is an over-emphasis, for the savage mind is not capable of such exact discriminations, & the line between is so faint & wavering that for the Australian his throwing-stick is sacred, while his spear which is thrown by it is profane; & the West African negro may beat his fetich or discard it as having lost its mystic power. Yet the distinction is a very useful one, as the particular instance of the theory of sacrifice will show.

Probably it is correct to say that MM. Hubert & Mauss regard the Sacred & Mana, which they have investigated with great accuracy, as identical. For them sacred things from the point of view of the savage are those which are invested with mysterious & consequently dangerous power. His religious world is constituted by these sacred things, & is pervaded by, charged with, this incalculable force. Sacrifice is the chief method of approach to that world, which is otherwise taboo to him. "It is quite certain that sacrifice always implies a consecration; in all sacrifice, an object passes from the common domain into the religious; it is consecrated."[3] "The sacrifice is a religious act which can only be accomplished in a religious milieu & by the medium of essentially religious agencies. Now, in general, before the ceremony, neither the sacrificer, nor the officiant,

1. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. pp. 38-39.
2. ibid. pp. 61-62.
3. Melanges. pp.9-10.

nor the place, nor the instruments, nor the victim, has this (religious or sacred) character in a satisfactory degree. The first phase of the sacrifice is designed to give them this character. They are profane: that state must be changed. For the purpose rites are necessary which introduce them into the sacred world & involve them in it more or less deeply according to the importance of the rôle which they have afterwards to play. This is what constitutes, according to the very expression of the Sanscrit texts, the entry into the sacrifice."[1.]

The "entry into the sacrifice" is a passage from the world of the profane into the realm of the sacred or the divine, a realm whose atmosphere is electric, whose every object is charged with power, which is profoundly dangerous to those who are not prepared for it or, as it were, insulated from it. The initial rites of the sacrifice, therefore, are true "rites de passage": their object is to bring the sacrificer, the priest who officiates & the victim, by a gradual approach through ceremonies of purification & consecration, out of their "profane" condition into that world of sacred & divine powers, contact with which otherwise would be disastrous. Thus the sacrificer in the ancient Hindu rites undergoes elaborate forms of purification, shaving of the head, cutting of the nails, a bath of lustration, new linen robes, & finally a curious symbolisation of a new birth by his simulating the foetus in the womb, before he is in a condition safely to perform the rite.[2.] The intermediation of a priest as officiant

1. Melanges, p.23
2. Op. cit. pp.24-25.

between the giver of the sacrifice & the sacred world is, naturally, a form of separation between that world & the profane, while the regulations in the Old Testament for the purity of the priest & the High Priest in approaching the sacrifice, are typical of the measures taken everywhere to fit the celebrant for contact with the sacred world & to preserve him from its perilous power.[1] Finally, the victim enters the sacred world by a series of purifications - separations, adornings, cleansings, anointings & the like - culminating in the death itself, which is the crowning act of severance from the secular world. "By this destruction, the essential act of the sacrifice was accomplished. The victim was definitely separated from the profane world; it was consecrated, it was sacrificed, in the etymological sense of the word, & different languages call the act which put it into that state, sanctification."[2]

From the point of view from which we are observing the psychology of ritual sacrifice, namely, as involving the essence of Taboo which is an attitude or adjustment to the fear of mysterious, dangerous power, it is interesting to note, under the guidance of Hubert & Mauss, how, as the victim is more & more absorbed into the sacred & divine world, it becomes the object of an increasing awe & terror. Thus in the Hindu ritual, as the end approaches, conciliatory speeches are made to the animal, with the view of averting its vengeance after its death; just as the

1. Lev. 8:6ff.etc.
2. Melanges.p.50.

Ainos of Japan make an appealing oration to the bear which they are about to send as a messenger to the spirit world.[1] At the instant of sacrifice, "the sacred character which it (the victim) is in process of acquiring is such already that the Brahman cannot touch it with his hands, & that the sacrificer himself hesitates to approach. He needs to be invited & encouraged by a special formula which the priest addresses to him."[2] After the slaying of the victim, finally, a strange panic often falls upon those who have performed it. It makes the impression upon them as in some sort a crime. "In Athens, the priest of the sacrifice of the Bouphonia threw away his axe & fled".[3] The Aino archer speeds an arrow to the heart of the bear. "No sooner has he done so, than the marksman throws away his bow & flings himself to the ground, & the old men & women do the same, weeping & sobbing."[4] Thus of the three participants in the sacrifice, the offerer of it, the priest who performs it, & the victim, the last which is farthest "ben" as the Scotch say, most deeply entered, into the world of the sacred, nearest to the gods, is the most fully charged, saturated, with that mystic power which achieves certain benefits for those concerned, but carries with it so much of peril. It is indeed the value & efficacy of the sacrifice, to more primitive minds at least, that the victim by its mediation enables the human participants to remain at a safe distance from the divine powers, while securing that contact &

1. Frazer. The Golden Bough. (Abridged edition)pp.500-510.
2. Melanges. p.43.
3. ibid. p.47.
4. Frazer. ibid. p.510.

rapport upon which the desired benefits depend. This is admir-ably expressed by Hubert & Mauss in the following passage. In referring to the reasons why the "profane enters into relations with the divine in this way" they go on: "it is because he sees in it the very source of his life. He has, therefore every interest in approaching it since it is there that the very con-ditions of his own existence are to be found. But how comes it that he only approaches it while remaining at a distance? How comes it that he does not communicate with the sacred except through an intermediary? The destructive effects of the rite explain in part this strange procedure. If the religious forces are the very principle of the vital forces, in themselves, they are of such a nature that their contact is dangerous to the ord-inary person. Above all, when they reach a certain degree of intensity, they cannot be concentrated in a profane object with-out destroying it. The sacrificer, whatever may be his need, can, therefore, only approach them with the most extreme caution. That is why he introduces between them & himself intermediaries of which the victim is the chief. If he engaged in the rite to the very end, by himself, he would find in it not life but death. The victim takes his place. It alone penetrates into the danger-ous sphere of the sacrifice, it succumbs, & it is there in order to succumb. The sacrificer remains secure; the gods take it instead of taking him. <u>It redeems him.</u>"[1.]

1. Op. cit. p.125.

Having entered by the rites of the sacrifice into the world of the sacred, both the celebrants & the victim have become charged with the sacredness of that world; & the nature of that sacredness for the primitive mind as essentially a saturation with dangerous power, could not be better demonstrated than by the difficulty all of them, especially the human partiwipants, find in returning to the world of the profane. The rites of exit (sortie) from the sacrifice, in other words, of outgoing from the sacred world, are thus only second in importance to the rites of entry into it. All sacrifices even of the simplest character, as the authors under notice finely show, include the two processes of "sacralis-ion" & "desacralisation", consecration & deconsecration.[1] The sacred objects & persons must be ritually divested of their peril-ous sacredness, before they can enter into the profane, ordinary world without bringing harm upon the people & things in it. As b the victim is generally destroyed, it is most easily dealt with, the careful disposal of the remains being often all that is necess-ary. The offerer of the sacrifice & the priest are rendered capable of sharing in mundane affairs by purifications resembling those by which they entered into the sphere of the sacred. Thus after Aaron had sacrificed the goat of the sin-offering & sent the scapegoat away into the wilderness, he had to put off the linen garments he had worn & wash himself, while the man who let the scapegoat go must bathe before he returns to the camp.[2]

1. Op. cit. p.122.
2. Lev.16:23, 24, 26.

The process of "desacralisation" or deconsecration throws further light upon the nature of Taboo, when it is seen to apply to other types of sacredness than that of the sacrifice. To escape from the state of consecration into contact with the "profane", that is the ordinary world, without harm ensuing, demands careful measures, which often themselves include a sacrifice. As Hubert & Mauss point out, "The Nazarite at Jerusalem was a perfectly pure being; he was consecrated to Jahwe by a vow in consequence of which he abstained from wine & did not cut his hair. He must keep himself from all defilement. But, once arrived at the conclusion of his vow, he can only disengage himself from it by a sacrifice."[1] The Nazarite, therefore takes a bath of purif-ication & offers various sacrifices. Similarly, a quite defin-ite sacredness frequently attaches to the fruits of the earth when first harvested. "Every kind of fruit, cereal & other, is wholly sacred, interdicted, so long as a rite, often very symbolical, has not removed the interdict which protects it."[2] These examples bring us back to the point at which every form of sacredness or consecration is seen to imply possession of a power, which to the primitive mind is mysterious & therefore fraught with peril, & against which it seeks to protect itself by varied defensive measures, interdictions, rites of purification sacrifice & the like, in other words, by various forms of Taboo.

Taboo, as thus illustrated, is a clear product of semi-instinct-

1. Op. cit. p.78.
2. Op. cit. p.79.

-ive inference from the perception of power in things or persons which is not understood, to danger, the appropriate "answer-back" to which is some form of defensive action. The inference is hurried & impulsive because it is made under the influence of fear; & for the same reason the response is not pause for reflect--ive thought, still less the formation of a theory. It is action which varies from simple respect for some taboo-sign of property or other reservation to the most elaborate performance of ritual. At the instinctive stage of animal life, the answer--back to the perception of power which is feared is the action of flight or defence, which, the less intelligence enters in, the more it resembles in swiftness & suddenness the reflexes of instinct. With the increasing of intelligence, making its tentative unifications of experience, there is pause for thought, & judgments are formed about phenomena & inferences made about them & the appropriate ways of dealing with them. The striking similarity in many of the religious & magical customs of savage man the world over, which enables us at a later stage to speak of them under the one designation of the Integration of Custom, is accounted for by the practical universality in different degrees of the characteristic of his psychology we are describing. Everywhere there is the perception of power in things & persons; everywhere the power is mysterious to his uninstructed mind; everywhere, therefore, such power is feared & regarded as a source

of danger; & everywhere the religious practice of savage man may be generalised as his varied endeavour to avert the danger & to escape from the fear by ritual methods of dealing with the power, which methods may be fairly described as more or less elaborate forms of Taboo.

2. The practice of Taboo is peculiarly fitted to illustrate a char-acteristic of the primitive mind which we have dealt with earli-er under the name of Atomism. This tendency to particularism in thought is the opposite of the tendency to co-ordinate exper-ience & unify it into general ideas, general conclusions & general laws for conduct, which is characteristic of the civilis-ed & cultivated mind. It is indeed a legacy from the instinct-ive stage of human development. The humblest animal mind is not incapable of some kind of generalisation; but it is the nature of the instinctive reflex to take each phenomenon by it-self & to respond to each of the innumerable situations of life separately. In intelligence just emerging out of the instinct-ive stage, as we have seen, the co-ordinative power of mind is but slightly developed, & in consequence the formation of concepts & general ideas is difficult. The primitive type of thought, therefore, as compared with the developed & cultivated, is like a stream of disconnected atoms. The ideas & impressions of savage man may be likened to a crowd of swarming bees which fly about singly & distractedly or pile themselves together in a confused & unrelated mass. The thoughts of the cultured mind

as such are like the bees in the hive; they are not without their moments of schwärmerei, but their are arranged in classes & orders, & there is a certain definiteness in the task of each class & even of each mental unit in building the structures, storing the food of the mind, & preparing for & producing the new generation of ideas. In other words, there is unification, integration, co-ordination by the developed brain & the cultivated mind of perceptions into conceptions, of impressions into concepts or general ideas; & in the performance of the tasks, whether theoretical or practical, in which these ideas are employed, instead of innumerable unrelated, or loosely related judgments & actions there are formulated a much smaller number of general principles & laws for application both to thought & to practical life. It has been already pointed out that this atomistic character of primitive thought is reflected in primitive language, where an appearance of complexity is given by the absence, or rarity of general terms & principles, & the multiplication of words & forms of speech designed to express each particular thing as it appears or each particular situation as it arises. This is precisely the simple complexity of Taboo.

Taboo, then, is essentially atomistic, like the primitive type of thought from which it proceeds. The difference between it & civilised law, of which indeed it is the parent or ancestor, may be compared to the difference between a modern power-loom & the

& the simplest methods of weaving cloth. In the modern machine a great many individual movements & detailed operations are co-ordinated & performed by one grand movement & complex operation, & thus rendered so manageable that a child could tend the loom. The almost vanished hand-loom weaver performs a multitude of detailed operations with his hands, his feet & his eye, in pro-ducing his patterned cloth. Simplest of all is the weaving of the primitive Papuan or the ancient Hebrew or Egyptian, which is but a superior form of plaiting, & in which each thread of the woof is individually & laboriously laced through the warp to make the simple fabric. Observe how this illustration of cum-ulative detail applies to any typical tabee. "Among the Todas of Southern India", says Frazer, "the holy milkman who acts as priest of the sacred dairy, is subject to a variety of burdensome restrictions during the whole time of his incumbency, which may last many years. Thus he must live at the sacred dairy & may never visit his home or any ordinary village. He must be celib-ate; if he is married he must leave his wife. On no account may any ordinary person touch the holy milkman or the holy dairy; such a touch would so defile his holiness that he would forfeit his office....Further, the holy milkman never cuts his hair or pares his nails so long as he holds office; he never crosses a river by a bridge, but wades through a ford & only certain fords[1], & so forth. The same characteristic weaving of the tabee, thread

1. Op. cit. p.169.

by thread, & the accumulation of small detailed regulations, are to be observed in all those elaborate systems of taboo which re-duce the sacred person, such as the Mikado of old Japan & the Dalai Lama of present-day Tibet & the priest-king of many tribes, to the condition of a prisoner or a recluse. The unhappy holy man, whose "mana" is dangerous to ordinary people, or, (which is the other aspect of the fear which originates most of these taboos) whose "mana" is so necessary to the existence of the people that at all costs his power must be preserved, or at least transmitted, is like Gulliver when the Lilliputians bound him with countless fine threads & fastened each hair of his head individually to the ground, until he could not stir hand or foot or head. The multitude of prohibitions are the attempt of the mind of primit-ive man to meet every single, possible contingency which may occur in experience, instead of devising general principles & laws which may cover a great many contingencies at once. Such general conceptions demand a certain development of the co-ordinative powers of the mind; while it is easy to see the simple logic in operation which, ascribing dangerous power to a sacred person or thing, extends step by step from one prohibition to another. The holy man is electric with "mana"; contact must be avoided; he must not go freely among the tribe. But what of his wife? She might pass it on; therefore he must be temporarily or wholly celibate. The vessels he eats from, what of them? They must

be his alone, & broken when he is done with them. And so on. The French school of sociologists regard all savagex theories & customs as of social origin, & one can see how in the case of Taboo their principle would operate. As the elders of the tribe gathered round the camp-fire or other centre of council or gossip one & another would make his suggestion, shaking his perturbed head over this or that danger that occurred to him; & fear of the mysterious power, the wealth of unknown possibility, the difficulty of proving a negative, would add another link to the chain of prohibitions. This growth of Taboo by an accumulation of crude inferences, unco-ordinated with each other, is an admirable example of the Atomism or particularism of the primitive type of mind.

3. The same characteristic of primitive mentality appears once more, immediately one considers the relation of Taboo to the earliest forms of Law & Ethics. For it cannot escape notice that the earliest codes of law known to us, like the Torah of the Old Testament or the laws of Ḥammurabi, are not strictly speaking codes or "systems", but rather collections of precepts, chiefly prohibitions, with reference to particular contingencies which may arise. These prohibitions are largely taboos of things & actions which may bring dangerous power upon individuals, but especially upon the tribe or nation. This particularistic way of dealing with actions which were wrong or crimes because they

let loose mysterious & perilous forces, was natural to the "atomistic" character of the primitive mind. The co-ordinative powers of the mind had first to be developed before it was possible to formulate general laws applicable to a whole class of offences, or to arrive at principles of ethics which would cover a multitude of individual cases & questions of conduct. The varied regulations for the avenger of blood in Hebrew legislation, which may be paralleled from early Anglo-Saxon life & from other examples of the same stage of culture, are superseded when a central authority defines the law & exacts the penalty; & in such a prophetic principle as "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, & thy neighbour as thyself" over against the Levitical laws, there is evidence of a mind capable of a large moral & spiritual generalisation which renders unnecessary a mass of precepts adapted to particular cases & situations. St. Paul's protest against "the law of commandments contained in ordinances" & "the works of the law" is a protest against a reversion or return to the primitive; & St. James, in his "law of liberty" signalises in a beautiful phrase the arrival of the modern type of mind in whose developed power of unification & discrimination the human spirit is most free.

Tabee, to conclude this study of its psychology, has the greater place in the origination of Law & Morality that it nearly, if

not absolutely, always has a social reference. Taboos mark a danger usually not in the first instance to the individual but to the community; & the community protects itself by raising the prohibition into a customary law. There is thus developed the rudimentary social conscience & a formative element is contributed to the basal distinction between right & wrong. Some anthropologists have, it is true, exaggerated the influence of Taboo in this direction; & Prof. Hopkins is probably correct in saying, "Taboo did not originate ethics, as Dr. Jevons has tried to persuade us, but it has legalised & strengthened morality. It has done this, as man has risen from fear of a mysterious power to fear of a more defined spirit-power, by eventually putting the fear of God into the sinner."[1] There may also be an over-emphasis of fear, embodied in Taboo, as a creative element in primitive morality, to the exclusion of other & more altruistic constituents. When the male wolf abstains from eating the ptarmigan he has caught in lean times & carries it to the mate & the cubs, the inhibition, the taboo, he lays upon himself is not imposed by fear but by rudimentary unselfish love. The character of human infancy & of the human family in general would naturally multiply these unselfish inhibitions originating not in fear but in self-restraining & even self-renouncing affections & impulses. With regard, moreover, to wider social relations than the family, a taboo mark indicating a Polynesian's

1. History of Religions. p.74.

claim to property in a fruit tree or an Eskimo's right to his driftwood, might soon be respected by his neighbour not from fear lest he should swell up & die but from a sense of fairness & of doing as you would be done by, a dim provision, in fact, of the Golden Rule. It is a too exclusive consideration of the fear motive which has led M. Loisy to define religion as essentially a system of taboos. It is an equally mistaken & exaggerated view which declares that fear made the gods with that which holds that fear made morality & created conscience. A rudimentary altruistic ethic is as old as the first human mother; & the protective impulse, an expression of nature's profound interest in the future generations, has probably a larger part than fear in the origination of conscience.

It is at this point also that the French sociologists of the school of Levy-Bruhl & Durkheim may be seen pushing to an extreme their theory that all morality, like all religion, is the creation of the tribal or clan community. Much farther back, in the earliest human or sub-human family can be observed the working of these self-taboos, these inhibitions of the self in the interests of "the other", as well as these positive activities for the good of "the other", which have at least as much to do with the origin of human ethics & law as fear of mysterious penalties or as tribal authority. To assert this, however, is not to deny the enormous influence of the tribal community & what we shall call the Integration of Custom in the creation of ethical standards. It is indeed striking to reflect that the first consci-

-ience in man was above all a social conscience, impelling savage man to estimate his actions by the question of their being harm-ful or not, good or evil, to the tribe, that is, to others. The point is expressed by Letourneau, with reference to the ages during which the law of the social group, the custom of the tribe, was thus the law & conscience of the individual, in these words: "It is then probable that to this long period of social solidar-ity through which our ancestors have passed, we owe the purest of our altruistic humanitarian instincts." He adds; "Our instin-ctive feelings of pity for others have often been explained by saying that each of us, on seeing misfortune or suffering, sub-stitutes himself, as it were, for the sufferer before his eyes, & feels the reflected effects of his misfortune. There is sure-ly a partial truth in this explanation. But if the misfortunes of others can thus touch us by reflection, it is because many generations of ancestors, living under a more or less strictly communal system, have bequeathed to us feelings of sociability & humanity, which are latent, but still alive in the depths of our consciousness."[1.]

1. Property its Origin & Development. pp.56-57.

Chapter XIX

REASONING OF PRIMITIVE MAN

(b). Imperfect Co-ordinations.

1. Causality & Magic.

It is a common characteristic of all thinking that it unifies experience into more or less coherent wholes. It integrates the materials provided in the first instance by sense impression into more or less differentiated totalities, such as conceptions, judgments, reasoned conclusions. The evolutionary process of the universe pursuing always integration by way of differentiat-ion, continues its invariable method in the life of its highest creation, man, whose whole activity may be summed up as a quest for unity, & whose mental life is justly characterised as an endeavour after a unification of the elements of experience which shall be as rich & varied as possible. Man's power for such mental unification, however, is not always the same; on the contr-ary the evolution of mind is essentially the growth of that capacity for the co-ordination of experience. The physical organ of mind, the brain, is itself subject to the universal process, & the highest type of civilised brain differs from the most primitive in being more compactly & sensitively unified, & at the same time more differentiated in its structure, functions & powers. For this reason & for others in the nature of savage life, the primitive mind in comparison with the civilised is deficient in co-ordinative power & makes mental connections among the phenomena of its experience with difficulty. We have seen

the operation of this primitive character in relation to the simpler units of the mental life, the concept & the general idea, & sought to trace its influence upon the religious theories & practice of savage man. We have also turned to the more complex activities of mind in judgment & reasoning, & have endeavoured to show how the primitive thought of man necessarily retains some-thing of the instinctive character of that stage of development which it shares with the higher animals. It is still under the influence of emotion, of feeling like fear & strong desire, especially of fear; & this results in those hasty, impulsive, & often mistaken conclusions as to dangerous power in things & persons, which issue in the symbols, regulations & systems of Taboo. The same disability we have now to see reappear in the more developed & deliberate thought of primitive man, when, not uninfluenced still by fear of the unknown, but more protected by the shell-armour of his customs, he forms his crude theories as to the connections among the phenomena of experience & carries them into appropriate practice. The relation with which he is most concerned is naturally that of Causality, the connections of cause & effect; & the best illustration of his mental attitude to that relation is probably to be found in Magic.

Having with some fulness discussed in earlier chapters the theory of Levy-Bruhl as to primitive mentality, it is probably unnecess-

-ary to do more than remark on his application, chiefly in his later volume, "La Mentalité Primitive", of that theory to savage man's representation of causal connections among phenomena. One does so only to throw into relief what one takes to be the true psychology of the matter. Here also as before, this author is concerned to demonstrate that the mentality of primitive man is totally different from that of civilised man. "It is" he says, "not only mystical, that is to say, oriented every moment towards occult powers. It is not only prelogical, that is to say, most frequently indifferent to contradiction. It is more: the caus-ality which it represents to itself is of a type other than that which is familiar to us, & this third character is of a piece with the two former."[1] The characteristic of this idea of causality which makes it "different" is that "everything, or almost everything, that happens is connected by it with the influ-ence of occult or mystic powers (sorcerers, the dead, spirits, etc.)".[2] These "mystic forces, which are causes, remain in-visible & intangible to the ordinary means of perception". A further important point in the theory is that "the connection between cause & effect is immediate. It does not admit of inter-mediate links, or at least if it recognises them, it regards them as negligible, & pays no attention to them."[3] The primit-

1. La Mentalité Primitive. p.85.
2. ibid. p.86.
3. ibid. p.87.

-ive mentality is thus indifferent to the investigation of second -ary causes. The argument is that the savage mind is so absorb-ed by the occult & mystic cause that what is to us the interved-iate nexus & complex set of causes drops out of view. Thus if a crocodile devours a man, or he is killed by poison, the mind of the primitive leaps at once to the witchcraft of a sorcerer as the true cause, & attaches no importance to the crocodile or the poison.[1.]

Such facts as these are undoubted, & this attitude of mind is common & widespread. The point at which we part company with M. Levy-Bruhl is where he makes a complete cleavage between the primitive mind & the civilised, regards it as different in nature, hardly inferior, if at all, in mental capacity to ourselves, & certainly not to be viewed as "a rudimentary form of ours, as infantile & almost pathological."[2.] To put the criticism of this theory in summary form, one might say first, that the ascription of mystic & occult, invisible & intangible causes to phenomena is not peculiar to the savage mind. The fishermen of Morecambe Bay believed but lately that cockles grew up out of the sand; Scottish children say that horsehairs become eels; & amulets, charms, & mascots have no meaning for moderns if there is not mysterious power clinging round them. In the second place, the savage does, in his ordinary apart from his ritual

1. Op. cit. p.88.
2. Op. cit. pp. 15-16.

life & action, take account continually of secondary causes. In his hunting, for example, he shows, as Levy-Bruhl himself points out, extraordinary accuracy in connecting the tracks of an animal with its presence in the jungle. Animal perception necessarily involves the connection of cause & effect between innumerable things; & Varendonck proves that the causal relation, antecedent & consequent occurring in their natural order, is unfolded or, as it were, unrolled, in that humble form of memory which he designates "Reduplicative".[1] The character of "immediacy", which Levy-Bruhl finds in the inferences of primitive man from effects to "mystic" causes, "the immediate passage from such & such sensible perception to such & such invisible force",[2] is explicable in terms of ordinary psychology. The same immediacy, though more intensified, is characteristic of animal perceptions at or near the instinctive stage: the humbler the intelligence in the higher animals, the swifter & more impulsive the inferences from the unknown or uncomprehended to peril or dangerous power; & the apparently immediate or "intuitive" conclusion is simply the semi-instinctive leap of the savage mind, still deeply influenced by emotion, at a causal connection which may or may not be real. It is a hasty attempt at the co-ordination of phenomena by an intelligence which co-ordinates its experience with difficulty. It is one of the great services of M. Levy-Bruhl's penetrating

1. Evolution of the Conscious Faculties. pp.36 f. p.51.etc.
2. La Mentalite Primitive. p.48.

studies that he has emphasised & very fully illustrated the gen-
-eralisation towards which anthropologists have been recently
converging, namely, that it is a universal tendency of the prim-
-ive mind in becoming human to see behind effects, especially
those which are not clearly understood, "mystic" causes, that is,
invisible & intangible powers.

It is in the tradition of the English school of anthropologists like Romanes, Tylor, & Frazer, that one should not be content to regard this quality of the primitive mind as characteristic of a mentality radically different from ours, & to leave it at that, but should attempt a psychological explanation of it. The first element in the process is the fundamental tendency which we have observed in all mind, to make "wholes" in thought. This involves the making of mental connections between phenomena. Of these connections by way of inference the most important is that of causality, of cause & effect. It is a familiar difference between the highly scientific & the uneducated modern mind that the latter makes causal connections among phenomena which Science shows to be mistaken & illusory. This is also a profound difference between the cultivated modern & the primitive type of mind. The primitive mind, working with its imperfectly co-ordinated brain, imperfectly co-ordinates the data of its experience; & amongst these imperfect co-ordinations, connecting things which are not really connected or connecting things wrongly, are those

of the causal relation. The co-ordination of cause & effect is present, as we have seen, in the mind of animals & man at the instinctive stage of development. The instinctive inference that the moving reeds are an effect of which the tiger is the cause makes the antelope dash away. Even at the instinctive level errors in causal inference are made; but as intelligence takes over the mental life from the hands of instinct, while the range of causal co-ordination is greater, the margin of error is also increased.

Co-ordinative intelligence is up to a point common to man & the other animals, as in the perceptions, inferences & even plans of the latter. The great departure in evolution which made man's intelligence definitely human was the high development of Imagin-ation. The large increase in the brain over the temporal reg-ion, as a development of the visual & auditory centres, partic-ularly of the visual, is a striking difference between man & all the lower animals, & is marked even between him & the anthropoids. Thus came into play a new organ of co-ordination, which was never to be superseded, being the creator of all man's most wonderful works of genius, but only to be corrected & disciplined by the more recently evolved logical Reason,, whose organ is the frontal region of the brain. Now, the peculiar quality of imagination is the power to visualise phenomena & the connections among them wholly within the mind. Its constructions may be purely mental constructions, corresponding to no actually existing facts or

connections in the real, external world, in other words, "imaginary". A further important characteristic of imagination, which is a primitive trait, is its extreme sensitiveness to feeling or emotion. Feeling, such as fear or desire, quickens its specific activity, its tendency, namely, to work up its perceptions into an imaginative picture; & it stimulates what is really a higher wave of the same tendency, the heightening of the imaginative picture by accumulating & working into it appropriate details from experience or from imagined possibility. It is this imaginative activity of the mind which is the essential quality of genius in modern man, accounting for its scientific discoveries & inventions, its poetic & artistic creations, & its prophetic inspirations, together with those works of imagination which are profoundly true to reality & yet never were "on sea or land". It was probably the same constructive imagination in more rudimentary form in primitive man which brought him by a flash of genius to those discoveries, such as the kindling of fire, the flaking of flint or the use of polished tools & weapons, which, though so simple to our thinking, were so truly epoch-making that the momentum of them carried man through long ages before they were superseded. But it was the same imaginative activity of the primitive mind which created the vast illusions, the strange & to us inconsequent reasonings, the innumerable false connections

among phenomena, which very largely constitute the Magic & Religion of savage man. To take but one example which is highly germane to our present discussion, the idea of unseen power was a tremendously important discovery from the point of view of its subsequent importance for the most modern science & religion, & it was a true construction of most primitive imagination; but its earliest expression was of the simple & concrete character of the West African fetich to which the savage ascribes a power to bring him luck, or of the floating log in the river, which by its mysterious appearances & disappearances gave the Ten'a Indians the impression of mystical power.

The mystical idea of power, to use Levy-Bruhl's word, can be traced directly to the simplest idea of cause. Cause is power to produce the effect. The cause does something, accomplishes something that is the effect, as rain makes wet & heat warmth or dryness. To perceive a cause is to perceive something which has power; & that power interests the savage only as potency to harm or help. If the object which has power is mysterious, & the mind cannot "place" it among known causes, the imagination comes into play, under the influence of emotion, usually fear; & the object is seen in a sort of Brocken mist of mysterious, dangerous imaginatively heightened & exaggerated power. Thus from the simple idea of cause comes the magical idea of power, by which charms, amulets, fetiches, & also ritual practices become the

instruments of potent Magic.

A second psychological factor in Magic & magical practices may be traced. The simpler unifications by the co-ordinating mind of primitive man, imperfect as it is, such as the concept or general idea, are, as we have seen, fluid & indefinite, wavering & mingling at the border line between, as, for instance, "dead" & "living", "dangerous" & "safe", "sacred" & "profane". The more complex unifications of reasoning have the same fluid & indefinite character, & thus slip easily into each other. Hence the relation of Similarity, things co-ordinated in the mind as being like each other, & the relation of Contiguity, things co-ordinated in the mind as being near or in contact with each other, encroach upon the relation of Causality, things co-ordinated as being respectively cause & effect. This is the more natural as similar & contiguous things often are in causal relations. It has not, perhaps, been sufficiently emphasised that even to savage observation many like & contiguous things were causally connected. Thus moon in the sky makes moon in the lake; white paint causes white totem marks on the face; the branch is like the tree, the child like the parent. So, many things associated in the mind by nearness or contact had actual causal relations. The arrow & the wound, the spear & the blood which follows it, the track in the sand & the opossum that made it, the hair on the thorn & the passing sambhur, there are both contiguity & causal-

-ity in all these. It is significant that the margins between Similarity & Contiguity, on the one hand, & Causality, on the other, fade into each other exactly where the sense of strange--ness or mystery or "mystic" power even slightly enters in. Thus among the Sema Nagas there are certain stones which are almost though not quite fetiches. They have a special name, agucho, & are "black stones worn into curious shapes by water, one or two faintly resembling the shape of a human neck & head". The inter-esting point is that the natives believe that these agucho "breed & beget young".[1] With that faint haze or aroma of strangeness & power about them the large stones are regarded as causally related to the small stones which are like them & lie near them. The effect of feeling, that is the feeling of mysterious power, quickening imagination, is to translate similarity & contiguity into causality. This has much to do with the psychology of Magic.

1. The Sema Nagas. (Hutton) p.174.

Chapter XX

REASONING OF PRIMITIVE MAN

(b). Imperfect Co-ordinations.

2. Magic.

The principles we have just stated with regard to savage Magic & of which we have made some slight endeavour to find the psych-ological origin, are, needless to say, part of one of the great generalisations of Sir James Frazer & illustrated with incompar-able wealth & charm in his two volumes in the Golden Bough ser-ies called, "The Magic Art."[1] In the first volume of that work he says: "If we analyse the principles of thought on which magic is based, they will probably be found to resolve themselves into two: first, that like produces like, or that an effect re-sembles its cause; &, second, that things which have once been in contact with each other continue to act on each other at a distance after the physical contact has been severed. The former principle may be called the Law of Similarity, the latter, the Law of Contact or Contagion. From the first of these princip-es, namely the Law of Similarity, the magician infers that he can produce any effect he desires merely by imitating it: from the second he infers that whatever he does to a material object will affect equally the person with whom the object was once in contact, whether it formed part of his body or not. Charms based on the Law of Similarity may be called Homoepathic or Imit-ative Magic. Charms based on the Law of Contact or Contagion may be called Contagious Magic."[2] One is inclined to broaden

1. The Magic Art. Vols.I & II

2. Op. cit. p.52. Vol.I

Frazer's definition of the latter, Contagious Magic, by adding to it the idea which covers numerous cases of power supposed to be communicated by mere contact or contiguity whether the objects had been previously in contact or not. There are many things regarded as having magical potency which are so without the association of either likeness or prior contact. Such, for example, was the potato mentioned by a lady sitting next to the late Mr. Andrew Lang at dinner. "I have found out", she said,"a new cure for rheumatism. You carry a potato about in your pocket."[1] Mr. Lang immediately connected the notion with the Maori habit of carrying about a baked yam as a protection against ghosts, with the classical ideas about the root mandragora or the mandrake, & with superstitions about roots among the Hottentots & elsewhere. He associates such magical ideas & practices with Fetichism, & quite rightly, for, in its more rudimentary forms of ascribing power over things & persons to an object having some association of curiosity, strangeness or luck, Fetichism is indistinguishable from Magic.

One may, therefore, distinguish three forms of magic: First, Imitative Magic, where the power is in the likeness of the magical object to the thing influenced, or of a magical process to to a process which it is desired to bring about. Second, Contagious Magic, in the sense in which Frazer uses it, where the object worked with magically has been in contact with the person

1. Custom & Myth. A. Lang. (Longman's. 1893.) pp. 143 f.

or thing influenced. Here generally a part is regarded as re-
-presentative of the whole & as mysteriously in contact with it
though actually separated from it, as some hair or nail-parings
or a piece of the clothing of a person could be employed as a
charm to affect him, usually for evil, but much more rarely for
good. Third, Magic of Communication, in which an object without
any association of similarity or former contact is on some other
ground endowed with power over things or men.

I. Of Imitative or Homoeopathic Magic innumerable examples are given in "The Magic Art". An instance, however, occurs in Tom Petrie' Reminiscences which is worth quoting because it is a double illu-
-stration of the extremely wide-spread rain-making magic, & in its simplicity is otherwise psychologically interesting. A certain rainmaker among the Brisbane blacks was with Petrie on one occasion, &, says the author of the book,"it seemed setting in for wet weather, so the old man, of course, proceeded to bring the rain." We italicise the "of course", & call attention to the rainmaker's careful choice of a likely time later on for the stopping of the rain, as illustrative of the simple, unco-ordin-
-ated character of savage reasoning. "He commenced", continues the narrative, "by spitting into the air & making signs; then he pulled out the 'kundri' stone" (a magic crystal) "from his mouth, chanting words which had this meaning: 'Come down, rain, & make the 'bon-yi' trees grow, so that we shall get plenty nuts, & make

the yams to grow big that we may eat them." It did rain shortly after this; but it lasted so long that Petrie asked Puram to stop the deluge. He answered, "Byamby". He waited cunningly, says the writer, until "he saw a break in the sky, & then started throwing fire-sticks up into the air, to dry up the rain, he said." He now declared that he had made the weather altogether dry with fire, & that no more rain would come. And as a matter of fact the weather cleared soon afterwards.

As already suggested, there was no perception in the minds of Puram's clansmen of cunning or unfairness in his waiting until the clouds came before proceeding to "make" rain, or delaying till they broke before he undertook to bring dry weather; & probably he saw nothing of the kind in it himself. The capacity for making the more refined co-ordinations & consequently for the discrimination which could perceive the finer inconsistencies in a line of reasoning was wanting in these primitive Australian brains. They might be vaguely conscious of the connection between the clouds & the rain; but it would be too abstract & difficult to be distinct. Much more easy & therefore impressive to such minds was the simple, tangible, concrete relation between the wetness the rainmaker caused by spitting or sprinkling water & the succeeding rain, & between the fire-sticks & the dryness which followed. The concrete, easily perceived relation, to minds "suggestible" to the confident medicine-man's claim, rein-

-forced by the immemorial tradition & custom of the tribe, easily slipped from a mere sequence in time into a causal, which is to say a magical, connection.

The spitting up into the air is a crude method of imitating the rainfall & so bringing it to pass on the principle that like pro-duces like, which is paralleled by many other magical rites in which the throwing up of water or pouring it out are accompanied by more elaborate symbolism than the Australian native is capable of. A good example is quoted by Frazer from Mannhardt. "In a village near Dorpat, in Russia, when rain was much wanted, three men used to climb up the fir-trees of an old sacred grove. One of these drummed on a kettle, or small cask to imitate thunder; the second knocked two fire-brands together & made the sparks fly to imitate lightning; & the third who was called 'the rainmaker' had a bunch of twigs with which he sprinkled water from a vessel on all sides."[1] Among the more civilised peoples the ceremon-ies have often elements of beauty, & higher forms of religion are combined with the ancient magical idea. Thus in Greece, in Thessaly & Macedonia, we are told, "when a drought has lasted a long time, it is customary to send a procession of children round to all the wells & springs of the neighbourhood. At the head of the procession walks a girl adorned with flowers, whom her companions drench with water at every halting-place, while they sing an invocation, of which the following is part.

1. Magic Art Vol. I. p.248.

"Perperia, all fresh bedewed,
Freshen all the neighbourhood;
By the woods, on the highway,
As thou goest to God now pray:
O my God, upon the plain
Send thou us a still small rain;
That the fields may fruitful be,
And vines in blossom we may see;
That the grain be full & sound,
And wealthy grow the fields around." [1.]

Other examples of this form of Imitative Magic, whose object is to stimulate natural processes on the principle that like is the cause of like, are connected with the food-quest. There magic is often associated with Totemism, the object of the magical ceremony being the multiplication of the food-animal or food-plant, which is also frequently, though certainly not always, the totem of the tribe. Thus the Witchetty-grub men of Australia, whose totem is the grub of that name, have an elaborate ritual imitative of its life-processes, which is designed to increase the supply. The Kangaroo men have ceremonies of a similar character, one specially interesting feature of which may be mentioned. The rocky ledge associated in tradition with the spirits of the kangaroos is painted with stripes of white gypsum alternating with red ochre to represent the red fur & white bones of the kangaroo. It is now generally recognised among anthrop-

1. Frazer. op.cit. p.272-273.

-ologists -perhaps the first suggestion came from the brilliant Frenchman, Salomon Reinach - that this practice is closely analog-ous to the paintings by primitive man of the Upper Palaeolithic Age, particularly of the Aurignacian & Magdalenian periods, found in caves in France, Spain & in less degree elsewhere. The theory is that these paintings, sculptures & reliefs, which often show a high degree of artistic skill & spirit, completely lost apparen-tly in the later & in other ways more advanced Neolithic culture, were efforts of imitative, or as it is sometimes called, sympath-etic magic, intended to help primitive man's hunting. There is support for this in the general absence of carnivorous & non-edible animals from these representations, & also in the fact that in many of the animal figures a wound is indicated, some-times with a weapon sticking in it or directed to it, at the vital spot which the savage in his hunting would desire to reach. As Prof. J.Y.Simpson says: "When we find bisons depicted with javelins in their sides (Marsoulas grotte), or bleeding from a mortal wound (Niaux cavern), it is difficult to resist the impres-sion that the wish or desire is father to the painting, & that it is hoped that the representations may be fulfilled in actual life. The picture in short is a portrayed prayer, a piece of sympathetic magic."[1]

The artists of these truly primitive works were thus probably the medicine men, priests or magicians of the tribe, & their art

1. Man & the Attainment of Immortality. p.140.

accomplished sometimes in dark cathedral-like caverns & by faint artificial light, may have gathered about it a profound awe which crossed the wavering borderline between magic & religion. It is worth remarking that the execution of these artistic creations in circumstances - the far recesses of caves - where the presence of the animals as models would be generally impossible, & yet often with a striking fidelity & truth to life as well as with verve & spirit, argues the possession in these early men of that high quality of visualising imagination which we have claimed for them.[1] These Palaeolithic men were low-browed but large-brained, that is to say, the visualising region of the brain & the corresponding imaginative power of the mind were almost if not quite as well-developed as in modern man, while the pre-frontal region of the brain & the co-ordinating, discriminating power of reason there resident, the organ & the power which correct & discipline imagination, were at a comparatively low stage of development.

The fine accuracy of detail in some of these works of prehistoric man is of further interest as throwing light upon his psychology. It is characteristic of magical practice & ritual, (& indeed more or less of all ritualism), that the details of it is of extraordinary importance. The reason is that the omission of some small point might invalidate the whole process. There is a parallel here, as modern psychoanalysts point out, between the

1. See Ch. II passim

mental state in savage magic & obsessional neurosis in modern civilised people. In both cases, as Dr. Oskar Pfister shows, the origin of the magical practice is "anxiety", one of whose expressions is intense care that the ritual shall be performed with perfect accuracy in every detail.[1] This is in accord also with what we have named the Atomistic or particularistic nature of the primitive mind, for which, owing to under-development of the co-ordinating power of the brain, generalisations or general principles covering & superseding many separate particulars in thought, speech & action, are difficult & rare.

Nor need it be supposed that the true artistic spirit, with its delight in the work of art for its own sake, was wholly wanting in these primitive artist-magicians. As we may see more fully in a later chapter, there is a certain pleasure attached by nature to all creative unifications, to every harmony accomplished in thought or things, wherever life & the nervous system are sufficiently developed to perceive it. In the art of these magicians there would be a definite pleasure in relief from the absorbing supreme anxiety of the tribe, concerning the food supply, when the work was completed which had the power to render the tribe successful in its hunting. But there must also have been present frequently the more general pleasure which always accompanies a mental or practical unification of a creative kind, when the artist saw the work itself as a completed whole, & even

1. Some Applications of Psycho-Analysis. pp.330f.

while the form of the bison or reindeer or mammoth grew into com-
-pleteness step by step under his hand. The satisfaction or
pleasure in the unification of the mind by deliverance from anxie-
-ty would coalesce with & fade easily into the artist's joy in
the accomplished work of art.[1]

Among other forms of Imitative Magic many are associated with the cure of disease. In Aberdeenshire, stones resembling parts of the body, & thus called "eye-stane" or "head-stane" or the like, were supposed to cure the corresponding part when rubbed upon it.[2] The cure of heat by heat has led within the present generation to the painful practice in the south of Scotland of holding a burnt limb to the fire. The use of Imitative Magic, moreover, was not & is not, of course, by any means always beneficent in intention. The burning of an unpopular person in effigy is a survival in modern times of a very wide-spread & varied type of nefarious magic, such as making an image or likeness of an enemy & then sticking thorns, driving nails or a needle into it, burn-
-ing or burying it, in order to cause the hated person's illness or death. The causal connection between like things is assumed to be complete.

II. Upon Contagious Magic it is not necessary to dwell at any length, since it is merely another variety of imperfect co-ordination, irregular inference & mistaken interpretation of cause & effect. Frazer develops the theory, also expressed by Tyler, that magic

2. Custom & Myth. (Lang) p.147. cf. Gregor, Folklore of North-east Counties.

1. Ch. [redacted]

is based on an erroneous association of ideas. "If" he says, "my analysis of the magician's logic is correct, its two great principles turn out to be merely two different misapplications of the association of ideas. Homoeopathic magic is founded on the association of ideas by similarity: contagious magic is founded on the association of ideas by contiguity."[1] The nail-parings or hair of a man is supposed to retain some subtle connection with him, or one is inclined rather to suspect that the savage mind, lacking the power of discrimination which is but another form of co-ordination, makes the distinction or separation between what has been part of a man's body & the man himself with difficulty, & thinks that he or his life-potency is somehow there. At any rate, these to us unconsidered fragments may be kneaded by his enemy along with clay into a rude image - thus reconstituting the man - & placed in a running stream, or they may be made up with wax & exposed to a fire, the melting away of the image being supposed to bring about the fading away into death of the unfortunate object of the magic. Potent use may be made even of a man's footprint by putting a poisoned dart into it, or even of the mark of his pot in the ashes by sticking into the impression sharp stones or glass or thorns or something equally indigestible, so that, on the principle of imitative magic, like producing like, the actual foot which made the footprint shall be wounded, or the pot be rendered fatal to the unhappy man who was not careful to

1. Op. cit. p.53.

smooth away the impression in the ashes of the camp-fire. It is pleasant to find that this form of magic is sometimes, though rarely, used for kindlier purposes. Sir James Frazer records, for example, that in North Africa "a woman who wishes to attach her husband or lover to herself, will take earth from the print of his right foot, tie it up with some of his hairs in a packet, & wear the packet next her skin." The last point cannot fail to remind one of the custom of persons wearing a locket containing a lock of hair from someone loved & perhaps lost. The locket is worn next the skin, & often, we believe, not as a display-ornament but so that it is not visible. This looks like a vague reminiscence of a contagious magic employed to keep the person near by the potency of something which had once been part of him or in contact with him - though, of course, it is overlaid by more refined ideas.

A curious & far-travelled notion of Contagious magic is based on the idea of a connection between a wound & the weapon or other object which caused it. On the one hand, if the arrow which inflicted the wound is thrown into the fire, greater inflammation & pain will result; on the other hand, if the weapon or thorn or even the bush on which the thorn grew were greased the injury would heal. This is a mingling of imitative & contagious magic, for grease or fat or oil was a primitive healing agent - it will

1. Op. cit. p.201.

be remembered that the Good Samaritan poured oil & wine into the robbed man's wounds - & it was thought that to put the healing grease upon the thing whose contact caused the injury, would go far to cure it. It is striking to find Lord Bacon treating this magical notion quite seriously, & we borrow the following quot-ation for the sake of a further point of interest. "It is constantly received & avouched" says Bacon, "that the anointing of the weapon that maketh the wound will heal the wound itself. In this experiment, upon the relation of men of credit (though my-self, as yet, am not fully inclined to believe it) you shall note the points following: first, the ointment wherewith this is done is made of diverse ingredients, whereof the strangest & hardest to come by are the moss upon the skull of a dead man unburied, & the fats of a boar & a bear killed in" peculiar circumstances.[1] The interesting point referred to is the ingredients of the oint-ment consisting of things 'strange & hard to come by' such as the moss from a skull. This is characteristic of all magical spells: the strangest, most distant, most difficult to obtain, & generally most abhorrent, ingredients are supposed to be the most potent. The horrid catalogue of elements in the withhes' cauldron in Shakespeare's Macbeth is an excellent instance. Strangeness & horror are gathered from all quarters, as they say,

"For a charm of powerful trouble."[2]

1. Frazer. op. cit. p.202.
2. ActII. Sc.I.

The reason of this is the tendency, often already noted, of the primitive mind to ascribe potency to all that is strange & mysterious & therefore looked upon with fear or awe.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, in The Professor at the Breakfast Table, rather more than hints that some taint of the same tendency remained in quite recent medical practice. He mentions scourging as a cure for epilepsy - which is no doubt a case of Imitative Magic, the scourging of the body being expected to drive out the evil spirit. Holmes adds: "A few score years ago, sick people were made to swallow burnt toads & powdered earthworms & the expressed juice of wood-lice. The physician of Charles I & II prescribed abominations not to be named. Barbarism, as bad as that of Congo or Ashanti."[1] It was barbarism in a sense slightly different from what he meant, namely, that these drugs were sought & compounded not because of their direct curative qualities as scientific medicines are, but because they had the potency which savage & uncultured man sees in the strange & horrible, wavering in the mists of his fears. It is one of the earliest as well as the most awful sophistications of the human mind which makes the savage, or his modern representative in civilised life, the superstitious person, imagine that the strangest & most disgusting things & the most pedantically cruel practices are the most to be relied upon to keep him safe, to secure his aims, & to influence the unseen powers, because to his primitive fear &

1. The Professor at the Breakfast Table. Vol.I. p.159.(David Douglas)

horror they are the most mysteriously potent.

III. The third type of Magic, the Magic of Communication, implies potency in some object which may have the association neither of likeness nor (originally) contiguity. The potato mentioned to Andrew Lang as a cure for rheumatism is a case in point. It will be remembered that to the people of England on its first introduction the now familiar tuber was rather an object of dread, & doubtless its growth as a fleshy root, with occasional grotesque forms, was unique to the peasant mind & something more than a curiosity. Hence a certain potency or mana was ascribed to it, for which the euphemism, veiling ignorance & escaping explanations, was that it was "lucky". Walter Bagehot, who wrote with wonderful judgment on these subjects when knowledge of them was in its infancy, attaches great importance to the part played by <u>mere</u> luck, in the sense of chance happenings, in creating magic, fetichism, & so early religion. He says, for example, that a savage cannot "well distinguish between a sign of 'luck' or ill-luck, as we should say, & a deity which causes the good or ill; the indicating precedent & the causing being are to the savage mind much the same; a steadiness of head far beyond savages is required consistently to distinguish them." That is the view we are here expressing. But when he puts forward instances, we see that Bagehot's ideas must be supplemented. Thus "some expedition had answered when the resolution to undertake it

was resolved on under an ancient tree, & accordingly that tree became lucky & sacred. Another expedition failed when a magpie crossed its path, & a magpie was said to be unlucky. A serpent crossed the path of another expedition, & it had a marvellous victory, & accordingly the serpent became a sign of great luck (& what a savage cannot distinguish from it - a potent deity which makes luck)."[1] These coincidences, it need hardly be said, are not at all sufficient to account for the wide-spread tree- & serpent-cults & bird-omens known to anthropology. The magpie is a bird of startling & curious appearance, & so the primitive mind attaches to it mysterious potency. As Dr. Wm. Crooke says in the article on Serpent-worship in Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics, the origin of all such cults "is to be sought in the effect which all animals more or less had upon the mind of early man - a feeling that they were stronger, wiser, subtler than he; in a word, uncanny."[2] The serpent, as Dr. Crooke shows, is specially equipped in many ways for making that impression. So also trees, with their mystery of life & growth, their dangerous shadows hiding possible lurking enemies, & above all their whispering & muttering sounds, easily are endowed with Mana & become whispering oaks & oracles of Dodona, abodes of dryads, prisons of moaning Ariels & haunts of nymphs & the great god Pan.

When an object has once had ascribed to it mysterious potency, to

1. Physics & Politics. p.127 f.
2. Vol.XI p.399.

hurt or to help, its progress towards becoming a fetich, an abode of spirit, a god, mainly depends on the co-ordinative capacity at the moment of the savage mind applied to it, & particularly upon the growth of the personalising or anthropomorphising power or tendency in that mind. The ascent of mysterious potency in this way is strikingly illustrated by the various cults of intox-icating juice, of which the Soma-worship of India & the Vedas is a typical example. The octli & other intoxicating ferments in Mexico & Peru came to be regarded as gods, just as wine did in Dionysus & Bacchus, & Soma in India. One book of the Rig-Veda is devoted to hymns in honour of the latter. "It is called the soul of the sacrifice & the delight of gods & men. It strengthens the weak, inspires the poet, prolongs life & gives divine power to the gods. Especially is Indra (the god of stren-gth & battle) the enjoyer of Soma, which (or who) is regarded as his inspirer & friend. As god, Soma, like Indra, frees from danger & conquers foes, & brings wealth to the Aryan from sky & earth & air. Soma is addressed in the highest strains of adul-ation & veneration; all powers belong to him; all blessings are besought of him." The early difficulty of distinguishing be-tween intoxication & inspiration, of which the Delphic oracle with its semi-intoxicated priestess is an example in the lofty Greek culture, is parallel to the identification, so widespread, of pathological conditions of insanity with possession by an evil

spirit or a god. How simple & natural the process of personif-ication is, can thus be illustrated from Soma or Dionysus onward to the "inspiring bauld John Barleycorn" of Burns. Enough has been said, however, to indicate how savage man begins with the vague idea of power, life-will-potency, or Mana in things, & proceeds naturally, with his growing intelligence & individuality, to raise that potency to more or less personal spirits or gods.

In turning to the practical side of Magic, one notes that the essence of it is that man endeavours to use the mysterious potency just referred to in order to serve his own ends. This practical endeavour we may now analyse. The psychological attitude of man to power has three primitive forms. If the power is unmanageable, he does either of two things: he flees from it, or he crouches or bends till the storm of it is past. If it is manageable power, he uses it as he does his tools or weapons to serve his ends. The impulse of flight from mysterious power results, as already seen, in Taboo; the impulse to take refuge from overwhelming power in immobility or crouching before it, characteristic of many animals at the instinctive stage, assumes in primitive man the form of cringing, submission, dull fatalism if there is no hope, & if there is, of propitiation & supplication. The employment, on the other hand, of manageable potency is characteristic of Magic. The thing

with the power in it becomes to the primitive man his tool, his instrument for getting things done. The difference of it from his ordinary tools is that the power is mysterious & therefore imaginatively heightened. The Australian's spear or club is not sacred to him; but his spear-thrower, which casts the weapon an amazing length by a mysterious dynamic, & his boomerang which astounds even the European by its calculated vagaries, are both regarded with semi-religious awe. His simplest & accordingly most primitive way of using a mana-possessing thing is therefore that of the straightforward application of its force, namely, in a coercive or compulsive way. Thus, just as he uses a flint to strike off from a core a splinter for an arrowhead, or any other tool for its appropriate purpose, so savage man employs his queerly-shaped root or stone to cure pain, his initative process to compel a natural process like rainfall to take place, & the hair or nail-parings of his enemy wrought into an image & destroyed, to bring about his enemy's illness & death. This coercive quality in magic continues even when it comes to be applied to spirits at later animistic & even higher stages of belief. Certain objects such as charms, certain words & formulae as in spells, certain ritual procedures & acts, are relied upon as infallibly to produce certain results as the chemist expects his proper reactions & the engineer the resultant movement from the application of his power. Even the spirits & the gods cannot resist

such magic, as the striking of the tinder-box brought the dog with eyes like towers in Hans Andersen, & the rubbing of Aladdin's lamp brought the Djinns to build his palace in a night.

The resemblance of this type of magic to science cannot escape us; & indeed it is rudimentary science - the knowledge, that is to say, of how to employ power to produce a desired effect. Nev-ertheless, a religious element is never far away. The magici-an may, even when he is sincere, be as calm & unemotional in the use of his spell as a mathematician busy upon the calculus, but that must be rare indeed. The savage knows he is working with mysterious power, something elusive & superhuman; & he does not escape easily or long from fear & awe of his own mysteries. There is always a nervousness in the primitive mind about being minutely accurate in the details of spell & ritual, like a chem-ist dealing with the manufacture of explosives. And thus, as the potency dealt with becomes very great, & particularly as it takes personal form in spirits & gods, a new attitude in magic comes into play.

This new attitude, like the former one, has its parallels in the savage's ordinary life. If he can command sufficient power over another person so as to make him do things, the savage will so coerce him, & employ him as a slave, or a servant, as he does his axe or his digging-stick. But if his neighbour is too potent to be compelled, he will ask him to do things, or he will make

common cause with him & try to go the way he is going & so take advantage of his power, or, if he is very strong & angry & dangerous like a great chief, then he will endeavour to appease & propitiate him, appealing by words & deeds to his mercy. These are three higher forms of magic than that of mere coercion; & in them magic begins to shade off imperceptibly into religion. The request to a potent object or being to do things for the savage - which is the point where spell, the command to do things, slips into prayer - may be directed to an inanimate object, because, as already frequently pointed out, primitive man never quite separates potency or mana in things from life like his own & will like his own. Thence the Australian kneels down & prays to his knife to go & kill his enemy, & the Ainu of Japan bids the young bear he is sacrificing go to the land whence the bears come, that he may return & bring many others with him. When the request is made to a human-like spirit or god, it rises naturally into prayer-like forms with reverent ascriptions & humble submissions.

The form of Magic which makes common cause with the potent object or being so as to share in its or his power, appears most characteristically in Totemism, where the various ceremonies chiefly of Imitative Magic are designed to lift the worshipper into communion with the Totem-god so as to be within the sphere of its potency & beneficence. These processes are often accompanied

by addresses to the Totem which are perceptibly rudimentary forms of that lofty kind of prayer which is an aspiration after communion with God. Lastly, the sense of vast potency which comes with the deification of natural forces, like the sun or the sky, or with the coalescence of smaller deities into one great god or spirit, tends to eliminate from the worshipper's mind the idea of compulsion, (though coercive magic dies hard even in high religions), & reduces him to the posture of supplication, propitiation, & sacrifice. Wherever there are high gods, or gods whose power eludes by its vastness magical compulsion, magic tends to vanish in the greater light of religion or to become like a smoky ~~kicked~~ lamp in the dim cellarage of the illicit & the nefarious; & spell gives place to real prayer, as when the Khonds of Orissa conclude a prayer to the earth-goddess, after enumerating their material wants, with the words; "We are ignorant of what it is good to ask for. You know what is good for us, give it us."[1] This is not far beneath the prayer of Epictetus: "Do with me what thou wilt: my will is thy will: I appeal not against thy judgments."[2] In these, as in the Christian, "Not my will but Thine be done", Religion is at the opposite pole from Magic. In thus tracing the forms of magic till they mingle with & fade into religion, & spell until it becomes prayer, we have really pronounced on the somewhat vexed question of the relation of Magic to Religion. We shall devote a portion of the next chap-

1. Farnell. Evolution of Religion. p.183
2. Op. cit. p.205.

to a short discussion of that question, with special reference to the views of Sir James Frazer & Dr. F.B.Jevons.

Chapter XXI

REASONING OF PRIMITIVE MAN

(b). Imperfect Co-ordinations

3. Magic & Religion. Spell & Prayer.

The controversy concerning the relation of magic to religion, & particularly as to the priority in age of the one over the other, appears to us to be, like so many other disputes, a question mainly of the meaning of the terms employed. Sir J.G.Frazer has been vigorously challenged by Dr. F.B.Jevons & Mr. E.O.James[1] for maintaining that magic is prior to religion in origin, & that there very probably was in the history of human development an Age of Magic before there was an Age of Religion. But the truth or otherwise of this simply depends upon the definition of religion involved. If we accept Frazer's definition of religion, it is true. He defines religion thus: "By religion, then, I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct & control the course of nature & of human life."[2] That is to say, religion everywhere & always means the recognition of quasi-personal beings or spirits, which, however, many anthropologists regard as rather an advanced stage in the evolution of religion. That this is his position is clear from the following passage: "In the first place a consideration of the fundamental notions of magic & religion may incline us to surmise that magic is older than religion in the history of humanity. We have seen that on the one hand magic is nothing but a mistaken application of the very simplest & most

1. Primitive Ritual & Belief.
2. The Golden Bough. (abridged) p.50.

elementary processes of the mind, namely, the association of ideas by virtue of resemblance or contiguity; & that on the other hand religion assumes the operation of conscious or personal agents, superior to man behind the visible screen of nature. Ob-viously the conception of personal agents is more complex than a simple recognition of the similarity or contiguity of ideas; & a theory which assumes that the course of nature is determined by conscious agents is more abstruse & recondite, & requires for its apprehension a far higher degree of intelligence & reflection than the view that things succeed each other simply by reason of their contiguity or resemblance."[1] It is perfectly clear how with this advanced conception of religion as the acknowledgment of conscious or personal agents, Frazer could assert that "among the Australian aborigines magic is universal but religion almost unknown",[2] though even here he would probably admit that the exig-encies of his theory carried him too far when first he stated it, since the more recent studies of the Australian tribes have prov-ed the existence of a widespread belief among them in personal spirits or gods.

On the other side, Prof. Hopkins, in discussing definitions of religion holds that "we may not even imply in our definition that religion necessitates a belief in spiritual powers, because such belief is not essential"[3] His own definition is: "Religion is squaring human life with superhuman life",[4] or more fully,"what is

1. Frazer. The Magic Art. p.
2. ibid. p.
3. Hopkins. The History of Religions. p.2
4. ibid. p.2.

common to all religions is belief in a superhuman power & an adjustment of human activities to the requirements of that power, such an adjustment as may enable the individual believer to exist more happily."[1] Accordingly, if one accepts the definition by Prof. Hopkins of religion as belief in a superhuman power, it is obvious that Frazer's sharp distinction between Magic & Religion, & between an Age of Magic & an Age of Religion, vanishes. For magic is belief in a superhuman power in magical things, beings & processes, & is thus at some points of human development indistinguishable from religion. The thing which the primitive savage regards as magical possesses "mana", mysterious power, which, as we have seen, he cannot separate from the notions of life & volition like his own. In simple terms, it can do things for him he cannot do alone, it can move about from place to place as living things do, & it can do things if it likes, that is, it has will which like his own can be coerced or cajoled into doing them. Add a little awe or fear of this mysterious power in the magical object - never really absent from his mind, as shown by the tendency to surround the object with taboos - & you have reached the generalised form from which have developed both magic & religion.

Prof. F.B.Jevons in his Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion in 1908 attempted to establish a fundamental distinction between magic & religion, which depends on a particular definit-

1. Op. cit. p.1.

-ion of magic as Frazer's distinction does upon his definition of religion. Jevons apparently up to quite recently adheres to this position, for in a paper in Folk-Lore for 1918 Mr. N.W. Thomas gives a trenchant criticism of an essay by Jevons on the same lines. The discussion is interesting as an example of the tendency of minds influenced by dogmatic interests to seek to lift religion somehow out of the normal course of evolution, & introduce at one point or another a special creation in its fav-our. Dr. Jevons is reacting against Frazer's theory of relig-ion as subsequent to & evolved from magic; & he endeavours to show that magic & religion are found both together in the most primitive human societies, but at the same time strongly opposed to each other. The latter proposition, however, he can only establish by the quite unjustifiable limitation of the term "mag-ic" to nefarious magic; & he declares that we should "reserve the term 'magic' exclusively for the proceedings which excite the disapproval of the community." If one granted him this premise, no doubt he could show the cleavage between magic & religion run-ning very far back indeed; but it is impossible to grant it with-out giving to magic a restricted sense which it has neither for the primitive mind nor for the science which studies it. There is nothing, for instance, harmful to the community in taking the advice of a "wise woman" to cure warts by burying a piece of meat on the principle of Imitative Magic that with the decay of the

1. "Folk-Lore. 1918. p.108.

meat the warts would disappear - an instance given by Mr. Thomas. It might be contended that the action is in the interests of the community, which could be supposed to have a refined objection to warts on the hands of its members; but even in that improbable contingency, the process could not be called religious as opposed to magical. In the case of Witchcraft, which Jevons takes as a crucial case of nefarious magic, & which he contends is always reprobated by the community, it is really impossible to distin-guish between a witchcraft which according to Jevons the commun-ity fears & hates & regards as "illicit"on the one hand, & on the other, the witchcraft which is exercised, with identical magical methods, by the medicine-man or priest of the tribe in the interests either of individuals or of the community as a whole. Among the Queensland blacks, according to Mr. Tom Petrie's observations, the "Turrwans", or "great men" of each tribe were regarded as having power to cause disease & death by sending their magic crystals into the body of an enemy, but also to cure illness by extracting from the body the crystal which was its cause.[1] One remembers the "wise woman" whom John Ridd in "Lorna Doone" consulted on his love affair, & the similar character in Kingsley's "Westward Ho!", representatives in fiction of a class of "white witches" who existed in considerable numbers a century or two ago, & who, surrounded by a certain awe of their mysteri-ous power, & liable in times of special excitement, terrorism &

[1] Op. cit. p.29 f.

bigotry to be tortured & burned, were yet often kindly regarded by the community. It is not, therefore, a satisfactory distinction which separates magic from religion in primitive life on the ground that the former is treated as nefarious & rpprobated by the community.

Essentially the same distinction is adopted by M. Emil Durkheim in his "Elementary Forms of the Religious Life." In his view "magic is opposed to religion as the individual to the social." Religion is "of the group". "In all history we do not find a single religion without a Church." "There is no Church of Magic"[1] The distinction thus made is in accord with the Group Theory of primitive psychology advanced by the French school of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl & others, which we have already criticised. We may simply add that the antithesis appears to us as little supported by the facts as the similar theory of Jevons. The individual magician frequently performs a social function, in accomplishing his magic rites, as in "rain-making" for the good of the community. The community itself in its dramatic representations of the life of the food-animal, which are designed magically to increase its numbers, & which are later evolved into the ritual dance, performs acts which are entitled to be called magical at least as much as religious. The artist medicine-men of the Magdalenian Age, sketching their probably magical pictures of the food-animals in the far recesses of caverns which resemble cathedrals, & doing this in the interests of the hunting of the tribe, who regard their operations with a deep satisfaction mingled with awe,

1. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. p.44

are not easily distinguished from a priesthood of a "Church of Magic". Durkheim withdraws a little from the extreme antithesis of magic & religion in a note, in which he says; "In thus distinguishing magic from religion we do not mean to establish a break of continuity between them. The frontiers between the two are frequently uncertain."[1] The attempt, in fact, to make a fundamental distinction between primitive magic & primitive religion must fail; for there is, as most anthropologists now hold, a magico-religious stage in primitive man's thought & practice, a "generalised" type, from which magic, religion, & also science have been differentiated.

A writer in the popular "Outline of History" edited by Mr. H. G. Wells falls into the error we have just referred to. In speaking of the art of Reindeer Man, that is Upper Palaeolithic Man, he says: "No doubt he had a certain amount of what is called fetishism in his life; he did things we should think unreasonable to produce desired ends, for that is all fetishism amounts to ; it is only incorrect science based on guess-work or false analogy, & entirely different in its nature from religion".[2] There is at least one inaccuracy in this statement, which is no doubt intended to be a simple & popular one. It is the extreme opposition of "fetishism", by which he means primitive magic, to religion. This extreme distinction can be avoided by glancing back to the stage in man's thought where magic & religion are

1. Op. cit. p.45 Note.
Outline of ~~Science~~ History, p. 22

are seen covered as species by a generalised form, having in fainter, dimmer & mingling shapes the characteristics of each. To the magico-religious object savage man ascribes power, in the vague sense of "mana", which he does not separate from the further association of life or animation & will or volition. At the same time this life-will-potency is mysterious, a little dangerous if mishandled, & so has an aroma, so to say, or an "aura" of fear or awe about it, which may easily become veneration. So far as the magical thing is felt by him to be manageable, usable, as are his flints, his tools & weapons, for defined ends, the use of it is magic, a secular thing, the germ of Science & of Art. But in so far as its mystery plays upon his fears, & so soon as its power eludes his grasp - now gripped surely as he holds his spear but now vaguely uncontrollable like a dancing shadow - he begins to regard it with awe, defends himself from it with taboos & acts towards it as a thing not to be commanded to do what he desires but rather besought - which is the beginning of the religious attitude. When the mysterious potency is raised to a living spirit or a god, the magic, like a star close to the moon, pales, recedes & vanishes in religion.

The relation between Magic-Spell & Prayer may be understood in the same way. Dr. Jevons, as in his general view of magic & religion, tries to prove a cleavage between spell & prayer at the very beginnings of thought. They are, he thinks, distinct

in nature, & he will not have it that prayer is a higher form evolved from the lower form spell. He makes the distinction that spells are essentially coercive, an exercise of quasi-physical force, & that they are generally reprobated by the community. Prayer, on the other hand, is supplicatory, submissive, & at the same time has the approval of the community with whose interests it is generally in harmony. The theory, however, which is really an effort to make prayer with its definite spiritual value absolutely primitive & inherent in human nature, does not cover the facts. Dr. Jevons seems led away by striving after the superficial & unreal catholicity - the Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, which it is imagined proves a belief to be true, & a religious practice such as prayer to be spiritual & Divinely inspired. But there is no need to fear that prayer may lose its value by being traced to its primitive roots any more than the daffodil by being related to its very differently-shaped bulb in the soil loses its beauty.

In thus tracing it back, therefore, we come as before to primitive man's vague notion of power in the magical object with which there are also bound up equally vague associations of life & volition in the thing. Man proceeds to use the power in the object, accompanying the action with appropriate gestures & equally appropriate words. The action & the gestures are magic; & the words are the spell. The process is so natural that it is universal & can be observed not merely in cases of modern neurosis & un-

-balanced minds, but in sane civilised men when in the relaxed mental attitude of play & at the same time under its excitements. Examples might be given from every sport; but the writer has seen the most ludicrous instances on the bowling green when the bowler twists his body in the direction in which he wishes the bowl to go, as the curler does with his curling stone, & calls out to it words of command, encouragement, & even entreaty. Forgetting the element of spell in the use of words in such cases, for the moment, one notes that there is here that quality of "action at a distance" which is one of the characteristic qualities of magic. This quality where it appears in the primitive mind M. Levy-Bruhl ascribes to the "mystique" nature of savage mentality, oblivious of contradiction, & thus leaves it as mysterious & inexplicable. Writers of the modern Psycho-analytic school throw some light upon it by insisting on the unconscious or sub-conscious influence of desire upon inward thought & outward action, especially in the tendency to Symbolism. Thus Dr. Oskar Pfister says that primit-ive man "trées (acting on the wish principle) to obtain by sym-bolic action that which he cannot obtain when acting on the principle of reality.[1]

We venture to suggest a quite simple psychological theory of the process. The most primitive response to all mental impressions, & therefore that which tends first to occur in the absence or relaxation of civilised inhibitions, is appropriate muscular act-

1. Some Applications of Psycho-analysis. p.330f.

-ion. As Ribot says, speaking of "the most elementary forms of the affective life", "their tendency to translate themselves into acts is immediate & irresistible."[1] There is a strong tendency which comes out in civilised people when excitement or other absorption releases the mind from the normal inhibitions of culture, to do the thing which you wish to be done. Varendonck gives a number of instances of this. He made the familiar observation that a mother, while her little daughter was reciting, unconsciously recited it along with her, without making a sound. Looking on himself at a film of the Far West, in which two men were struggling for the possession of a revolver, he found himself "making movements of the shoulders", sympathetically participating in the fight.[2] Innumerable examples of the phenomenon could be given from ordinary experience. The point of importance is the striking resemblance of these unconscious processes, translating desire into appropriate action in the civilised mind, to the Magic of savage man. The absurdity of seeking to make a person at a distance from you recite correctly by moving your own lips or of enabling your hero in the picture to reach the revolver by moving your own appropriate muscles, or of turning your golf-ball far in flight away from the bunker by inclining your own body in the desired direction, is speedily apparent, & with a smile you restore the divilised restraint; but the resemblance between you & the savage magician is for the moment com-

1. Quoted in Varendonck, Evolution of the Conscious Faculties, p.203.
2. Op. cit. pp.171-172.

-plete. He also in his cavern at home attempts to influence the flight of the arrow of the hunter far in the forest by painting it already in the side of the bison in his magical picture, & tries to produce the thunder by making a thunderous noise, & to make the food-animal come by elaborate imitations of its coming. The difference is that the primitive man has not yet acquired the logical reason, employing the pre-frontal region of the brain, which has taught civilised man that there is no causal connection between his imitative or symbolical action & the events which he desires to bring to pass at a distance from himself. For the savage the impulse to do the thing you wish done is free from that restraint. He allows himself to be swung onward by that impulse to put desire into action which is so powerful in civil-ised people in their unconscious moments. He even with growing intelligence elaborates a crude theory about it, & sees it con-firmed by experience, noting its successes & ignoring its fail-ures, as is natural to the uncritical mind seeing only what it desires to see. He does symbolically, in action resembling it, the thing he desires, & believes that it is accomplished. This is his theory & practice of Magic.

When the expression of the desire in action takes the form of words, we are in the region of Spell or primitive prayer. We have observed the civilised bowler calling to his bowl with words of command or entreaty. Thus also the rain-maker accompanies his imitative magic, the gestures & paraphernalia whereby he

imitates the process of the approach & falling of rain, with words of command or request, "Come down rain, come down rain" & the like. Sometimes the words are a mere assertion that the desired process is taking place, on the principle just analysed that to say a thing is happening makes it happen. Thus the New Caledonian kindles a fire in order to make the sun's heat increase & at the same time adds the formula, "Sun, I do this that you may be burning hot."[1] There is truth so far in Dr. Jevons' position that spell may be roughly distinguished from prayer in that it is regarded mainly as coercive, having power in itself to compel the desired event to take place, or to coerce a spirit or god into doing what is required. The sense of command remains so long as the magical potency is felt to be manageable like a tool or weapon in the man's hand, enabling him to be, as in Meredith's eastern phantasy, (The Shaving of Shagpat), "Master of the Event". The words pronounced add to that potency by reason of a primitive awe of language, still lingering perhaps from the first human time when it was new & strange, but at any rate enhanced by the probably immense diversity of dialects & tongues making speech often unintelligible & mysterious. The stranger the words, sometimes, the more powerful the spell, a fact with which Scott makes play in the introduction to "Guy Mannering". The reverence profound of the illiterate mass for the written word

1. Farnell. Evolution of Religion. p.175.

in later times added in the same way to the potency of written spells.

A further element of power was conveyed by the use of mighty names of gods or spirits. This belongs to a wide field of magic-al lore which we can only touch & pass by, the great importance of names in early religion & magic. The origin of the reverence for names lies probably far back in that incapacity for distinct-ions or for discrimination which we have seen to be character-istic of the primitive mind, & which here takes the form of inability to distinguish clearly between the name & the thing or person, & thus of the tendency to identify the two. At one end of the scale of religious evolution the savage will not pronounce the name of a dead person in case it calls up the ghost or brings the dead back - which is always unpleasant -; & names are often concealed because the name can be employed for nefarious purposes for the reason that it is as much a part of the person as his hair or the parings of his nails. At the higher end of the scale in spiritual development there is in the Scriptures the close association of the Name of God with His personality & power, & in Christian practice, prayer in the Name or baptism into (or in) the Name associates it very definitely with the Divine Spirit or Person.

The potency, then, of the Spell consists in its power to command an event, a process or a spirit, by means of the strongest poss-ible association in it of potent elements, far-fetched ingred-

-ients, compelling actions, mighty words or names. The stronger the spell, the greater the man's sense of power & the more daring & insolent his air of command. The extreme of this is to be found in the notion, existing even in the Christian church in quarters where superstition is permitted to exist side by side with its spiritual faith, that there are certain rites which even God himself cannot resist. Thus Sir James Frazer says; "French peasants used to be, perhaps are still, persuaded that the priests could celebrate with certain special rites, a 'Mass of the Holy Spirit', of which the efficacy was so miraculous that it never met with any opposition from the Divine will; God was forced to grant whatever was asked of Him in this form, however rash & importunate might be the petition."[1] Wherever in general an external religious rite must be performed only by certain persons in a certain scrupulously exact manner, with the repetition of always the same words or formulae, & when the rite being so per-formed with exactness, infallibly calls down a certain Divine power or miraculous action of God, we are really in the sphere of magic rather than in that of religion.

There is, as we have suggested earlier, a type of prayer which is of a higher character than the spell type of prayer whose development & nature we have just been pursuing. Both types have a common primitive root in the endeavour to give physical, outer expression to an inward desire, but at an early stage this

1. The Magic Art. Vol.I.p.232.

this higher form of which we have now to speak & which is more akin to true prayer, diverged from the other. As already remark-ed, so long as the magical potency in an object or process is felt to be manageable, the words take the form of command rather than request, & are coercive spell more than entreaty or supplic-ation. Even from the beginning of thought, however, the idea of life like his own in the potent thing, & also volition, made the savage ask it to do things for him, as he might ask a friend, alternatively to commanding it as he might a slave, a woman or a child. The Australian who kneels down & sings a request to his knife to go & kill the abductor of his wife, is, as Hopkins points out, in a religious attitude; & his words are prayer rather than spell. But when the potency is not so manageable & eludes control, the elements of respect & entreaty more & more supplant command & compulsion. Thus, for example, as Farnell says, while "the Chinese 'Let the devil of poverty depart', & the Greek 'Go out, hunger', & 'To the door, you ghosts' are pure coercive spells, the Buro address to the small-pox, 'Grandfather smallpox, go away' is of a different colour." [1] The disease by hard experience has proved a vast & elusive power, & so the man entreats it as he might a great chief. The Santee Indians hav-ing made a feast for the buffalo address him thus, "Grandfather, venerable man, thy children have made this feast for you: may the food thus taken cause them to live & bring them good fortune."

1. Evolution of Religion. pp. 170-171.

This is clearly the petition form of prayer. The title of kin-ship, such as grandfather, is very common in primitive prayer. Thus, to quote Farnell again, the Egyptian appealed to Isis, "O my father, my brother, my mother Isis"; the Babylonian addressed Bel as father & mother, & a Vedic hymn contains the phrase, "Thou O Agni, art our father, we are thy kinsmen."

The address implying kinship is a simple & natural way of expressing respect & the endeavour to conciliate; & there is probably an element of imitative magic in its use, the inference being that to say there is kinship will bring about the fact of kinship between the god & the worshipper. It is possible that we have here one of the roots of Totemism; for, in the endeavour to propitiate the totem-god, say the food-animal, buffalo, bear or kangaroo, which they wished to come in generous numbers, the obvious thing to do would be to claim kinship with the totem, & treat that kinship as a fait accompli, calling the totem the grandfather or ancestor of the tribe. However that may be, this is the germ of the idea of prayer as in its nature communion with God. Without further illustration of the process it may be clear that as the conception of the deity becomes more & more imposing, man's attitude in prayer is progressively more humble & entreating. As his idea of God increases in spirituality, his requests are more & more in the moral & spiritual sphere. Many of the nobler pagans, even, have reached that conception of

1. Farnell. Evolution of Religion.p.

infinite wisdom & beneficence in God which would sum up all prayer in the petition, Thy will be done. This is a sublime form of that Integration, that Unification of the human spirit, which we have maintained to be the goal of all man's striving since first he became human; & in that unification, which is capable of indefinite differentiation, it is natural that he should find the deppest peace of which he is capable. There is such a higher differentiation & consequently a richer integration which brings also a finer & more satisfying sense of unity to the soul, in the Christian conception of the Divine Fatherhood. For the greatness of the human spirit which that Fatherhood im-plies in its children permits us a certain freedom & power to make requests which He is able to grant. As His sons, we have the power, through the prayer which is communion with Him, to provide Him - if one may dare to say so, by a sublimated & transfigured magic - with the conditions upon earth, spiritual, moral, & even physical or natural, which enable Him, who honours us with the power to share His work, to answer our highest pray-ers, & without stooping for an instant from His Divine majesty to do what even we desire.

The position we have been elaborating is that there is a contin-uous evolution - in the same sense as evolution is continuous along other lines of human development - from magic spell-forms to the highest forms of prayer. It is needless, perhaps, to

decide which was precisely the earlier, the coercive command which is more particularly the essence of spell, or the conciliat-ory request which is nearer to true prayer. Both are found in very primitive minds & ritual. But it is certainly possible to trace the refinement & exaltation of prayer through so many stages & grades - ever becoming higher & purer on the whole until the teaching & practice of Jesus Christ are reached - that the process has all the character of a gradual & continuous develop-ment. It is instructive, however, to notice that Professor Jevons believes the contrary. With that dogmatic tendency which we have already remarked in at least his earlier works, & which takes the form of postulating a special Divine creative inter-vention to bridge the gaps which he inveterately sees in the evolutionary process, he declares that there is a chasm, in all man's efforts after communion with God & towards true prayer, between him & God or the gods, which it needs a new revelation to bridge. "And that revelation" he says, "is made in Our Lord's Prayer." "With", he adds, "the most earnest & unfeigned desire to see the theory of evolution as a means of ordering the facts of the history of religion & of enabling us - so far it can enable us - to understand them, one is bound to notice as a fact that the theory of evolution is unable to account for or explain the revelation, made in Our Lord's Prayer, of the spirit which is both human & divine. It is the beam of light which, turned

on the darkness of the past, enables us to see whither man with his prayers & his sacrifices had been blindly striving, the place where he fain would be."[1] It is not necessary, in order to give the Lord's Prayer its supreme & indeed unique beauty, to make it, as Dr. Jevons does, a crudely miraculous & magical thing, & to regard all earlier human prayer & aspiration as but darkness in contrast with its incomparable light. There is no necessity to consider the chasm between man & God unbridged & unbridgeable until the revelation of that prayer was thrown as it were from Heaven across the gulf. What in that case could one say of the prayers of the Old Testament, of the saints, prophets & psalmists? And what could be said of this Greek prayer to Asclepios: "We rejoice in thy divine salvation, because thou hast shown thyself wholly to us: we rejoice that thou hast deigned to consecrate us to eternity, while we are still in these mortal bodies. We have known thee, oh true life of the life of man... Adoring thy goodness, we make this our only prayer...that thou wouldst be willing to keep us all our lives in the love of thy knowledge."?[2] This, as Farnell truly says, "would not surprise us if found in a Christian liturgy." Examples of an almost equally high spiritual tone might be quoted of prayers addressed to an Egyptian goddess such as Ishtar, to the Sun-God of the monotheistic Akhn-Aten or Amenhotep IV, to Marduk supreme god of Babylon, & others; & it is impossible to regard these as simple

1. Jevons.
2. Evolution of Religion. p.207.

darkness in comparisen with the light of Christian prayer & even of "the prayer that teaches to pray". It is one of the services of the comparative study of religions that we learn from it to reserve the term idolatry for what is low & unethical in all religions & to regard that as true worship of God which, however it names Him, is morally & spiritually high & pure. It is im-possible to deny that in non-Christian times, ppoples & cults, prayer has sometimes risen to an extraordinary height of spirit-ual refinement, both in regard to its conception of the divine nature & its interpretation of human need; & it is equally futile to deny that these noble conceptions & prayers are revelations of God & inspirations of His Spirit given to minds which were able to receive them. The infinite gradations traceable in the relig-ious thought of mankind & in the spiritual quality of their prayers from low to high, mark out a process of evolution of the capacity of man to meet & to express - it is the same thing from two different aspects - a progressive revelation of God. There is one image which might represent the essentially religious attitude of man through out all the ages, namely, that of man face to face with a difficult & hostile world, &, conscious of his own weakness in the struggle with it, tending ever to look round him for someone or something stronger than himself & strong-er than that world, to save him from it & to help him to conquer it. It is what we have called man's Quest for Unity, the fund-amental endeavour, in which man reproduces & carries on, like

the most advanced wave of the tide, the universal evolutionary process, to achieve unification within himself, in his world, & between himself & his world, & so to find harmony & peace. This tendency is creative of religion; & there is, so far as we know, no better explanation of it than to say that the Spirit of the universe implanted the tendency, co-extensive in its incidence with humanity itself; in other words, that God the Omega of man's upward striving is the Alpha of it as well.

Chapter XXII

REASONING OF PRIMITIVE MAN

C. ~~(c)~~. Fatigue or Weariness of Effort.

We have already considered this characteristic of primitive mentality under the heading of the Generalised Mind, & the description there given need here only be supplemented & further illustrated. The lack of co-ordinative power which is the main difference between the primitive type of mind & the civilised or cultivated, manifests itself not only in the difficulty the savage finds in grasping together phenomena & their relations in such a way as to form coherent totalities in thought, like concepts, general ideas, causal connections & general principles or laws, but also in the transience of that grasp & the ease & relief with which he relinquishes any sustained effort of co-ordination ~~thought~~. In judgment & in reasoning, as in more elementary operations of the mind, the primitive falls back upon various ways of resting & escape from the effort to pursue a train of reasoning or to sustain a line of thought.

1. Of these manifestations of Fatigue which we mentioned an important one is that which we have called Atomism. The reasoning of savage man attains comprehensiveness only in a cumulative & as it were inorganic way, piling details together like a handful of pebbles, while the reasoning of the cultured mind forms organic unities in which the details are absorbed & transformed. We may take an illustration from Taboo. Taboos concerning chiefs or

kings continue from the customs of the most primitive tribes through the Shakespearean "divinity that doth hedge a king" to the court etiquette of modern times - but with a difference. In the case of the savage chief whose "mana" is dangerous to all around him, it is not difficult to see the simple atomistic mode of reasoning in operation. The chief has dangerous power; he can only be touched therefore with the greatest precautions. But what about his clothes? No one can wear them after him. His food? The dishes he uses must be broken; anyone eating his leavings dies inevitably. And thus the piling of details goes on with its simple logic, for want of general principles, until the man is a recluse or bound hand & foot by the innumerable things he must not do. An excellent example of this primitive type of reasoning is given by Frazer: "a Maori chief would not blow a fire with his mouth; for his sacred breath would communicate its sanctity to the fire, which would pass it on to the pot on the fire, which would pass it on to the meat in the pot, which would pass it on to the man who ate the meat, which was in the pot, which stood on the fire, which was breathed on by the chief; so that the eater, infected by the chief's breath conveyed through these intermediaries, would surely die."[1] The development of the mind in co-ordinative power makes possible the general idea of sacredness attaching to the king's person, the honour due to him as the head of the state, & even the highly abstract princ-

1. The Golden Bough. (abridged edition). p.205.

-ciple that the "king can do no wrong"; but these, though in the direct line of descent from it, are far beyond the simply cumula-tive, atomistic reasoning of primitive man. It is this char-acteristic which appears in primitive law, which itself is largely developed out of earlier taboos. The "Law of Moses", with its many provisions against "uncleanness", & its generally negative & prohibitory character, has many of the marks of the primitive type of mind, though gleams of higher & more comprehen-sive principles are not wanting even in its earliest forms. The co-ordinative thought which could sum up the whole of the Law & the Prophets in the two great commandments of love to God & love to the neighbour, & the Pauline preference of faith & love to the "works of the law", alike mark the assured grasp upon ethics & religion of the distinctively modern civilised mind. On the other hand, the typical Pharisaism or legalism is a "reversion", a lapse back from the moral & spiritual effort of which the mind had become capable into that care about details of ceremonial purity & ritual, which is but little removed from the method of magic, the spirit of taboo & the general attitude of the savage mind we are describing.

A striking illustration of the same characteristic of primitive reasoning is found in the posthumous Fitzpatrick Lectures of the late W.H.R.Rivers.[1] It is from the realm of Magic, & describes the extraordinary elaborateness of the process by which a sorcerer

1. Medicine, Magic, & Religion. (Kegan Paul) pp.19-24.

of the Kai tribe of New Guinea endeavours to produce the illness & death of an enemy. The details of the method, which is admir-ably self-consistent & logical in its atomistic way, are too numerous to reproduce here, but we may mention a few of them. Hav-ing secured a portion of the soul-substance of the intended victim, by gaining possession of something which had been part of or closely associated with his body, such as hair, nail-par-ings, remains of food & the like, "as soon as possible the sor-cerer wraps the gâ" (as this article is called) "in a leaf of which caterpillars are fond, with the idea that, as the leaf is eaten by caterpillars, so will the body of the victim be eaten by worms." Later, "the packet is wrapped in a prickly creeper so that the body of the victim shall be tormented with painful stings, & then in a leaf with fine hairs which tickle & irritate the skin, & the whole is wrapped in a withered leaf of the bread-fruit tree, with the idea that, as the leaf falls to the ground, so shall the body of the victim wither & fall into the grave." So it goes on in its fantastic elaborations, yet entirely logical, & simple as the adding of stone after stone to a cairn or a child's gathering of shells. There is no organising principle, unless the magical premise that like is the cause of like applied separ-ately to the details of the process may be called such; & the connection of them, as inorganic & mechanical as beads on a string, is maintained, sometimes through "many months",[1] by the fatal pur-

1. Op.cit. p.22.

-pose.

Man's unifications are mechanical & inorganic before they are organic. We have noted this atomism in his primitive language & early conceptual thought. In the absence, through lack of co-ordinative mental power, of general terms which for civilised mind organically unite & comprehend a large number of particulars, the savage takes the details of experience one by one & employs a separate word for each phenomenon, aspect or situation. It is the same mentality which we are observing now in its reasoning processes. We can see quite clearly the unco-ordinated contin-gencies of the illness he wishes to produce come one by one to the sorcerer, & his crude ingenuity invent an appropriate answer-back to each separately, adding thus to the interminable detail of the whole. "The packet is heated at the fire after being covered with fine prickles, & the bark of a tree covered with tubercles is added so that the body of the victim may be covered with similar lumps. The packet is bespattered with the chewed root of a hot peppery plant so that the victim shall have fever. The fire at which the packet is heated must be made only of cert-ain woods & of a creeper, the section of which darkens when it is cut, with the idea that the skin of the victim shall darken & his blood become black...."[1] etc., etc. These individual adaptat-ions of each element in the charm to the symptom of the disease it is desired to produce, are in their hard atomic separateness nearer to the reflexes of instinct than to the higher co-ordinat-ions

1. Op. cit. p.22.

-ions of the civilised intelligence. The attraction for the primitive mind of these series of small operations lies in the ease & simplicity of each one separately, requiring the smallest modicum of thought & providing each time the pleasure of unific-
-ation,[1] the satisfaction of a thing accomplished which all savage experience assures is perfectly certain in its effect. The process as a whole seems to us infinitely wearisome, but it is much less wearisome to the savage than would be the effort to grasp & to hold one comprehensive general idea as to the cause or cure of disease. To be equal to the strain of comprehending how one drug, a poison, could produce all the symptoms & results he aims at by his nefarious magic, or, as a more difficult problem still, how one drug could cure all the different manifestations of the illness, it would be necessary that the primitive should possess the co-ordinating mind which is on the way to the Science & art of Medicine. This atomism or particularism in primitive reasoning is thus an important common element in Taboo, Magic, & primitive Religious Ritual, the three main institutions or customs of savage life everywhere. This mental characteristic is responsible in some part for that almost universal state of savage existence which we shall deal with in the next chapter under the title of the Integration of Custom. It accounts also, by the equilibrium which it secures between the primitive mind & its environment, between the savage & the conditions of his survival, for the long endurance of that Integration in wide regions

1. See Ch.

regions of the globe.

2. To solve his problems by action rather than thought is a further characteristic of primitive man. "In the beginning was the deed", as Goethe said, but not, as he meant it, because the deed was greater then the thought, rather because for earliest man it was easier & less great. We have already noted this also as a quality of the human mind where it is nearest the instinctive. Hence whenever the mind is wearied of the effort of thinking, the tendency is to do something which will meet the situation. In Magic & in Ritual, whether magical or religious or partaking of both, it is actions, not thought, which are called into play. Even in Taboo it is negative action - action to inhibit action. The distinction may be sufficiently illustrated by one salient example of savage custom, namely, Divination with its cognate form, the Ordeal.

To decide his questions by recourse to birds, animals, & later, stars, is an expression of that tendency which we have found to be fundamental in man to see power to help or hinder him in all things which are mysterious to him. The following examples, given by Dr. George Brown, are typical. They are from Samoa. "If an owl flew before a company of Manono warriors, it was a signal to them to go forward, whilst the rainbow in front of them had the same significance. If, on the contrary, the bird crossed the path, or the rainbow was behind them, these were bad

omens

omens". It is worth while perhaps to note the simple, natural element in the reasoning, that the bird flying in front beckons onward; flying across, it crosses the expedition; & the rainbow (most beautiful of omens surely!) is interpreted similarly. Thus further, "In another district of which the totem or village war-god was the kingfisher, if this bird were seen flying before the troops, it was regarded as a good omen; but if flying towards the people, it signified defeat... The movements of certain fishes were also observed, & if these were seen to swim briskly this was a good omen; but if one of them turned about often in swimming, they were afraid." In these examples we perceive once more the savage mind, with its imperfect powers of co-ordination, as observed earlier,[2] seeing causal connections - on the ground chiefly of likeness - between mysterious power in nature & its creatures, & the events of his own experience. It is a further consequence of this sense of mysterious power in the things observed as signs that omens are not regarded merely as presages but as causes of good or evil fortune. As Levy-Bruhl says; "If the decision of the omens is thus sovereign, it is not merely because they are considered to be infallible predictions. The reason is more profound: the favourable omen is a positive aid which is not to be ignored. It is not simply the announcement; it is above all the guarantee, of success; the indispensable guarantee, the condition sine qua non. It is not enough, therefore

1. Melanesians & Polynesians. George Brown D.D. (Macmillan 1910) pp.174-175.
2. See Ch.

-fore that no evil omen has appeared. It is still necessary that favourable omens should be produced. In their absence no-thing is done, even if it is disastrous to refrain."[1].

It is an important point that the observation of omens is a sub-stitute for thought; it is even at times, as just seen, a sub-stitute for action. The great chief, the savage Napoleon, the beginner of a new era for his tribe, who became a myth & legend tp more degenerate times, may very likely have been one whose more organised & organising brain left others to take the omens, while he by titanic mental effort produced a new weapon or tool, a new military formation, a migratory impulse, a better boat. In the Ordeal there is a practical method of solving problems without mental effort which, so long as confidence is placed in it, keeps constructive thought & Law permanently at bay, or indeed far out of sight. As Levy-Bruhl expresses the West African point of view; "Why fatigue oneself with laborious investigations when it is so easy to get at the truth by making the vessel of muavi pro-nounce the verdict?"[2].

The Ordeal as a substitute for thought & a relief from mental effort has had an unconscionably long life even in civilisation. The reasons are not far to seek. One is that it was reinforced by the religious idea - never thoroughly reasoned out & generally the product of excited feeling or passion as in the duel or in war - that the gods or God threw a weight, imponderable but dec-isive

1. La Mentalité Primitive. p.131.
2. ibid. p.247.

-isive, upon the just side. This was for ~~the~~ long the theory of the duel, & it is set out with his ~~grace~~ usual grace by Maeter-linck in the essay to which we have before referred. It is also for multitudes of civilised people a powerful subconscious justification for war. Another reason is that the increasing demands in modern civilisation for mental effort induce fatigue & therefore increase the tendency to fall back upon methods of judgment & decision in which thought is abrogated, as in games of chance & gambling. It is significant that it was from the lowest stratum of civilised ~~at~~ society, in which the environment & the mentality most nearly reproduce the conditions of savage life, that recruits for the late war were most easily & swiftly drawn, & that it is from the same stratum chiefly that those come who set their hope for a better life for themselves on a class war or some wild hazard of revolution. There is probably no de-liverance from the danger to civilisation of reversion to savag-ery except the increasing prevalence & cultivation of the typic-al civilised mind with its ever wider, deeper, more sensitive & more sympathetic co-ordinations, & the diffusion of a spirit whose essence is faith in the unifications, both theoretical & practical, of that ~~xxx~~ mind.

To return to the primitive savage from whom we have perhaps not unpardonably digressed, it may be remarked that Divination & its special form of the Ordeal are methods of solving their rudiment-

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-ary moral problems naturally taken by minds which are not yet capable of producing for themselves laws of evidence & judgment. Psychologically, they can probably always be interpreted as part-icular cases of the application of the savage conception of causality, especially the principle that like is the cause of like, which plays so great a part in Magic & magico-religious Ritual. They are thus typical of the tendency under notice to avoid or to escape from the fatigue of co-ordinative thought into the easier channels of action, which is characteristic of that primitive & savage condition of life which we name comprehensive-ly the Integration of Custom.

3. A further quality of the primitive mind which brings it under the general heading of Fatigue, is what modern psychology would call Suggestibility. The savage is extraordinarily credulous & uncritical as to the communications of his fellows. The first explanation of this which would occur to some anthropologists is summed up in the phrase, the Herd Instinct. This theory, not without value in certain directions, must be used with caution, particularly with respect to the meaning to be attached to the word "Herd". In the extreme forms of the theory, the word im-plies close analogies to the wolf-pack or the herd of deer which are exceedingly doubtful as representations of the early group-life of man. There is, it is true, a sufficiently striking resemblance between the implicit obedience of the individual in

the tribe to tribal custom & the iron authority of the group over its members, on the one hand, & the instinctive unity of the herd on the other, moving like a single animal all under one impulse. But resemblances in nature are not always reached by the same road, as in the case of the branching coral & the tree, or the diamond & the sun-stricken crystal. The rigidity of the Integr-ation of Custom in the tribal life of man is the product of in-telligent reflection, rudimentary but real, hardened by tradit-ion & fear of change into habits of the tribe to which obedience is almost instinctive. The rigidity of the Herd Instinct is the product of instinctive reflexes, the only difference being that the perceptions of any one individual animal may start the reflexive circuit which sets the herd as a whole in motion. The associations of animals in herds & flocks, therefore, is adapted to the small-brained, long-muzzled, long-sighted quadrupeds rath-er than to the large-brained, short-muzzled, short-sighted, hand-using anthropoids. The only apes which live successfully in real herds are certain kinds of baboons, which are very distant in the simian scale from the anthropoids & are almost quadrupeds in many respects. Their brains, smaller than those of the man-like apes, yet denoting their kinship to the latter by being larger in proportion than those of other quadrupeds, enable them to modify in a slight degree the instinctive operations of the herd in the direction of intelligence, as in accepting leadership,

placing sentinels & the like; but that is all that can be said. In the case of the anthropoid apes evidence of the herd type of social organisation is conspicuously lacking. The large-brain-ed, eye-minded anthropoid, with its tendency to inward reflect-ion, which became human, reached its life in society in another way. The long & comparatively helpless infancy sharpened the necessity of communication between the mother & child, between both parents & the young. The early development of the organs of speech enabled this humanoid creature to call his relatives or his fellows to his help against an enemy or in the capture of the prey. Hence the communication of ideas first in warnings of common danger & then instructions & later plans for common action. The achievment of some great means of safety such as the cave or the discovery of the use of fire would facilitate the gathering of the elders of the group for interchange of experi-ences & of ideas. There are few races, however primitive, where there is not the assembly of an evening of the hunters around the camp-fire, when tales are told of familiar or strange happenings, suggestions as to the problems of life, practical or theoretical, are interchanged, & even dim speculations struggle for expression against the imperfections of mind & speech. Here probably is the quite natural source of those "représentations collectives", those common ideas both as to the seen & the occult world, which dominate the thought & practice of primitive man, &

issue

issue in his magical & religious customs.

In these conversations & interchanges of ideas within the group two lines of thought & experience would emerge. Along the first, that of communicated observations of simple natural facts such as the signs & tracks of game, there would be built up by instruct-ion & correction from experience that small body of accurate knowledge, often astonishing to the civilised, which is the savage's natural science. Along the other line we meet with that power of his mind which was among the first gifts of his large brain, & which differentiates him very completely from the other animals, namely, Imagination. The specific work of imag-ination is the representation or vision within the mind of exis-tences which may have no reality corresponding to them in the external world. Man has from his common inheritance with the animals the perception of power in things in the simple experien-ce that they are able to <u>do</u> things, which Power he classifies into activities which help or injure him. But when he comes face to face with things which he cannot understand, but which challenge his attention because they do things which excite his awe or fear, Imagination steps in & dimly bodies forth to his mind power in these phenomena which is mysterious, invisible, intangible. Here, then, is a subject of intense & palpitating interest for communication between primitive man & his fellows. Thus are related the whispering sounds in the trees when no wind was felt,

the bird call when no bird was seen, the strange movement up-stream of a black tree-trunk, the vivid dream of one's own death under the fallen rock, or of the clearly-seen dead ancestors; & the simplest conclusion about them is not at first gods or spirits, but that there is power there, mysterious, beyond reach of hands or weapons, & therefore dangerous & somehow to be guarded against. There are two circumstances which make primitive man remarkably "suggestible" to such ideas. One is that they are the creation of imaginatively-heightened fear. It is vastly safer, it seems, to believe in them than not. Even civilised people "touch wood" or avoid 13, because there is no harm in being on the safe side. The other point may be illustrated by the follwwing passage from "The Jungle Book". The village hunter "Buldeo was explaining how the tiger that had carried away Messua's son was a ghost-tiger, & his body was inhabited by the ghost of a wicked old money-lender, who had died some years ago. 'And I know that this is true,' he said, 'because Purun Das always limped from the blow that he got in a riot when his account-books were burned, & the tiger that I speak of he limps, too, for the tracks of his pads are unequal.'

'True, true; that must be the truth,' said the graybeards, nodding together.

'Are all these tales such cobwebs & moontalk?' said Mowgli, 'that tiger limps because he was born lame, as every one knows. To talk of the soul of a money-lender in a beast that had never had

the courage of a jackal is child's talk.'"[1]

The "inside" knowledge Mowgli had of the animal gossip of the jungle is, of course, normally absent; & such tales as this of Buldeo to the wondering & believing graybeards of the community, & the naive kind of reasoning are unchallenged & accepted because it is impossible to disprove them. The effort of critical reas-oning which could put these intangible phenomena to some search-ing test of reality is far beyond the power of the primitive type of brain; & any savage mind which attempted it would speed-ily desist from fatigue. Thus would grow up the system of savage belief by an atomistic accretion of communicated experien-ces, with the common element underlying of the idea of myster-ious power, accompanied by vague suggestions of life & will, which is expressed by "Mana", & which is sufficiently simple & general to be regarded as the generalised type from which the many other savage ideas of Magic & Religion have developed. Thus also would grow up the practical methods of dealing with the perilous power in mysterious things, persons & events. One & another in these informal gatherings of the group, when they are relaxed & at leisure to gossip & exchange experiences, describes the charm, the fetich, the ritual act which for him has been effi-cacious, or, if untried, seems likely to be. As Levy-Bruhl, for example, says, "In a number of primitive societies in which every one pays the greatest attention to dreams, the people ask each

1. The Jungle Book. p.97.

each other every morning as to their dreams, narrate & interpret them: there is always at least one among them who has had a dream."[1]

One may sum up under three points the factors which make the mind of the tribe extremely open to such suggestions, whether of crude speculation or practical method. One is the imaginative sense of unknown power which was the probably invariable result of the substitution of intelligence & imagination for instinct, & which drove early man to accept easily any avenue or means of escape from its perils. The second is the fact that the critical reason, & the prefrontal region of the brain on which it depends, are undeveloped, & assent is given to such suggestions in a manner resembling the smooth flow of instinct. The third factor is the solidarity of the group or clan or tribe itself. In that close association the perilous power, which is conceived of naturally as a kind of infectious & contagious miasma, would pass readily from one to another & threaten the whole. The psychology of the crowd in modern times renders familiar to us the sudden panics, the unreasoning impulsive mind, the tendency to action rather than thought, the childish whims, even the cruelty & savagery inconceivable to the same individuals apart from the crowd & its emotion, in all of which there is a reversion or return to a more primitive state of mind. Still more for savage man in the mass the vagueness & indefiniteness of dangerous possibility heightens the sense

1. La Mentalite Primitive. pp.96-98.

sense of peril, & so the group imposes more stringent rules for Taboo, for the use of Magic & for the exact performance of Religious Ritual, & severer penalties for violation, than would otherwise be the case. Disobedience to such regulations menaces the whole community: no man knows whom the incalculable power may strike: no one can see the limits of the forces set in motion: & hence the only safety is in absolute obedience. It is from these causes, inherent as we have sought to show in the nature of primitive mind, that the immense & often crushing authority of the tribe & its customs over the individual is built up. ~~Thus~~ Thence it is that what we are now to describe as the Integration of Custom derives that static & enduring character, & that appearance of complicated mechanism, which it shares, though on the higher plane of intelligence, with the Integration of Instinct.

Chapter XXIII

THE INTEGRATION OF CUSTOM

We are wont to speak of "savage" life & of "the savage" as dis-
-tinct from civilisation & the civilised person, & it is clear enough what we mean. The terms do accurately describe certain common characteristics of a large portion of mankind. These characteristics, though they belong to very varied & widely-
-scattered peoples all over the globe, are so definite & in their nature so universal among them, that they enable us to group these tribes & races under one common name of "savages". It has also been our endeavour in the preceding chapters to show that the savage's habitw of thinking & conduct are "primitive" on the whole, in that they probably reproduce in many respects the ways of thought & action of the earliest human beings on the earth, & are the expression of minds which are primitive in character as com-
-pared with those of civilised & cultured races. These primitive mental characters are solidified & crystallised into what are called the Customs of savage peoples; & there is so much that is common to all savages in such customs, amid the most bewildering variety in detail, that it is possible to speak of that body of thought & practice as the Integration of Custom.

This is the more natural as there is a certain static quality, a stability, in the customs of primitive peoples which, so long as certain disintegrating & differentiating influences which we have shortly to describe are absent, enables them to remain for vast periods the same or but slightly changed. Indeed, since, follow-
-ing

Mr. Spencer, we regard the progress of man in common with the rest of the universe as proceeding by a series of integrations with intervening differentiations, we have already suggested that after the well-defined stage in the evolution of life which we have called the Integration of Instinct, there succeeded in the history of human development the great Integration of Custom, linked to the former by the differentiations created by intelligence playing upon or working with the instincts as its material. Intelligence & the incipiently reflective brain lead even the higher animals, but above all man, out from the world of instinct into a larger & wider world. For the definite grooves & quasi-mechanical reflexive circuits of instinct there are substituted the vastly more varied reactions of intelligence to circumstances & the environment; & alternative ways of dealing with these, aims consciously pursued, plans, & finally for man even theories, enrich the possibilities & freedom of life. The material with which the instincts are concerned, & the instincts themselves, become the subjects of man's primitively reflective thought. Thence arise certain general ways of thinking about the phenomena of experience & of dealing with them practically, which, being accepted by man's social groups as meeting their requirements, become the Customs of his clans & tribes. But just as the repeated & customary thoughts & acts of the individual tend to become instinctive, & to recover the unreflectiveness,

unconsciousness & quasi-mechanical character of instinct, so the ways of thinking & especially the practices of the social groups of primitive man, (who has only just broken out from the realm of the instinctive,) becoming customary & traditional & weighted with the authority of the group, recover within the integration of intelligence the unreflectiveness, the quasi-mechanism, & the unquestioning obedience of the integration of instinct. It is these characteristics which have induced Levy-Bruhl to treat the "immediacy" of primitive man's responses to the representations & customs of his social group, & the "imperviousness" of his mind "to experience" as constituting a peculiar mentality. They are, however, simply the restoration, through the customs of habits of the group, of qualities which characterise the reflexive circuits & stereotyped modes of action of the instinctive stage of evol-ution.

In view of the nearness of primitive man to the instinctive, & the large place it has in his life, & taking into account the tendency just noted to sink back upon instinct in his habitual behaviour, it is probably a good method of examining him within the Integration of Custom to refer back to the impulses, motives & conduct of his ancestral instinctive life, & to trace some parallels between the two. As a largely instinctive animal, then, there would be observable in the sub-human ancestor the motive power of Self-preservation. This would have its negative

&

& positive manifestations in flight from danger, with the accompanying emotion of fear, & the food-quest with its feeling of desire. The other motive, which divides the interest of living things almost equally with Self-preservation, is sometimes called Other-preservation, & embraces those impulses & instincts to which Nature has entrusted the future & the continuance of races of living beings. The most powerful of these other-preservative motives is the Sex-Instinct. Associated with it closely & springing from it, is what may be called the Instinct of Kinship, which begins with the parental relationship in the animal family, with its necessary care & even sacrifice for the more or less helpless young. This branches out into the various impulses & motives of social & group life, one of the most important of which from our point of view is the motive of Self-suppression. This appears even so early as in the denial of his own appetite by the male wolf in order to take the "kill" to the mate & the cubs; & it culminates for the savage in his unquestioning submission to the authority of the social group & the impressiveness for him of the danger of injuring the tribe as a whole by any error or "sin" of his own as an individual. We may now examine these motive powers as worked over by the rudimentary human intelligence & the results within the Integration of Custom, as embodied, that is, in the Customs of savage man.

(a) The impulse of Self-preservation is expressed in man as in other animals

by flight from the object of fear & other natural reactions. But man is different from the animals in the possession of Imagination; & the first result of that immensely significant gift of mind is the dim imagining of power in things about which there is any strangeness or mystery to him. Ommipresent fear compels imagination to visualise the mysterious power as dangerous. The substitute for instinctive flight from such intangible power & peril is the Custom of Taboo. Taboos are thus essentially ways & means, often simple & often extremely complicated, of marking & warding off the dangerous power of mysterious things, persons & events. The frequently elaborate customs of savage man the world over concerning the uncomprehended forces & occurrences in life, such as birth, adolescence, marriage, death, & concerning persons who have large indefinite powers, the sorcerer, the priest, the chief or king, are mainly varieties & as it were foliations of Taboo. And since the fear of such mysterious power is felt by the whole social group, taboos easily slip into laws imposed by the group for its protection, offences against them are sins against the social conscience, & thus the sapling Taboo may be seen making in its growth towards the great spreading tree whose twin branches are Law & Ethics.

When the mysterious power or "mana" in things-to-be-feared, which from the beginning was probably interwoven with vague ideas of life & will, rises into the stage of Animism & to the conception of personal beings or spirits, there is a corresponding change

change in the customary ways of dealing with it; & Taboo here yields to Customs whose essence is conciliation & propitiation, (or it may even be coercion), such as Sacrifice, Supplication, & in general the practices of Magic & the rites of Religion.

(b). The other great impulse of Self-preservation is that involved in the search for food. The two supreme pre-occupations of the animals, apart from that of sex, are the escape from danger & the securing of food. In the latter the larger-brained animals sup-plement instinctive activities with the operations of intelli-gence. In man, reflection, which is not only intelligent but imaginative, upon the food-quest & the animal or plant object of it, has two results. One is the accumulation of natural facts about the food-creature, its nature, habits, haunts, tracks & so on, which he observes & takes into account in his hunting. The other result is that under the influence of what the psychologist would call an "anxiety-complex," the savage sees the creature in an imaginative haze, is impressed with its beneficence or its incalculable caprice, with the strangeness of its coming & going, & thus looks upon it as invested with mysterious power, & even will, to bless or to inflict privation upon his life. His pract-ical measures in dealing with this "mana" in the object of his food-quest comprise a great part of the customs of his Magic.

(c). This sense of mysterious power in the food-animal (or plant), to-gether with the feeling of its necessity & beneficence, is one

of the main roots of Totemism. The simple idea of being "all-one-flesh" with the animal which when eaten becomes part of oneself, coalescing with the conciliatory attitude to it as benef-icent expressed in terms of kinship like "father", "grandfather" & so forth, may account for the idea of kinship between the totem animal & the tribe. The eating of the totem animal is frequent-ly forbidden to the group or individual whose totem it is; & this appears to contradict the theory that it was the food-animal which became the totem. It is not necessary, as we have before remarked, to suppose one sole & universal origin of totemism or of any savage custom.[1] The solution of the problem may possibly be that at the earliest & most primitive stages the food animal gathered to it the reverence of the tribe to which it specially belonged, & whose magical rites were designed to increase its numbers. But as it acquired sacredness, & at the same time the sense of kinship with it developed, the savage at first only ate it with expiatory & as it were apologetic rites, & then under severe restrictions; & finally, pursuing his simple logic, revered it so much, & felt it so deeply his kin, that he dared not kill or eat it at all. The following quotation by Frazer from Sir George Grey as to a totem or kobong in Western Australia, illustrates the mode in which such restrictions may have encroached upon the original free use, as an animal uses its habitual prey, of the totem creature for food. "A certain mysterious

1. See Ch. XIV

connexion exists between a family & its kobong, so that a member of the family will never kill an animal of the species to which his kobong belongs, should he find it asleep; indeed he always kills it reluctantly, & never without affording it a chance to escape. This arises from the ~~[illegible]~~ family belief that some one individual of the species is their nearest friend, to kill whom would be a great crime, & to be carefully avoided. Similarly, a native who has a vegetable for his kobong may not gather it under certain circumstances, & at a particular period of the year [1.] ".

Totemism, it is generally admitted, is an early type of culture, & survives in modern times mainly in animal names of tribes as among the Amerindians, in the feeling of kinship among those who have the same totemistic name, & particularly in Australia, in the restrictions upon marriage amongst the clans & phratries, which are involved in the regulations of Exogamy. It seems probable that as man advanced in co-ordinative power of mind & towards the animistic stage of culture, & thus came to conceive the objects of his reverence anthropomorphically & in spirit-form the Totem would slip behind that spirit-shape & become lost to view. There are lowly tribes, for example in Australia, who can speak of animals as their ancestors apparently without any sense of incongruity; & this we have ascribed to their imperfect powers of co-ordination; but the tendency to conceive of the ancestor

1. The Golden Bough (abridged edition) p.639.

as human or humanlike could not but prevail in the end, & the spirit of Animism, the god of later cults, would supervene. The common meal in which the flesh of the god is partaken of solemnly & symbolically by all the people has probably its origin, as in Robertson Smith's famous theory, in the totemistic practice of the food-animal being first ritually & sacramentally eaten before it was permissible to kill & use it for daily food. As the god becomes more personal & spiritual in character, the sacr-ament grows more finely symbolical, until it is capable in the Christian Eucharist of expressing the purest mystical & spiritual communion. The humblest form of unification sought by man with the animal or plant which was his daily bread & became physically part of him, & yet, from the first moment of his thought about it was invested with mystery & hence with sacredness, is thus line-ally connected with that communion with God which may be indep-endent of all symbols, & still is a deep & true unification of the soul within itself & with its universe.

2. The impulse of Other-preservation, within the integration of instinct, is directed towards the production & continuance of the race. The two main race-preserving instincts, the Instinct of Kin & the Instinct of Sex, are nowhere stronger than in man. One reason of this is his supremely sensitive nervous organisation. Another is that the long & helpless infancy of man makes the parental, protective impulses & affections necessary for his survival

survival; & as regards the sex instinct, the human quality of imagination very greatly increases its power over the mind.

(a). The Instinct of Kin is mainly of importance to the Integration of Custom as creative of the solidarity of the primitive social group. The type of organisation which may be loosely called tribal is one of the distinctive characteristics of savage life as compared with that of the civilised peoples which are organis-ed as nations, states & empires. The fundamental bond of the tribe is that of kinship. The controversy as to whether the original human group was of the promiscuous or family type, & the similar discussion as to whether matrilineal or patrilineal organisation was the earlier, are still in process; & we do not pro-pose here to enter upon them. We should maintain, however, that the earliest social unifications were doubtless woven of the threads of kinship, & that the most elementary & at the same time immensely formative type of community was that of mother & child. The latter position is elaborated with much skill by Mr. E.W. Hirst in his book, "Self & Neighbour",[1] in which he traces all forms of "community" to the parental instinct, or with its associ-ated impulses & emotions, the parental sentiment. He may be quoted here as stating finely the connection in human development between this elementary relation & the very highest unifications of the human spirit whether within itself or in its social organ-isations. "For just as in the biological phenomena of propag-

1. Self & Neighbour. Edward W. Hirst. (Macmillan. 1919) -ation

-ation the individual & the race are merged, just as in the pro-
-cess of gestation the mother lives alike for herself & the child
that is to be, so in that mental syatem we call the parental
sentiment, regard for 'ego' & for 'alter' is organised as a unity.
The parent by caring for herself cares for her offspring, & vice
versa....There is duality of reference in the content combined
with a reconciliation of interest. And it is therefore in the
parental sentiment that we find the psychological possibility of
that ethical love which, in the experience of community, effects
the unification of self & neighbour." [1] Describing the psycholog-
-ical "extension" of this sentiment not merely to the weak &
defenceless but to every rational creature, he adds; "To enlist
this fundamental nutritive & protective impulse on behalf of man
as man, to regard your neighbour everywhere & anywhere as your-
-self, to experience a unity with all souls, is to attain the
utmost ethical development of which the mind is capable...love,
which has its origin in organic conditions, is capable of sub-
-limation & extension, till a stage is reached in which it becom-
-es a devotion to the spiritual community of all men." [2]
The unifications of the social group, based on kinship, are of
all degrees of looseness or organic unity. The question why
certain races, like the Australians & the Eskimos, have not
developed a social organisation beyond that of small clans &
vaguely related larger groups, while others such as the ancient
Greeks & the modern dominant races have grown from tribes to
nations

1. Op. cit. pp. 149-150.
2. ibid. pp. 150-151.

nations & empires, points forward to our next chapter. One re-marks here, however, that it is fundamentally one of psychol-ogical differences. The lowest type of race, with ill-developed co-ordinative functions of the brain, is lacking in the power to make large unifications, not merely of an abstract character, but of a concrete kind. Hence the organisation of great masses of men under a keen consciousness of unity, tribal or national, has been left to the races which have the late type of brain, of large pre-frontal development, & the civilised type of mind with great co-ordinative powers. The races which have been capable of holding one great idea in common, such as an aim of migration or conquest, an ideal such as that of a Promised Land, have been those who have broken through the integrations of clan & tribe, & created the complex unifications of civilised & cultured soc-iety. The peoples which have not that capacity attain their unifications in simple concrete ways, as by totemistic ideas, names, & ceremonies, minglings of blood at initiations, & rare & transient re-unions for the purpose of "making the boys men". Beyond this they may never pass for many long ages. It is, however, of some significance that the lowliest tribal organisat-ion is built up from reflection upon the instinct of kin, & has some relation to universal human ties & affections. The Austr-alian does not, it is true, conceive of Daramulun as a "high god" nor as "divine"; but he calls him "father", as he calls his headman or his elders.[1] Thus even he may not be permanently beyond

1. Howitt. The Native Tribes of South-East Australia. pp. 500-501.

beyond the pale or grasp of a religion whose unifying principle is Fatherhood & its social organisation expressible in terms of the family or a brotherhood.

b). The Sex Instinct is the concentrated essence of nature's interest in the race & its future. It is strongest in man because of his highly sensitive nervous system & the power of his imagination. Of all men too it is strongest in the savage who has not the developed co-ordinative quality of the mind which directly imposes control & the inhibitions of reason upon these impulses, & which indirectly restrains & limits them by supplying other absorbing & competing interests. The lack of the control which is resident for the higher races in the pre-frontal region of the brain, together with the comparatively high development of the imagination, would probably have destroyed many primitive races had it not been for the fear of the mysterious power of sex which imposed innumerable taboos & restrictions & thus ensured survival. This terror of sex which creates the countless taboos relating to women, to birth, adolescence, marriage & so forth, is nature's cunning substitute for the functional, seasonal, & periodic limitations to which the other animals are subject. On the other hand, in spite of the restrictions imposed by the customs & laws which are the product of the fear of the mana of sex, absorption in the sex-interest is probably a very important cause of

of the stagnation & even degeneration of many savage peoples, so that they remain at a low level of culture & never break out from the integration of custom & of the tribal life into the ways which lead to civilisation.

This cause operates in several directions. The immense place which rites concerning sex occupy in life, absorbing time & re-stricting other activities in many ways, limits the time & atten-tion which might be given to the improvement of the arts of life. The dullness & lassitude which as a result of this pre-occupation have been observed to afflict the savage, would also put an embargo upon inventiveness, originality & progress. The practices, moreover, to which this obsession gives rise, while they may chance to increase fertility, as some suppose circum-cision, for example, to do, very probably have the effect for the most part of reducing it & keeping down the numbers of the race. There is something truly pathetic in the ceremonies of initiation among some of the Australian tribes, when most of the dramatic representations which shock the civilised observer are really moral lessons in which an evil practice is dramatised before the adolescents & accompanied with an expression of dis-gust or reprobation like "yah!", which negatives the whole,[1] or ended with the injunction, "If you do this after you get back to camp, you will be killed".[2] It has the pathos of the first crude struggles of ethics & moral idealism with the poor instrument of the savage understanding - the pathos also of the probability

1. Howitt. op. cit.p533

2. Ibid. p.549.

that the evil suggestions are likely to have more potency than the moral prohibition, enforced though it be by the solemnity of the occasion.

Two things, it appears to us, were necessary to the growth, if that was to be, of such small & primitive clans into the large tribal masses or hordes which, as observed in history, shattered the Integration of Custom & moved on to become nations & civilis-ations. On the one hand, there had to come the development of the prefrontal region of the brain, & the corresponding power of the mind, which at once exercise control over the passions & at the same time are capable of the higher mental unifications such as conceptions, invention & discovery. On the other hand, there was necessary that knowledge of sex & its relations which would eliminate the excessive wastage of life at its source, & ensure fertility & increase of numbers so as to form those masses of migratory tribes from whose conquests & settlements the civilis-ations known to us have chiefly arisen. It may be suggested, therefore, that the pastoral stage of culture, with its use of domesticated animals like cattle & sheep, probably provided that security of life & abundance of food which make the existence of great tribes possible, while at the same time it educated man in the knowledge of sex, particularly as to what was good for mother & child, so that the natural laws of the herd became the moral laws of the horde.

3. One important feature of the Integration of Custom & of the trib-
-al system within which all savages, as distinguished from the
civilised races, live, is the deep subordination of the individ-
-ual to the whole. Self-suppression, in the form of absolute
obedience to the customs of the tribe, is so habitual as to re-
-cover almost the stability & mechanism of instinct. It is
this feature which induces Levy-Bruhl to say that all the ideas
of the savage are tribal ideas,"collective representations", &
leads Durkheim to the doctrine that the essence , not merely of
savage religion, but of all religion, is worship of the group,
that the object of religious worship is really the group itself.
We have maintained earlier that these doctrines are exaggerations
of a genuine fact in savage mentality, which we have endeavoured
to analyse. The fact referred to is that the sense of mysteri-
-ous power-life-will or mana in things which we have regarded as
the original germ both of magic & religion, together with the
fear, which as a rule is associated with it, naturally spreads
from mind to mind in the social group & becomes intensified &
imaginatively heightened in the process. The group therefore,
with an emphasis derived from its common nervousness & the im-
-pressiveness of its mass, imposes its customary ways of dealing
with these mysterious & perilous phenomena of experience upon
the individual. The suggestibility of minds of the primitive
type increases the effect of the authority of the group; & this

suggestibility is quite different from the openness & intellectu-
-al receptiveness of the cultured mind. For the savage will readily enough accept accretions to his magical charms & further details of ritual which it is supposed add to the efficacy of the spell or ceremony; but this must be within the custom of the tribe. Alterations in the custom itself are either simply in-
-conceivable or are suppressed as threatening the whole group with immeasurable harm. "Precept upon precept & line upon line" may be added to the law of ritual & magical practice & the good issue will seem only the more secure; but attempt to substitute the law by a spirit or to exchange the custom for a better one, & every hand of the tribe will grasp a stone or club to avenge the contumacy, & above all to avert catastrophe from themsel-
-ves.

There is, however, one form of Self-suppression which has more of promise in it. There are probably no tribes which do not delegate some of their functions as a whole & as individuals to a special class of men. The simplest secular enterprise of the group demands a leader: someone must be first in Indian file go-
-ing through the bush. So Palaeolithic man has his "represent-
-ative men" in those magician-artists who aid the hunt by their engravings & paintings in the cave. So emerges the "Turrwan" of Queensland, the "great man", the rainmaker, the witch-doctor, the priest, the chief, the priest-king. The authority of the tribe

over its members is delegated to the authoritative individual. He himself, indeed, may be so bound by the authority of tribal custom that he can hardly move for taboos; & custom may decree that he must live only to be sacrificed at the last for the life of the community. But precisely in this emergence of the auth-oritative man there is embodied nature's inveterate urge towards variation, towards new & richer unifications. There is here the basis of leadership in some great enterprise, the possibility of some epoch-making invention, the tendency to develop a ruling class & found dynasties. A certain degree of mental development is necessary not only in the authoritative class but in the people generally, before these advances are possible; & tribes ~~xx~~ such as the Australians are apparently too lowly to be capable of the necessary co-ordinations of thought. But once this power arrives, the special position of this leading & to a degree powerful order of men provides a spear-point for the advance which breaks up "the cake of custom" in Bagehot's phrase, & pre-pares for the larger unifications of polity & civilisation.

4. It is these characteristics of the life of savage man which ac-count for the stability of his condition & enable us to describe all his tribes as contrasted with the civilised peoples as being all within the Integration of Custom. What that static condit-ion is in which many tribes the world over & of every type

remain

remain for long ages, & what creates it, may be summarised in a brief reference to those primitive Australian people who are the most striking & perhaps best known example of it. They have in the first place a low mental development, an archaic type of brain, deficient in the organs & powers of co-ordination. This has necessarily restricted the possibility of invention or dis-covery, which are in the nature of unifications, & has preven-ted such an advance as the domestication of food animals, or the simplest agriculture or practice of irrigation. The same undeveloped mind, "suggestible" & undiscriminating, gives an extreme authority to custom, & reduces individual initiative to a minimum. The customs themselves, particularly as to food & sex, which crude intelligence substitutes for instinct, probably interfere with the natural fertility & increase of the race, & thus keep down its numbers. The hardness of the struggle for existence in a harsh environment, with the Australian as with the Eskimo, reduces them further to small & widely-scattered clans. The small numbers once more react upon the possibility of pro-gress by affording nature fewer opportunities of variation in useful directions such as the larger brain & more inventive mind. There are thus no great aggregations which might throw up some unusual man or genius or leader who should initiate a literally epoch-making conquest of the environment, or set in motion those migrations which have had much to do with the making of the great modern nations.

The influences thus seen in the extreme case of the Australian tribes are present, with variations owing to generally higher mental capacity & more favourable environment, in other uncivilised races in all quarters of the globe. The features of their life which keep them within the integration of custom, while other races break out into differentiations which ultimately become the order & institutions of civilisation, are substantially the same everywhere. In all there is the iron authority of the social group over the individual, suppressing originality, & accepted with an obedience resembling that of instinct. There is the overwhelming preference of action to thought, the tendency to solve life's problems by doing things, in ritual of Magic or Religion, instead of by reflection & theory. There is the confining of energy to elaborations of customs within themselves, & the consequent diffusion of energy in the petty details of such customary practices. One adds the "fatigue" of the uncultured & unco-ordinated mind which falls back all too easily from the effort of inward thought to the outward act. Finally, there is the nature of the Customs themselves, which by interference with sexual functions & relations & so with fertility & the life of offspring, by infanticide, exogamous & other restrictions of marriage, tribal wars, head-hunting & the like, poison ordeals, penalties for infractions of taboos, restrict the numbers & increase of the group. Hence there is maintained a sort of

equilibrium

equilibrium in the struggle for existence between the race & its environment which gives a stability to the savage condition & mode of life resembling that of communities of bees & ants within the realm of instinct.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF CUSTOM

Polity: Morals: Religion.

Civilisation has grown up out of barbarism & savagery. The ancestor of the cultivated man was the primitive savage, as his ancestor was an anthropoid animal. The evolution of mind as of body is a continuous evolution, though considerable variations or mutations may have occurred suddenly. On the verge of history the early inhabitants of Britain, Neolithic folk & their successors, show dimly through the mists as not much different, in habit & condition at least, from shellfish-eating & fishing or hunting tribes of the present day. It is legitimate to surmise that in belief & custom the primitive ancestor of civilised man also resembled the existing savage; & this is confirmed by what remains have been found of Palaeolithic, Mesolithic & Neolithic man in Europe, & what is known in history of their uncivilised successors. It is probable, therefore, that the primitive savage from whom the cultured European or American is sprung, had his vague imagination of Mana in things, his Taboos, his Magic & his Animistic Religion, in various forms & stages, & his corresponding practical methods, parallel to those of tribes which live to-day within the Integration of Custom. Survivals in the historic period & in the superstitions of our time indicate that this is the path trodden by our forebears before they struck into the great highroad of civilised life.

If one asks what made the difference, why, for example, the Australian

Australian has remained as he is, almost as archaic in his way as his animal neighbours, the Marsupials, while a race of Palaeo-lithic blood has moved on through the Azilian & Neolithic cult-ures to the European of history & civilisation, one may attempt an answer in which there is a good deal of speculation, but which nevertheless leads some way towards the truth. There are thus two great factors in the progress of man from savagery to civil-isation. They also mark two great lines of differentiation along which nature moves in accordance with her law of evolution, breaking up the Integration of Custom & shattering the associated integration of the tribe, & constituting gradually the immense new Integration - which is itself a complex of many subordinate & wonderfully varied integrations - of Civilised Life. These factors of differentiation were:

I. The Domestication of Food Animals & Plants, &

II. The Development of the Pre-frontal Region of the Brain.

The latter point, it is necessary to remark before proceeding to the discussion of each in turn, encounters the difficulty at the outset that many races which remain uncivilised have an apparent-ly good frontal development & are not small-brained. This is true, for instance, of the Bantu peoples in Africa & the American Indians, many of whom have "good" foreheads & "regular" features. But these races are very probably mixtures in which a higher type of brain development has been united with a lower, "Caucasian"

with Negroid in the one case & "Caucasian" with Mongoloid in the other; & both in intelligence & capacity for civilisation they are midway between the truly primitive & the cultured type. It is broadly true that all races which are civilised or have achieved civilisation in the past are comparatively "high-browed", that is, well-developed frontally, while those, such as the Australians, the extinct Tasmanians, & the purely Negroid races, which have foreheads "villainous low" & the co-ordinative region undeveloped, are, generally speaking, at the typically primitive level alike of intelligence & culture.

It must also be remarked that the development of the frontal area of the cortex, which was the seat originally of control & co-ordination of the muscles & muscular movement, & then later of the control of impulse, emotion & imagination, & finally of more & more reasoned co-ordinations of mental material & processes, was probably already attained before any race so endowed had reached the second factor in progress out of & beyond the integration of custom & the tribe, namely, the Domestication of Animals & Agriculture. It is a curious fact that Mousterian or Neanderthal man combined a mass of brain of more than average European size with a low frontal development comparable to that of the Australian; & he became extinct, while his sole achievment was his remarkable art, for which, however, the observational & imaginative powers resident in the central region of his brain were

were doubtless sufficient. On the other hand, there were con-
-temporaries & successors of Neanderthal man, such as the Cro-
Magnon race, & probably even predecessors like the type represent
-ed by the Piltdown skull, who had not the prominent eyebrow
ridges of the former, but in height of forehead & frontal develop-
-ment are difficult to distinguish from modern man. Thus the for
frontal region of the cortex to which the anterior development of
the skull corresponded, was undoubtedly well-developed long be-
-fore the great co-ordinations of the domestication of animals
& the invention of agriculture, & the immense advance to which
these led, took place. The conclusion is that the co-ordinative
capacity of early man was absorbed for long ages in the Integrat-
-ion of Custom, as are the minds & energies of many races even
of considerable mental power which remain in the savage state at
the present time. That integration provided sufficient scope
for his mental activities, while it maintained for vast periods
the equilibrium with his environment which enabled him to exist.
The equilibrium between any branch of the race, with its weapons,
tools, beliefs & magical & religious practices, & its world -
including its animal & human competitors - would be disturbed in
one direction, unfavourably, say by the irruption of more intell-
-igent & slightly better-armed people; & it would become extinct,
as Neanderthal man probably did; while a disturbance in another
direction, as in the increase of the food supply by the domestic-
-ation of plants or animals, might initiate an immense progress-
-ive

-ive movement shattering in many directions the shell of custom & making towards civilisation. It is such a process we have now to observe.

I. The Domestication of Food Animals & Plants.

The difference between ancient Egypt & Babylonia, on the one hand, with their colossal works of architecture & delicate works of art, their elaborate tombs & temples, their writings, libraries, priesthoods, imperial officials, & dynasties, as disinterred from the sand & familiarly known to-day, & on the other hand, either the Neolithic savage or the Australian native or Vedda of Ceylon at the present time, is simply the difference between civilisat-ion & primitive savagery. Six thousand years ago, life was lived in Egypt in a way which was vastly nearer to the life of the modern European than to that of the primitive tribes of our time. Customs there were, & superstitions were numerous; but the Integration of Custom was broken up, the tribal organisation was disintegrated, & the hunting savage ancestor or contemporary had ceased to be regarded as in any sense akin to the proud & stately lords of civilisation. Yet that inconvenient & despised poor relation was in the pedigree, & he is our peculiar interest at the moment. When, accordingly, we look for the reason for the diff-erence, for the causes of the emergence of this civilised type from what must have been the cave-dwelling or lake-inhabiting or desert-wandering primitive, we are struck with two features com-mon to all the ancient civilisations, namely, the possession of

of domesticated food animals & the practice of agriculture. These civilisations, in fact, were the creation - as all subsequent civilisations have been - of peoples who had discovered the use of flocks & herds, & sowed & harvested grain for food. Their x achievments, indeed, have been in large measure the direct con-sequence of these two discoveries or inventions. We shall endeavour now to trace what difference they must have made to the life & thought of the primitive hunting savage.

1. The first result of domestication & of agriculture would be a great increase in the certainty & abundance of food. The prim-itive hunter is the victim of immense uncertainties in depending upon the life of wild creatures. In spite of his keen observat-ion of their habits, they may elude him in a thousand incalcul-able ways. Hence the enormous part played in his life by Magic - more important to his mind, as Levy-Bruhl insists, than his natural methods of capture. It is significant of change that domestication greatly reduces the sphere & application of Magic. Instead of occupying a great part of his time with its rites for increasing the food supply, magic becomes seasonal, & the festiv-als of Spring with its sowing & its impulse of fertility, & of Autumn with its harvests & productiveness, concentrate in them-selves his magical & - as magic merges into religion - his rel-igious practices. Taboos also become seasonal & otherwise limited instead of affecting almost every instant & movement in the pursuit of the game, while binding in curious fashion the

women

women & children at home during the hunt. The hunter's anxiety about the food supply, especially in countries where life is hard as in Australia, is practically a "neurosis"; & that atomism of mind already described which attempts to meet every contingency by some negative taboo or positive rite, is characteristic of his mental state, absorbing much of his energy in innumerable acts of ritual. The relatively great abundance of food at the agricultural or pastoral stage reduces this anxiety, & assists the tendency to unify the acts of magical & religious ritual into large & comprehensive celebrations. These are more & more of the nature of festivals, limited to particular seasons, connected with various natural phenomena, & associated with certain image-concepts & ideas such as life & death, sleep & awakening, burial & resurrection.

Of great importance is the element of pause in the life of pastoral & agricultural peoples. The periods of waiting while the flocks are feeding, & the cattle are with young, & the crops are growing & ripening, are the antithesis of that impulsive, semi-instinctive hurrying to & fro which fills the life of the truly primitive savage. Psychologically, as already remarked, pause in the mind is the beginning of thought; & these times of cessation of activity are opportunities of reflective thought, of which the increasingly co-ordinative mind takes advantage, lifting its eyes to the hills & seeing there Olympus or Hermon, or considering

considering the heavens & arriving at the astronomical science of Babylonia, the moon-worship of Ur, & the sun cults of Egypt. To the very primitive hunting savage the powers which awaken his awe are of the nature of mana, & may be attached to any small thing, the grub he feeds on, the curiously-shaped stone, the unexpected bird-call, the tumbling log in the river, anything & everything that claims his attention & is mysterious. The shepherd or the tiller of the soil must take account of the large, slow, elemental powers of nature, sun, moon & stars, the awakening of Spring, the bareness & threat of winter, the weather & the sky; & so the unifications of his thought about these things, his simple nature-knowledge or science, the gods he worships, the ritual of his magic or religion, demand the co-ordinative effort of a brain approaching the modern civilised type, & increase by their demands that co-ordinative power.

2. The second great preoccupation of the mind of primitive man is Sex. The mystery of reproduction, birth, adolescent change & marriage, & their psychological effect upon himself, fill him with the terror of dangerous power, & move him to enact the numberless taboos, regulations & rites which characterise the Integration of Custom, & absorb so much of the interest of the tribe. The domestication of animals, however, makes these matters of sex necessarily familiar, lessens or removes the sense of their mystery, & thus brings them gradually out of the "sacred" world into the

the "profane". Taboos against the infection or contagion of sex are of necessity relaxed where the sheep & cattle are concerned; & this has its reflection in less stringent rules & less elaborate ritual with regard to human beings. In the age of cattle-rearing & agriculture there is nothing like the fear of woman which made the Australian black kill his wife for stepping over him or the touch of a woman's petticoat render the spear of the Sema Naga "genna" or taboo; & the intensely absorbing customs of initiation of boys & girls into maturity among primitives vanish from the life of the pastoral peoples.

The idea of the impurity of sex is a striking example of an integration by the modern type of mind which absorbs & supersedes numberless rites & customs of the savage in one unified conception with its correspondingly simplified practice. It appears even in higher religions such as Buddhism & the ascetic forms of Christianity like a palimpsest manuscript on which the first writing of the primitive mind has not been thoroughly effaced & modifies considerably the later writing in its letters & meaning. The impurity of sex is a conception which could not have been grasped or formulated by the unco-ordinating primitive type of mind; but, once attained, it integrates very many fragmentary & isolated ways of dealing with the peril of sex-power under one comprehensive principle, & as a consequence supplants them by its own manageableness for thought & simplicity for practice. In place

place of very many detailed taboos upon the sexual conduct & relations of the married priest designed to ward off danger from the tribe, the Roman Catholic church says "Celibacy of the Clergy," & wipes out these regulations with the sponge of a comprehensive principle. At the same time that principle is recognisable as a refinement by the modern mind of the ancient fear of sex, & destined itself to yield to the more abstract & spiritual prin-ciple which treats sex as natural & pure.

3. An important element in the break-up of custom & the authority of the tribe is the growth of self-feeling or the sense of his individuality in the individual man. There are several ways in which this was promoted by the domestication of animals.

(a). In the first place man's self-feeling must have grown as he saw himself over against his dog to whom he is like a god, & his flocks & herds upon which he exercised his personal authority. The satisfaction children have in helping to drive sheep or catt-le, or lead a horse, & the delight little Toomai of the Eleph-ants in Kipling's story took in calling Kala Nag, the huge elephant his father rode, "fat pig", & making him lift up first one foot & then the other, are probably an echo in the child mind of early man's pleasurable sense of power over his domesticated creatures. And the pleasure - the psychology of this is dealt with more fully in our final chapter - is the accompaniment of a new integration achieved over his environment, & at the same time

time an integration of his self in the form of self-feeling & the consciousness of individuality in relation to the beings which he moulds & guides to his will.

(b). The institution of property was naturally fostered by pastoral & agricultural life. It was not created by the latter, for it existed much earlier. The animal keeps the "kill" to himself if he can & growling warns others off: the lark fights for the area within which he builds up alone his airy spirals; & many animals respect each other's hunting grounds. Among the most primitive men property wavers between the simple communism which makes the stranded whale or the cluster of fruit-trees the property of the whole group, & the equally simple individualism which claims the driftwood or a particular tree for oneself, (much as the schoolboy demands the corner seat in a railway train from his colleagues by saying, "Bags I") & attaches a taboo symbol to it. The care of domestic animals & the operation of agriculture, however, would necessitate a certain security & permanence in possession, which strengthened the self-feeling of the individual.

(c). The domestication of animals & plants, resulting in an increase in the food supply, brings into action the principle embodied in the maxim of Malthus; "Population always increases where the means of subsistence increase." The immense hordes which swept in successive conquering waves in prehistoric & early historic times over Europe from the steppes of Asia [redacted], had

already arrived at the cattle-rearing & pastoral stage; & it seems likely that these migrating hordes were the overflow of the pastoral peoples who had increased in numbers through the abundance of food, & become too numerous for the limited area of their original home. Prof. Teggart has indeed maintained that a shrinkage of the food supply in consequence of famine or succ-essive years of drought, appears in some known instances to impel wholesale migration.[1] This, however, appears to us not inconsistent with the operation of the Malthusian principle just mentioned; since a rapid increase of population arising from the abundance of food would probably outrun the capacity of its area to support it, & thus compel a surplus to seek "fresh fields & pastures new". At any rate, the swelling of small groups or tribes to migrating hordes would have two far-reaching results. In the first place, the size of the horde would burst the bands of custom on every side by the sheer impossibility of applying rules like those of taboo or exogamy, which worked well enough for small groups, to large & moving aggr-egations. As Prof. Teggart says, "Briefly, a situation was created in which the old rites & ceremonies could not be perform-ed, one in which the old rules of action were manifestly inadequ-ate, & hence one in which the individual became, in some measure a law unto himself. This, at bottom, is a fact upon which all history turns."[2]

1. The Processes of History. F.J. Teggart. (University of California (Oxford University Press) p. 69.
2. ibid. p.86.

In the second place, migration & conquest demand leadership. Within the Integration of Custom there are representative men who are apart from the common people, the sorcerer, the medicine man, the priest, & the headman or chief, who may combine all of these characters with leadership in the tribal enterprises. But the iron hand of custom is upon him ; he is sometimes more a prisoner of taboos & other customary rules than the ordinary tribesman; & what he is able to do is prescribed rigidly for him by tradition & the authority of the group, which for its own safety hardly tolerates originality. With the increase of the tribe to a horde, the shivering of the earthen vessel of custom, & the flashing out of a large new enterprise, the strong individ-ual naturally comes to the front. Equally naturally the new circumstances & necessities develop his individuality. The authority of the group is transferred to him, & secures almost the same quasi-instinctive obedience. The sacredness which clings like a scent to everything which for primitive man means power over his life, also passes over to the chief or king. It appears to be nature's way at times to make her first experiments in a new species of organism on a large or even gigantic scale. Hence the individuality of the early chief or king of the migrat-ing & conquering hordes was greatly aggrandised, so that, for example, the conquered land & the people were his land & his people as personal possessions. But the spectacle of this individual par excellence before them inevitably called to the

quest for unity, the unifying tendencies, in ordinary men, & made visible to them the ideal of power & dignity to which their own life was pressing. Thus the sovereignty of the absolute individual lost its uniqueness in the course of history, & filtered down through the king's own family, rival dynasties, ambitious great nobles, lowly-sprung adventurers attaining the throne, the "ablest man" of Carlyle, until the common man began to think that even he might have something royal about him. To describe the process by which the ordinary individual attained personal liberty, freedom of self-expression, & finally the title to as complete & unified a life as is possible in society, would be to summarise the political history of civilised nations. The indispensable preliminary to that process was the disintegration of that system of custom in which the individual was undeveloped & suppressed, being almost mechanically subordinate to the group; & in this achievment the crucial part was played by the domestication of animals & plants leading by increase of food supply to the disintegration of the tribe & the formation of large migrating hordes whose settlement in new lands was the beginning of civilisation for most modern nations.

4. The Integration of Custom is broken up finally & superseded by the new integrations of civilised life through the settlement in particular areas of migrating peoples who have reached the pastoral & agricultural stage of development. The new unification,

taking the form of nations, states & empires, with all their differentiations & subordinate integrations, may be described as the Integration of Polity. It is an advance from an organisat-ion based upon kinship & blood relationship to one which may be called in a wide sense of the word political. The tribe is merged in the nation: the migrating horde is welded into the settled state. The customs of the half-savage folk are differ-entiated into the Law & Morality, the Science, Philosophy & Religion of the civilised people. Theories as to the way in which the transition was made from the savage & his customs to the ancient civilisations are, where they exist, in a somewhat fluid state. It is becoming apparent, for example, that too exclusive attention to the civilisations of Egypt & Babylonia has led to an exaggeration of the importance of the fertile river valley system in the origination of early civilisation. As Prof. Teggart remarks; "while at first it may appear that these beginnings have some relation to the irrigable valleys of rivers like the Nile & the Euphrates, further considerations will show, on the one hand, that there were valleys of this character in which civilisations did not arise, & on the other, that civilis-ations have made their appearance in quite different situations."[1] A more comprehensive common factor may be found in a suggestion of this writer. The area in which every great civilisation has arisen has the appearance of a cul-de-sac, or, to use Prof. Tegg-art's

1. The Processes of History. p.49.

-art's expression, a "pocket". They are, as he says, "termini of routes of travel, & hence points of pressure which have been strictly determined by the physical conformation of the earth's surface."[1] The migrating horde pours into this cul-de-sac, &, conquering the indigenous people, settles upon the land. But succeeding waves of migration follow; & the earlier arrivals are pressed ~~further~~ forward until they can go no further, having reached some barrier - mountains, desert, or most often the sea. The first waves thus recoil against the later, the earlier sett-lers strike back at the later invaders, as did Sumerians against Accadians, Babylonians against Assyrians, Greeks against Persians Romans against Germanic tribes, Angle-Saxons in Ehgland against Danes & Normans. If they succeed in maintaining themselves against being annihilated or absorbed, in vigorous racial exis-ence, they establish themselves finally in that region, occupy-ying the closed end of the cul-de-sac, but still subject to invasion from the open end which spreads out into the wider world. The same free opening provides the opportunity for the expansion of the community towards that wider world, whereby, should it develop the capacity, it may extend its rule, until from a small city-state it becomes a world-empire. From this situation several important consequences may be traced.

It has been very generally observed by modern ethnologists that a collision of races, whether as between an invading horde & the

1. Op. cit. pp. 49-50.

native inhabitants or between successive waves of the invaders, appears often to be followed by an advance in culture, as though an impetus to intellectual progress were given by the conflict. We have already noted the observation of Darwin that admixture of races in other biological spheres than the human seems to produce an accession of vigour in the offspring. It provides a distinct impulse to variation; & variation in the case of the human animal has set its current strongly towards the evolution of mind. It would not be surprising, therefore, if admixture of peoples through migratory invasions should convey an impetus in the direction of advance in intellectual power, culture & civilisation. This would provide one factor at least in the explanation of the truth thus stated: "the dispossession by a new-comer of a race already in occupation of the soil has marked an upward step in the intellectual progress of mankind".[1] Prof. Teggart does not stress this factor, but emphasises another & equally true aspect of the change. He states it thus: "that human advancement follows upon the mental release, of the members of a group or of a single individual, from the authority of an established system of ideas. This release has, in the past, been occasioned through the breaking down of previous idea-systems by prolonged struggles between opposing groups which have

1. Quoted in Processes of History p. 149.

been brought into conflict as a result of the involuntary move-
-ments of peoples. What follows is the building up of a new idea-system, which is not a simple cumulation of the knowledge previously accepted, but the product of critical activity stirred by the perception of conflicting elements in the opposed idea-
-systems."[1.]

The customs of the migrating, pastoral tribes & their authority had been disintegrated, as we have seen, by the mere increase of the people to a great mass or horde with new occupations & in a new environment as compared with their hunting ancestors. The process is continued & accelerated by contact with new peoples & new systems of ideas. It is, however, an important point for the psychology of races that nature observes her principle of economy in human history as elsewhere, in that, when the new wine is past its first effervescence, during which indeed it has destroyed some ancient vessels, it is poured, innocuously enough, into old wineskins: in other words, each new integration formed by differentiation from an earlier slips back easily into the moulds, runs in the grooves, builds up upon the plan, of the old. Thus the Integration of Instinct, broken through by the varied activities of intelligence, yet reasserts its sway, when the customs created by primitive mind reflecting upon instinct assume the stability of instinctive reflexes, & the authority of the

1. Op. cit. pp.151-152.

group or tribe commands an obedience from the individual which is almost instinctive. Similarly, it is interesting to observe how remarkably the great early integrations of human society or of polity resemble communities within the realm of instinct, like ants & bees. Like the ants, Egypt & Assyria have their builders, their food-producers, their soldiers, their slaves, apparently doing their task with mechanical certainty albeit with art & intelligence. The authority of the tribe has become the authority of the state, obeyed as unquestioningly. The taboos have changed into laws, but they are "as the laws of the Medes & Persians", unalterable often not at all because they are reasonable, but because mysterious powers & perils are attached to the keeping or the breaking of them. Mr. F.S. Marvin has described the special achievment of these early imperial civil-isations as "order & consolidation...based upon religion".[1] They performed the striking service to human progress of organising immense hordes of people into settled communities, extending one law over vast territories, & (an incomparable service this to the growth of mind) providing in that law a majestic general-isation which the half-savage tribes everywhere in the empire were compelled to assimilate, & striking out once & for all, in the claim of "world-empire", the truth & the prophecy that humanity may be organised as a whole. They did all this in virtue of certainly of an advance of co-ordinative intelligence, which

1. The Living Past. F.S.Marvin. (Oxford. 1917) p.38.

probably came at the pastoral & migratory stage; but they accom-
-plished it also by the aid of a more primitive force. Like
the alloy of baser metal which gives strength to the gold, there
was in the consolidating & organising achievments of these em-
-pires the earlier power of the absolute authority of custom &
the tribe over the individual savage, which itself was a recrude
-escence, upon the higher plane of intelligence, of the obedience
of instinct.

It is unnecessary for our purpose to trace in any detail the development of the varied forms of the Integration of Polity, & of the institutions of civilised life in settled communities. One wishes simply to show how the transition was made in the commun-
-ities which became civilised from the tribal customs & modes of thought to the higher integration. One feature of immense im-
-portance was undoubtedly this that the nomadic hordes on settl-
-ing in a country come to be organised on the basis of territory in place of the ancient bond of blood-kinship. As Sir Henry Maine says, "The constitution of the family through actual blood-
-relationship is of course an observable fact, but, for all groups of men larger than the family, the land on which they live tends to become the bond of union between them, at the expense of kin-
-ship, ever more & more vaguely conceived."[1] It is worth noting however, that the bond of those early empires which made the first essays at civilisation was not so much the territorial one as the binding force of that power of authority, exercised from

one centre, to which we have just referred, & which commanded great stretches of territory, many scattered savage tribes, & loosely settled communities, through the obedience to authority which was a habit of the tribal mind. The spirit of nationality which would have interfered with that universal submission had not yet arisen. Nations in the modern sense did not yet exist. There were simply hosts of tribes still in the savage state & a huge number of nomadic hordes which accepted the authority of a great disciplined power which had forced itself upon them, as they had formerly accepted the authority of chief & priest & custom of the tribe. Most men had still the suggestible tribal mind which makes the willing slave or serf under the great ancient empires, &, persisting into later ages, has made modern autocracies & modern serfdom possible.

The rise to power of these vast ancient aggregations, "tentacular" empires, which resembled the octopus in the disproportion of its far-stretching arms to the head & centre of the body, appears to have taken place in some such way as this. A conquering people settled in a new country was compelled to concentrate its forces in more or less permanent camps, which became towns & cities. The close association of men in these communities demanded organisation & discipline, & sharpened wits & invention. Particularly the defensive force was developed into a compact disciplined army which in taking the offensive easily overcame the undisciplined

tribesmen

tribesmen as far as they cared to march. Thus the early civil-ised empires around the Mediterranean came into being, almost all beginning as city-states & the rest in small areas with one capital city, the empires of Ur, Babylon, Assyria, Egypt, the brief maritime empire of Athens, Macedonia & Rome. The latest, the Roman, marks the transition to the modern type of empire or commonwealth of nations. The latter, the higher integration, is reached through differentiations, budding out as it were on the stem of the Roman system, in the direction of nationality. The Hebrews, the Greeks, & the Romans themselves acquired a strong national spirit, & vigorous suckers of the same growth shot up in the fierce struggle for independence of Germanic & Celtic tribes. The wise & tolerant policy of Rome fostered this tend-ency in recognising peoples as such & giving them much latitude of local custom & self-government. This policy hastened the disintegration of the Empire itself by stimulating the growth of the nations as smaller but more intense unifications. The history of the Anglo-Saxon settlement in Britain provides an ex-cellent example of the process of integration of the nation, by the substitution of the territorial bond for that of kinship, by the development of laws for the allocation of land & for inherit-ance, by the replacement of individual, family & tribal vengeance by communal action, & similar enactments of the community as a whole whereby customs are superseded finally by law. Love of

country, a common literature & community of historical tradition & heroic & passionate memory, with other influences complete the unification of the national spirit & individuality.
The order & law derived from the ancient empires, & in particular from the transitional Roman Empire, had much to do with the shaping of the polity of the nations, while the tradition of world-unification which they had created continued to hover over them as a dim, misty ideal of a new & greater integration still, the integration of these differentiated units of the nations into great commonwealths & at length into a world-polity. There is from our point of view a certain universal significance in the fact that the unification of the Anglo-Saxon tribes, & finally the Heptarchy, into one kingdom under Alfred followed so directly upon the conversion of the English to Christianity; just as the unification of the tribes of Israel into one nation with a national spirit of unparalleled keenness & passion, is inseparable from, organically connected with, the progress of its peculiarly intense monotheism to supremacy in the national mind. The primitive tribe is never so intensely one as when under the influence of one common religious impulse. It is also probably true to history to say that there has never been a force for welding a nation into unity, & even combining diverse nations in at least a temporary unification of great power, comparable to a moral passion, such as the desire for justice or freedom, raised to white heat by religious faith in the one Power supreme in the

universe, as upon their side. There may, therefore, be even some scientific justification for the contention that the surest "sanc-tion" for any world-wide organisation such as the League of Nations, any tentative construction of world-polity, & for the dreams, bright during war-time but presently dimmed by post-war disappointment & scepticism, of "the Great Society", is the pro-gressive realisation of the supreme moral & religious ideal, namely the Christian, of the Kingdom of God in the soul & the Kingdom of God in the world - which is a religious way of express-ing Herbert Spencer's conception of "the complete individual in the complete society".[1]

II. The Development of the Co-ordinative Mind.

The external factors in the process which has resulted in the disintegration of custom & the tribal system & the creation of the modern Integration of Polity have been the subject of the major portion of this chapter. Much less space may be given to the internal factor in the same process for the reason that many of our earlier discussions have been concerned with the growth of the prefrontal region of the brain & the corresponding develop-ment of the co-ordinative power of the mind. We shall, there-fore, give some brief attention to a few examples of the mental progress from the customary ideas & practices of the tribal integ-ration to the higher unifications which supersede them in civil-ised life. The preliminary remark must be made, however, that

1. Data of Ethics. pp.73-74.

in the nature of things it may never be possible to prove that, antecedent to the development of that co-ordinative power which distinguishes the cultivated man of the past six or seven thous-and years from his primitive ancestors & our primitive contemp-oraries, there was a special growth in the pre-frontal region of the brain. Traces of that perishable organ are naturally almost wholly inferential. The most we can say is that in the modern type of ancient skull there was room for such anterior cerebral development, & that further the racial types which have created civilisation & have accomplished the great co-ordinations of its thought & practical life, have possessed skulls well-developed in the frontal region. That this type of brain & mind it was which originated the domestication of animals & agri-culture, & thus made the transition possible from the primitive institutions of custom & the tribe to those of civilisation, we have just been maintaining. We have now to show how the same process went on in other spheres than that of polity.

1. We have seen that the primitive conception of causal relations, the savage idea of Causality, is so different from that of the cultivated mind that M. Levy-Bruhl concludes that it comes from a specifically different mentality. This hypothesis, we have held, is unnecessary; but it points to the fact that to the prim-itive mind the mysterious force represented by "mana" & spirit-like beings, & spirits themselves, are causes of innumerable

effects which for the civilised man are due to what he calls "natural causes". The savage is never without some idea of "secondary" causes & of the natural connections in that way among phenomena, as he ascribes the minute disturbance of moss upon a rock to the tread of an opossum or a kangaroo. But the domest-ication of animals & care over flocks & herds would familiarise him with multitudes of simple & natural causal connections, which took place without the interposition of any supernatural power. Thus birth, both human & animal, remained mysterious & suggestive of dangerous contagion, so that he drove his cattle, after part-urition, through the purifying Beltane fires; but he would escape from the curious failure of some savage tribes to make the causal connection between breeding & the birth of young; & familiarity with that connection in practical pastoral experience, would bring it to the "profane" level of a natural relation of cause to effect. The taboos concerning birth, therefore, would gradually vanish as its laws became the subject of the early cattle-rearer's nature-knowledge & crude, incipient science. In like manner, the primitive hunter finds mystery in the ways of his elusive quarry, & his anxiety drives him to countless taboos & magical operations which may concern every detail in the hunt, except where he for-gets himself & becomes for the nonce the instinctive animal. But the primitive agriculturist grows familiar with the causal connec-tions between sowing the seed & the green "brairdˮ which follows

so that it becomes increasingly a natural, that is, an unmysterious phenomenon. The fertility of the soil & of life still remains mysterious, & there is much that is incalculable about the larger conditions of growth & ripening, like sun & rain & wind; & thus the primitive farmer has his fertility-rites, his bull slain at the Spring festival, & other & strange ways of magically adding to productiveness; & there are supplications to the spirits or gods of sun wind & rain, & sacrifices offered to conciliate them. Nevertheless the familiar & constant repetition of the sequences of sowing, growth, ripening, reaping, would bring these inevitably out of the "sacred" into the "profane", & from the realm of the "supra-natural" into the workaday world. Hence would follow the relegation of the magical & religious rites which were designed to assist the processes & to invoke the helpful powers, to a seasonal performance, to the Spring & Autumn especially, before the process begins, when the endeavour is to throw into it an increased power of productiveness, or after the process is completed, in order to bring the products of nature out of the sacred world into the profane & thus to make them available for ordinary use, & to express that gratitude to the powers involved which is a "lively sense of favours to come". Here also, apart from these seasonal observances where magical & religious ~~observances~~ rites hold unquestioned sway, there grows up a body of knowledge of the ways of nature & even of these constant

relations which are natural laws; & here once more we have a beginning of Science.

The connection between land settlement & agriculture, on the one hand, & the development of Science on the other, is clearly seen in the first great empires of the Near East, Egypt & Babylonia. As Mr. F.S.Marvin says; "The measurement of land was an essential condition of the orderly co-operation of a large number of individuals, or of corporations, cultivating a continuous territory. The measurement of time was no less necessary for the common performance of public functions, especially the religious ceremonies for which the whole calendar seems originally to have been devised."[1] For Egypt geometry was the more important for the exact measurement of her inundations & of the irrigated land; Babylonia with her vast plains & greater dependence upon meteorological conditions devoted herself to astronomy & made some few discoveries, such as the degrees of the circle & the divisions of time, which were made once & for all. But, as Mr. Marvin says, "there is no more evidence in Chaldea than in Egypt of any scientific analysis of their observations, or of rational inference as to the properties of the bodies observed & the causes of events".[2] These achievments were reserved for the Greeks of the classic age who possessed the co-ordinative mind in a perfection which has never been surpassed by any race. "The millenium of Greece must be regarded therefore as the turning-point in Western

1. The Living Past. F.S.Marvin (Oxford 1917) p.42.
2. Op. cit. p.42.

history, &, through the West, of all the world. It is of supreme importance & unique, in three respects, of what it ends, of what it achieves, of what it leads to. It ends the old prim-aeval rule of tradition & authority. It achieves the most beautiful & perfect creations in language & plastic art which the world has seen, & within the shortest time ever known for such an evolution. It leads directly to the formation of modern science & the civilised system in which we live: it is the decis-ive step in the advance of man's power over nature."[1] Within their brief but wonderful creative period the Greeks pursue the quest for unity with unexampled intensity & de light; & the unif-ications they accomplish in science, in art, in politics, in philosophy, & in ethics - even religion, though a great, is only a partial exception - lay down the lines for all future advances of the human spirit.

The question why the Greeks, who were much nearer barbarism than the ancient civilised peoples of Egypt & Mesopotamia, should have gone so far beyond them in the triumphs of thought & art, is an interesting one & relevant to this study. They did indeed utilise the material provided by the earlier civilisations, but it is natural to wonder why they should have advanced so far beyond those who had the same material for a much longer time. In venturing an explanation we suggest that it was the very greater nearness of the Greeks to the savage state than the peoples of

1. The Living Past. p.49.

of the older civilisations which accounted in considerable measure for their swift brilliance in creative genius in every sphere. For those Greeks who came down as migrating hordes, nomads of the pastoral & agricultural stage to which their Aryan ancestors had attained, into the peninsula from the north, & settled as conquerors behind their polis or "circuit wall of stones",[1] were so barbarous that they had not acquired an alphabet & carried their sagas in their heads. Nevertheless, they had in a high degree the power of creative imagination. "Intensity of imagination"[2] is, according to Gilbert Murray, the supreme quality of the poets who created the Homeric poems which the "Achaean" land invaders & sea pirates brought with them. Now imagination, as we have before suggested,[3] is a primitive power of the human mind, preceding the co-ordinative reason in order of evolution. Races have it which have a low frontal development of the brain; children possess it before the co-ordinative powers are developed. It is the earlier organ of unification, working mainly by the visualising of a whole wrought artistlike out of the material of experience. Imagination was fresh, vivid & intense in the migrating Greeks as it was not in the more civilised Egyptian or Babylonian, whose mind was filled, like that of the imaginative child when he goes to school, with the facts & details of his more varied & complex existence. But the Greek had more than imagination. He had the co-ordinating & control-

1. The Rise of the Greek Epic (Gilbert Murray. Oxford. 1924.) p.58
2. ibid. p.251 f.
3. Ch. XI

intellect, perhaps in a greater degree than these earlier peoples, depending upon a high development of the pre-frontal region of the brain, which is not merely integrative but critical; that is to say, its co-ordinations are discriminative, articulated & organically related to the facts or particulars which are co-ordinated. Thus the imagination of the Greek wrought, forexample, in science or in art, visualising a whole, say a tentative generalisation in science or a vision of some form of beauty in art; thereupon the critical mind set itself to test the generalisation by relation to the particulars, or to define the beautiful form in lines of proportion & truth to nature. The unifications of the Greek in the geometry of Eudoxus, the medicine of Hippocrates, the trigonometry of Hipparchus, the physics of Archimedes, the politics of Plato & Aristotle, the philosophy of Socrates & the Stoics, the dramas of Aeschylus, Sophocles & Euripides, are, like all works of genius, imaginative creations, with a certain primitive emotion & passion breathing fire through them; but the calm intellect of the Greek, questioning, critical, discriminative, sets to work to see that the whole thus achieved is as finely & deeply integrated as possible. In this reppect the classical Greek is the true, one might say, the ideal, modern mind.

2. The progress from the primitive to the cultivated mind is a change of emphasis from action to thought. At the purely instin-

-ctive stage of mental development, motor reactions following upon sensory impulses without any reflection at all fill the whole of waking life. The evolution of the cortex stops the even flow of instinctive reflexes, & in the pause thought is born. The intervention of intelligence has the increasing effect of delay--ing action for the choice of alternatives, elaboration of plans & the like. The development of the co-ordinating portion of the cortex still further detaches mind from action. Detachment is indeed increasingly the characteristic note of the co-ordinative mind. The latter acquires a character almost of transcendence. It inhibits action upon one impulse or another; it withdraws from action for long periods; It becomes a spectator & looks on at things. The change is most marked in religion.

Religion in its earliest forms is practically all ritual, that is, magico-religious action to secure the ends of life. The ritual dances of savage tribes, in which they represent the expected battle, the death of winter & the coming of new life in spring, or the life-process of the food-animal, are not dramatic performan--ces merely, not that at all in our sense. They are actions designed & expected to produce the events they represent, as tru--ly as modern weaving is intended to produce cloth. The ritual dance is thus an action of the whole people, partaken in with the utmost earnestness, emotion & excitement. Even when the action is delegated to a special class, the rest take part by

rythmic swaying, handclapping or singing, & share the frenzy of the dancers. The increase of small clans or tribes to great nomadic hordes at the pastoral & agricultural stage of culture, would make delegation to a small number imperative, & leave large numbers in the position of spectators, who would tend to be more & more detached from the ritual action. Miss Jane Harrison takes up the development at thia point in tracing in a lucid & brilliant way the evolution of Greek art, particularly that of the drama. This evolution is admirably illustrated by the development of the Greek theatre. As she says, "it is in the relation between the orchestra or dancing-place of the chorus, & the theatre or place of the spectators, a relation that shifted as time went on, that we see mirrored the whole development from ritual to art - from dromenon to drama."[1.] The progenitor of the theatre was a level dancing-ground on which at first the whole people went through their war- & fertility-dances. As the action was more & more delegated to priests or other representat--ives, the part of the spectator increased. Hence the orchestra came to be placed at the base of a hill like the Athenian Acropol--is for the accomodation of the onlookers. "The spectators" says Miss Harrison, "are a new & different element, the dance is not only danced, but it is watched from a distance, it is a spec--tacle; whereas in old days all or nearly all were worshippers acting, now many, indeed most, are spectators, watching, feeling,

1. Ancient Art & Ritual. Jane Harrison.(Williams & Norgate1913) p.124.

thinking, not doing. It is in this new attitude of the spectat-
-or that we touch on the difference between ritual & art; the
dromenon, the thing actually done by yourself has become a drama,
a thing also done, but abstracted from your doing."[1.]
The actual transition from the ritual to the drama was, as this
writer points out,[2.] mainly due to a decline of faith in the effic-
-acy of the magico-religious process to affect natural phenomena.
We may supplement her explanation by the suggestion that the co-
-ordinative mind of the Greek could not remain satisfied with
such an elementary co-ordination or causal unification as between
his ritual action & the processes of nature. By the time of
his settlement in Greece he must have become acquainted with
"secondary causes" in the purely natural sense, & with relations
of cause & effect, hidden from the primitive savage, between the
sowing of seed & its growth, between breeding of cattle & birth,
& the like. The fact that there are clear indications that the
ritual dance, pure & simple, had been practised very near to the
brilliant historic period, may point to the interesting conclus-
-ion that it was the mixture of races when the conquerors settled
down among the conquered people, which produced a sudden acceler-
-ation of development of the co-ordinative intellect. However
that may be, the change from the expression of the deepest inter-
-est in life in excited ritual action of the whole people to the

1. Op. cit. p.127.
2. ibid. p.136.

attitude of spectators looking on more or less critically at dramatic repreeentations by selected actors, is intelligible as a continuous process. The pouring by Peisistratos & his son of the Homeric sagas into the mould of the ancient ritual represent--ations, made the transition to the tremendous dramas of the great writers natural; & it must have been less abrupt than even Miss Harrison makes it, on account of the fact that the epics, being in the minds of the people already, had been many times enacted before their imaginations, & thus their dramas & charact--ers only became more vivid & defined by being acted on the stage. Finally the attitude of the spectator, released from action, look--ing on with co-ordinating mind at natural events, produces Sci--ence; observing the universe & seeking to make an ordered whole of it for thought, it creates Philosophy; & seeing in that whole of things the higher integration still of mind, spirit & personal--ity, restores upon a higher plane & with a purer emotion, the ancient tentative unifications of Religion.

Chapter XXV

The Higher Unifications

Individuality; Society; Religion.

I. Individuality.

The simplest living thing has a certain individuality. It is a life-centre over against the world. The microscopic animal-cule takes what it needs for itw life & keeps out the rest of the universe; its alternative is to die. Prof. J.Arthur Thomson in giving the life-history of the Common Liver-Fluke, says of the minute larvae; "In the course of their swirming they must come near or into contact with many different kinds of things, such as water-plants, sticks & stones, & various water-animals, but they answer back to nothing save the proximity of a little water-snail. When they touch this mollusc...they arrest their movements & they enter into the body of the animal, within which they pass through a succession of juvenile stages. Now the point is that this brainless microscopic larva responds effectively to no stimulus save the touch of the one creature through which it can manage to con-tinue its life-history." In plant-life the individual pursues its most perfect forms in the interests of its race; it lives,- even where the flower seems a complete achievment in itself, an artistic whole, so to say, - for the seed, that is for the future of its species. Within the realm of instinct the individual may be finely organised & yet, as in the case of the bee, it is absorbed in & wears itself out for the birth & care of the young & the continuance of the race. With the advent of intelligence

the individual animal organism is still more deeply unified & reacts in many respects uniquely to the stimuli of its environment. The tiger never hunts twice in quite the same way. The acquisition of a superior brain to that of all other animals lifted that anthropoid-apelike creature who was the ancestor of man out of the comparatively safe grooves of instinct & exposed him to a thousand new perils. His descent from the trees & his lack of speed & strength in comparison with the larger animals of prey made his life precarious enough; but his dependence upon this new capacity of thought with its imperfection & immense possibility of error, his high nervous organisation, his exposure to fear & other nervous excitement, his vivid imagination, might well have made life too dangerous for survival. But the naked sensitive crustacean finds a shell; & so man crept into the safety of Custom. The new organ of individuality, his mind, escaped from its perilous uniqueness into a shelter resembling that of instinct, by secreting for itself the hard encasement of the customary ways, habits, traditions & laws of the tribe.

Originality within the tribe is not unknown, as the rare & far-separated improvements in tools & weapons testify, as well as growth in the complexity of custom itself with growth in the intelligence of the tribe; but the originality must be <u>within</u> the customs on penalty probably of martyrdom for the too daring genius. At this stage the race is still supremely important to

nature; she is "careful of the type" & strikingly wasteful of the individual within the tribal integration. It is as though, as in the lower stages of evolution such as plant-life, nature were intent - to use anthropomorphic metaphor - upon the continuance of the race for the sake of the emergence of some new variation, perhaps some great mutation, providing at a leap some immense advance. This advance, as we conceive it, arrived with the emergence of the co-ordinative type of brain & mind which characterises the races which have created civilisation, whether that type was evolved very gradually or as a swift mutation in consequence, perhaps, of some crossing of races. This mental achievement is associated everywhere with that pastoral & agricultural stage of culture which equally universally preceded the great civilisations. We have noted how this social condition resulted in disintegration of the tribe & the break-up of the Integration of Custom. We have also observed how it fostered the individuality which it had, as it were, delivered from the womb of custom. The man acquired a definite self-feeling over against the animals in his power. The dominance of the leader of the horde, the strong individual, set before him a unified conception of individuality which tended to stamp even the soul of the common man with its likeness, as a coin bears the ruler's image. In the ancient empires there was a supreme individual in the monarch, before whom in a sense the "genius" of all others was "rebuked";

but there was in all these great states an aristocratic caste which had the prerogatives of freedom & culture. It was one of the great achievments of Greece to evolve a transient democracy in which a lofty theoretic construction of the complete individ-ual became possible, conceived as completely developed on every side of his life, richly differentiated, as the Platonic Socrates imaged him, like a nobly organised state, & finely integrated with the harmonious order of the ideal republic.

The Roman citizenship asserted in a practical way a peculiar dig-nity, rights & superior manhood for the Roman citizen, & being extended under the empire tom people of almost all races, gave a certain universality to the conception. The Stoics, particul-arly those of the Roman imperial period, like Seneca, Epictetus, & Marcus Aurelius, carried this practical element of universality into the theoretic sphere, & under its influence developed the Platonic idea of the complete & harmonious soul into their often lofty theories of the perfection of the individual through life according to Nature, according to Reason, & according to God. In order to emphasise its difference from the inferior systems which preceded it, & its place at the summit of non-Christian endeav-ours to conceive of the ideal unification of the soul, one may quote the following summary of Stoic doctrine by Dr. T.R.Glover.

"Stoicism gave its convert a new conception of the relation of God & man. One Divine Word was the essence of both - Reasonx was

shared by men & gods, & by pure thought men came into contact with the divine mind. Others sought communion in trance & ritu-al - the Stoic when he was awake, at his highest & best level, with his mind & not his hand, in thoughts, which he could understand & assimilate, rather than in magical formulae, which lost their value when they became intelligible." We interrupt the quotat-ion to remark here the authentic note of the modern, civilised type of mind, the note which distinguishes the science, philoso-phy & religion of the co-ordinating cultivated mind from the ideas & practices of the primitive type, whether of ancient times or of the present day. "God & men formed a polity, & the Stoic was the fellow-citizen of the gods, obeying, understanding & adoring, as they did, one divine law, one order - a partaker of the divine nature, a citizen of the universe, a free man as no one else was free, because he knew his freedom & knew who shared it with him. He stood on a new footing with the gods, & for him the old cults passed away, superseded by a new worship which was divine service indeed."[1.]

The Stoic unification of the soul within itself is a noble & impressive one; & some even to our time have thought it needless to look for any higher expression of individuality. The true Stoical note is struck by W.E.Henley in his well-known poem, not only in his defiance of fate & his "unconquerable soul", but in his indifferent "whatever gods there be". But Stoicism, though

1. The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire.(Methuen) pp.56-57.

it seemed a very Gospel to its great exponents, did not capture the heart of its own age, nor of any age since. This might not prove it untrue, but as a matter of fact it points to its limit-ations. The things to which men turned in turning away from it in the period when its luminaries were the most brilliant constellation in the night sky, are significant of the failure of Stoicism to set the soul in harmony with itself & with the world. The Mystery Religions stand in striking contrast with it in their charm for the popular mind where it sought satisfaction of its deeper needs. In the first place they took the form of societies in which men & women felt themselves united in fellow-ship with each other & with the god, & rejoiced, as Plutarch says, in the sacred dances, initiations & sacrifices in which they took part together.[1] This was a return to the more primitive mind & practice, to the tribal mind & the integration of custom, & therein lay, no doubt, something of its fascination. But it gave scope to that relation of the individual to society, which Stoicism, in spite of the fine but attenuated idea of a common citizenship of the world, rather neglected. It emphasised the extreme individualism of the Stoic, his isolation in the pursuit of the peace of his own soul, & his at times hard & almost inhuman detachment from the ordinary ties & feelings of family life & friendship.

In the second place there is in the Mysteries manifested a remark-

1. Conflict of Religions. p.76.

-ably strong desire for purification; & rites of cleansing by some form of water baptism or by blood, as in the blood-bath of the taurobolium, played a great part in their ceremonies. Here also there is a return toward the primitive, & suggestions from the barbaric & savage world which the Empire had embraced, determ-ined the character of these rites considerably. But there had been developed in that society a conscience which was very far beyond the primitive; for the ethics of Greek, Hebrew & Roman had not been without their effect upon the average man, to whom in the course of some hundreds of years they had percolated down, & whose type of mind, it must be remembered, was such as to be not incapable of this moral unification of the civilised conscience. Hence the very wide-spread moral phenomenon in that age of what we can only call a deep sense of sin, a feeling of the depravity of the world & of the soul itself, from which to be cleansed, by a symbolism which gave the effect of reality, was felt & frequent-ly spoken of as a salvation. There are signs, in Seneca in particular, that the same feeling shook a little the fortresslike heart of the great Stoic; but for the most part he sought his peace within, in the steadfastness, resignation & harmony of his own mind, & in the last resort in the open door of death—as Epictetus put it, if the smoke in the house grew unbearable, he could always go out. In this respect also the Stoic unification

of the individual remained "caviare to the general", & the Stoic himself a hermit inhabiting the cell of his theory, partly be-cause its principles were at once too lofty & too abstract for the average mind, but partly because they fell short of answering to the whole of human need.

In the third place, the Stoics, in spite of some fine approaches to monotheism & magnificent utterances about God & Providence, leave their ideas of the divine & of the relation of man to God vague & indefinite; & they hesitate to ascribe personality to the Divine Being. As Dr. Glover says: "The Stoics in some measure felt their weakness here. When they tell us to follow God, to obey God, to look to God, to live as God's sons, & leave us not altogether clear what they mean by God, their teaching is not very helpful, for it is hard to follow or look to a vaguely grasp-ed conception. They realised that some more definite example was needed. 'We ought to choose some good man', writes Seneca, '& always have him before our eyes that we may live as if he watched us, & do everything as if he saw.'"[1] It is striking to find, on the other hand, how important a personal relation to some deity is in the Mystery Religions. There is a grouping of the initiates around one divine personality, Orpheus, Serapis, Is-is, Osiris, Dionysos, Cybele; as though there was a hunger in that age for a divine being who was not an abstraction, but who would come close to men, & stand by their side in a kindly human-

1. Op. cit. p.72. (For the lines of criticism of Stoicism we follow Dr. Glover closely; pp.63-74.)

-like relation. Thus Plutarch can say; "For it is not abundance of wine, nor the roasting of meat, that gives the joy in the festivals, but also a good hope, & a belief that the god is pres-ent & gracious, & accepts what is being done with a friendly mind".[1.]

The action & reaction between the Mystery Religions & the ideas & rites of early Christianity have recently become the subject of more & more fruitful investigation; but without going into its results it is clear enough how finely adapted to meet the trend of the human mind in that age were the unifications of Christianity, first in its rich & full ideal for the individual soul, then in its unification of God & man in a kindly & intimate society, & finally in its bringing God out of the haze of philo-sophy & the mists of high abstractions into the definiteness of Personality, & giving Him as it were a concrete reality, through His manifestation & embodiment in Christ - vivid & human as He was - which even the simple & ordinary mind of the age could grasp.

The further growth of the conception of individuality is so close-ly interwoven with the progressive unifications of human society & with the higher integrations of religion that it is convenient to pursue the investigation of the former through the more modern forms of society & the later history of religion.

1. Conflict of Religions. p.77.

II. Society.

The history of the integration of society through a series of differentiations is a history of the similar unification in the individuals who compose it. The first form of social life, the family, arises from the need of the individual to unify his nature by satisfying the sex-impulse & thus carrying on the urge of life towards its own continuance. Here at once the self is limited in freedom & yet enriched by obedience to the protective or parental instinct. Within the larger society of the clan, individuality is contracted by the rights & interests of others, while it is expanded by the safety & power conferred by the community as a whole. The integration of the tribe unifies the members of it into an almost chemical unity in which individuality is largely suppressed, & so great is the authority of custom that to some observers there appears to be only a "group mind" & "collective ideas". Within this shell of custom, however, the individual here & there finds opportunity to grow. Customs themselves become more intelligent, the level of mind rises, & in some races the ground is prepared for an advance in mental co-ordinative power & for a discovery such as the domestication of animals or agriculture, which leads to the break-up of custom & the disintegration of the tribe.

The new integrations of society after the diffusion of the migratory, nomadic period, were, as we have noted, first the world-

-empires & then the nations. Within the former the suppression of the individual by authority, as in the tribe, still continued, though a strong self-feeling had been developed in the migrating life, & was maintained by the dominant caste & to a less degree by the conquering people as a whole. It was in the smaller area of the nation that the intensive culture of the individual was brought to perfection. In the rise of national life as exempl-ified ~~by~~ in the modern European nations, the self-feeling of the nation becomes the self-feeling of each of the persons composing it: its struggle is his struggle, its achievment of freedom his achievment, its culture his culture, its glory his glory. Within each nation the process of unification goes on; & the internal history of the modern civilised people is the story of the more or less gradual broadening down of the possession of a free & rich individuality till it is regarded as the birthright of every citizen. The task of the leading nations of the world, as pur-sued chiefly during the nineteenth century with varying success, has been that of completing earlier struggles for freedom of thought, sppech & religion, by securing for the ordinary man freedom of political action. The Liberals of most European countries ~~perhaps~~ dreamed that that achievment of true democracy would solve many problems. It is by this time clear, however, that the integration either of the national or of the individual life is not complete, & even freedom is not real, so long as the

complex of conditions known comprehensively as the environment denies the soul the realisation of a full & rich individuality. Of this environment the other nations & the life of the world as a whole form part. The nation, no more than the individual, can attain salvation by itself; & the hope of any people or state that it may secure a full & happy life for all its citizens in independence of the rest of the world is manifestly illusory. It was one of the products of the world-war, both of its exalted moods & of its practical experience, that poets & philosophers & even lawyers & business men had visions of a unification of mankind in a world-community. The late Josiah Royce, in his book written during the war, "The Hope of the Great Community", identified that hope with the Christian ideal of the salvation of mankind, & thus expressed what seemed to him the recent progress towards it; "In our day this vision of the salvation of mankind, while indeed far enough away from us to cause constant & grave concern, & to demand endless labour, has been for a long time becoming clearer than ever, while both science & industry have tended to bring men together in new fashions of cooperation, in new opportunities & exercises that involve an expressed charity in its true form as a devotion not merely to individuals but to the united life of the community. The belief that mankind can be & in the end shall be one, has thus for a long time had an increased concreteness, definiteness, practical applicab-

-ility, & despite all the vast evils of our modern social order, a genuine hopefulness."[1] The Poet Laureate, Dr. Bridges, grace-fully uttered the thought that in the world-community no nation need lose its individuality - the grand unification, in our terms, permitting the richest differentiation both in the national & in the individual life - in these verses:

Truth is as beauty unconfined:
Various as nature is man's mind:
Each race & tribe is as a flower
Set in God's garden with its dower
Of special instinct; & man's grace
Compact of all must all embrace.
China & Ind, Hellas & France,
Each hath its own inheritance;
And each to Truth's rich market brihgs
Its bright divine imaginings,
Its rival tribute to surprise
The world with native merchandise.[2]

To many to whom such visions brought a thrill of enthusiasm to-wards the end of the war, they probably seem too roseate now. Disillusionment & scepticism as to idealism in international affairs have settled like a late & bitter frost upon that warm & full-budded springtime. It seems to such as though that ideal-ism had been part of the war-mentality, a white & glistening

1. The Hope of the Great Community. p.40.
2.

foam cast up by the waves of its emotionalism, beautiful but in-
-substantial. But it is not impossible that the mood of scept-
-icism is itself in part a result of the war-mentality. The return
of the nations to fear of each other, to trust in force, to trad-
-itional suspicions & hostile views of one another, is probably
an evidence of "fatigue" & weariness of effort, in which the post-
-war mind, tired of the endeavour to piece the world together ag-
-ain, weary of the vast co-ordinations necessary to solve the
practical & theoretical problems which are so pressing, falls
back on an earlier mentality & throws itself upon the instinctive
& tribal impulses of the savage past. The disillusionment may
be serviceable in the end if it brings men back to the truth that
the basis of such hopes of a brotherly community of mankind is
ultimately not economic nor utilitarian but religious & Christian.
It is true that it may be urged that the world-process of evolut-
-ion by integration & differentiation, of which humanity is the
summit, might seem to demand that there should be no pause in the
march of development from the primitive unifications of human
life, the family, clan & tribe, through the integrations of the
nations & the great commonwealths like the British, embracing vari-
-ious nations in a more comprehensive unity, to the organisation
of the whole of mankind in one community. But there is no nec-
-essity to imagine this process as a purely "natural" & determin-
-istic one on the analogy of the lower processes of nature like

crystallisation or the growth of a plant. Physical & biological analogies are notoriously untrustworthy in the interpretation of human life, for the simple reason that there is development, that crystallisation is not life, & the life of man not the life of vegetation nor of the brute. The difference is of importance to the point under discussion.

Every growing thing normally pursues steadily its perfect form, that is, the most richly differentiated integration of its life. If one looks at an apple-tree in blossom, one sees how all its processes have made towards this beautiful end. But the pursuit has been unconscious. The similar progress of the animal to the full unification of its nature is still unconscious, but it is instinctive, & intelligence begins to have glimpses of partial ends. The peculiarity of man, the supreme quality of his individuality & the essence of his freedom, is that he is conscious of his unifications, has vision in imagination of the ideal integrations of his life, can order & correct them by his reason, & make them his own, setting his will to pursue them. Now, the unification of his life presents itself before the mind of man - dimly yet really for the primitive, ever more clearly & insistently for the civilised man - in two forms, on the one hand, the perfect realisation of his own individuality, &, on the other, the perfect form of his relation to other persons, that is, of his life in society. The twofold ideal expressed in Christian terms is the Kingdom of Heaven within the individual soul, & the

Kingdom of Heaven upon earth, the society of such individuals. It is not, indeed, a hope or ideal held only by Christians to be capable of practical realisation. For example, Herbert Spencer, speaking of man at the summit of development, says; "Of course the implication is that the man who thus reaches the limit of evolution, exists in a society congruous with his nature - is a man among men similarly constituted, who are severally in harmony with that social environment which they have formed. This is, indeed, the only possibility. For the production of the highest type of man can go on only pari passu with the production of the highest type of society."[1] We are inclined to maintain, however, that it is through the Christian system that the conscious pursuit of this ideal has come to be part of the evolutionary process. It has happened from time to time in the history of modern civilisation that the Christian ideal, coming as a Gospel, of a perfectly unified life in the soul, & less prominently of a finely integrated society, church or brotherhood, has been grasped afresh by the faith of men, & has swept the trend of human thought & effort in the direction of these ends. The dynamic in these cases has been a faith. Men believed in a goodness & a harmony in the soul as a realisable thing; & they believed that those whose life was thus nobly integrated could live in a brotherly community. The faith had force enough to give the early Christian community its power to maintain itself

1. The Data of Ethics. p.73.

against the Roman world, & to penetrate like a leaven through it all. Its recovery of the worth for God & man of full & rich individuality at the Protestant Reformation began the movement for freedom of thought, speech & worship which triumphed in the succeeding centuries. In the Evangelical Revival of the end of the 18th. & the beginning of the 19th. centuries, & in more secular movements, such as even the French Revolution, the same wave from the same ultimate tidal source of the Christian ideal was resurgent; & the assertion of the value of every soul to God sent its fresh impetus far into the social & political efforts for a better & fuller life for the common man in the succeeding century. There is certainly a power of encouragement to pursue the endeavour after a more & more finely unified life for the individual & for society, in the faith, which may be purely scientific, that the universe is on its side, & that, in the endeavour, man is continuing consciously the hitherto unconscious evolutionary process of integration through differentiation. But there is no very strong defence there against disillusionment & scepticism in difficult times. There are, moreover, pessimists enough who assure us that the earth will soon be overcrowded, & not sufficient food to go round, & who not obscurely hint that it has been a mistake to abandon the motives of the jungle & the methods of the tribe. In truth there never has been, & there is not, any dynamic to move men on to seek the individual

& corporate betterment of mankind to compare with the faith Jesus taught that, because God is our Father & we are His children, to seek first the Kingdom of God & His righteousness would be to have all things, even those things which meet material necessities, added unto us. There are also no men who will take up the task of securing an inner harmony in their own lives & organising the world so as to bring that harmony into every life, with such unconquerable hope as those who have the faith that the ideal of the unification of the soul & of human life exists for the mind of God, & that it is one of the ways in which the personal Spirit of the universe seeks the unification of His own Divine life, the satisfaction of His own mind & heart.

III. Religion

In our discussion on Animism we endeavoured to trace the evolution of man's conceptions of spirits & gods from their earliest form, the generalised image-concept or idea of mana. This it is not necessary to recapitulate. It is sufficient to recall that it is a process of unification which reflects the growing enrichment & integration of man's mind, & also the increasing unification & order of his outward life. With the cessation of atomism, restless disconnectedness both of life & thought, & a gain of co-ordinating power in his mind & of opportunity for reflection such as comes at the pastoral & agricultural stage of development, religion escapes from action & magical ritual into

more inward forms created by thought & imagination; & concrete representations of spirit, like the miniature soul & a plurality of souls, are replaced by more & more definitely grasped abstr-actions such as the invisible, the intangible, & the unseen world. The soul ceases to be conceivable as a bee or a lizard, & is figured as wind, breath, spiritus, ghost. For peoples like the Aryans before they were diffused into the various races of the stock, pastoral & agricultural life directed attention to the large & vast phenomena of nature, earth, sky, sun, moon, constel-lations; & having minds capable of such co-ordinations, they formed conceptions like the Earth-Mother & the Sky-Father. It is some small justification of Max Muller's discredited theories that these large conceptions were steps towards "the idea of the infinite". Not the only way, but one of the ways, in which a personal god arises is, as Miss Harrison shows, the transference to the god, originally a fertility-spirit represented by an animal, the sacred bull, of the personality of the youth who led the ritual Spring dance, out of which arose the cult of Dionysos.[1] So Professor Gilbert Murray says that there was a period in which "there was no personal god. There was the tribal blood; there was also the live animal that bore in it the life of the tribe, set apart & consecrated, till it became full of magical vitality. The personal god seems to have been made by abstraction & 'pro-jection' out of this magical mana, out of the ritual dance, the

1. Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. pp. 28 f.

desires & fears of the tribe."[1] This is probably true in particular cases, though it is not in our view likely to have been universally the origin of personal spirits & gods. In mana itself, as we have seen, there is a suggestion - even so early of life & will as well as power, derived from primitive man's own sense of activity, of "doing things"; & when his self-feeling, his consciousness of individuality, had developed so far as it had done at the agricultural stage, the idea of soul, of quasi-personal spirit, separate from body in himself or other beings, hardly needed the ritual association of the human King of the May or leader of the dance to make its "projection" possible. Man's dawning conception of personality in himself & in his spirits & gods is a unification to which his mind approaches along many avenues, of which this is but one. It is, however, striking that the universal evolutionary process which embraces all nature & human life, should apparently culminate in personality, which, according at least to our common evaluations of the moral & spiritual, is the highest & most differential integration of which life, so far as we know, is capable. As the late Sir Henry Jones said, "it is becoming more & more clear that, in interpreting the natural world, its most complex, &, it is believed, its highest & most comprehensive & marvellous product, namely, an animal that thinks & distinguishes between right & wrong, cannot be left out of account, as has been done by science in the past.

1. The Rise of the Greek Epic. p.62.

May more, man's meaning, which is ultimately spiritual, may best convey the final meaning of his world."[1] If one glances back upon the world-process, & observes inorganic & organic nature apparently making through out its course, unconsciously & then instinctively, & then increasingly with the aid of intelligence & conscious pursuit, towards the highest integration of personal-ity, its rich differentiation in knowledge, in inward beauty & harmony, & in goodness, it is at least worth considering as a hypothesis that the meaning of it all may be found in that final, or at all events highest, form of moral & spiritual personality. There are other hypotheses, worthy of all respect; & this, like any other, stands, as we believe it does stand, by its success in interpreting the facts of existence."[2]

There are, then, two ways in which the idea of personal spirits & gods grows in definiteness & clearness. One is that to which we have just referred, through the unification of man's own mind & of his individuality in general: the other is through the unific-ations of his outward life, the organisation of his societies.

(a). The former appears in the anthropomorphic conceptions of the gods, who for the Greeks, for example, before they were subjected by the great thinkers to critical & ethical standards, were often little better than larger & more irresponsible human beings. The Hebrews were not so bound to anthropomorphism as the Greeks, part-ly because they had not the art of the latter which fixed their

1. A Faith that Enquires. p.113.(Macmillan 1922.)
2. Ibid. pp.103-104.

gods in beautiful human forms, & partly because Jahwè was very early conceived as unrepresentable by outward forms, & became more & more the unseen & transcendent deity. Even He, however, is in the earlier writings humanlike in character as a "jealous God," revengeful, "a man of war". A more pleasing & important aspect of Hebrew anthropomorphism is the close personal relationship described as maintained between Jahwè & certain great human figures of the nation's history. Whether the stories of Abraham, Jacob, & Joseph are tribal sagas or not, the writers or composers of the tales were able to conceive of them as individual men who walked, conversed, strove with, & served a personal God. The same relation continued in the prophets who felt themselves so intimate with Jahwè that they came forth from his presence & gave their message as, "Thus saith Jahwè". It was this close personal relation with the god, together with the high ethical conception of Jahwè from the beginning of the prophetic period or from as early as the ninth century B.C., which made possible that extraordinary detachment of the prophets of Israel, from the ordinary motives & prejudices of patriotism. Keen lovers of their country & poignantly sensitive to their nation's shame & suffering, they were so intent upon the mind & will of God that they saw clear-eyed, & pronounced with the inexorableness of Fate, the judgments which meant the external ruin, though they also led to the higher spiritual service of their nation to the world as a whole. It

is well-known to be the case that in the earlier Biblical writ-
-ings the religion of Israel is "henotheistic", or, to use the
word of Archdeacon Charles, "momolatrous", that is, Jahwè is a
god amongst other gods, each of which is the deity of a particul-
-ar land or people. But the great prophets far transcend this;
& the significance is seldom emphasised sufficiently of their
conception of Jahwè as creator of the universe as they know it,
having - to use one of their favourite metaphors - the material
of the earth & the heavens & the nature of man & human history
under his hands like the clay of the potter, shaping them accord-
-ing to his mind & purpose. It is the combination of this uni-
-versal conception of the one deity, together with the high ethic-
-al elements of righteousness, truth, mercy & sympathy which the
prophets associated with it, & also that humanlikeness or person-
-al anthropomorphism which we have just described, that kindly
nearness & friendly contact of the god with humanity, - it is
this combination of qualities which makes the religion of Israel
the true parent of the universal religion of Christianity.

(b) Man's unification of his external life, especially of his forms
of society, is reflected in his gods; it is indeed evidently
influential upon his conceptions of his divinities. We have
noted this tendency in the tribal form of society & its effects
chiefly at the animistic stage of religion.[1] The national
unity has its counterpart in the national god; the world-empire
is rarely if ever without some idea of a world-god, whether as

1. Chapter XIV.

a grotesque shadow as in the deification of an emperor like Nero, or as a philosophic unification like that of the Stoics, or as a World-Gospel in the case of Christianity. In monarchical systems of government the tendency is to conceive a hierarchy of gods, with one chief or supreme god over all. The great god is often a unification of several local gods, which were the deities of incorporated peoples. In the case of the Greeks, the philosoph-ic people par excellence, & the Hebrews, the similarly religious people, of the immediately pre-Christian period, there is a cur-ious parallelism between their political unifications on the one hand, & their religious unifications on the other, as well as in the corresponding disunities & disintegrations. We may glance at this parallelism for a moment.

L.R.Farnell makes this remark about the religious ideas in Homer; "The Religion of the Homeric poems is not merely tribal, not even merely civic. The high god & some of those beneath him are recogn-ised by all the different tribes, even by the alien races of Asia Minor. Zeus has, in fact, almost the status of a world-deity, & his name becomes at times a synonym for Θεός, a vaguer designation of universal godhead; & many of Homer's religious utterances could be adapted to a world-religion"[1]. This tendency to a somewhat vague monotheism probably repres-ents the unity of the "Achaeans" as migrating, conquering & mainly pastoral hordes, such as they were in the pre-Homeric

1. The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion. pp.92-93.

period. The representation, it must be noted, is heightened & refined by the poetic genius of a slightly later time. The settlement in Greece, by various waves of immigration & in various regions, broke up the loose unity of the tribal horde, & when the different city-states with their agricultural surroundings emerge, they are seen to have lost that early but vague universal element from their religion. A number of autochthonous gods, derived from the conquered peoples, stole into the pantheon, especially fertility-spirits & agricultural deities like Dionysos, which either add themselves to the company of the old gods or add their characteristics to the deities with whom they coalesce. There is confusion enough for a time, & a certain inrush of the primitive & barbaric in legend & mythology which is disconcerting to Plato's imaginary legislators, & provides material for the dramatists of the great period to set their problems. There were tentative efforts towards religious unity, as in the common reverence for the oracle at Delphi & in the idea of the Panhellenic Zeus; but these were defeated by the internecine strife which thrust the states apart. The statement of Farnell is significant: "The title, however, which in the later historic period best expressed the ideal of a united Greece, an ideal realised to some extent by its religion, but never by its politics, was that of Zeus Panhellenios."[1]

By the time when the world-empire of Alexander might have sugges-

1. Op. cit. p.94.

-ted the conception of a world-god, the idea had already arrived by other & purer channels. Indeed Alexander is said to have proclaimed his own deification, the transient Brooken-mist of his empire throwing up that simulacrum of superhuman greatness. But already the science, philosophy & ethics of Greece in the classic period had distinguished between the "One" & the "many"[1], had vision of truth as an "absolute"[2], spoke of the "good" as supreme & hardly escaped calling it personal.[3] Hence the way was clear to the Stoic with his one Nature, one Reason, one God. As Prof. Hopkins says; "There passed forth from this period into the coming greater religion of the world many streams of thought & cultural practices. The idea of a world-religion, of the brotherhood of man, the missionary spirit (in Orphism), these were all pre-Christian. Bloody sacrifice had been condemned by the Pythag-oreans & by Heraclitus. The acceptable sacrifice was already a pure heart. The thought that man was of God & that God was one, was current before Christian theology began."[4]

There is a similar parallelism between the political & religious history of Israel. The Biblical narrative is probably accurate in ascribing to nomadic Israel under the leadership of Moses a common worship of Jahve. With this god of a pastoral people, who may have been associated with thunder, storm, & cloud, & thus

1. Plato's Republic. (Jowett) Bk.7;525. 2. id. Bk.6. p.484.
3. id.Bk.6;506.
4. History of Religions. p.510.

had a certain freedom from the grossly material & affinity with the impalpable & invisible, the horde of Israel came up from the desert to conquer Canaan & become an agricultural people. In the sectional wars of the conquest, & in the succeeding struggles for supremacy among the tribes themselves, the vaguely monotheis-tic common worship of Jahwe is not lost entirely but submerged beneath an inrush of the lodal "gods of the land", the fertility-spirits & agricultural deities of the conquered race. The achievment of nationhood under the strong monarchy of David & Solomon is accompanied by a revival of monotheism, with its cen-tre in the temple in the capital city. Had Solomon's extensive kingdom expanded in time under a dynasty & in space as a world-empire, resembling its great neighbours, Israel might have acquired & rested in some low & unethical conception of world-deity, in the form of an autocratic, supreme chief god or even of a deified world-emperor, such as came to most of the ancient conquering world-states. It is not, however, along that road, as the history of these empires plainly shows, that a moral & spiritual monotheism is reached.

In the case of Israel that great unification in religion was attained by the way of outward failure & national suffering. With those puny attempts at world-politics & diplomacy from which Isaiah did so much to endeavour to dissuade her, playing off, as she thought, Egypt & Assyria or Babylon against each other, she

was crushed between the upper & nether millstone. The Exile, however, in which it all ended, or seemed to end, was the begin-ning of a new & richer life. The prophets had insisted upon the ethical character of Jahwè, & upon the ethical conditions of his favour to Israel. With that detachment from the common impulses of patriotism on which we have remarked, they prophesied disaster for the nation in the course it was pursuing; & when de-struction came, declared it to be the just judgment of God. As Dr, Charles says, "Although the preachers of the destruction of the nation of Israel, the prophets became the saviours of its religion. Through their living communion with God, they made it known, in terms that could never be forgotten, that Yahwe pursued His own righteous purposes independently of Israel. Thus it was that Yahwism did not perish with the nation, & that true religion survived the destruction of the state. In the religion thus enfranchised from national limitations, the individual becomes the religious unit, & is brought into immediate communion with God. Thus the way is prepared for the coming of Christian-ity."[1.]

The Jewish people thus brought back with them from exile three great unifications. The first was an intense monotheism, which through the profoundly ethical conception of Jahwè, & through the idea of His guidance of history in making even the Empires serve Him, had the potentiality of a universal religion. The second unification was the value to God & hence the intrinsic worth of

1. Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish & Christian. R.H.Charles. p.17.

the individual. It was in the first instance the individual Israelite, to whom with the shattering of the nation & his dis-persion all throughout the world the special favour of God was transferred; but the moral & spiritual conditions were never far away, & the germ of the universal was there. The great achiev-ment here is the direct personal relation between the supreme God & the individual soul to which there is no parallel in any religion so far as we know, except in the Christianity which springs from this. The third integration is the society of such individuals, whose basis or unifying bond is not so much the spirit of nationality or the patriotism of the land, as faith in Jahwè; so that, to anticipate a Paulinism, men are not so much the children of Abraham as the children of Abraham's faith. From the position which we have taken up throughout this study & from various statements at many points, it may have become clear that in our opinion the supreme answer to man's Quest for Unity is to be found in Christianity, the greater child - as to its human parentage - of Judaism. In what we call comprehensiv-ly "the Spirit of Christ", which is not only of the first age of Christianity, nor only in the words of Jesus, nor in the things he did, nor in his memory, nor in his living presence, but in all these & indefinitely more, there is to our mind the supreme ex-pression of that creative power which is in the process of evol-ution, & moves on by differentiation from integration to higher

integration. We cannot stay to substantiate this; but we may illustrate what we mean. When we represent to ourselves the highest unification of Religion, it appears to us that the idea of God is never so rich in meaning, so alluring in mystery & yet so satisfying in content, so finely integrated in a word & so deeply & fully differentiated, as when that representation is seen within the personality of Jesus Christ or his personality is seen within the representation. We can conceive no fuller & richer individuality, no character more harmonious within nor more vigorously active towards the world, than the human personality which has taken into itself the personality of the Son of Man. And we imagine there could be no human society more deeply harmonious, more varied in its activities, more devoted to truth, beauty & goodness, than any approach to the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth of which Christ is King.

Chapter XXVI

Unification & Happiness

The place of happiness in life is an unfailing problem of human thought. It has been the subject of one age-long philosophy, & has played a leading role in all the others. It is needless to mention its importance in Religion, in all religions. Even in Buddhism, albeit negatively, happiness is central. It might be said that these remarks are trite because the Quest for Happi-ness is the mainspring of all man's activities. Other philo-sophers, however, would contest this; & the very ancient but inveterate controversy between Idealism & Hedonism would be re-sumed: the familiar problem of the relation of Duty to Pleasure, of Goodness to Happiness, would once more occupy the stage. But we have been engaged throughout this work in the study of another Quest (it has at least another name), the Quest for Unity. It is perhaps worth while to consider the relation between these two pursuits of mankind in the hope that some light may be thrown upon the nature of both, & also upon the never-ending discussion to which we have referred.

Some connection is evident at the very first glance. The famil-iar Christian phrase, "the Kingdom of Heaven", represents a unification with an association of happiness. In its two forms in the Christian system, the Kingdom of Heaven in the soul & the Kingdom of Heaven as a society, there is in each a particular form of unity, a unification, to which is attached like its fragrance to the rose the suggestion of happiness. This is not, of course,

a unique discovery or possession of Christianity. One remembers that the Socrates of Plato found harmony, a finely ordered unity, both in the ideal state & in the virtues of the nobly governed soul; & that harmony was his conception of the happy life & the happy republic. We have noted that in our own age Herbert Spencer speaks of "complete life in a complete society"; in which completeness of richly unified life he, no doubt, included happiness as the crowning capital of the column. In fact, it ought not to surprise us that this relationship, this connection between unity in man & among men, on the one hand, & harmony or peace or happiness, on the other, has been the subject of so much of the best of human thought, since Unification, as we have been illustrating all through, plays so great a part in all the processes, especially the creative processes, of nature & of human life, & indeed describes, as comprehensively as any word can, the essential goal & tendency of the whole creative process of Evolution. The plot thickens, the affair becomes more interesting, when one discovers in the realm of Biology very early associations in the living thing of unification with pleasure, while the highest unifications of the human soul, which are moral & spiritual, frequently blossom into happiness. It becomes, therefore, a question worth investigating by at least a glance along the evolutionary process whether these two, unification & happiness, are not closely linked together biologically from the very begin-

-ings of sentient life right on to the purest & fullest integrat-
-ions of which man is capable.

It may be well to trace the first term of the relation through some stages of the evolutionary process, in order to have some light upon the nature of Unification, its means & manner of work-
-ing. In the course of this essay, we have used Mr. Spencer's term for the same thing, Integration, chiefly for the sake of adapting to our purposes his brilliant generalisation that Evol-
-ution proceeds by a series of alternate integrations & differen-
-tiations. We shall sketch faintly some steps in the pro-
-cess. On the Nebular Hypothesis, the vague, undifferentiated gaseous mass of the nebula is differentiated into the new integra
-ations of suns & potential planets: these are succeeded by the higher & more varied unity of the cooling planet with an atmosph-
-ere & oceans. Life, which comes next, is a wonderful step in the same direction. The plant is much more finely & sensitively unified & at the same time more differentiated, than the mineral or chemical elements of which it is composed - carbon, potash & so on.

With the emergence of animal life a new advance is made, import-
-ant also from our present point of view. The novel integrating factor, the organ of unification, is a nervous system. With nerve cells, feeling, & therefore pleasure, becomes possible. The nervous system passes through the universal process of integrat-
-ion through differentiation. The nerve cells in the simplest

animals are diffused & unorganised. Their presence becomes manifest first in movement as a result of sensation, the simple nervous chain of afferent, central & efferent neurones being established, & the reflex actions of Instinct becoming possible. Upon the manifold & often beautiful unifications & varieties of the realm of instinctive life, the Brain supervenes, the last & to our way of speaking highest organ of nature's quest for a unity within which there shall be infinite diversity. The brain as we observed earlier, has passed theough the universal process, from an indifferentiated, chiefly olefactory organ up to the fine-ly compressed & delicately organised instrument of Mind; & its advent means "unity of command" over most of the nervous forces, & the powers of the body they affect. The mind of man carries on the undeviating tendency of nature in a Quest for Unity now become conscious & expressing itself in all the activities of his theoretical & practical life. From the simplest perception to the scientific theory of Einstein, from the humblest concept, such as "greenness or "sunshine" to the most complete system of Philosophy, from the vaguest taboo to the Categorical Imperative, & from the simplest prayer to the most deeply realised communion with God, man is in search of, & progressively attaining, mental, moral & spiritual unifications within his own soul. It is the Christian philosophy to regard the highest possible unification within a man, the most finely & richly woven texture of his

personality, as capable of being secured by "the Kingdom of Heav-
-en" within him, that is, the ordering & harmonising of all the elements of his inner life by the Christ-ideal, & the governance - in the freedom of faith & love - of his spirit by the "Spirit of Christ". This, which is just as really & scientifically part of the evolutionary order as the unconscious unifications of form & colour in the flower by the co-operation of sun & air & living cell, is, we believe, the method by which nature achieves a high moral & spiritual integration of a man's inner life.

As, however, it is the case that even for very simple integrat-
-ions of his life, such as speech, for example, or the family, man needs his fellow, there is developed in the world-process a series of social unifications in an ascending scale of size & complexity, namely, mother & child, family, tribe, nation, common-
-wealth, with in the future- variously conceived as a dream, an ideal, a utopian vision or as the logical expansion of these ear-
-lier integrations - a world-community, humanity organised as a whole. For these social unifications the Christian system of thought also provides an ideal in the "Kingdom of Heaven upon earth", a society of personalities in which there may be, it is believed, the richest, most differentiated individuality & free-
-dom for the members of that community within a close integration of common faith, shared ideals, & realised brotherhood. Finally there is a unification towards which Philosophy & Science inevit-

-ably move, & which Religion is constrained also to attempt, a -unification of the whole of existence. For Religion it is maintained that that supreme Unity is best conceived as Personal. The word is inadequate, as any word, or indeed any attempted unification, is. Vast antinomies remain unresolved by it. But human personality, the culmination of the process of natural development, is, at its best, the richest, most varied & yet most sensitively integrated unity to be found in nature. Using it, therefore, as the best category at our disposal, we conceive of the whole of existence as falling into an order which suggests an infinite Mind, acting upon principles of wisdom & love. We are not concerned to defend at this moment this "spiritual monism [1.] " as it has been called, as against, say, a materialistic or a pantheistic monism; but what we do say can hardly be disputed, that there is, according to history & experience, great power for the unification of the individual soul in faith in the unificat--ion of existence in God; & there is great power also for the creation of a finely & nobly unified society in this faith in the Divine wisdom & love at the heart of things.

This is the "everlasting yea" at which Carlyle's Teufelsdrock arrived; & we quote his expression of it partly for its own beau--ty & partly as an illustration of what follows. "How thou fermentest & elaboratest, in thy great fermenting-vat & laborator-- of an Atmosphere, of a World, O Nature! -Or what is Nature? Ha!

why do I not name thee God? Art not thou the 'Living Garment of God'? O Heavens, is it, in very deed, He, then, that ever speaks through thee; that lives & loves in thee, that lives & loves in me?

Fore-shadows, call them rather fore-splendours, of that Truth, & Beginning of Truths, fell mysteriously over my soul. Sweeter than Dayspring to the Shipwrecked in Nova Zembla; ah, like the mother's voice to her little child that strays bewildered, weep-ing, in unknown tumults; like soft streamings of celestial music to my too-exasperated heart, came that Evangel. The Universe is not dead & demoniacal, a charnel-house with spectres; but godlike, & my Father's."[1] It is impossible to miss the note of joy, of happiness, of ecstasy even, in this rhapsody. It is significant, for it is a happiness which accompanies a unification, that union of the soul with God, as the Meaning of the whole of things, which brings unification, harmony, peace to the soul itself. It is one of the highest forms of the association we are observing, of unification with happiness, the gladness of faith, the joy of religion, the ecstasy of mysticism. We turn now to trace the evolution of the happiness of unification from its lowest to these higher forms.

In these early & lower stages it is better, probably, to speak of Pleasure, in the sense of pleasurable feeling, &, though as with all developing things distinction of stages cannot be absolute,

1. Sartor Resartus.(Chapman & Hall.) p.130.

to reserve the term Happiness for the higher human forms. In looking back, then, upon the evolution of animal life, which, in virtue of its endowment of nerves, is first capable of pleasurable feeling, we perceive the interesting fact that nature attaches a pleasure to every unification which has survival value. An obvious example is the assimilation of food, which is certainly necessary for survival, & which is accompanied by not merely the satisfaction of an appetite, but the pleasure of taste & the sense of well-being. The most striking instance is, naturally, Sex, where the very nerve of Biological Evolution itself, the impulse towards new life-integrations, is re-inforced by the intensest form of pleasure. Unifications in the Mind, upon which human survival comes mainly to depend, have also their attendant pleasure. The formation of totalities or wholes in thought, reasoning & imagination, carries with it this satisfaction which is the descendant of earlier & cruder forms. Curiosity, for example, the food-appetite of the mind, is extremely important for survival in animal life. Interest in the environment, especially in the new & unfamiliar object - the moving of reeds against the wind, the shadow in the jungle which was not there before - is a matter of life & death. The pleasure of this mental satisfaction we shall analyse more fully presently; but it is said on good authority that the rabbit is sometimes attracted towards the antics of a gambolling weasel by a fatal curiosity; which is an instance of a pleasure, misused, striking

back against its original survival value, & can be widely paralleled in human life.

In treating of this connection between Unification & Pleasure or Happiness more in detail, we may do so most conveniently under four heads: I. The Animal Body.

II. The Mind.

III. The Moral Life.

IV. The Religious Life.

I. The Animal Body.

In approaching this aspect of the subject, we remind ourselves once more of the two great aims of nature in the realm of life. The first is the maintenance & development of the existing organism. This is what is commonly called the instinct of Self-preservation; but it is really, as we have seen earlier, a group of self-preservative instincts & tendencies, with intelligent adaptations added in the higher creatures. The second aim is the reproduction of the organism, the creation of a new organism & provision for its maintenance. This is embodied in the Other-preservative tendencies, instincts & intelligent adaptations.

1. The pleasures connected with Self-preservation & its various unifications.

(a). There is the group of pleasures associated with all that sustains, strengthens & develops the animal body. The pleasure of food, already referred to, of expansion of the lungs with fresh

air, of warmth, of relaxation, of exercise of the muscles, are examples of bodily integrations accompanied by pleasurable feeling. The pleasure of muscular activity may be taken as a good instance of a bodily unification with its accompanying feeling, which passes through many modifications in the process of evolution, but retains always something of its original character. It throws light upon the psychology of play; for this pleasure of unification appears in the play of young animals, which has survival value both because it develops the body & because it is the overture which summarises the future grand opera of life. It is also the attraction, in part, of athletic games & sport. Many of these, it may be added, may be classed as examples of "reversion". In this, the return to the primitive, there is a subtle source of pleasure which we have in some measure already analysed. The semi-ritual ball-games in many towns & villages on the Scottish borders, which may have originated the various hand- & football games of modern sport, are held in Spring, & are very probably survivals of ancient magical contests between Winter & Spring, or the death & life of nature. Another element is the recovery of the open-air life, which man lived for ages many times longer than those of his civilisation. Many of the games are also forms of hunting, or being hunted. This pleasure of muscular exertion, which is the main point, overcoming resistance & bending things to the will, is found in healthy creative manual

labour; it may be degraded into a savage delight in exerting physical power over & even torturing others; it may become wholly mental & be translated into Napoleonic ambition & love of conquest; & it may be sublimated into bearing one another's burdens. There is a fairly clear lineage, allowing for enhancements & refinements of it from other sources on the way, between this ancestral bodily unification, with its pleasure of tingling nerve cells, & the higher integrations of creative work & altruistic endeavour.

(b). Another example under the head of Self-preservation is the pleasure of Escape. Anyone who has been in serious danger knows the thrilling delight of having escaped. Peril was the constant environment of primitive man. For countless ages his main business in life apart from food & sex was escaping from his enemies. He must, then, have known more frequently than we can imagine the thrill of being in danger & then being safe. These two would naturally become associated in his mind, the peril & the pleasure, the risk & the delight of escape. This would be an advantage biologically; it would have a certain survival value; for in order that man should continue to evolve in the line of humanity, it was necessary that he should take risks, & equally necessary that he should escape. Thus the pleasure of escaping would induce man sometimes to accept the risk, such mental integrations as curiosity with its attendant pleasure, to which we refer

presently, playing their part. This is the pleasure, not hith-
-to analysed, so far as we know, in all risk in modern times. It
is the fascination of gambling - by taking the risk of loss to recover the
ancient thrill of escape.

Other examples can be found of this association of pleasure with
escape or relief, which deliverance is, of course, a form of inte-
-gration, the preservation in some sense of the threatened unity of the self.
The enjoyment of looking on at tragedy on the stage is partly of
this nature. On the one hand, there is the relief of knowing
subconsciously that the sorrows are all unreal: on the other hand,
there is the more poignant element of escape, in that we see the
"terror" & the "pity" & feel them too, but at the same time are
safe from them, enjoying, as it were from some height or cave of
safety, the delight of escape. We are far from ignoring other
& loftier elements of both unification & pleasure in the enjoy-
-ment of drama, intellectual & emotional elements of sympathy,
resignation or moral relief, which bring with them their "purific-
-ation"; but the pleasure of escape is also there. The thrill
of "Grand Guignol", for instance, is very much a renewal of the
primitive ancestral thrill of viewing the horror while knowing
oneself comfortably out of it. This probably throws some light
on the psychology of spectators at gladiatorial shows & autos-
-da-fe.

2. The Pleasure connected with Other-preservation & the continuance of the race.

(a). The integration of Sex, supremely important for the existence of the race, has attached to it the keenest of pleasures. There is no better example of the survival value of this association. As a unification, the sex motive differentiates into many subord-inate integrations, such as display, song, nest-building & home-making. The satisfaction attached to these appears to brim over at times into a mental & even artistic pleasure. The thrush & other birds sing after their mating is completed; & some starlings, with their imitations of the cornerake & jackdaw, seem to derive an almost humorous satisfaction from the performance.

(b). The unification of the Family, to which is entrusted nature's immense interest in the future of the species, has its own endow-ment of pleasure. The pleasure of motherhood & of parenthood is connected inseparably with that parental care which is so necessary to survival in view of the long & helpless human infan-cy. The pleasure associated with the family relation tends from the beginning to be altruistic, being for example, satisfact-ion in the safety & well-being of the offspring pursued often at the cost of considerable self-sacrifice.

(c). The unification of the Tribe involves several elements of pleas-ure, which, like the honey at the base of each flower of one of the Compositae, strengthen the motives of early social morality. There is the sense of safety & of power in being part of a mass,

An important feature is the exhilaration of taking part in massed actions, such as tribal dances & other ritual celebrations, & in general the expansive feeling of doing things on a large scale, when each individual feels himself part of one great personality constituted by the tribe. The counterpart of fear of being out of conformity with theb customs of the group & terror of the imaginatively heightened penalties, is the deep satisfaction of being at one with the tribe & at peace with the tribal law. The tribal unification, which we have also named the integration of custom, has, as already observed, both advantages & disadvanteges for human progress. On the one hand, it lays down the foundat-ions for a social morality, & teaches the individual to subordin-ate the interests of himself & the family group to the wider interests of the larger social unity. The pleasure of unificat-ion, to which we have just referred is a powerful sanction of this social ethic. The disadvantage, on the other hand, of the tribal unification is, as we have seen, that it secures an ad-aptation to the environment which is an equilibrium of safety & stagnation. This equilibrium can be, & in most cases of savage tribes is, maintained through indefinite ages, when also the custom of the tribe receives an almost instinctive obedience, to which the pleasurable sense of unity with the whole, the satis-faction of conformity & the peace & relaxed effort of submission to authority, add so much strength that many tribes remain in the

social condition of instinctive groups like fighting, hunting & slave-keeping ants. Deliverance from this stagnation comes by those impacts & movements which break up the tribe & the integr-ion of custom & create the new unifications of nationhood & civilisation. The new pleasures associated with these integrat-ions are very much of a mental character.

II. The Mind.

In order to have a true idea of the connection of Unification with pleasure in the mind, it is necessary to recall what we have said often before, that the mind itself, like the brain, its organ, & step by step with it, passes through the evolutionary process of integration through differentiation. Savage thought is simple, incoherent, diffused: the civilised mind has highly differentiated powers & interests such as knowledge, reason, imagination & appreciation of art. Yet the highest type of mind is the most integrated, most a unity. The peculiar quality of genius is this power of unification, the specific unifying activ-ity of mind in it being imagination. Shakespeare's poetic imagination integrates, not mechanically but as by a transfused fire or by the life-process which makes flowers out of dust & air, his observation of nature & his knowledge of men, his sense of music & rhythm, & all the differentiations of his manysided mind, into the sublime unification of King Lear or The Tempest. The ordinary cultured mind arranges in a more pedestrian way the material of experience into ordered wholes. A mind, further,

possessed by an ideal or by a great faith touched with emotion, may find all its acquisitions, powers & interests unified, & dir-ected into the pursuit of that ideal or devoted to the service of that faith. An ideal of goodness, a social enthusiasm, a faith like the Christian faith, loyalty to a personality such as that which Jesus Christ commands, may integrate even the ordinary mind, & make of it a unification of its life which is both noble and happy.

For here also, so to say, nature pursues her ancient policy: to each true unification in mind, as in the realm of the body, she attaches a pleasure, or as it becomes in human life, a happiness. After our arboreal ancestor left the trees, nature depended al-most wholly upon mind fpr human survival. It is not surprising therefore, to find that to all mental unifications which have sur-vival value there is added an element of pleasurable feeling. A good example is curiosity, of which we spoke earlier. If the animal is to live in its dangerous world, it must be curious as to the new & unfamiliar when it appears. Thus there is always a drop of nectar in the heart of every flower of knowledge for man. And all the realms into which the curious & enquiring mind travels, provided it is towards life & not towards death, are "realms of gold", because every newly discovered country of the earth or of the heavens or simply of the mind itself, is suffused with this warm radiance. Every totality unified out of new

experience blended with old, every rich whole of philosophic idea, of scientific law, of poetic or artistic imagination, or even of mystical vision, newly attained, brings with it nobly refined this primeval joy.

It appears to be the case in mental unifications that the pleas-ure is often in proportion to the magnitude of the integration. The ecstasy of Archimedes when he discovered his great law of hydrostatics, & Kepler's reverent joy when, in reading the laws of the stars, he exclaimed; "O God, I am thinking Thy thoughts after Thee!", suggest this conclusion. The poet Keats, in com-paring his own delight in the grandeur of Chapman's Homer to the thrill of the astronomer "when a new planet swims into his ken", & to the charmed wonder of Cortes having as it were to make room in his mind for the Pacific Ocean, brings together three illustrat-ions of the same psychological fact, of the delight attending large mental unifications. It is as though the mind, expanding to take in, to grasp entire a vast new totality in thought, felt the same kind of exhilaration as the lungs feel in expanding to deep draughts of mountain air. Have we here a hint as to a possible physiological basis for these facts & for the connection of pleasure with unification? One ventures to state it simply perhaps crudely.

The cells of the brain are connected by synapses, locking process-es, with each other. This gives a physical connection for uni-fied thought & common feeling alike. A new integration of

fresh phenomena with elements already in experience, in the form of, say, a scientific discovery, an invention, or a great project means that the cells which "store" the elements which belong to the past are awake & thrilling with the reproduction of them in memory, while other cells are excited by the new elements. The co-ordinating mind, using the developed co-ordinating power of the brain, in making the unification sends through all these cells alike a nervous discharge which is at once an awareness or cognition of the mental content in them & a reinforcement of each by the energy of all the others as in the unification. Now, pleasure is in all its forms an excitation or excited condition of nerve cells. Here is, then, an area of the brain in which all the cells are thrilling together, each as it were pouring out its own message, but each electrified or stimulated by the message of the achieved whole in which the message has new meaning. This seems to give the physiological conditions of mental pleasure. The cognitive side of the same phenomena of thrilling nerve cells in the one interconnected brain area is knowing, discovery, the vision of a great whole: the feeling side of it is pleasure.

III. The Moral Life.

In the higher animals there are not wanting the rudiments of courage, loyalty & unselfish love. These are present in the most primitive men; & the unification of the inward life which the deed of courage, loyalty or unselfishness would mean would

bring with it its own satisfaction. Within the integration of the tribe or of custom these elements of "natural" morality are never absent, though the sophistications of savage reasoning & the logical elaborations of custom often produce a harshness & refinement of cruelty which are not found within the "natural" morality of simpler peoples & even the relations of the more in-telligent brutes. The mores or customs of the tribe are its morality; & the great achievment of this stage of human develop-ment is the sense of social obligation. Morality may thus become concern for the safety of the whole, for the interests of others. We have noted in the last section the satisfaction & pleasure which no doubt come from the sense of unification with the custom of the tribe. True morality, however, necessitates a degree of individuality. This as already seen emerges in peoples which have broken from the tribal system & moved out under leadership of strong individuals towards the institutions & spirit of national life. Here grew up moral standards which become the conscience of the individual, & once again the law we are trading operates - the man finds happiness in the harmony of his life with these moral standards & in the unification of his motives & conduct with that conscience.

We may reach the same point along another line. Nature though "careful of the type" is not careless of the individual. We saw that her first aim is the maintenance & development of the existing organism. All the energies of a healthy plant move towards its perfect form, with unconscious concentration, &, as

it were, unanimity. The animal pursues with a certain conscious-ness the unifications of its bodily & mental life, & finds its happiness in the most complete & varied integration which is its individual perfection. In man nature is pursuing a higher integ-ration still, one which includes in his perfection as an organ-ism not only his animal & mental but his moral & spiritual life. In man the pursuit of the highest unification of his life is increasingly self-conscious: he can visualise it & visualise him-self, & thus it becomes his ideal. In obedience to that ideal & unification with it he attains happiness & peace. It is evid-ent enough where this theory parts company with Hedonism & Utilitarianism. The aim of nature through the whole biological series is not pleasure or happiness but unification, namely, the highest & most differentiated integration of life; but all through, pleasure, in the lower ranks of the series, happiness, in the human sphere of conscience & duty, is the prize of unification. The Kingdom in the soul is a Kingdom of Heaven.

IV. The Religious Life.

We have seen that the moral unification becomes man's ideal con-sciously pursued. But the highest & most differentiated integ-ration of human life is personality. Now, in the Christian system of thought the personality of Christ is the ideal of the soul. As the plant lives by seeking & moving up to its full blossoming, though unconsciously; so the soul lives by "admirat-

love & hope" of its ideal. Love, in particular, the most spir-
-itual & yet the strongest power of unification between personal-
-ities, unites the spirit of man seeking its ideal with the
Spirit of Christ which is the richest conceivable expression of
that ideal; & the unification brings with it its natural & very
deep happiness. This reign of the ideal, loved as a personality,
is the Kingdom of Heaven in the soul.

Union with God, the supreme religious state of the soul, the
mystical unification, however it is conceived, being the entrance
into the mind & heart of the infinitely great Unity, should nat-
-urally bring with it that keen pleasure or happiness of which
we spoke earlier as arising from the expansion of thought & feel-
-ing in order to take in something very great. This, we believe
accounts for the pleasurable feeling which some of the Mystics
have found in their union with God when he was conceived of in
a highly abstract way, as Pure Being, Unapproachable Light,
Divine Darkness, & the like. In these experiences there is
probably no more than the momentary thrill of the rushing into
the mind of pure vastness, like a brilliant, blank wall of sheet
lightning. Yet these are sometimes regarded as the typical
Mystics. Mrs. Herman has recently corrected this error by point
-ing out that the visions of the most inspired mystics have an
intellectual warp & woof, & that their idea of God has the con-
-creteness & richness of personality. "Almost without exception

says this brilliant writer, " to come upon an explicitly anti-intellectual passage in mystical literature is to discover a conspicuously uninspired passage. Especially is this true of endeavours of mystical writers to describe the 'sleep' of reason under the ravishing touch of the Godhead, where the world is but the stage-scenery against which the drama of the God-intoxicated soul plays itself out, & where memory, will, & thought are all suspended in the beatific vision. Such utterances not only lack sanity & the moral realism which is the salt of the spirit; they also, strangely enough, lack all those qualities of spiritual fervour & immediacy of religious feeling which make the best devotional literature immortal. They lack wings & eyes; or having them, there is no wind in their wings, no living light in their eyes."[1] We may put this criticism into our own terms & say that the metaphysical abstraction with which the mystic thus enters into communion, like the ultimate unity of Pantheism, is an integration in which, with all its immensity, there is little or no differentiation; & this defect limits (which is our special point) the happiness of the communion. The conception of God from which the great mystics derive most satisfaction, in which indeed they find their richest ecstasies, is one in which the Divine Unity is most differentiated into all the various aspects, forms, & activities of Wisdom, Love, Creative Will, Redemptive

1. The Meaning & Value of Mysticism. E.Herman. (James Clarke & Co.) p.257.

Action & so forth. It is precisely through the opening of a window in the mind of St. Paul upon a new vision of what might be the practical method of God's redemption of Israel through Christianity, that one of his great ecstasies of delight in the perception of the Divine Nature & Will comes upon him. "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom & knowledge of God !" In other words, the conception of God which enables the mystics to enter into the most fruitful & the most blessed communion with Him is that of the Divine Personality. As Mrs. Herman says; "At the heart of mystical literature there throbs, as its vital impulse, a sense of God immanent in the world & in the soul not merely as cosmic Force, but as personal Love; not only as animating Principle, but chiefly as redeeming Power. However passages might be multiplied that seem to prove the contrary, it remains that the God of the Christian mystic, at any rate, is & has always been a Person whom he delights to describe positively & interms of his own highest & best, & whom, more often than not he completely identifies with the Saviour Christ to whom his most passionate & personal love is given."[1.]

1. Op. cit. p.299.